Doctrine for Orders and Decentralization in the British and German Armies,1885–1935

I. Command Approaches

Elsewhere ³⁰ I have suggested the interaction between command and friction ³¹ may be understood through considering the options open to commanders in responding to the three ‘gaps’ ³² through which friction is expressed:

Different command approaches represent different combinations of responses to those gaps.

The three gaps, and the command approaches arising from the various options for closing them, may be understood further by reference to parallel analysis in the field of management science. At the start of the twentieth century, Frederick Taylor was convinced ‘the man in the planning room’ could use his extensive records of factory processes to define in advance the tasks for each worker. The latter simply needed to follow those detailed instructions, which laid down ‘not only what is to be done but how it is to be done and the exact time allowed for doing it’. Taylor believed this separation of functions led to greater productivity. ³³ In effect, he assumed the knowledge gap could be closed through the collection of complete data, and the alignment gap eliminated by requiring the worker to act only as exactly instructed. Since the consequences of actions could be determined in advance, there could be no effects gap. ³⁴ This approach, termed scientific management, soon became predominant in management thinking. ³⁵

In the 1970s, however, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber recognized the ‘classical paradigm of science and engineering … is not applicable to the problems of open societal systems’. ³⁶ They realized scientific management was not effective outside the controlled environment of the factory. Rittel and Webber identified factors, remarkably similar to those Clausewitz listed as expressing friction in warfare, which meant societal problems differed from the ‘tame’ nature of scientific questions. These problems’ lack of a clear mission or defined solution caused them to be what Rittel and Webber termed ‘wicked’. More recently, Keith Grint ³⁷ has suggested a ‘tame’ problem ‘may be complicated but is resolvable through unilinear acts’. These are associated with management (the function of providing the correct process through which to implement the single right solution). By contrast, a ‘wicked’ problem ‘is often intractable, [has] no unilinear solution, [and] there is no “stopping” point’. Such problems are associated with leadership (the function of asking the right questions to draw out the best from the many possible solutions). ³⁸ The model shown in Table 1 illuminates the three ‘gaps’ associated with friction.

OPEN IN VIEWER

Table 1.

The three gaps associated with friction.

Gap	Tame problem: unilinear, with a single ‘correct’ solution	Wicked problem: complex, with many possible solutions
Knowledge gap	Commanders can extrapolate from their greater knowledge of the broader context to predict the local situation within which their subordinates will operate	Extrapolation is unlikely to be accurate and therefore widens the gap
Alignment gap	Role of subordinates is primarily to apply the ‘correct’ process as determined by the commander	Subordinates must be part of a collaborative effort that draws upon everyone’s unique knowledge to secure the most effective solution
Effects gap	Focus is on making sure the commander identifies the single ‘correct’ solution, even if this takes time	Role of the commander is to ensure a ‘good enough’ solution is implemented as quickly as possible

Grint noted it is rarely possible to determine objectively at the time whether a specific problem is tame or wicked. Rather, the participants’ perception of the problem leads them to express it in ways emphasizing its tame or wicked aspects and hence (often unconsciously) legitimizing their chosen approach. ³⁹

Taking account of this model of wicked and tame problems, and connecting it with the three gaps, three factors seem of greatest importance:

These factors provide a lens though which to examine the different approaches adopted by the German and British armies during the half-century to 1935. Indeed, it may be suggested the absence of such a conceptual model, which highlights the potential for ontological and epistemological differences between (and within) armies, is a significant weakness of much academic literature on doctrine. Since doctrine is ultimately a question of how an army interprets the fundamental nature of warfare, and hence determines the most appropriate means by which to respond successfully, doctrine cannot be properly understood without reference to that interpretation.

Use of this model is not intended to suggest military commanders were guided by, or even aware of, scientific management. Similarly, the concept of the ‘learning curve’ can help explain British army performance during the First World War, ⁴⁰ even though its commanders never used the term. Nonetheless, some of the professional managers brought into the army were familiar with Taylorism and applied it in their newfound military duties. For example, Brigadier General E.G. Wace, who from 1916 headed the army’s military labour establishment, was ‘an enthusiastic advocate of scientific management and a follower of … Taylor’s system’. ⁴¹ Related approaches, based on careful statistical analysis of methods, were also widespread across the British engineering industry: ⁴² Sir Eric Geddes, who revitalized the BEF’s logistics systems, ⁴³ received advanced training in statistics as a management tool at the North Eastern Railway. ⁴⁴ More importantly for this study, the model of problems being either ‘wicked’ or ‘tame’ has become standard in modern management thinking, ⁴⁵ where friction is as much an issue as in warfare, and so there is benefit from interdisciplinary borrowing.

II. Truppenführung

Truppenführung’s key statements on command and friction are contained in its introduction and chapter 2 on command. ⁴⁶ The former’s 15 ‘highly philosophical paragraphs’ ⁴⁷ set the tone:

1. War is an art, a free and creative activity founded on scientific principles. It makes the very highest demands on the human personality. …

3. Combat situations are of an unlimited variety. They change frequently and suddenly and can seldom be assessed in advance. Incalculable elements often have a decisive influence. One’s own will is pitted against the independent will of the enemy. Friction and errors are daily occurrences.

4. Lessons in the conduct of war cannot be exhaustively compiled in the form of regulations. The principles enunciated must be applied in accordance with the situation. …

6. The command of an army … requires leaders capable of judgement, with clear vision and foresight, and the ability to make independent and decisive decisions and carry them out unwaveringly and positively. Such leaders must be impervious to the changes in the fortunes of war and possess full awareness of the high degree of responsibility placed on their shoulders. …

9. Every leader in every situation must exert himself totally and not avoid responsibility. Willingness to accept responsibility is the most important quality of a leader. It should not, however, be based upon individualism without consideration of the whole, nor used as a justification for failing to carry out orders where seeming to know better may affect obedience. Independence of spirit must not become arbitrariness. By contrast, independence of action within acceptable boundaries is the key to great success.

10. … The emptiness of the battlefield requires soldiers who can think and act independently, who can make calculated, decisive, and daring use of every situation, and who understand that victory depends on each individual. …

12. Leaders must live with their troops and share in their dangers … Only thus can they acquire a first-hand knowledge of the combat capabilities and needs of their soldiers. …

14. … Orders that are impossible to execute will reduce confidence in the leadership and damage morale.

15. Every man, from the youngest soldier upward, must be required at all times and in all situations to commit his whole mental, spiritual, and physical strength. Only in this way will the full force of a unit be brought to bear in decisive action. … The first criterion in war remains decisive action. Everyone, from the highest commander down to the youngest soldier, must constantly be aware that inaction and neglect incriminate him more severely than any error in the choice of means. ⁴⁸

Consideration of the text allows an assessment of the German perspective on the three key factors identified earlier as determining the relative effectiveness of different command approaches.

It is clear the authors of Truppenführung considered the problems of warfare were inherently ‘wicked’ (non-linear, hence chaotic). The introduction’s emphasis on war as an art and the unlimited variety of combat situations produced by the interaction with the independent will of the enemy was reinforced in chapter 2: ‘uncertainty always will be present. It rarely is possible to obtain exact information on the enemy situation’; ‘if the assigned mission no longer suffices for action, or if it is overtaken by events, the course of action must take these circumstances into account’; and ‘one must reckon with incomplete and inaccurate information’. ⁴⁹

The drive towards reliance on subordinates’ initiative, resulting from this perception of the problems faced in warfare being ‘wicked’, was set out clearly. Leaders at all levels were required to accept responsibility, soldiers were expected to think and act independently, and it was emphasized that failure to act was more serious than error in the choice of means. This was underlined in chapter 2: ‘the commander must allow his subordinates freedom of action’; ‘an order should contain all that a subordinate needs to know to be able to execute his mission – and nothing more’; and ‘the general intent must be stated for the execution of impending operations, but the method of execution is left to the subordinate commanders’. ⁵⁰

Finally, the importance of speedy decision-making was underlined by the recognition that combat situations change frequently and suddenly, and the requirement for decisive and daring use of every situation. Further: ‘great success requires boldness and daring’; ‘favourable situations must be quickly recognized and decisively exploited’; ‘actions based on surprise are only successful if the enemy is given no time to take effective counter measures’; and ‘the commander most likely to succeed is the one who makes the quickest and most skilful use of … the situation’. ⁵¹

Truppenführung also strongly emphasized the need for senior commanders to place themselves very close to their troops, especially during the attack, to ensure they were personally at the decisive point (entscheidende Stelle) at the earliest possible time. ⁵² In this way the commander increased his direct knowledge of the local situation, his decision-making was fastest, and his attention and resources were most focused at the decisive point of the battle, which narrowed all the gaps leading to friction within his own forces. At the same time he maximized the potential for achieving tempo over the enemy, thereby increasing their friction. This provided a response to a third type of problem, identified by Grint as an extension of Rittel and Webber’s original typology: the ‘critical’ problem, characterized by its self-evident nature and need for rapid, authoritarian decision-making associated with command. ⁵³

III. Continuity and Change

To what extent were the authors ⁵⁴ of Truppenführung breaking new ground? Strohn suggested an ‘obvious’ influence ⁵⁵ from Hans von Seeckt’s 1921 manual, HDv 487: Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen (‘Command and combat of the combined arms’), ⁵⁶ known as Das FuG. Similarly, Citino stated Truppenführung ‘bear[s] the stamp’ of the previous regulations, ⁵⁷ while Corum argued much of the new manual was no more than ‘a paraphrase’ of Das FuG. ⁵⁸ Conversely, Condell and Zabecki claimed those 15 paragraphs in the introduction were a vital novelty. ⁵⁹

But this comparison is only partial, in that it treats the German command philosophy as if originating only with the publication of Das FuG, effectively discarding as irrelevant the doctrinal statements made prior to 1914. Taking account of this longer history, it becomes clear the absence in Das FuG of an introduction like that in Truppenführung was itself a break with tradition – the editions of the Felddienst-Ordnung (FO) (‘Field service regulations’) of 1887, ⁶⁰ 1894, ⁶¹ 1900, ⁶² and 1908 ⁶³ all included a 10-page introduction. ⁶⁴ Although the precise wording varied between editions, ⁶⁵ several statements were carried forward throughout the period. Relevant to the issues considered here were the following (1908 wording):

Foreword: The latitude allowed for the performance of duties in the field is intended to give scope for original thought and initiative on the part of commanders. Superior officers are forbidden to issue orders restricting this latitude. …

1. The training of troops in peacetime is regulated by what will be required of them in war. …

4. Every officer should exert the whole force of his character in every situation, even the most unusual, without fear of responsibility. It is the duty of superior officers to stimulate and to foster this spirit in their subordinates. …

13. Lectures delivered to officers … serve both to instruct and to stimulate new ideas … It is desirable that each lecture should be followed by a discussion, in order to give as many officers as possible an opportunity of expressing their opinions. …

25. It is no less important to educate the soldier to think and to act for himself. His self-reliance and sense of honour will then induce him to do his duty even when he is no longer under the eye of his commanding officer. …

37. All peace exercises lack what in war is the principal factor, namely, the enemy, the will and offensive power of whom have to be reckoned with until both are broken down. It must never be forgotten that the situations encountered in war will differ in many respects from those met with in peace exercises, and will impose a far more unequal and a severer test on moral endurance. …

38. Resolute action is consequently of first importance in war. Every individual, from the highest commander to the youngest soldier, must always remember that supine inaction and neglect of opportunities will entail severer censure than an error in conception of the choice of means.

While less succinct and philosophical than Truppenführung, important continuities are apparent. For example, wording on the officer’s role as the leader and teacher of his troops and the need for him to accept responsibility without fear, on the importance of resolute action, and on inaction being worse than errors in the choice of means reappeared almost unchanged in Truppenführung. ⁶⁶

As with Truppenführung, these paragraphs, along with the relevant statements in the FO’s chapter on orders, permit an assessment of the pre-1914 German perspective on the three key factors identified earlier as determining the relative effectiveness of the different command approaches.

The perception in Truppenführung of warfare as inherently ‘wicked’/chaotic represents continuity with the FO, as shown by the latter’s reference to the importance of the enemy’s will and the difference between situations encountered in war compared with those in peace, and the statement ‘circumstances may have changed before the order can be carried out’. ⁶⁷

Although the sense of warfare as unpredictable was much less strong in FO than in Truppenführung, the emphasis on the need for commanders to make maximum use of the initiative of their subordinates was equally firm. Reinforcing the prohibition on commanders restricting their subordinates’ scope for original thought and initiative, the statements on the need for leaders at all levels to accept responsibility and for soldiers to think and act independently, and the stress on failure to act being a more serious fault than error in the choice of means, were explicit. This was reinforced by the text regarding the issue of orders: ‘an order should contain, and only contain, everything which the recipient requires to know to enable him to carry out independently the task assigned to him’, and ‘the general views of the commander for the conduct of the intended operations should be given, but the method of execution must be left open’. ⁶⁸ The FO clearly provided the template for Truppenführung here.

By contrast, the issue of surprise achieved through rapid decision-making facilitated by the presence of commanders placed far forward with their troops was completely absent from the FO – indeed, every reference to surprise related to forces avoiding being themselves surprised, ⁶⁹ with no mention of surprising the enemy.

The FO was complemented by a second manual, covering command at the higher operational level. As with the FO, this went through several editions. The Verordnungen für die höheren Truppenführer (‘Instructions for large unit commanders’) of 24 June 1869 ⁷⁰ was written under Helmuth von Moltke’s direct supervision and included his personal amendments. ⁷¹ It was revised in 1885 ⁷² and again in 1910, when it was renamed Grundzüge der höheren Truppenführung (‘Principles of large unit command’). ⁷³ Both revisions preserved much of Moltke’s original wording. ⁷⁴ Following the First World War, drafts of a revised manual, still drawing heavily on Moltke’s text, were prepared in 1924, 1930, and 1938. None were published, however, in part because the text was considered too focused on the mass armies forbidden to Germany by the Versailles Treaty. ⁷⁵

The Instructions, especially the 1885 and 1910 editions, clearly assumed warfare was inherently unpredictable. The 1885 edition observed: ‘From out of such darkness the correct thing has to be felt out and frequently guessed at, to enable the issuing of orders whose execution may encounter unforeseen eventualities and obstacles.’ ⁷⁶ The manual therefore noted:

any disposition made far in advance and going into too much detail can only seldom be carried out completely. It shakes the trust of subordinates and gives the units a feeling of uncertainty if things happen entirely differently from what orders from higher headquarters had presumed. ⁷⁷

The 1885 edition included the sentence so central to subsequent manuals: ‘It should be the rule that orders contain everything – but only that – which the subordinate commander cannot independently determine for the attainment of a certain goal.’ ⁷⁸ Linked to this is the statement:

One must never forget that if one orders too much, the most important part, that which unconditionally should be done, is easily pushed into the background by minor things and may be carried out only in part or even not at all. ⁷⁹

The focus was clearly on the need for the commander to rely on the initiative of his subordinates, setting out his intent but leaving maximum scope for them to apply their initiative, based on their better knowledge of the local situation.

Finally, the Instructions underlined the importance of decisions being made quickly. It noted comparison between orders issued during manoeuvres and those in war revealed the detail of the former and the brevity of the latter. This, it argued, was due to the lack of time in war. The 1869 edition emphasized the confusion and stress of battle, the ‘momentarily changing situation’, and that situations ‘change very rapidly in war’. ⁸⁰ Taken together, these indicate Moltke believed commanders should seek to make decisions at speed, though there was no suggestion this was designed to achieve tempo, and thereby surprise, and so inflict shock on the enemy, increasing their friction.

Furthermore, there was no intimation senior commanders should place themselves far forward, at the decisive point, to maximize their personal impact. Quite the reverse: the 1869 edition insisted:

Bypassing an intermediate authority destroys its effectiveness and causes it to appear superfluous. … The advantage, moreover, which the commander believes to achieve through continuous personal intervention, is mostly only an apparent one. He thereby takes over functions for whose fulfilment other persons are designated. He more or less denigrates their ability and increases his own duties to such a degree that he can no longer fulfil them completely. ⁸¹

A similar prohibition was included in the 1885 edition, though it recognized the need for speedy execution of orders might sometimes make bypassing intermediate headquarters necessary. ⁸² Elsewhere, however, Moltke was clear senior commanders should place themselves with their most forward units, to gain personal knowledge of enemy strength, positions and movements, though he recognized the risk that, in so doing, they might lose control of their own forces. He therefore urged them to return to the rear once battle opened. ⁸³

Significant continuities having been identified, in both perspective and specific wording, between Truppenführung and both the FO and the Instructions, it is possible to turn to Germany’s first post-war manual, Das FuG, written under Seeckt’s personal supervision, ⁸⁴ as the link between the two.

As Corum has pointed out, Das FuG emerged from extensive analysis of the German army’s experiences during the First World War: 86 committees, involving more than 500 officers. ⁸⁵ Neither the FO nor the Instructions had been revised during the war, but matters of command had been considered in two key doctrinal manuals. These were Grundsätze für die Abwehr im Stellungskriege (‘Principles for the defence in position warfare’) and Der Angriff im Stellungskriege (‘The attack in position warfare’). There can be no doubt these two manuals were considered by Seeckt’s committees and influenced the preparation of Das FuG.

Die Abwehr went through four editions between December 1916 and September 1918. ⁸⁶ Although this period was marked by robust debate within the General Staff, and there was often a significant gap between the doctrine and operational practice, ⁸⁷ the wording regarding the system of command to be employed showed considerable continuity: later editions strengthened and expanded key sections, rather than change the approach. Reflecting the short period during which the Germans were on the offensive, only one edition of Der Angriff was published (January 1918), though amendments were issued. ⁸⁸

The philosophy expressed in the two manuals was mutually consistent. Given their narrow focus on specific aspects of combat, however, they concentrated on practicalities rather than the statements of principle that characterized the pre-war manuals. The nature of position warfare meant both manuals made repeated reference to the need for careful planning in advance. ⁸⁹ However, Der Angriff noted commanders would often find they had to make decisions based on incomplete reports and, especially as the depth of the advance increased, senior commanders would be too far removed to influence events personally. ⁹⁰ This indicates some sense that, even in this limited context, the problems of command might be ‘wicked’.

This was reinforced by the emphasis in both manuals on the central importance of initiative at all levels. Die Abwehr noted commanders, even of middling rank, must be granted ‘a degree of freedom’, and underlined the need for troops at all levels to use every opportunity arising during the battle. ⁹¹ This was still more explicit in Der Angriff: ‘every attack offers opportunity for freedom of activity and an eager readiness for decisive action (entshlußfreudigem Handeln) even for the individual soldier’. Similarly, decisive results were gained through the initiative of individual assault squads and platoons in seizing opportunities, which underlined the importance of ‘independent and readily responsible action (verantwortungsfreudiges Handeln) by junior commanders’. ⁹²

In contrast to the pre-war doctrine in the FO, speed and surprise, based on personal knowledge of the situation, were central to both manuals. Die Abwehr stated it was ‘the duty of every commander to gain, by means of personal reconnaissance, a thorough knowledge of the ground … Only thus will he be in a position to conduct the fight properly and maintain the necessary personal touch with the troops’. ⁹³ Opportunities were to be taken quickly by the troops on the spot, without waiting for further orders. ⁹⁴ This was emphasized even more strongly in Der Angriff; ‘Everything depends on fast and independent action by all ranks, in the context of the whole’. The importance of surprise was also recognized and senior officers were therefore encouraged to place themselves far forward. ⁹⁵

While there was continuity in these wartime manuals from those before 1914, two developments stand out. First, the need for initiative at every level, even down to the individual soldier, was more strongly stated than before, reflecting the decentralization forced by the overwhelming firepower of the Western Front. Second, whereas surprise had been almost entirely absent from the FO, by 1918 it was a major feature of the doctrine, giving added impetus to the existing principle that commanders should place themselves forward.

Drawing as it did on these manuals and the broader outputs of Seeckt’s host of ‘lessons learned’ committees, Das FuG reveals much continuity with the manuals that preceded and followed it, but also important differences. Unlike both Truppenführung and the FO, it did not include an introduction. Chapter 2 dealt with matters of command. Here the manual stated it was insufficient for a commander ‘to rely on regulations, which have to apply to every circumstance, to guide his tactical handling. This would lead to a formulaic approach, which would be counter to the many-faceted nature of war.’ Similarly, it asserted:

The situation will rarely be so clear as to give an exact insight into the situation of the enemy. Uncertainty in war is the norm. … In the changing situations of combat … inflexibly clinging to a course of action can lead to failure. The art of leadership consists of the timely recognition of the moment when a new decision is required. ⁹⁶

Taken together, these statements suggest Seeckt maintained the traditional German view of warfare as inherently unpredictable and hence ‘wicked’.

With regard to reliance on subordinates’ initiative, Das FuG did not include the iconic statement about orders including everything required by subordinates, but nothing more. This is surprising, given identical wording had featured in every edition of the FO since 1887 and the Instructions since 1885, and was reintroduced in Truppenführung. Instead, Das FuG stated, ‘A decision is translated into action through an order. This must express simply, and without room for doubt, the will of the commander and the missions for the lower commanders. The independent execution of the lower commanders must not be restrained.’ It did, however, retain the statement, ‘Willingness to accept responsibility remains the most important quality of a leader. All leaders must constantly bear in mind, and emphasize to their subordinates, that neglect and carelessness will weigh more heavily against them than error in the choice of means.’ ⁹⁷

Finally, Das FuG followed the tradition of the FO in making no mention of surprise as a key goal in warfare. Again, this is unexpected, given the emphasis on surprise in the wartime manuals. It did, however, pick up from them the doctrine, retained in Truppenführung, that the place of the commander was at the front: its wording – ‘The Divisional Commander must constantly be among his troops. During an advance, his place is far forward’ – was very similar to that in Truppenführung. ⁹⁸ A similar requirement was placed upon subordinate commanders. Unlike the wartime manuals, however, Das FuG focused on the personal influence of the commander on his troops for reasons of morale, not on rapid decision-making. ⁹⁹

Taking all these considerations together, it appears Truppenführung was indeed building on well-established foundations in many areas of doctrine regarding command, and so represented significant continuity in its philosophy. In several key areas where it differed from Das FuG, Truppenführung was closer than its predecessor to the precepts established during the First World War.

From the 1880s onwards, German manuals stressed that the nature of warfare as a clash between two independent wills meant it was characterized by rapidly changing situations. Consequently, commanders could not see far into the future and often had to operate with partial and uncertain information, features characteristic of ‘wicked’ problems. It was therefore essential to rely upon subordinates’ initiative, on the basis of their commitment to, and understanding of, the commander’s overall intent and their ability to interpret the best way to achieve this, drawing on their better knowledge of the local situation. This was expressed in two key rules: commanders should include in their orders ‘all that a subordinate needs to know to be able to execute his mission – and nothing more’ and subordinates should remember ‘inaction and neglect incriminate [them] more severely than any error in the choice of means’. These phrases were repeated in successive editions over fifty years, though Truppenführung’s simplicity and directness of language perhaps expressed these doctrines more succinctly and memorably than before.

Where Truppenführung, building on wartime experience, broke new ground was its focus on surprise as a key goal, and hence the need to secure tempo over the enemy through rapid decision-making based on senior commanders positioning themselves at the decisive point of the battle. While Das FuG started to point in that direction, its focus was on the moral impact on the troops of seeing commanders share their joys and sorrows. By contrast, the emphasis in Truppenführung was on commanders making better decisions faster. ¹⁰⁰ This doctrine, which emerged in the manuals of 1917 and 1918 but was overlooked in Das FuG, marked a vital new departure in German doctrine, though only in the limited circumstances of the decisive point.

IV. Field Service Regulations

The year after the second volume of Truppenführung appeared, the British army also published the final pre-Second World War edition of its equivalent manual, drafted by Archibald Wavell while on half pay: ¹⁰¹ Field Service Regulations: Volume II – Operations (FSR II). ¹⁰²

Taking again the three factors central to command approaches, and starting with whether the problems experienced in warfare were expected to be ‘tame’ or ‘wicked’, FSR II (1935) set out a structured series of steps through which commanders should develop their plans. However, while noting these were similar to those in civilian life, the manual argued the nature of warfare made them far harder to execute. It pointed to ‘the continual succession of unforeseen incidents and obstacles’ which arise, listing causes almost paraphrasing those in Clausewitz’s description of friction. ¹⁰³ Echoing Clausewitz’s analogy of warfare as being like a wrestling match, ¹⁰⁴ the manual referred repeatedly to the need for the commander to be like a boxer (boxing was a sport more familiar to British officers), engaging with and responding to the enemy’s moves. ¹⁰⁵ Taken together, these statements suggest Wavell considered the problems faced during warfare were unpredictable and hence ‘wicked’.

On whether subordinates should use their initiative or instead follow detailed orders, the manual stated:

14(1). An order must contain only what the recipient requires to know, in order to carry out his task. Any attempt to prescribe to a subordinate at a distance anything that he, with a fuller knowledge of local conditions, should be able to decide on the spot will be avoided.

14(2). In framing orders for operations, the general principle is that the object to be attained, with such information as affects its attainment, will be briefly but clearly stated; the actual method of attaining the object will be given in sufficient detail to ensure co-ordination of effort, but so as not to interfere with the initiative of subordinate commanders, who should be left freedom of action in all matters which they can or should arrange for themselves.

These words are very similar to those in the German manuals, and suggest a doctrine based on subordinate initiative.

The German manuals complemented their statements with a warning that inaction and neglect by subordinates would be treated more severely than errors in the choice of means. The equivalent section in FSR II (1935) stated:

14(5). Notwithstanding the greatest skill and care in framing orders, unexpected circumstances may render the precise execution of an order unsuitable or impracticable. In such circumstances the following principles will guide the recipient of an order in deciding his course of action:

i. A formal order will never be departed from either in letter or spirit so long as the officer who issued it is present, or there is time to report to him and await a reply without losing an opportunity or endangering the force commanded.

ii. If the above conditions cannot be fulfilled, a departure from either the spirit or the letter of an order is justified if the subordinate who assumes the responsibility bases his decision on some fact which could not be known to the officer who issued the order, and if he is satisfied that he is acting as his superior would order him to act were he present.

iii. If a subordinate neglects to depart from the letter of his orders when such departure, in the circumstances of sub-para. ii, above, is clearly demanded, he will be held responsible for any failure which may ensue.

iv. Should a subordinate find it necessary to depart from an order, he will immediately inform the issuer of it, and the commanders of any neighbouring units likely to be affected.

While s. 14(5)iii paralleled the German doctrine, and appeared to give significant scope for subordinates to use their initiative, the text around it represented a vital difference in philosophy expressed in both tone and wording.

First, s. 14(5)i required subordinates to report back to the commander and await new orders. Independent action was permitted only if doing so would risk losing the opportunity or endangering the force. Yet, the dynamic nature of warfare would often make it almost impossible for subordinates to judge whether opportunities would last long enough to receive revised instructions. This created the risk commanders whose views had not been sought might (with the benefit of hindsight) reach a different conclusion, and the word ‘never’ suggested commanders might well do so.

Second, even if subordinates were convinced it was impracticable to seek guidance from the commander, the hurdle to independent action set by s. 14(5)ii was very high indeed. The subordinate might expect to be able to fulfil the first condition set by the sub-paragraph, since he ought to be able act ‘as his superior would order him to act were he present’, if that superior had properly explained his overall intent, as required by s. 14(2). The second condition, however, was virtually impossible to discharge: the subordinate could never be certain he was basing his decision ‘on some fact which could not be known to the officer who issued the order’, especially as s. 14(2) also enjoined commanders not to constrain their subordinates by giving too much detail.

Given these two near impossibilities, the statement in s. 14(5)iii that the subordinate would be held responsible for any failure resulting from not acting merely worsened the dilemma. If events turned out badly, the commander could blame the subordinate whether he had acted (because there might have been time to await new orders or the situation was not unknown to the commander when issuing his original orders) or not (because he should have used his initiative).

In short, despite similarities in wording with Truppenführung, s. 14(5) constrained severely the scope for subordinates to exercise initiative in the face of changing situations. As David French has noted, it created ‘a recipe for delay and lethargy’. ¹⁰⁶

This assessment is reinforced by FSR III – Higher Formations (1935), ¹⁰⁷ also drafted by Wavell. ¹⁰⁸ FSR III (1935) noted the commander’s

outlook must be a broad one. It is certain that any future war will bring many surprises, many novelties, many fresh methods. … A commander who has not prepared his mind to deal with the unexpected and thinks only in terms of past experience will be at a loss. ¹⁰⁹

As with FSR II (1935), this suggests a perception of warfare as dynamic, with commanders unlikely to have better knowledge of the local situation than their subordinates. The problems faced were therefore ‘wicked’ in nature, rather than ‘tame’.

FSR III (1935) accordingly advised a formation commander to issue orders

clearly explaining his intentions, and … then allow [his subordinates] liberty of action in arranging the methods by which they will carry out these tasks. Undue centralization and interference with subordinates is harmful, since they are apt either to chafe at excessive control or to become afraid of taking responsibility. ¹¹⁰

This stress on local initiative, however, was undermined by the suggestion the commander should have regard for ‘the ordinary unmilitary citizen, who may compose the bulk of the forces under his command and will have had only a short military training’, with the implication the commander should not expect too much of his subordinates. This was reinforced by the requirement for the commander to assign his subordinates ‘definite tasks’ and issue ‘clear and definite orders’, ¹¹¹ reducing the scope for subordinates to exercise the liberty of action recommended earlier. While emphasizing the ‘wicked’ nature of the problems arising in warfare, therefore, FSR III (1935) doubted whether it was safe to expect subordinates to make the right decisions if given scope for local initiative.

On whether commanders should aim for certainty or for making good decisions quickly, FSR II (1935) noted:

speed in action must be cultivated; the power to think quickly in an emergency is one of the greatest assets both of the boxer and of the commander; and the power to move quickly often gives to a body of troops, as to a boxer, the advantage of surprise.

It emphasized surprise and mobility as two fundamental principles of war, noting, ‘Time is the most precious element in war, and the saving of it by all possible means is the surest test of a good commander.’ ¹¹² Also:

A commander must realize that he will usually have to act on imperfect knowledge of a situation; it is his business to seek continually by every means in his power to supplement, confirm or correct his information; but to postpone action, when information is required, on the plea of waiting for fuller information, will lead to the loss of valuable time and the risk of failure. ¹¹³

Although underlining speed as a means to surprise the enemy, FSR II (1935) did not address implications for the location of the commander during the battle. For example, it suggested commanders assemble their subordinates prior to the battle, to impress their will and inspire confidence through their personality, but implied this would be by bringing the subordinates back to the commander’s position, rather than the commander going forward. ¹¹⁴ During the battle itself, commanders were expected to place themselves where they could ‘best control the course of the action, remembering that at the crisis personal example and leadership are the best means to ensure success’, ¹¹⁵ values shared by FSR III (1935). ¹¹⁶ In this, therefore, FSR II (1935) and FSR III (1935) were broadly consistent with German manuals prior to 1933. This highlights the novelty of Truppenführung’s emphasis, ¹¹⁷ though partly echoing the German wartime manuals, on the need for the commander to place himself far forward, to make better decisions faster.

Taking these factors together, it may be suggested Wavell saw the problems generated in warfare as inherently unpredictable and subject to friction. Consequently, speed of reaction was an essential means by which to inflict surprise on the enemy. Conversely, he lacked confidence in the ability of subordinates to respond beyond narrow limits to the changing opportunities of warfare through the exercise of initiative. Since he assumed these subordinates would be inexperienced civilians drafted into the army at the start of any major war, this may have been a well-founded concern. Commanders were therefore expected to assign detailed tasks to their subordinates, who were required to follow those orders, even though the situation might have rendered them ‘unsuitable or impracticable’, other than in exceptional circumstances.

However, before drawing conclusions about which command approach Wavell favoured personally, it should be noted he wrote in the context of significant pressures and constraints which affected the basic thinking of the army between the wars. David French has analysed these, highlighting the concern of the General Staff whether the urban citizens who would fill the ranks of a mass army would display in combat the steadfastness of their rural ancestors. The army also believed it possible to reduce warfare to a set of fixed principles, a desire for order on the battlefield, and a focus on consolidation rather than exploitation. ¹¹⁸ All these factors encouraged an approach emphasizing the ‘tame’ nature of warfare.

Wavell’s text was also in the tradition of earlier editions of FSR. His wording on the need for orders to contain only what the recipient needed to know in order not to interfere with his initiative was very similar to previous editions, ¹¹⁹ as was his text on situations when subordinates could depart from their orders. ¹²⁰

Indeed, the wording of both subsections goes back further still. Jim Beach has recently explored the process of doctrinal writing at Haig’s GHQ, noting this became more coherent under Cuthbert Headlam from March 1918. ¹²¹ From July, Headlam concentrated on a new version of the BEF’s core statement of offensive doctrine, ¹²² the British equivalent of Ludendorff’s Die Abwehr and Der Angriff, which like them had gone through several previous editions. ¹²³ A key feature of the manual, finally published in November as SS 135: The Division in Attack, ¹²⁴ was its ‘genuflection’ to the pre-war edition of FSR I. ¹²⁵ This was underlined in its introduction:

There has been a tendency during the present war to … a disregard of many of the fundamental principles, laid down in the training manuals issued before this war … We have now, however, returned our allegiance to the principles of training employed before this war, and must be careful not to depart from them again. ¹²⁶

Headlam’s manual made repeated references to FSR I (1909), ¹²⁷ for example to the issuing of orders, where it was emphasized ‘operation orders should be based on the principles laid down’ in FSR I. ¹²⁸ The wording there was virtually identical to that used by Wavell in 1935. Headlam strengthened his appeal to FSR I (1909) by quoting a single sentence: ‘An operation order should contain just what the recipient requires to know and nothing more.’ ¹²⁹ Perhaps tellingly, there was no reference to the FSR explanation of the reason for orders being brief: ‘It should tell him nothing which he can and should arrange for himself.’ Headlam’s emphasis on secrecy ¹³⁰ may suggest the purpose of brevity had now become control of information, rather than avoiding constraints on initiative.

V. Discontinuity in British Doctrine

Although FSR (1909) is often treated as the first formal British military doctrine, Part I (Operations) was in fact the second edition of such a manual: the first edition of FSR I appeared in 1905 as Field Service Regulations: Part I – Combined Training. ¹³¹ This, in turn, was a revised version of Combined Training (Provisional) (1902). ¹³² Examination of these manuals reveals significant differences from the doctrine expounded in subsequent editions. While subtle, the differences in wording are significant.

The first issue is the likelihood of orders being rendered unsuitable (see Table 2). The wording in FSR I (1909) shifted the emphasis significantly. From orders being rendered unsuitable ‘often’, the emphasis on the ‘greatest skill and care in framing orders’ suggested such a situation would happen only rarely.

OPEN IN VIEWER

Table 2.

The likelihood of orders being rendered unsuitable.

FSR I (1905)

FSR I (1909)

3(2): It will often happen that local circumstances, impossible to foresee, may render the precise execution of the orders given to the subordinate leaders not only unsuitable but impracticable. Moreover, when it is impossible, as must often be the case, to issue more than very general instructions, the attainment of the object aimed at must be left to the initiative and intelligence of these leaders.

12(13): Notwithstanding the greatest care and skill in framing orders, unexpected local circumstances may render the precise execution of the orders given to a subordinate unsuitable or impracticable. a

a

Carried forward into FSR I (1923), s. 86(1), and FSR II (1929), s. 129(6), and (1935), s. 14(5).

The second issue concerns decentralization (Table 3). Although the second part was largely retained, FSR I (1909) removed the first part, which emphasized decentralization of command. The entire sentence was omitted in subsequent editions.

OPEN IN VIEWER

Table 3.

Decentralization.

FSR I (1905)

FSR I (1909)

3(2): Decentralisation of command, and a full recognition of the responsibilities of subordinates in action, are thus absolutely necessary; and leaders must train their subordinates not only to work intelligently and resolutely in accordance with brief and very general instructions, but also to take upon themselves, whenever it may be necessary, the responsibility of departing from, or of varying, the orders they may have received.

12(2): It is necessary to train subordinates not only to work intelligently and resolutely in accordance with brief and very general instructions, but also to take upon themselves, whenever it may be necessary, the responsibility of departing from, or of varying, the orders they may have received.

The third issue covers the scope of orders (Table 4). Again, the 1909 wording initially appears consistent with leaving subordinates maximum scope for initiative in implementing orders. However, omission of the requirement that the commander ensure his orders were sufficiently full to enable subordinates to properly appreciate the situation represented a vital shift in emphasis. In the absence of a full understanding of the commander’s context and intent, it would be impossible for subordinates to use their greater knowledge of the local situation to recognize when to abandon orders and instead use their initiative to achieve the higher intent.

OPEN IN VIEWER

Table 4.

The scope of orders.

Combined Training (1902)	FSR I (1909)
45(10)iv: The order will not touch on anything that subordinate commanders can, and should, arrange for themselves. …vii. The subordinate commanders will, in turn, frame their own orders on receipt of the superior’s order, of which only just so much will be embodied as is necessary. Their orders should, however, be sufficiently full to enable those under them to properly appreciate the situation, and to understand how they may co-operate with others. a	12(2): An operation order should contain just what the recipient requires to know and nothing more. It should tell him nothing which he can and should arrange for himself. …
	Operation orders, especially in the case of large forces, should not enter into details except when details are absolutely necessary. It is usually dangerous to prescribe to a subordinate at a distance anything that he should be better able to decide on the spot, with a fuller knowledge of local conditions, for any attempt to do so may cramp his initiative in dealing with unforeseen developments. b

a

See also FSR I (1905), ss. 3(6) and 3(15).

b

See also FSR II (1929), s. 14(1), and (1935), s. 14(1).

Finally, the criteria for departing from an order are compared in Table 5. Although the wording of Combined Training (1902) was very similar to later editions, there is one very significant difference: the later addition of the requirement for the subordinate to base his decision ‘on some fact which could not be known to the officer who issued the order’. As noted earlier, this represented an almost impossible hurdle for subordinates, especially given the shift towards commanders restricting the amount of information given to subordinates.

OPEN IN VIEWER

Table 5.

The criteria for departing from an order.

Combined Training (1902)	FSR I (1909)
43(3): The following rules are to be observed:	12(13): Under such circumstances the following principles should guide an officer in deciding on his course of action:
i. A formal order is never to be departed from, either in letter or spirit, so long as the officer who issued it is present, and can see what is going on; or, if he cannot see what is going on, provided that there is time to report to him without losing an opportunity or endangering the command.	i. A formal order should never be departed from, either in letter or spirit (a) so long as the officer who issued it is present; (b) if the officer who issued the order is not present, provided that there is time to report to him and await a reply without losing an opportunity or endangering the command.
ii. A departure from either the spirit or the letter of an order is justified if the subordinate who assumes the responsibility is conscientiously satisfied that he is acting as his superior would order him to act if he were present.	ii A departure from either the spirit or the letter of an order is justified if the subordinate who assumes the responsibility bases his decision on some fact which could not be known to the officer who issued the order, and if he is conscientiously satisfied that he is acting as his superior, if present, would order him to act.
iii. If a subordinate, in the absence of a superior, neglects to depart from the letter of his orders, when such a departure is clearly justified by circumstances, and failure ensures, he will be held responsible for such failure.	iii. If a subordinate, in the absence of a superior, neglects to depart from the letter of his orders, when such departure is clearly demanded by circumstances, and failure ensues, he will be held responsible for such failure.
	iv. Should a subordinate find it necessary to depart from an order, he should at once inform the issuer of it, and the commanders of any neighbouring units likely to be affected. a

a

FSR I (1909), s. 12(13)ii, and (1923), s. 88(1)ii; FSR II (1929), s. 129(6)ii, and (1935), s. 14(5)ii.

Taking these differences together, Pugsley was incorrect in arguing ‘the guiding command philosophy remain[ed] unchanged’ between the 1905 and 1909 editions of FSR I. ¹³³ There were in fact several important (though subtle) shifts which carried forward to every subsequent edition.

First, the sense of warfare as an unpredictable (and hence ‘wicked’) phenomenon was less pronounced from 1909 onwards. The likelihood of unexpected situations arising was downgraded from this being the case ‘often’ to where it might occur ‘notwithstanding the greatest care and skill’ (in other words, ‘rarely’).

Second, although the emphasis on commanders not seeking to give orders to their subordinates from a distance was stronger from 1909 onwards, this was counteracted by a requirement for commanders to minimize the information concerning the wider context given to their subordinates. Yet subordinates could depart from their orders only if certain they were basing their decisions on information that could not have been known to their commander.

This assessment is reinforced by the preface to Combined Training (1902):

Success in war cannot be expected unless all ranks have been trained in peace to use their wits. Generals and commanding officers are, therefore, not only to encourage their subordinates in so doing by affording them constant opportunities of acting on their own responsibility, but they will also check all practices which interfere with the free exercise of the judgement, and will break down, by every means in their power, the paralysing habit of an unreasoning and mechanical adherence to the letter of orders and to routine, when acting under service conditions. ¹³⁴

These words almost paraphrase the prefaces of the German FO. ¹³⁵ They were not repeated in any subsequent edition of FSR.

VI. Haig, Henderson, and Initiative

These changes in the tone between the 1905 and 1909 editions of FSR indicate the need for an examination of the processes by which these manuals were written.

The Boer War cruelly highlighted the deficiencies of the Infantry Drill Book. This was especially clear to Lord Roberts, who as commander-in-chief from 1900 was in a position to address the issue. The man he selected to update the Drill Book was Colonel G.F.R. (Frank) Henderson. The latter had been professor of military art and history at the Staff College (1892–9) until Roberts appointed him his director of intelligence in South Africa, though ill health soon forced a return to England. ¹³⁶ Early in 1902, however, Henderson travelled back to South Africa, in connection with the official history of the war. Before departing, he asked a colleague, Colonel Gerald Ellison, to complete his work on the new manual.

Ellison found a lot of what Henderson had already written applied as much to the other arms as to the infantry. ¹³⁷ Roberts (who had been closely involved in the project) therefore ‘decided that a manual laying down authoritatively a doctrine regarding the tactical employment of all arms should be drawn up and published’. To do this, he established a small committee at Aldershot, chaired by Lieutenant General Sir Henry Hildyard ¹³⁸ (commandant of the Staff College during much of Henderson’s time there ¹³⁹ ) with Ellison as secretary. The committee used Henderson’s material to produce Combined Training (Provisional), published in May 1902.

That Hildyard’s committee produced the manual in less than three months suggests Henderson’s text was well advanced. Indeed, it was so complete Roberts also published Infantry Training (Provisional) in April 1902. ¹⁴⁰ Equally, Henderson had produced his own text at high speed, as he had devoted at most six months to it, having returned to duty only in August 1901. ¹⁴¹ The time available was in practice even less, since he had at the same time drafted several chapters of the official history.

One explanation for the speed (and broad scope) of Henderson’s work was given in 1913 by Colonel James Edmonds: ‘Our first Field Service Manual was taken from the German. As fast as the German Felddienstordnung could be translated, the sheets were handed over to Colonel Frank Henderson, and he invested the translation with artistic merit for British use.’ ¹⁴² A new edition of the FO had appeared on 1 January 1900 and was indeed translated by the War Office, but Edmonds was exaggerating, as it was published eight months before Henderson began work. Nonetheless, there are parallels between the text on command in Combined Training (1902) and the FO (1900).

It is unknown whether Henderson based his work on the German manual or independently reached similar conclusions. However, his favourable description of the German command system ¹⁴³ suggests he approved its emphasis on initiative and delegation. It would therefore have been surprising had his text for the new British manual not taken a similar approach, although he was not working alone, given Roberts’s close personal engagement in the work. ¹⁴⁴ It is uncertain whether Henderson was aware of the fierce debate within the German army regarding the decentralized Auftragstaktik and the tighter Normaltaktik, though his comment ‘it was long before the system was cordially accepted, even in Germany itself; and it has been fiercely criticised’ suggests he was. ¹⁴⁵

Although the wording and approach of Henderson’s draft carried forward into FSR I (1905), the command philosophy in FSR I (1909) was very different. This was prepared under Douglas Haig, director of military training from 24 August 1906 ¹⁴⁶ and director of staff duties from 9 November 1907; his remit encompassed providing ‘a central doctrine for the training for war, and the organization in war, of the whole British Army’. ¹⁴⁷ His direct contribution to FSR (1909) is uncertain, since few relevant War Office files survive ¹⁴⁸ and his diaries contain only passing references to this aspect of his work, ¹⁴⁹ though he was certainly closely involved in FSR II. ¹⁵⁰ He was, however, a strong champion for the manual: in his Final Despatch of April 1919 he stated, ‘The principles of command, Staff work, and organization elaborated before the war have stood the test imposed upon them and are sound.’ ¹⁵¹ Whether or not he personally wrote FSR (1909), therefore, the words and philosophy had his full support. The switch in command approach between the 1905 and 1909 editions, representing a shift from warfare being considered inherently unpredictable to being instead seen as predictable, must therefore have had, at minimum, Haig’s active agreement.

There is irony that Henderson’s revolutionary emphasis on decentralization of command, as the essential means by which the chaos of battle should be addressed, was reversed by Haig – he had been Henderson’s student at the Staff College. However, as Tim Travers has shown, Haig may have believed he was being true to the principles Frank had taught him, ¹⁵² since Henderson was, for most of his time at Camberley, a passionate critic of decentralized command. ¹⁵³ His early writings emphasized the dangers of giving subordinates scope to exercise their own initiative, drawing on German experiences in 1870. In the 1891 article that secured his post at the Staff College, he castigated ‘the reckless impetuosity of the German officers of every rank’ and their ‘unreasonable initiative’. ¹⁵⁴ His solution was to prevent the chaos of war, not adapt to it. He noted with favour that, in the 1889 Drill Book, ¹⁵⁵ ‘instead of encouraging excessive exercise of initiative, the paramount importance of order, of the cohesion of the attacking body, and of maintaining the true direction is inculcated on every page’. ¹⁵⁶ Consequently, ‘English soldiers are brought up with the idea that obedience is of more importance than initiative.’ ¹⁵⁷ The connection with FSR I (1909) is clear.

Yet, around the time Haig graduated from the Staff College in 1897, Henderson dramatically changed his views. He now argued, ‘All systems … which depend on explicit regulations make but small demands on the intelligence of the individual officer, and for that reason, if for no other, they are quite inadequate to the exigencies of modern warfare.’ ¹⁵⁸ Henderson welcomed ¹⁵⁹ moves towards decentralization and initiative in Infantry Drill (1896). ¹⁶⁰

The cause of this reversal in Henderson’s approach is unclear. It may have been a gradual process – Jay Luvaas noted he ‘probably learned more about war during his tenure at the Staff College than did any of his students’. ¹⁶¹ Equally, the possibility must be acknowledged that it was the result of a more direct engagement with the German army than he had gained through earlier study of the battles of 1870. In 1895 Henderson observed the annual German manoeuvres. His official report noted the troops ‘act like intelligent beings, who thoroughly understand their duty, and the fact speaks volumes for the way in which even the privates are taught to use their initiative’. ¹⁶² Alternatively, it may have been his deeper analysis of the American Civil War, culminating in his famous study of Stonewall Jackson, ¹⁶³ his first major publication following those German manoeuvres, which sparked his change of heart. Certainly, these two events mark a turning point in Henderson’s philosophy, with his subsequent work consistently emphasizing the importance of decentralized command and flexibility, in contrast to his earlier publications.

Perhaps it was precisely because of this newfound support for decentralized command that Roberts selected Henderson for his staff in South Africa. Certainly, the hours they spent in discussion during the voyage to Cape Town ¹⁶⁴ gave ample opportunities for the issue of decentralization of command to have arisen. Roberts’s decision to ask Henderson to update Infantry Drill (1896), along with his instruction that Frank’s incomplete text form the basis for Combined Training (1902), suggests he shared his subordinate’s views.

Henderson’s former students frequently approached him in South Africa, seeking their mentor’s views on the practical problems they faced fighting the Boers, ¹⁶⁵ but the rapid collapse of his health and the brevity of his return to work before his premature death in 1903 allowed very little time to promulgate his new ideas. Although he encapsulated his latest thinking, reinforced by experience in South Africa, in Combined Training, it was therefore his previous doctrine that guided Haig when he revised the manual in 1909. The result was a return to the philosophy Henderson himself had once taught, but then rejected: a philosophy that remained the official doctrine of the British army, expressed in successive editions of the FSR, throughout the interwar period.

Henderson’s close connection to Roberts suggests Ellison’s view ¹⁶⁶ may be correct that the latter’s role in the development of the new doctrine has been underplayed, even by recent historians, such as Spencer Jones ¹⁶⁷ and Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly. ¹⁶⁸ Roberts’s abrupt dismissal in 1905 as part of the process to establish the General Staff may have been more of a backward step than has perhaps been recognized.

VII. Conclusions

While recognizing the limitations of a study of military doctrine as expressed in FSR and its German equivalents, this article has revealed key continuities within the command philosophies of the British and German armies in the half-century to 1935.

From at least 1885, German doctrine saw warfare as inherently unpredictable, such that commanders could not extrapolate from their greater knowledge of the broader context to understand the local situation. The doctrine therefore demanded commanders give subordinates clear direction, but leave achievement of that intent to their initiative. After 1918 the German army concluded decentralization remained an appropriate response to the reality of modern warfare and this was expressed in its first post-war statement of command doctrine – Das FuG. However, following further analysis and the development of thinking around armoured forces, the fundamentally chaotic nature of warfare became even more central to the army’s thinking. Truppenführung therefore strengthened still further the existing tradition of forward command, in order to enable rapid decision-making at the decisive point of the battle and thereby achieve tempo and inflict surprise on the enemy.

In Britain, Henderson’s analysis of the German doctrine of command led him to a fundamental change of view. This was expressed in his draft text for a replacement of Infantry Drill (1896), which ultimately became FSR I (1905). While no mere paraphrase of the FO, the new manual drew parallel conclusions about the nature of warfare and accordingly promulgated similar solutions. Yet Henderson’s own students revised his manual, severely weakening the emphasis on decentralization and reverting to the former belief in the need to minimize the chaos of warfare by commanders retaining tight control over their subordinates, a change sustained through successive editions of FSR.

This reinforces Paul Johnston’s conclusion:

It is not enough to write a new doctrine, if the purpose is to change the way an army will fight. Ultimately, an army’s behavior in battle will almost certainly be more a reflection of its character or culture than of the contents of its doctrine manuals. ¹⁶⁹

The German army perceived warfare as chaotic, or ‘wicked’, and its doctrine reflected this over an extended period of major change. British commanders saw it as structured, or ‘tame’. Since Henderson’s new doctrine did not fit with the cultural norm of the army, it was rejected.