Rethinking the Turkish-Armenian War in the Caucasus: The Position of Ottoman Armenians

Introduction

During the First World War, the Russian Empire occupied the Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, including Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Trabzon, and Muş. Thousands of Armenians volunteered to join the Russian offensive, with the hope that the Russians might leave these Vilayet-i Sitte (Six Provinces) to be established as ‘Greater Armenia’, as promised by the Allied Powers. ¹ Following the collapse of the Russian Empire and the beginning of civil war in Russia, Russian forces retreated from Eastern Anatolia in 1917, leaving the disorganized Armenians vulnerable to Turkish forces. The Armenian political parties assembled a congress in Tbilisi with 200 delegates and formed an Armenian National Council consisting of 15 members. To fill the power vacuum in the region, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan formed the Transcaucasian Commissariat, though they would each soon pursue their respective independence. In 1918, during the last months of the First World War, the Ottoman army launched a campaign to regain the provinces which had been abandoned by the retreating Russian forces. In order to put down the Ottoman offensive towards the Armenian nucleus of Yerevan and the holy city Echmiadzin, the Armenian National Council declared on 30 May 1918 that it would protect the right of the Armenian people, thus in essence declaring the independence of Armenia. ² Soon after, when the Armistice of Mudros was signed on 30 October 1918, the Ottoman military was to cease its activities on the Eastern border. ³ With the aid of British authorities, the Armenians were able to take back lands including Kars, Ardahan, and as far as the Sarıkamış region. ⁴ However, after the Turkish National movement organized and began to mobilize troops on the Eastern border under the leadership of Kazım Karabekir, tensions began to rise at the beginning of summer 1920. ⁵ Ultimately, in September 1920, the Nationalist forces embarked upon an offensive towards the tiny Armenian State, thus beginning the four-month Turkish–Armenian War.

The historiography on the Turkish–Armenian War was written primarily by Armenian historians who studied in the Soviet period; as such, due to their Soviet affinity, many were not sufficiently objective towards the subject matter. For instance, criticism was hardly ever levelled at the Bolshevik invasion of the Armenian state, which was portrayed by many Armenian historians as a legitimate act ‘to defeat the imperialist Armenian government’. Instead, academic works written by the Armenian historians of the Soviet period focused on criticizing the Tashnak (ARF) government of the time, which conceded the lands such as Kars, Ardahan, and Oltu to the Turks. ⁶ The literature created by Armenian historians of the Soviet period did not explore in depth the role of Ottoman Armenians in the war. The position of the Ottoman Armenians regarding the war has barely been discussed by Soviet-period Armenian historians, with the importance placed on the ‘betrayal of the Tashnaks’ and the offensive fuelled by the Nationalist army’s ‘Turanic ambitions’ to unite Turkic peoples under one state. ⁷ Few works have analysed and criticized Bolshevik politics during the Turkish–Armenian War, though it is a valuable scholarly angle to shed light on the success of Bolshevik propaganda among the Armenian soldiers and villagers amid the clashes on the front. ⁸

The four-volume monumental study of Richard Hovanissian could be considered the foundation of Armenian historiography on the Turkish–Armenian War, as the objective, methodological approach of the author distinguishes the work from that previously written by Soviet academicians. Based on extensive archival research and secondary sources, Hovanissian examines the Turkish–Armenian War within the broader context of post-war ambitions of the Great Powers and the dynamics of Soviet–Turkish relations. However, the position of the Ottoman Armenians during the Turkish–Armenian War is not extensively included in the work of Hovanissian, which makes this article a unique contribution to the existing literature. Raymond Kevorkian, in his authoritative book tackles the Turkish–Armenian War in illustrating the continuity of the Turanic, nationalistic ambitions between the Committee of Union and Progress policymakers and the Turkish National movement. He argues that the Nationalist forces launched an offensive on the Armenian state to eliminate ‘the Armenian question’ entirely and to unite with the Turkic populations in and beyond the Caucasus. ⁹

Turkish historiography has employed the Turkish–Armenian War in the Caucasus as an important victory for the Turkish National movement, since it was the first victory of the Nationalists, and from the Turkish perspective, it eliminated the ‘Armenian question’. Within the Turkish historiography, Mim Kemal Öke and Kamuran Gürün have contributed the principal works in the literature on the Turkish–Armenian War. Öke puts forward the notion that the aim of the Nationalist forces’ campaign was to stop ‘the wide-ranging massacres of the Armenian forces against the innocent Muslims’ and to gain leverage against the Bolsheviks on the bargaining table. ¹⁰ According to him, the Armenians were ‘attacking the Turkish-Muslim population’ in the region, and the offensive of the Nationalist forces was ‘a fair, belated action’. ¹¹ Öke’s analysis concludes that the Turkish–Armenian War, resulting in the signing of the Treaty of Gyumri, annulled the Treaty of Sèvres’ conditions for the Turkish nation.

Kamuran Gürün, similar to Öke, highlights the view that the Armenians were ‘attacking innocent Muslim villages’ around the border area and the Nationalist offensive was inevitable, given the difficult conditions of the Muslims. His narrative is based on the Turkish military archives and provides a framework of how the Nationalist military elite approached the Armenian state and what political and strategic tactics were implemented. ¹² In addition to these two bedrock pieces, there are other academic studies, including dissertations written on the subject matter. ¹³

It is to be noted that nowhere in the existing literature – be it by Turkish, Armenian, or any other scholars – is there to be found insight into how the Ottoman Armenians reacted vis-à-vis the developments which occurred during the Turkish–Armenian War. Did the Ottoman Armenians support the Turkish side, in this case the Turkish National movement, or did they express their support toward the Armenian government? If so, what activities did the Ottoman Armenians partake in during the war to support the Armenian government? What is the meaning of Ottoman Armenians’ support to the Armenian government within the broader context of post-First World War politics? This article seeks to answer these questions by building upon the recent literature written in Turkish, Armenian, and English; most importantly, this article benefits from the use of Ottoman Turkish and Armenian dailies from the period which have not been analysed previously in the above-mentioned literature. The article suggests that the comparative analysis of the Ottoman Turkish and Armenian dailies will provide a deeper understanding of the subject matter and provide an important contribution to the current body of literature.

The Ottoman Turkish and Armenian dailies – namely Jagadamard (The Battle), Zhoghovurti Tsayně (Voice of the People), Verchin Lur (The Latest News), Peyam-ı Sabah (The Morning News), and Vakit (The Times) – are used as primary sources in understanding the contribution of the Ottoman Armenians during the Turkish–Armenian War in the Caucasus and the reaction of Ottoman Turkish society vis-à-vis the Ottoman Armenians.

The organ of ARF, Azadamard (The Battle of Freedom), was first published in 1909 after the revolution in the Ottoman Empire. Because of strong opposition of the daily against the policies of Ottoman governments on the Armenian community, the daily was supposed to be published under different names over time. Artaramard (The Battle of Justice), Ariamard (The Battle of Braveness), and Jagadamard were published as the continuation of Azadamard (The Battle of Freedom). ¹⁴ The paper changed its name in 1918 to Artaramard, then Ariamard, and finally to Jagadamard, which it stayed as from late 1918 to early 1924. ¹⁵ Jagadamard was published without interruption during the Armistice period, therefore, it is a valuable source for this study.

Verchin Lur was published in İstanbul from 1914 to 1930. ¹⁶ The daily remained ‘neutral and independent’, without any official political affiliation. However, the arguments supported in the daily’s columns were often similar with Ramgavar Party policies. ¹⁷ Hovhannes Asbed and Ardashes K‘alpak‘jyan, who wrote for the daily, were previously affiliated with the Ramgavar Party. ¹⁸ Verchin Lur was one of the most popular dailies among the Armenian community in İstanbul, with a circulation of 10,000 before the First World War. ¹⁹ Therefore, it is an essential source to analyse the Ottoman Armenian political stance during the Turkish–Armenian War.

Zhoghovurt (The People) was published in İstanbul from 1918 to 1919 by the Armenian intellectual Dikran Zawēn. ²⁰ The daily continued publication under the name Zhoghovurti Tsayně until 1923. The famous Armenian poet Vahan Tēkēyan was the editor from 1920 to 1922. ²¹ Zhoghovurti Tsayně was an independent newspaper during the Armistice years and positioned itself as a liberal, nonpartisan daily which covered the political developments of the period.

Vakit daily was founded by renowned Turkish intellectuals Mehmet Asım (Us) and Ahmet Emin (Yalman) in İstanbul in 1917. Prominent Turkish authors such as Ziya Gökalp, Halide Edip, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Reşat Nuri, and Ruşen Eşref wrote articles for the Nationalist daily. ²² Vakit openly supported the Turkish National movement emerging from Ankara and strongly advocated the right of Nationalist forces to attack the Armenian government in the Caucasus.

Following the war, the Ottoman newspapers Peyam (The News) and Sabah (Morning) merged and were re-established as Peyam-ı Sabah in 1920 by owner Mihran Efendi. ²³ Editor-in-chief and renowned intellectual Ali Kemal strongly opposed the Turkish National movement, openly characterizing the Turkish National movement as ‘daydreamers’. His anti-Nationalist publications were so intense that he was lynched by a crowd in Izmit after the Nationalist victory against the Greek forces in 1922. ²⁴ Accordingly, Peyam-ı Sabah is a crucial source to compare with the pro-Nationalist Turkish daily Vakit during the Turkish–Armenian War.

Ottoman Armenians and the Road to the Turkish–Armenian War in the Caucasus

There was a common belief among Ottoman Armenians that if the Vilayet-i Sitte were one day to be liberated from the Turkish yoke, the army of the Republic of Armenia would be the sole liberator. Thus, no other foreign power would assist the Ottoman Armenians to claim independence in those lands, as supporting the military of the Armenian Republic meant collaborating in the future annexation of the Vilayet-i Sitte. From the beginning of 1920, the Ottoman Armenians embarked upon several fundraising campaigns to channel aid to the Armenian military. During the early days of 1920, a meeting took place at the Armenian National Assembly in the Galata neighbourhood of İstanbul to organize an extensive donation campaign for the Armenian military. Thirty-six Armenian associations, together with all Armenian political parties, elected to establish a central committee for fundraising. Izmir Armenians, besides fundraising activities, organized a campaign for the donation of socks for the Armenian military. ²⁵ In a single day, the fundraising campaign in Izmir gathered 3,000 Ottoman liras. ²⁶ Armenians in Konya – who were mostly refugees sheltered around the Konya railway station, living in tents – collected 700 socks to send to the Armenian military. ²⁷

The Central Committee for fundraising included Armenian activists Armenag Horigyan, Kalusd Eynatyan, Vrtanes Mardigyan, and Araksi Varujan. The committee decided at its first meeting that the collection of clothing for the military would be organized by the Armenian Red Cross and the Women’s League, and the Vartanants Feast would be declared as the day of the military, on which ceremonies would be held at schools and donations would be collected. ²⁸ On Christmas day and those following, boxes were placed in the courtyards of churches and an announcement was made to the wider Armenian community to collect cigarettes and tobacco for the Armenian military. ²⁹

In Bursa, Armenian students declined their Christmas gifts of simit (bagels), asking their teachers to instead donate the bagel money to the Armenian military. ³⁰ On Christmas day, around 60 packages of cigarettes, ten packages of tobacco, and 10,000 liras were delivered to the Kumkapı Church in İstanbul. In Gedikpaşa, during the two days, around 40 packages of cigarettes and 3,000 liras were donated. Similarly, in other districts of İstanbul such as Kadıköy, Yenikapı, and Ortaköy, donations were made, totalling more than 100 liras. ³¹ Regardless of political affiliation, the Ottoman Armenians participated in the donation campaigns ‘to fulfil their national duties toward their fatherland’. ³²

Throughout the first half of 1920, the fundraising campaigns continued within the Armenian communities in the Ottoman Empire. In September, before the outbreak of war between the Nationalists and the Armenian State, the Armenian community in İstanbul participated in the Loan Campaign (Փոխառութիւն) for the Armenian government, with the participation of the various Armenian associations established throughout İstanbul. The Loan Campaign was intended to cover the urgent pecuniary need of the Armenian military to purchase weapons and ammunition. For this purpose, Armenians of the Pera district gathered at the Skating Palace ³³ and held a fundraising evening for the Armenian state. A prominent member of the Armenian community in Pera, A. Arsenyan, highlighted that participating in the fundraising event was the duty of each Armenian towards his or her fatherland. Following the remarks of A. Arsenyan, another prominent member, Hovhannes Amaduni, added that as the Armenian soldiers and volunteers who fought for the independence of the Armenian state had fulfilled their duties, it was now time for those who had not fought on the battlefield to pay their own debts. At the end of the night, 5,000 Ottoman liras were collected from the community. ³⁴ Even though it was named a loan campaign, the aim was in truth more focused on fundraising and donations, with the money lenders knowing that it was highly possible that they would not be repaid. B. Khojasaryan, during the gathering on Kınalı Ada, argued along similar lines that while the Armenians in the Caucasus and Anatolia had fought for the independence of the Armenian state and paid their ‘blood debts’, the İstanbul Armenians had not participated in the struggle on the ground. Therefore, he argued that it was time for the İstanbul Armenians to pay their own ‘blood debts’ by taking part in the loan campaign. Eleven thousand Ottoman liras were collected on Kınalı Ada. ³⁵

For İstanbul Armenians, the campaign for the Armenian military was a historic moment to show their loyalty to their fatherland and nation. Benon Deyirmenjiyan, the president of the Armenian community in Kuruçeşme, argued that even though the Armenians in İstanbul were only 10 per cent of the total population, 35 per cent of the economy of the city was in the hands of Armenian merchants. Therefore, he noted that if the İstanbul Armenians gave just 2 per cent of their wealth, more than 1,000,000 liras would be generated through the Loan Campaign. ³⁶ During the first gatherings of the Loan Campaign, 46,000 Ottoman liras were collected in the pool account. ³⁷ This donation campaign had such importance among the Armenian community that those Armenian businessmen who were reluctant to participate in the campaign or made very small donations were targeted for public shaming. Sebuh Sdepanyan, for instance, named those wealthy Armenian men who refused to take part in the Loan Campaign as ‘enemies of Armenia and the Armenian nation’. He ended his article with an open threat, that those wealthy Armenians who refused to give their money should not be surprised to see their names on a list titled ‘the enemies of Armenia’. ³⁸ These examples arguably demonstrate that the Armenian upper class was forced by the greater Armenian public opinion to bestow part of its wealth to the Armenian military. When an Armenian woman from Bardizag, Dikranuhi Der Simonyan, who worked as a maid in İstanbul for many years, donated her savings of around 50,000 French francs to the Armenian government, hoping that this amount would help the construction of an Armenian orphanage in an Armenian city, the Armenian Patriarch Zaven acknowledged her donation and hoped that it would become a model for the Armenian upper class. ³⁹

Beginning of the Nationalist Offensive and Fall of Kars and Gyumri

Two months before the Turkish offensive, the joint commission composed of all political parties in Armenia presented a report to the Tashnak government advising that precautions should be taken in foreign and military policy to prevent the destruction of the state. Furthermore, it stated that the experience of Minister for the Military Rupen Minasyan showed him to be unfit to hold the position. Under his administration, thousands of inexperienced soldiers were conscripted into the military, and the total number was raised to 56,000, two-thirds of whom had never fought on the battlefield. The high-ranking officers as well as the privates were avaricious, and there was scant discipline to be found within the ranks. Furthermore, General Hovsepyan and his units oppressed disobedient Turkish villages close to the border in the Kars region. These villagers migrated to the Turkish side and lodged complaints with the Armenian government. ⁴⁰

In foreign policy, given that the offensive of the Nationalist forces was inevitable and the aggressiveness of the Bolshevik and Tatar forces was evident, the Armenian government sought to secure the support of the Allied Powers in preparation to defend the borders. Nevertheless, no Allied government expressed any inclination to back the Armenian government, arguing that a new military campaign in the Caucasus could create unnecessary financial burdens for them. ⁴¹

Domestically, at the beginning of September it was reported that the influence of Bolshevism was decreasing in the region after the defeat of the Bolshevik army on the Polish front. Meanwhile, the negotiations between the Armenian government and the Soviet representative Boris Legran were yielding encouraging results. The year’s harvest was bountiful, and the country’s economy was improving; thus, there were fewer beggars on the streets of Yerevan than in Tbilisi. The government was embarking upon various construction projects, such as railway construction in the Oltu and Kamarlu regions. In daily life, speaking Russian was prohibited in order to increase the use of the Armenian language, and streets in Yerevan were renamed after prominent Armenian historical figures. ⁴²

On the Nationalists’ side, in a speech given at the Turkish parliament in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal reported that the commander of the Eastern army had sent letters stating that the local Muslim population in Armenia was in danger of massacre and the Armenians sought to occupy Erzurum at the earliest opportunity. ⁴³ In response, he gave orders to the Eastern army to prepare for an attack to occupy Sarıkamış, Oltu, and Soğanlı, which were already Turkish territory according to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. ⁴⁴ Although Georgy Chicherin of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union assured the Ankara government that the disagreements regarding the borders between the Turkish and Armenian governments could be solved with diplomatic negotiations, Mustafa Kemal asserted that they had rights to the Kars, Oltu, and Ardahan regions, and thus it was legitimate to occupy these regions. ⁴⁵ When Bekir Sami, the foreign minister of the Ankara government, protested the military operations against the Turkish-Muslim communities in the Oltu region by the Armenian forces in June 1920, the Armenian government responded that the operations were carried out against bandits in the regions but had not targeted Muslims; moreover, the Armenian government handed the administration of municipalities to local Muslims in the Oltu region. ⁴⁶ Everything aside, the primary obstacle of the Nationalist authorities was, as Bülent Gökay highlights in his article, that the Armenian state prevented it from accessing the much-needed war material from Russia. ⁴⁷ The foundation of Gökay’s arguments, Jagadamard postulated that the offensive of the Nationalist forces sought to accomplish two primary objectives: first, recapturing Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, which were given to the Turks by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; second, establishing a land connection with Azerbaijan in order to receive military and financial support from the Bolsheviks. ⁴⁸ In addition to these, as Peyam-ı Sabah presented in an editorial, the offensive of the Nationalists was a tactical move designed to produce certain guaranteed victories, pre-emptively guarding against potential internal opposition. ⁴⁹

By early September, Kazım Karabekir, Ottoman commander of the Eastern front, had organized the Turkish volunteer groups beyond the Armenian border, and offensive measures had been prepared. It was reported by Armenian intelligence that Turkish aerial reconnaissance had increased along the border area and some Turkish reconnaissance units were crossing the border, making contact with Armenian security forces. ⁵⁰ According to Turkish sources, around 8,000 soldiers were sent to the front from the Black Sea region, including a thousand each from the cities of Samsun, Rize, and Trabzon. ⁵¹

In his letter addressed to Chicherin, Mustafa Kemal reiterated that the Muslim population living under the Armenian government was in danger of massacre and feared for their safety; it was therefore necessary for them to occupy strategic points in the Kars, Ardahan, and Batum regions. ⁵² Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal assured Chicherin that they would accept the diplomatic intervention of the Bolsheviks in order to solve the border problem with the Armenian state peacefully. ⁵³ During the Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku in September 1920, the National government secured guarantee that the Bolsheviks would agree to the occupation of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum by the Nationalist forces. ⁵⁴ The only point of concern for Mustafa Kemal was the uncertainty of Georgian policy in the case of a war between the Nationalists and the Armenian government. For this mission, the Turkish committee, headed by Yusuf Kemal (Tengirşenk), paid a discrete visit to Tbilisi, staying at Hotel D’orient. ⁵⁵ The Turkish delegation held a meeting with the president of Georgia, Noe Zhordania, and minister of foreign affairs, Evgeni Gegechkori, to make certain the position of Georgians in the case of war. ⁵⁶ After two days, Yusuf Kemal returned to Baku with the assurance that the Georgians would remain neutral if conflict were to break out and would not enter the war on the Armenian side. ⁵⁷ At the beginning of September, it was reported by Bekir Sami that the diplomatic arrangements were made, and the path was cleared for the Turkish army to begin its offensive. ⁵⁸ There were four brigades, each consisting of 8,000 soldiers, as well as Kurdish and Turkish volunteers under the command of Kazım Karabekir. ⁵⁹

In the middle of September, the Nationalist forces under the command of Kazım Karabekir initiated an aggressive offensive toward the Oltu front, with the objective of taking Sarıkamış as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the Bolshevik forces began an offensive from the north-eastern border of Armenia, mainly the Ghazah region. When the Turkish offensive was launched against Sarıkamış, the border security units withdrew without resistance. ⁶⁰ On 28 September, the Armenian generals decided to withdraw from Sarıkamış, arguing that, given the strength of the Turkish army, it was not feasible to defend the region with 2,500 men in Sarıkamış and 1,500 men in the Oltu region. ⁶¹ The Armenian forces, outnumbered by the Bolsheviks and Nationalists, pulled back from both fronts. The Central Committee of the Tashnaksutyun in Tbilisi made an announcement titled ‘Liberty or Death’ and called on all Armenian men who were capable of fighting to join the military forces. ⁶² After the victories at the Oltu and Sarıkamış front lines, the Nationalist forces were ordered to halt operations by orders from Ankara headquarters, as it was an ideal moment to evaluate the international repercussions of these occupations, particularly in Soviet and British circles. ⁶³

Meanwhile, in Erzurum the Turkish-Muslim community was running out of patience, tired of both Armenian general Nazarbegyan’s obstinance in his refusal to surrender, as well as the continued demand of Karabekir’s troops for their food and money. The unrest was such that at its height a group of protestors attempted to attack Kazım Bey, the deputy governor of Erzurum at that time. The hospitals in Erzurum were full of wounded soldiers who had fought at the front. ⁶⁴ In Erzurum, Celalleddin Arif, the second president of the National Assembly, argued that the weaponry and ammunition of their forces had been sold to Laz and Kurds and that some officials were involved in corruption. ⁶⁵ On 28 September, when the Nationalists embarked upon another offensive on the front, a telegram criticizing military officials involved in corruption was signed by more than 50 individuals and sent to Ankara. ⁶⁶ Kazım Karabekir in his telegram stated that the allegations negatively affected the morale of the army. ⁶⁷

On the other side of the border, on 26 September 1920, the Central Committee of the Tashnaksutyun in Tbilisi issued a public statement calling for the Armenian nation ‘to unite and fight’ against the Turkish offensive. ⁶⁸ Following the statements of the committee regarding the mobilization of Armenian volunteers, thousands of Armenian men enlisted to join the front. ⁶⁹ It was indicated that more than 30,000 Armenian volunteers registered to join the front. The Armenian merchants and wealthy men of Tbilisi said that they would meet the needs of those families whose men went to the front. However, the Armenian government ultimately recruited only those who had previous battlefield experience. ⁷⁰ The first president of the Armenian Republic, Hovhannes Kajaznuni – whose two sons Ashot and Aram died while serving in the military, the former in 1918 in Karakilise and the latter in 1920 in Zankipasar – registered as a volunteer. ⁷¹ The Armenian government announced the full mobilization of the nation, and Armenian men up to the age of 35 were sent to the front. Even the ministers of the government joined the troops on the fronts. Minister of Labour Vratsyan went to Kars, Minister of Economy Abraham Gyulhandanyan went to Dilijan, Minister of Communications Arshak Camalyan and Minister of Education Kevork Ghazaryan went to Gyumri, and Minister of Interior Affairs Sarkis Araradyan went to the Iğdır front. ⁷²

On 6 October, the Armenians in Tbilisi organized a meeting at the Armenian Cathedral to protest against the offensive of the Nationalists and Bolsheviks. Armenian merchants closed their shops, Armenian schools were closed, and thousands rushed to the streets, crying ‘Long live the Armenian army!’, ‘Damn the Turkish-Bolshevik reaction!’, and ‘Long live free Armenia!’ At the end of the meeting, a statement was released which criticized the Entente powers for not responding to this offensive campaign and the Bolsheviks for cooperating with the Turks, who were striving for ‘the complete annihilation of the Armenians’. ⁷³ On that day, Leonid Stark, the head of the Soviet mission in Tbilisi, made a statement that the Armenians were collaborating with the imperialists and their interests, thus making this offensive inevitable. ⁷⁴ This statement provoked the feelings of the crowd, but security forces took the necessary steps to prevent any disorder. ⁷⁵ The tension increased further between the Armenian government and the Bolsheviks with the annexation of the Karabakh and Zangezur regions to Azerbaijan and recurrent statements of Bolshevik officers that the Armenian government was serving ‘imperialist’ ambitions. ⁷⁶

In Tbilisi, the Armenian community organized Salvation Committees (Փրկութեան Կոմիտեներ), which were responsible for the mobilization of volunteers and fundraising for the Armenian military. Similar to the Salvation Committees, the Armenians in İstanbul organized the Loan Campaign units. While the Salvation Committees in Tbilisi had the authority to force Armenian individuals to make a donation for the military or to attend the army as privates, it was voluntary in İstanbul. Jagamadard suggested that there should also be Salvation Committees in İstanbul in order to accelerate the fundraising and recruiting campaigns. It was argued that it was time for the Armenian community to spend even their last ‘pennies’ to save their motherland. ⁷⁷

The Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin, the governing body of the Armenian Apostolic Church, called for a national mobilization on 6 October 1920. ⁷⁸ Similarly, President Ohanjanyan appealed to the public to join the front as they did in 1918 in Sardarabad. ⁷⁹ The mottos were ‘To Erzurum!’, ‘To the Black Sea!’, and ‘Death or final victory!’ ⁸⁰ Major Sebuh, one of the commanders leading the defence in Kars, made a statement on 1 October calling for volunteers to join the front. ⁸¹

The Armenian troops were in a position to recapture Sarıkamış, but the commanders ordered the withdrawal of the units. There were rumours among the soldiers that the commanders were ‘traitors’ who had taken ‘bribes from the Bolsheviks’. The Ottoman Armenian units on the right flank of the defence line, mainly the Ardahan front, fought until the end, even while the other units were withdrawing. It should be stressed that prior to the Turkish Kars offensive, there were two pressing issues within the ranks of the Armenian military. First, the propagation of Bolshevism was so intense that low-ranking Armenian Bolshevik privates disobeyed orders and refused to attack the Nationalist forces, many of who were the friends of Bolsheviks. Second, there was a disagreement between the high-ranking military officials and the Armenian volunteers, particularly those who joined the front from İstanbul and Cilicia, namely the Ottoman Armenians. ⁸²

The Turkish offensive towards Kars started under the command of Kazım Karabekir on 27 October. ⁸³ In Kars, the Turks met with no resistance, with the Armenian army of 26,000 soldiers withdrawing, of which 1,500 surrendered. With his unit of 5,000 soldiers, Major Sebuh moved forward on the left flank of the front line to encircle the Nationalists, and at the same time Major Hovhannes Marzmanyan, with his unit consisting of 4,000 soldiers, moved on the right flank to unite with Sebuh. During the march, resultant of the effective Bolshevik propaganda, many soldiers refused to fight and deserted; desolate, Marzmanyan committed suicide. Besides the desertion issue of the Armenian military, the Muslim population in the Akbaba region took up arms against the Armenians, forcing some units to leave the front to put down the insurgency. ⁸⁴ As the Turkish-Muslims were located between the Akbaba and Çıldır regions, their resistance to the Armenian army cut communication between its front and the rear support. When Sebuh and his unit were en route to the newly established front after the collapse of Kars, the Turkish-Muslim militias in Akbaba attacked, slowing their arrival to the front. ⁸⁵ To make matters worse, the commander of Kars, Taniel Beg Perumyan, had recently broken his leg in a car accident and was forced to give orders from afar in his hospital room, causing disorder in the ranks. ⁸⁶ Artillery units in Kars did not fire upon the Nationalists forces, and no serious clashes took place in the city, leaving the people of Kars in disbelief when they saw Turkish forces entering their city. ⁸⁷ More than 100 prominent officers were held hostage; additionally, around 100,000 sacks of wheat, flour, and rice; 60,000 sacks of sugar; and thousands of weapons, bombs, cannons, and cases of ammunition were left in the hands of the Nationalists. ⁸⁸ The Armenian junior officers and enlisted men who fell prisoner were taken to the railway station and transported to labour camps in Erzurum. ⁸⁹

The Ottoman Armenians during the Clashes

Following the first clashes between the Nationalists and the Armenian military, the Ottoman Armenians initiated a new donation campaign in the Armenian dailies, ‘Everything for the Front’, which elicited strong support from the İstanbul Armenian community, both wealthy and poor. For instance, an Armenian porter, Penyamin Safaryan, who was working at Mahmudiye Han (Mahmudiye Inn) in İstanbul, donated 25 Ottoman liras. He said that since the Armenian government had not recruited him for the military, he wanted to ‘pay his debt to the fatherland’ with this money. ⁹⁰ Officials of the Armenian government proposed to members of the donation committees for the Armenian military in İstanbul that these committees unite as one organization, the National Defence Association, in the same fashion that Ankara had organized the National movement. The National Defence Association planned to have headquarters in İstanbul and organize every aspect of moral and material support for the Armenian military, from preparing the lists of volunteers to organizing communications with government officials. ⁹¹

Jagadamard openly admitted that the Armenian state was ‘in danger of complete destruction’ and urged İstanbul Armenians to join the struggle by giving examples from Poland, where thousands of Polish women were organized under self-defence units and thousands of Polish men defended their fatherland on the front lines against Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine in 1920. ⁹² Verchin Lur initiated a donation campaign under the slogan of ‘Each Man for One Daily Wage’, and the first donations of the campaign were given by the workers of Verchin Lur itself. ⁹³ In Pera, Kumkapı, and Kadıköy, Armenian teachers and students participated in the campaign. The Armenian Patriarch Zaven thanked the daily for initiating such campaigns, and personally donated ten Ottoman liras. ⁹⁴ Armenian orphans too joined in the donation campaigns. For instance, in the Bezazyan school in Bakırköy, the Armenian orphans asked the director to donate the whole value of one month’s food to the Armenian military, choosing to eat only dry bread. The director refused on the grounds that they should eat properly for their health and donated a significant amount to the military on behalf of the orphans. A few days later, the Armenian orphans collected the cheese that they were getting for breakfast, and one of the orphans attempted to sell the cheese in Bakırköy shops in order to donate the income to the military. The director donated a second amount to convince the orphans that they had made an ample donation already. ⁹⁵ Similarly, the director of the Aramyan-Uncuyan school, M. Shamdanjiyan, in his letter sent to Verchin Lur stated that all of the students refused to eat fruit and demanded from their families to donate the value to the Armenian military; some of them even went days without eating anything. ⁹⁶

Not only in İstanbul, the Ottoman Armenians of the remote parts of Anatolia were also engaged in the donation campaigns. For instance, on 8 November, the Armenians of Biga, a small town in Çanakkale, organized a fundraising campaign for the Armenian military, collecting 500 Ottoman liras. The committee highlighted that the Armenians in Biga felt that they had not sufficiently ‘paid their debts to the fatherland’; with the fundraising they hoped to be able to fulfil their duties. Students in the Armenian school in Biga collected 12 liras and participated in the fundraising event. ⁹⁷ Students of the Armenian orphan Karagözyan school in İstanbul, after hearing the news that the Armenian army was defeated on the Kars front, refused to eat their daily food and asked the administrators to donate the food money (around 25 liras) to the Armenian military. ⁹⁸ After the fall of Kars and Gyumri, the Armenian community in Bursa declared a state of mourning on 14 November; no Armenian in the city opened his shop on that day, and a religious rite was held in the Armenian church in ‘honouring the Armenian martyrs who fought on the battlefield against the Nationalist forces’. ⁹⁹

The Fall of Gyumri and Sovietization of the Armenian Republic

After the defeat of the Armenian military in Kars, leaving both soldiers and citizens alike begging for peace, the Armenian government was advised by authoritative politicians and military men such as Kajaznuni, Nazarbekyan, and Ter-Minasyan to sign a ceasefire agreement. ¹⁰⁰ On 1 November, when the Armenian parliament convened in Yerevan, the president spoke on behalf of the government and declared that, despite the military defeats, they would continue fighting against the Turks until the last Armenian unit. Regardless of their political affiliations, members of the parliament applauded this speech for minutes. ¹⁰¹ Ignoring the calls for a ceasefire, the Armenian government made a public announcement, calling upon the whole nation ‘to fight to the end’. ¹⁰²

After the fall of Kars, nonetheless, the Nationalist forces marched 50 km to Gyumri. With their military forces spread thin across much territory, the Armenian government asked for a ceasefire on 6 November. Starting from 7 November, the ceasefire agreement was put into force, stipulating that the Armenian government was to pull back their forces to east of the Arpaçay River and leave the administration of the Gyumri region to the Turks, including the Gyumri train station. ¹⁰³ After the signing of the ceasefire agreement, Kazım Karabekir discussed the agreement conditions with Ankara, and with the support of the Nationalist administration, he imposed a second agreement on 9 November. This agreement included rather strict conditions, such as the removal of the Armenian forces from Gyumri to an area consisting of only Yerevan and the surrounding villages, the free use of Armenian railways not only in Gyumri but also in Sanahin and the Georgian border zone, and the transfer of a considerable amount of weapons and ammunition to the Turkish military. The Armenian government refused these revisions, and the conflict resumed on 11 November. ¹⁰⁴ President Ohanjanyan in his statement argued that the Turks did not mean to establish an agreement between the two sovereign nations but aimed to destroy the legitimacy of the Armenian government, bringing into question its independence. ¹⁰⁵ The Armenian government rejected the updated terms of the Nationalists and decided to continue fighting. The government called on the people anew: ‘To the front, to the ultimate victory and holy self-defence! This is our motto.’ ¹⁰⁶

According to a personal letter written on 29 October and then sent from Yerevan to İstanbul, the entire city of Yerevan was mobilized. Even 16-year-old students were training in the streets and registering with the army to serve at the front. It was possible to see in almost every street units from all strata of the populous – villagers, businessmen, intellectuals, merchants, and students – marching in line to receive weapons training in boot camp. ¹⁰⁷ On 2 November, the Armenian parliament voted to establish self-defence units in the city in case of a Turkish attack. Dr S. P. Yeghiyazaryan was elected president of the committee of self-defence units and called on the residents of the city to join the units in the fight against the Nationalists until the last district fell. ¹⁰⁸

After the occupation of Kars and Gyumri by Nationalist forces, 60,000 Armenian refugees from the neighbouring villages of Kars migrated to the neighbouring villages of Yerevan. Seven thousand refugees escaped to the Sanahin region from Gyumri; however, the Georgians did not allow them passage at the border. Before the war, 6,000 Armenian roubles equalled one Ottoman note, but after the occupation of Gyumri, one Ottoman note cost 20,000 Armenian roubles. ¹⁰⁹

After the occupation of Kars and Gyumri, Kazım Kararbekir issued a circular to the Armenian community stating that the primary objective of the Nationalists was to overthrow the Tashnak government ‘to save both nations from the imperialist Tashnak administration’. ¹¹⁰ In practice, while the local Armenian population in the regions occupied by the Nationalists was generally spared from Nationalist violence, there were multiple reports of the Nationalists plundering the food and harvest of the villagers. ¹¹¹ Furthermore, in the Yerevan region, with the increasing number of refugees from the Gyumri area, there were famine and the spread of contagious diseases. ¹¹²

Though the Armenian government rejected the Nationalists’ terms, the representative of the Bolsheviks, Boris Legran, paid a visit to Yerevan in order to come to an agreement with the Armenian government. According to the preliminary agreement between Legran and the Armenian government made on 21 October, the Armenian government was ready to allow the Bolshevik forces to pass through the Armenian border and use the train lines if the Kars, Zangezur Ghazah, and Lori regions were left alone. Legran also agreed that the Bolsheviks would give oil and return the assets of the Armenian Lazaryan Institute. ¹¹³ The agreement was reached by Boris Legran and Levon Shant in the fourth week of October. ¹¹⁴ Nevertheless, when Legran informed Moscow of the terms of the agreement, the Soviet authorities were hesitant, as they interpreted the agreement to be in favour of the Tashnak government. Separately, the Tashnak government was forced to yield to the terms of the Nationalists; refusal to do so would have resulted in a Nationalist march to Ecmiadzin and Yerevan, and the complete occupation of the Armenian lands. ¹¹⁵

When Khadisyan was discussing peace terms with the Nationalists in Gyumri, the Bolsheviks made a proposal to the Vratsyan government. They offered the return of Nahcevan, Karabakh, and all other Turkish-occupied areas to the Armenians if they accepted Bolshevik authority. However, Vratsyan rejected this offer, and the Bolsheviks ordered Commander Gasyan to march on Yerevan. The offensive of the Armenian Bolsheviks started from the north-eastern border; soon the forces occupied the Dilijan region and declared that the Armenian state was now part of the Soviets and the Tashnaks were ‘the enemies of the Armenians’. The Moscow administration assigned an army of 10,000 soldiers to support Gasyan. Discussions were held in the Armenian parliament, and the majority agreed on making peace accords both with the Soviets, based on the Legran agreements, and with the Nationalists to put an end to the war. ¹¹⁶ The agreement was signed on 2 December, the same day Khadisyan was signing the agreement with the Nationalists in Gyumri. ¹¹⁷

On 6 December, after the Bolsheviks took control of the country, the arrest of prominent Armenian politicians began. ¹¹⁸ The Tashnak leaders were imprisoned, particularly those who strongly opposed the Bolsheviks. On 10 January, General Tro and his officers were exiled to Russia, and 70 prominent officers of the Armenian military were exiled to Baku. On 24 January, 1,200 Armenian military officers, including commanders Siligyan and Hakhverdyan, were exiled to an unknown place. ¹¹⁹ The Armenian Bolsheviks sent hundreds of waggons of gifts to Lenin to express their ‘gratitude’. ¹²⁰

As Gökay clearly outlines in his analysis, the occupation of the Armenian state was based on an agreement between the Bolsheviks and the Nationalist authorities. Even though the Nationalists had aspirations toward formerly Russian-controlled Armenian lands, they did not venture east of Kars. ¹²¹ On the other hand, the Bolsheviks, as Payaslian puts clearly, were not willing to discuss the return of Erzurum, Van, and Muş on behalf of the Armenian nation. ¹²² Thus, both sides adhered to the previously agreed upon principles before attacking the minute Armenian state.

Conclusion

The war between the Nationalist forces and the Armenian government is a critical vantage from which to analyse the Ottoman Armenians’ collective position vis-à-vis the related political developments. The Ottoman Armenians sided with the Armenian Republic and in doing so became ardent supporters of the Armenian military. Hundreds of Ottoman Armenian volunteers joined the Armenian military to fight on the front lines against the Turkish Nationalists, and those who were not able to join the armed struggle paid their ‘national debts’ by raising tremendous amounts of money to donate to the Armenian military. As has been analysed in this article, the Armenian press and the majority of the Armenian public closely followed the developments on the front lines, which then influenced their actions – for instance, the Armenian orphans in İstanbul refused to eat their daily meals to save money to send to the Armenian military, and the Armenian individuals wealthy or poor took part in the donation campaigns. The participation of the Ottoman Armenians in the fundraising campaigns and as volunteers in the Armenian military demonstrates how the Ottoman Armenians, who suffered wartime genocide, saw salvation in supporting the fledgling Armenian state established in the Caucasus.

However, the political stance of the Ottoman Armenians significantly changed after that the Turkish Nationalists won the battles against the Armenian forces in the Caucasus, the Greek and French forces in Western Anatolia and in the Cilicia region, respectively. ¹²³ In 1923, when the newly established Turkish state signed the Treaty of Lausanne, the Armenian community who stayed within the borders of ‘new Turkey’ worked toward re-establishing the Turkish–Armenian friendship by organizing Türk–Ermeni Teali Cemiyeti (Turkish–Armenian Ascent Association). ¹²⁴ The prominent members of the Ottoman Armenian community in İstanbul including the newly elected locum tenens of the Armenian Patriarchate, Kevork Aslanyan, expressed their loyalty to the Mustafa Kemal’s movement and blamed those Armenians who worked against the newly established Republic of Turkey’s interests. ¹²⁵ During the early republican years, Armenians who remained in İstanbul and Anatolia remained ‘loyal citizens’ of Turkey and worked toward preserving ‘healthy relations’ with the Kemalist administration. ¹²⁶ Therefore, it is possible to conclude here that the support of the Ottoman Armenians to the Armenian state in the Caucasus in 1920 was a unique chapter in the history of Ottoman Armenians in the sense that they pursued a pro-Armenian, pro-Allied approach during this historic period.

Through the use of primary sources including Armenian and Ottoman dailies such as Jagadamard, Verchin Lur, Zhoghovurti Tsayně, Vakit, and Peyam-ı Sabah, this article contributes to the historiography in its presentation of Ottoman Armenians’ viewpoint regarding the Turkish–Armenian War.