Abstract
The new book by Michael M. Walker, The 1929 Sino–Soviet War: The War Nobody Knew, invites the reader to explore this period in Chinese history from a new perspective. With its intriguing title, the author takes on a difficult task of convincing the reader that the use of the term ‘war’ for the 1929 Sino–Soviet military conflict is justified.
In the introduction, the author points out that the 1929 war serves as ‘a cautionary tale for the historians’ (p. 2). He warns that the presentation may be unattractive, as compilation of forces, orders of battle, and tactical analysis are often seen as stale relics of old-school military history, but the traditional operational history should not be jumped over so quickly as to miss its significance.
Structurally, the book is divided in two parts. The first one examines the background of the conflict and addresses the period between the Boxer Uprising and the Northern Expedition (1900–28). The author takes on an interesting approach to describing the history of the region. Seeing the Central Eastern Railroad (CER) and the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) as the main reasons for the 1929 Sino–Soviet conflict, he builds his historical narrative around these strategic objects, paying special attention to the changing perception of their significance both in China and the Soviet Union.
The first Sino–Soviet clash over the railroad happened in 1900 during the Boxer Rebellion. In light of these events the Ch’ing dynasty finally decided to create a national military using Yuan Shih-kai’s Peiyang army as its nucleus. With the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution the Chinese army exploded in size. Yuan Shih-kai soon became the president, if only to accept the Twenty-One Demands put forward by the Japanese – a move that further decreased his fading popularity with the masses. Yuan’s death in 1916 resulted in a leadership crisis and power struggle among the Chinese political elites. Meanwhile, in Russia, another revolution brought about the Kerensky government, although its legitimacy was soon challenged by the Bolsheviks.
By 1918, when the Brest-Litovsk armistice treaty was signed, the Chinese were active participants of the Allied intervention into the Russian Far East. Militarily, such cooperation provided China with new combat capabilities: while the Allies transferred German gunboats to the Chinese, Russian armoured trains migrated into the Northern Chinese warlord armies. They were often operated by White Russian mercenaries, and both sides used them in the 1929 Sino–Soviet conflict.
During the period between 1919 and 1922, public frustration over the Versailles Treaty and the May Fourth Movement reinvigorated the Chinese revolutionary spirit, and ended with the creation of the CCP and the United Front. However, despite the clash over Outer Mongolia, the Soviet victory in the Russian Civil War and the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic ultimately led to the 1924 CER agreements and the diplomatic recognition of the USSR.
Walker points out that the sequence of events – the implementation of the 1924 CER agreements, the death of Sun Yat-sen, the May Thirtieth Movement, and the rapid rise of the NRA under Soviet Red Army tutelage – had caught Chang Tso-lin and his son ‘flat-footed’ (p. 125). The author argues that the success of the 1926–8 Northern Expedition put China on a collision course with the Soviet Union. The 1927 KMT–CCP split made the Soviet Union an enemy of both Nanking and Mukden.
The second part of the book describes the events preceding the conflict, the sequence of military and diplomatic encounters, and their immediate aftermath. Walker shows that the dominos leading to the 1929 Sino–Soviet war began to fall when Chang Tso-lin was assassinated by the Japanese and his son Chang Hsueh-liang took over the command. The Young Marshal soon pledged allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek. He also proposed to end direct bilateral discussions between Mukden and Tokyo, deferring further negotiations over Japan’s Manchuria rights to Nanking.
Meanwhile, in the Western part of the world, the Kellogg–Briand Pact was signed in an attempt to make war unlawful. It was in part due to this agreement that the foreign powers were never inclined to consider the Sino–Soviet conflict as a war; after all, doing so would have rendered the Pact virtually useless. In addition to that, the Young Marshal, after a meeting with his generals, concluded that the use of force to recover the CER was warranted and that the Soviets would not fight.
After the seizure of the CER and the raid on the Harbin Soviet consulate, the Soviets retaliated by mobilizing troops in Chita and Irkutsk. On 7 August, Red Army and Chinese soldiers clashed at Suifenho and Manchouli. The first Russian raids in August were rather poorly executed, but after Blyukher took over the command of the Special Far East Army (ODVA), the efficiency of operations improved significantly. The main fight was conducted on two fronts: the Western, running through Manchouli-Dalainor and Hailar, and the Eastern, along the Amur and Ussuri rivers with most fighting concentrated in close proximity to Suifenho.
Several chapters of the book are devoted to the detailed analysis of the military capabilities, strategy, tactics (artillery, infantry, cavalry, and riverine fighting), communication, and unconventional warfare (propaganda). Walker points out that, in 1917–24, the Red Army acknowledged the abilities of the Chinese army and tried to avoid military conflict. But, by 1929 the Soviets had a better-equipped professional army that had learnt a lot from its cooperation with the Germans, be it the advanced mechanized warfare theory or the focus on tactical air support. In addition to that, the former Soviet advisors to the Northern Expedition had important insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese forces.
The disunity within the Chinese leadership played an important role. The October uprising of Feng left Chang Hsueh-liang alone on the field of battle. One of the most disheartening aspects of the way in which the Northeast Frontier Defense Force fought the war was a failure to use its armed force. The Young Marshal, unwilling to risk such a valuable asset, never sent them to the front – a move more akin to that of a calculating warlord than a commander at the head of a national army. No aerial combat with the ODVA took place, and the prohibition against border crossings ruled out reconnaissance missions and bombing raids, the two areas where Fengtien pilots had gained some combat experience during the Tuchun Wars and the Northern Expedition. Red Army squadrons, on the other hand, went into action early and demonstrated marked superiority over their tsarist predecessor of the First World War.
Walker argues that the story of an overwhelming Soviet victory was not as clear-cut as proclaimed. The war between China and the USSR would remain obscure to outside observers for the duration of the crisis. Nevertheless, Voroshilov’s deliberations on 17 November over abandoning the Western Front offensive after hitting unexpectedly tough Chinese resistance prove that victory was gained often in the face of stiff resistance with multiple casualties on both sides. In the final chapters of the book, Walker underscores his main argument: Stalin’s goal was to humiliate and embarrass Nanjing and Mukden – to let Chang and Chiang know who held the real power over the CER – and he succeeded. Yet he had failed the prime objective – to remove them from power.
As a pretext for war, the GPU (State Political Directorate) and ODVA soldiers presented Moscow with proof that hostile armed groups were crossing into Soviet territory, thus marrying the CER incident to the White threat. Walker believes that the Kremlin had to manufacture the evidence of threat to justify its attack on China. Once the victory in the Chinese northeast was achieved, the Soviets used the opportunity to clear it of White Russian troops. The imprisoned Russians were forcefully repatriated to the Soviet Union and never heard from again. Meanwhile, Chinese prisoners underwent political education, and the proselytization effort, combined with fair treatment, moved a few to join the Young Communist League.
Walker identifies a number of consequences of the war. For China, it signalled defeat as it tried to re-emerge as a country willing and able to defend what was thought to be its national interests against the aggression of a major power. The Red Army victory compelled Japan to reorient its defences toward northeastern China and Soviet Russia. For the Soviet Union, it provided evidence that the Stalinist era of Soviet imperialism had begun. The Soviet victory reverberated across the globe, helping the USSR re-enter the East Asian arena. But more importantly, the war nullified the Kellogg–Briand Pact, proving the attempt to outlaw warfare futile.
Thus, Michael M. Walker makes use of his military expertise, multiple archival sources, and earlier scholarly works on the topic. He provides an insightful analysis of a widely overlooked international conflict. His book transcends the limits of political or military history, elegantly uniting the two in one concisely written manuscript.