Abstract
This article investigates how the Swedish state's supply system was organized during the campaign against Napoleon in 1805–1807, and how the state-merchant cooperation, which was so important for the outcome of military campaigns, functioned during the war. The article utilizes the concept of the ‘contractor state’ to comprehend how the Swedish system operated. The results show that the supply system was based on warehouses which were supplied by local resources, but also with supplies that originated from Holstein, Livonia and Scania. These supplies arrived in the warehouses through the assistance of merchants in places such as Lübeck and Stralsund.
In 1805, Sweden joined the third coalition against Napoleon and sent troops to Swedish Pomerania. Beside Sweden, the coalition consisted of Britain, the Habsburg monarchy and Russia, and the aim was to prevent further French expansion in Europe. 1 The concentration of troops in the province of Western Pomerania, which was largely funded by British subsidies, required the mobilization of resources, such as food for the soldiers and fodder for the horses. The plans of the coalition to campaign in Hanover also necessitated the gathering of resources in storehouses along the river Elbe. 2 Since the army did not have the necessary market information to acquire food and fodder on its own, the officials in charge of procurement had to interact with merchants in several locations to get hold of the required commodities. The Swedish state was therefore, like all European states, dependent on the cooperation of merchants when waging war.
The purpose of this article is to investigate how the Swedish state's supply system was organized during the campaign against Napoleon in 1805–1807, and how the state-merchant cooperation, which was so important for the outcome of military campaigns, functioned during the war. The article utilizes the concept of the ‘contractor state’, coined by Roger Knight and Martin Wilcox to capture the character of the British state and the close relationship between the Navy and private suppliers during the Napoleonic Wars, to comprehend how the Swedish system operated. 3 This perspective has mostly been used to examine how major powers, such as Britain, France and Spain, organized their military supplies, but scholars have seldom examined how minor powers, such as Sweden, arranged their supply systems in major conflicts. By investigating the Swedish system, we will gain a better understanding of the opportunities and constraints that influenced a minor power's participation in a major European war.
All the supply systems of the warring states had to contend with warfare on a scale never seen on the European continent. Only the French army had around 212,000 soldiers and 48,000 horses in the beginning of 1807, and five years later it comprised 611,000 men and 182,000 horses. 4 Clearly, the size of the armies put pressures on the warring states and their capabilities to feed their troops. The increase in the scale of the fighting also led to a more pronounced difference between major and minor powers. The hierarchy between them had become more obvious during the second half of the eighteenth century, but this trend increased even further during the Napoleonic Wars. The major powers were much stronger states – financially and militarily – and therefore able to dominate less resourceful states in Europe. Thus, the interests of the major powers set the agenda in the international states system by controlling the existing alliances and by strongly influencing decisions about war and peace. Although the minor powers had to adapt their policies to the major powers, they could still seek advantages from these arrangements by using neutrality in trade during war, or by seeking subsidies from the major powers. 5
Previous research on logistics during the Napoleonic Wars has focused largely on the major powers and their efforts to supply their military forces. Martin van Creveld, who has analysed Napoleon's campaign in 1805, argues that French forces mainly gathered supplies locally through requisitions rather than relying on the establishment of magazines in advance along the marching routes of the army corps. 6 John Lynn disputes this interpretation by stressing that all early modern armies depended on magazines that often were stocked through contributions from occupied territory and supply convoys from areas further away. However, Lynn admits that Napoleon's advance in 1805 was based on organized foraging by well-disciplined army corps that were dispersed along a broad front. Thereby, they could maximize the area from which they collected supplies. 7 Frederick Schneid follows Lynn's interpretation by emphasizing that the French army depended on the establishment of depots along the marching routes. Thus, in the wars against the third and fourth coalitions military contractors in France provided food and fodder, which were supplemented by resources from German princes in Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria and local provisioning. 8 Meanwhile, John Gill shows how the armies of the Habsburg monarchy used networks of warehouses and civilian transport to carry goods from the warehouses to the armies. The main magazines were located inside the border of the monarchy, which were connected to a chain of subsidiary magazines established along its lines of operations. The supplies were procured from local authorities and merchants, or through requisitions on enemy territories. 9
In contrast to van Creveld's analysis, Roger Knight and Martin Wilcox show how the Victualling Board in London provided provisions to the British Navy by interacting with merchants and brokers in Britain and overseas. It was this cooperation between the state and private actors that facilitated the British Navy's successful operations. 10 In a similar approach, Peter Wilson and Marianne Klerk argue that fiscal-military hubs, such as Amsterdam and Genoa, were located throughout Europe, which could provide manpower, commodities and credit to warring states. These hubs emerged in the early modern period, and they continued to play a role in the early nineteenth century, even if Napoleon's control of previously independent cities, and other states’ attempts to nationalize war-making, reduced their roles in Europe's fiscal-military system. 11
The Swedish military campaign in 1805–1807 has attracted very limited scholarly interest. The few studies that have looked into the campaign have focused on the foreign policy context and the military actions during the campaign, but without examining the system of supplies or the cooperation between state officials and merchants. 12 Scholars have also noted that the Swedish war effort was largely financed by British subsidies and that there was no total mobilization of resources to fight the war. 13 By focusing on the logistics of the Swedish campaign, the study will provide new insights into the operations of the third and fourth coalitions against Napoleon, and present an intervention in the scholarly debates about the organization of military logistics during the early nineteenth century.
The only major investigation of the Swedish supply system during the Napoleonic Wars has been conducted by Martin Hårdstedt, who has investigated the procurement of goods during the Russo-Swedish War in Finland in 1808–1809. He shows that a war commissariat was set up in Finland with the main responsibility of acquiring supplies, and that the system relied on cooperation with the civilian local authorities who could order peasants to deliver goods and transport capacity to the army. He concludes that the Swedish war effort was heavily dependent on stored supplies and that provisions were purchased or commandeered from local sources. He also shows how the transport organization functioned badly during the war and how this hampered the war effort. 14 However, Finland had more limited local resources than Swedish Pomerania, which means that the campaigns in 1805–1807 and 1808–1809 differed from a supply perspective.
In this article, the concept of the ‘contractor state’ is utilized to investigate the procurement of foodstuffs and fodder to the Swedish army. The analysis therefore focuses on the type of commodities that were procured, from where the goods originated and how the purchases were arranged. Other important aspects concern the character of the contracts between the state and the suppliers, and the overall relationship between the Swedish state and the merchants who provided goods to the army. The analysis is based on the correspondence and ledgers in the archive of the Swedish general war commissariat that was set up to oversee the procurement of goods during the war. Moreover, customs records from the towns of Lübeck and Stralsund are analysed to gain insight into the origin of incoming goods into Swedish Pomerania. The article then proceeds as follows. First it presents the background to the political and military situation in the beginning of the nineteenth century and the lead up to Sweden joining the third coalition. This is followed by an analysis of the military operations and the Swedish supply system during the campaign in 1805–1807. The final section summarizes the findings and discusses how the Swedish system related to the logistics of other European powers during the period.
The Economic, Political and Military Background to the Campaign in 1805–1807
The constitutional and fiscal framework that guided the decisions leading up to Sweden's participation in the third coalition was established during the Russo-Swedish War 1788–1790. The framework meant that the king's powers were absolute, especially in the areas of foreign policy, military affairs and in determining how the government's revenue should be spent. He had the authorization to declare war and participate in alliances with other states without summoning the four estates of the Riksdag (nobility, clergy, burghers and peasants). However, any new taxes and legislation had to be approved by the four estates. This divided fiscal authority between the royal government, and the elite was strengthened by the fact that the estates controlled the Bank of the Estates and the National Debt Office. The bank issued money (riksdaler banco) that had silver backing, which reduced its ability to fund government deficits by increasing liquidity. The National Debt Office was given earmarked taxes to pay interests on the government debt. The debt consisted of three parts: external long-term debt issued primarily in Amsterdam, Antwerp, Genoa and Leipzig; internal long-term debt in the form of bonds; and non-interest-bearing promissory notes that functioned as legal tender parallel to the notes issued by the bank. Following a decision in 1800 that was implemented in 1803, there was a fixed exchange rate between the two notes. 15
Swedish Pomerania was a province with its own political and administrative institutions and its own currency. The Swedish king was Duke of Pomerania and as such he was represented at the Imperial Diet of the Holy Roman Empire. 16 In the accounts of the war commissariat in Stralsund, transactions were recorded in Pomeranian Courant, which meant that resources from Sweden in the form of riksdaler had to be exchanged into Pomeranian Courant before they could be utilized in Swedish Pomerania. Actors usually utilized bankers in Hamburg to organize these transactions. 17 Economically, the province had areas for grain production and several merchants were involved in international trade. Grain exports to other parts of the Swedish realm were an important part of their business. 18
Sweden's foreign policy in the 1790s was driven by the policy of neutrality to benefit from interloping between the major powers. The biggest threat to this policy was seizures of goods on neutral ships. Britain, which dominated the seas, enforced its own interpretation of maritime law with the purpose of reducing the opportunities for neutrals. In response to these measures, Sweden formed the League of Armed Neutrality together with Denmark, Prussia and Russia in December 1800. The actions of the League targeted British interests, and it led to a military reaction from Britain when British forces attacked Denmark in April 1801. The Danish state was forced to leave the League, and it soon led to a collapse of the whole arrangement. Instead, Sweden joined an Anglo-Russian trade agreement in March 1802. The British were the main buyers of Swedish bar iron, the most significant Swedish export commodity. 19
The resumption of the war between Britian and France in 1803, and the latter's advances in German lands raised concern within the royal government. The king, Gustavus IV Adolphus, was married to Fredrika from Baden and the couple spent time in Baden in 1803–1804. News of Napoleon's actions angered the king since he thought that the French ruler broke with the established political order in the Holy Roman Empire. Sweden therefore broke off its diplomatic relations with France in September 1804, and actions were taken to strengthen the Swedish military presence in Swedish Pomerania. 20 Concurrently, it became increasingly evident to the British government that it was not enough to control the seas to defeat the ambitions of Napoleon. Thus, victory could only be achieved on land, which made Britain willing to provide subsidies to allied states. At the same time, many European governments were reluctant to resume the war against France. The Habsburg monarchy, for example, was still dealing with the economic fallout of the previous war, while Prussia had benefitted from its neutrality and was unwilling to change this policy as it tried to balance between Russia and France. 21
It was the actions of Napoleon rather than strong commitments from the anti-French side that sparked the formation of the new coalition. In May 1805, Napoleon took the throne of the former Cisalpine Republic and turned it into the kingdom of Italy, and Genoa was annexed into France the following month. Soon thereafter Britain ratified a treaty with Russia, which sent troops to support the Habsburg monarchy, and then the Habsburgs joined the Anglo-Russian alliance. In October 1805, Sweden joined the coalition, which made it possible for Russian troops to use Swedish Pomerania as a base for its operations in northern Germany. Prussia, however, remained neutral despite diplomatic pressure to participate in the anti-French coalition. Both the Habsburg monarchy and Sweden received subsidies from Britain for their participation in the coalition. 22
Britain had already in December 1804 agreed to pay out £60,000 to Sweden to strengthen the defences at the fortress in Stralsund. In August 1805, Sweden received monthly payments in exchange for continuing to strengthen the defences in Stralsund and for allowing Russian troops to use Swedish Pomerania as a bridgehead. In October the same year, Sweden was given further subsidies for active participation in the coalition with 10,000 men. In total, Sweden received around £20,000 per month from October 1805 plus compensation for transport and procurement costs. These sums were far greater than what other coalition partners received, which shows the significance the British government put on the involvement of Sweden in the coalition. 23 In table 1, the total amount of British subsidies to Sweden during the campaign 1805–1807 is summarized.
British Subsidies to the Swedish State, 1804–1807
Source: Karl Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser 1719–1809 (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1961), p. 853.
Although the coalition against Napoleon could muster significant military resources of around 500,000 troops, the contradictions in the war policies of the different states meant that the coalition was poorly coordinated. In other words, there was neither a clear-cut strategy nor a plan for an offensive against France. Instead, the coalition could only agree that in Northern Europe, Napoleon should evacuate Hanover and northern Germany and allow for the reestablishment of Dutch independence, but how this should be achieved was rather vague. Consequently, it was Napoleon who had the initiative. 24
Military Operations and the Mobilization of Resources, 1804–1805
In 1804, a general war commissariat was set up in the town of Stralsund in Swedish Pomerania with the aim of acquiring, storing and supplying the army with supplies. The commissariat was headed by an intendant who reported to the commanding officer. The officials in the commissariat also set up storage facilities in the towns of Greifswald and Wolgast in Swedish Pomerania. In total, 14 officials were initially employed in the organization. 25 Besides the commanding officers, the commissariat cooperated with the central financial administration in Stockholm, which administered the incoming British subsidies, and the civilian administration in Swedish Pomerania, such as the governor-general, who could command civilians to provide housing and transport capacity to the army. 26
This system was well-established in Sweden in the early nineteenth century, and it had been used both during the Seven Years’ War (1757–1762) when Sweden was part of the anti-Prussian coalition, and during the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–1790. During these earlier campaigns, the efforts of the local war commissariat were complemented by centralized procurement commissions (utredningskommission), which, with the assistance of merchants, purchased goods further away from the theatres of war. During the campaign in 1805–1807, such assistance was deemed to be unnecessary because of the limited number of troops that had to be supplied, and the relatively good availability of local resources in Swedish Pomerania. 27
Two of the leading administrators in charge of procurement were Achates Carl von Platen (1752–1832) and Gustaf Fredrik Wirsén (1779–1827). Platen had had a military career in both Prussian and Swedish service before he started to concentrate more on managing his landed estates in Swedish Pomerania and southern Sweden. 28 It was probably the combination of his military experience and his knowledge of the local economic conditions in Swedish Pomerania and Scania that made him suitable to head the organization. Platen's close associate in Swedish Pomerania, Wirsén, started his career as a naval administrator in the 1790s before he became more involved in administering the central government's revenues. In 1805, he was appointed to the general war commissariat with special responsibility for the commissariat's accounts. 29
Initially, the king ordered the commissariat to purchase foodstuffs and fodder for 6,000 men and 300 horses during seven months from November 1804 to May 1805. The costs for these purchases were primarily covered by local revenue in Swedish Pomerania. The requested quantities included 25,000 litres of brandy, 20 lasts of potatoes, 34,850 kilograms of salted pork, 100 barrels of salted herring, 42,500 kilograms of butter, 12 lasts of salt, 1,020 kilograms of cheese and 6,096 kilograms of hay. Moreover, the commissariat was ordered to procure sufficient volumes of rye, but without specifying the number of barrels. According to the regulations, the commissariat should have organized public auctions to procure the goods, but because of the need to purchase relatively large volumes in a short period of time, the commissariat was given permission to buy the goods directly from different suppliers. 30
At the outset, the commissariat utilized the local civilian administration to provide a total of 116 lasts of rye valued at 10,321 Pomeranian Courant (hereafter abbreviated pc). 31 However, it soon became clear that this solution was insufficient and that the commissariat had to become actively involved in the purchases of grain. 32 One of the merchants they interacted with was Johann Heinrich Israel, a merchant born in Stralsund in 1772 and who had established his merchant house in the town in 1795. 33 In 1804, Israel provided 503 lasts of rye, 72 lasts of oats and 52 lasts of peas. In total, his contracts with the Swedish state were valued at 94,699 pc. 34 Although the sources do not tell us where the supplies originated, the records for incoming ships in Stralsund in 1805 shows that foodstuffs handled by Israel either came from Wolgast and Greifswald, or Riga in Livonia. 35
The size of the supplies from Israel was so large that the commissariat was unable to pay him right away upon delivery of the goods. Von Platen therefore had to use his own short-term credit in an extraordinarily manner to pay Israel while he waited for government resources. The size of the credit extensions amounted to 62,012 pc at the end of 1804, and the administrator provided such credit on three occasions, averaging 88 days, in 1804–1805. Von Platen was later paid for these credit arrangements together with five percent interest. 36 These arrangements show that it was important for the commissariat to portray itself as a reliable partner among Stralsund's merchants. Thus, rather than delaying payments to the suppliers, which had been common during Swedish campaigns in the seventeenth century, it became paramount for the leading administrator to step in and use his own resources to cover existing deficits. 37 The necessity for the administrator's private intervention also shows that the Swedish state was not financially prepared for the costs of building up sufficient volumes of supplies in Swedish Pomerania in 1804.
The merchant Israel was by far the largest supplier to the war commissariat in 1804, but other merchants also played crucial roles, such as Johann Heinrich Bartels, who had established himself as a merchant in Stralsund in 1793. 38 In 1804, he supplied 25,000 litres of brandy, around seven lasts of barley grain, twenty-one lasts of salt and around 1,400 litres of vinegar. 39 Of these commodities, salt was usually imported to Stralsund from the Mediterranean via Liverpool, while brandy could be shipped to Stralsund from both Memel in East Prussia and the Danish capital Copenhagen. 40 Von Platen also used his contacts in the Swedish province of Scania to get hold of commodities. These goods were either supplied by the merchants Borlind and Fernström in the town of Ystad, or by von Platen's own estate at Bollerup. The latter supplied 4,200 kilograms of cheese and salted beef valued at 3,711 pc in 1804. 41 This shows that the war commissariat initially concentrated their procurement from merchants in the Swedish realm rather than seeking relationships with external suppliers.
This picture is strengthened if we examine the procurement of potatoes. This commodity was not traded in large volumes by a few merchants. Instead, the commissariat interacted with more than 60 local suppliers in Swedish Pomerania who each provided relatively small volumes. Many of these sellers were peasants, such as Carl Beu who sold potatoes for eight pc and Johann Steinfort who provided potatoes valued at four pc. In total, the commissariat procured 197 lasts of potatoes valued at 6,587 pc, which was a far greater volume than what had been requested, and a volume for which it was difficult to find storage space in Stralsund. Consequently, around 25 lasts had to be discarded in the spring of 1805 due to poor storage underground in the countryside during the winter. 42 This indicates that there were many local producers who were willing to trade with the commissariat, and that local storage facilities could not accommodate the supply of goods in 1804.
The efforts to build-up the supplies and to strengthen the fortress in Stralsund continued during the first half of 1805. In order to secure local supplies, the royal government ordered an export ban on all grain, except wheat, from Swedish Pomerania. This led to protests from the grain merchants in Stralsund, such as Johann Heinrich Israel, who argued that the supply was more than enough to cater for both the military needs and the export of grain. Clearly, the merchants were worried that they would be forced to only interact with the Swedish crown, and thereby reduce their ability to seek the highest price in the region. A compromise was reached, which allowed some export if the merchants guaranteed the sale of certain volumes to the crown. 43 Thus, it was important for the crown to listen to the sentiments of the local merchants.
In October it was settled that Sweden would take active part in the northern army together with a Russian contingent. The first aim of the combined force was to move towards Hanover and dispel the French forces from the province. 44 Thus, a Swedish army contingent of around 10,000 men was to cooperate with a Russian army corps of 19,000 men by marching from Swedish Pomerania through Mecklenburg into Hanover. The Swedish force consisted of twelve infantry battalions, fourteen squadrons of cavalry and six artillery batteries, which were concentrated into four infantry brigades, a cavalry brigade and an artillery brigade. 45
Following the decision to join the northern army, the king ordered the commissariat to provide foodstuffs and fodder for 12,000 men and 2,000 horses during three months initially, and that a major part of the resources should be located in storage facilities close to the river Elbe in Boizenburg, Lauenburg, Lüneburg and Ratzeburg. 46 In November, Wirsén calculated that bread for one month and other supplies for half a month for 9,000 men and 2,000 horses required the procurement of 153,000 kilograms of dried bread, 130 barrels of peas, 200 barrels of barley grain, 8,500 kilograms of beef, 8,500 kilograms of herring, 5,738 kilograms of cheese, 3,825 kilograms of pork, 2,975 kilograms of salt and 2,890 kilograms of butter. Additionally, 1,600 barrels of oats and 63,750 kilograms of hay had to be acquired for the horses. 47 This shows that bread and hay were the main commodities, which were accompanied by smaller volumes of beef, herring, pork and peas as well as butter and cheese.
Instead of transporting goods from Swedish Pomerania to the storage facilities around the river Elbe, the commissariat decided to purchase most of the commodities from merchants in Hamburg and Lübeck. Thus, the merchant house Pauli and Sohn in Lübeck signed a contract already on 30 October for provisions valued at 30,191 pc. Additionally, Pauli and Sohn arranged the grinding of rye and the baking of soft and dried bread. The bankers Luis and Jencquel in Hamburg also signed a contract for the delivery of 90 lasts of oats for 11,846 pc. Moreover, the merchant Berckemeyer in Thurow provided food, especially soft bread, and fodder to the Swedish contingent valued at 10,544 pc. Finally, another important supplier was Diedrich Heinrich Mussehl in Boizenburg, who signed a contract for both food and fodder valued at 17,835 pc. 48 Around sixty percent of the cost of these purchases, or 103,200 pc, were directly paid for with British subsidies, which arrived in Hamburg and distributed to the commissariat through the banker Luis and Jencquel, whom the Swedish state had a well-established relationship with since the 1780s. 49
These agreements show that it was relatively easy for the commissariat to get hold of significant volumes of goods in a rather short period of time on open external markets. They also show that the commissariat had made arrangements in Hamburg and Lübeck even before they received the king's official orders and before the declaration of war, which indicates that the plans to move westward into Hanover were circulating within the military administration beforehand. The availability of British subsidies helped the commissariat to reach agreements with the suppliers and to pay them promptly upon delivery of the goods. There was no repeat of the situation the previous year when the officials had to use their own credit to procure the necessary goods.
At the same time as the deliveries were arranged to the storage facilities around the river Elbe, the procurement activities in Swedish Pomerania continued during the whole of 1805 but with increasing intensity in the autumn due to rising military demands. First, the commissariat arranged for deliveries from crown warehouses. From Stockholm, four ships with a cargo of 4,000 barrels of rye arrived in Stralsund in October and November, and from Karlskrona a total of six ships arrived with 158,882 kilograms of dried bread, 136 barrels of peas, 19,006 kilograms of salted beef, 13,430 kilograms of salted pork, 5,712 kilograms of salted herring, 6,129 kilograms of butter and 2,720 kilograms of tobacco leaves. 50 Second, the commissariat purchased commodities from two merchants in Stralsund, Peter Hermann Friedrich Reimer and Johann Christoff Wallis junior. Reimer, who was born in 1765 and who established himself as a merchant in the town in 1789, signed a contract in November valued at 13,673 pc for the delivery of butter, cheese, salted beef and salted pork. 51 These commodities had arrived in Stralsund on two ships from Denmark on 6 November, one from Assens and the other from Ærøskøbing. 52 Thus, it was Reimer who had made the arrangements for the purchase and loading of the cargo on the ships before the contract had been signed. The contract stipulated that Reimer would be reimbursed as soon as the goods reached Stralsund and inspected by officials from the war commissariat. He received his payment in seven instalments from 8 to 20 November. 53 Wallis meanwhile, who had started his own merchant house in 1801, signed a contract on 4 November through a broker valued at 7,782 pc for the delivery of 36 lasts of rye from Riga. He received his full payment for the shipment only two days after the arrival and inspection of the goods in Stralsund. 54
Additionally, the commissariat purchased salted beef from the butcher guild in Stralsund for 5,457 pc, and they continued to use merchants in southern Sweden to get hold of goods. Thus, from the merchant Borlind in Ystad, they received 180 barrels of beef valued at 3,960 pc, while the merchant Brodd in Helsingborg provided around 240,000 litres of brandy for 41,225 pc. 55 Interestingly, the commissariat did not turn to Johann Heinrich Israel in 1805, despite his displayed capacity the year before to procure large quantities of commodities. Perhaps the earlier payment problems, as well as the planned export restrictions, had created tensions in the relationship, which made Israel unwilling to assist the crown. However, the commissariat had other options, such as Reimer, who could step in and procure the necessary goods.
The activities of the Swedish contractor state made it possible for the Swedish army to advance into Mecklenburg and toward Hanover. In November, a small contingent also joined up with the Russian force in Lüneburg, which meant that the coalition army occupied the Hanoverian electorate while the French commander Barbou kept his force passive at the fortress of Hameln. The arrival of Hanoverian troops in Bremen and Verden further strengthened the northern army. However, the Swedish king was suspicious of the intent of the Prussian government. The main force of the Swedish army therefore stopped at Lauenburg in Mecklenburg, while ignoring a request from the Russian commander to concentrate the Swedish force further west to meet up with the Anglo-Hanoverian contingent. 56
After the news of Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz in early December, the military and political dynamic totally changed. The Prussian government decided to reach an agreement with France, which guaranteed Prussian control of Hanover. 57 Subsequently, the Russian army was evacuated from Hanover by January, and the Anglo-Hanoverian force shortly thereafter followed suit. The Swedish king, however, kept the army in Mecklenburg, which could have resulted in a war with Prussia over the control of Hanover. 58 But since the Swedish contingent was designed to operate only together with allied forces, it was too small to challenge the Prussian army backed up by Napoleon. The Prussian government was also eager not to escalate tensions with Sweden. The Swedish king therefore decided to slowly retreat to Swedish Pomerania. 59
Because of the retreat, most of the resources in the newly established warehouses were no longer needed. The king thus ordered the disbandment of the warehouses. 60 Parts of this disbandment were accomplished by cancelling existing contracts. The procurement from Luis and Jencquel of ninety lasts of oats for example was simply revoked, while Pauli and Sohn in Lübeck accepted to take back forty-six lasts of rye, 1,054 kilograms of cheese and 3,808 kilograms of salted pork if the government paid a sixteen percent discount or fee. In other cases, von Platen used merchants to sell the goods on the open market or arranged public auctions to regain as much as possible of the funds that had been utilized to buy the goods. Still, the losses were expected to reach around 6,000 pc for the goods acquired in Hamburg and Lübeck. 61
Continuation of the Campaign 1806–1807
Even if the defeat at Austerlitz, together with Prussia's decision to join France had shattered the ambitions of the third coalition, the Swedish king did not remove Sweden from the war, and he continued to receive subsidy payments from Britain. 62 Consequently, the Swedish authorities maintained the army in the region and planned for a renewed campaign in 1806 in cooperation with its allies. In the spring, a Royal Pomeranian Militia was formed, which comprised all unmarried men aged between nineteen and twenty-six and capable of bearing arms. In May, around 3,000 men had been conscripted into the militia. 63 Concurrently, the commissariat continued to procure foodstuffs for the warehouses in Swedish Pomerania. The king ordered it to have the capacity to feed at least 12,000 men in Stralsund during a period of three months. 64 To achieve this goal, the local authorities were ordered to provide goods from local producers in the province, but the commissariat also procured goods, mainly flour, oats and barley grain, from the abandoned Russian warehouse in Stralsund. 65 Moreover, the commissariat again turned to merchants in Stralsund, such as Reimer and Wallis junior. Reimer sold oats, salt, herring, salted beef, salted pork and butter, while Wallis supplied salt. 66 The merchant Johann Heinrich Israel, who had been very active in 1804, again delivered oats valued at 6,300 pc in June. The merchant Borlind in Ystad also continued to supply goods to the army. In 1806, he sold ninety-one lasts of oats and 5,279 kilograms of salted beef to the crown. 67 Additionally, the Swedish commander in southern Sweden, Johan Christopher Toll, procured 2,374 barrels of rye through the merchants Hamberg and Hagerman in Ystad. 68 All of this shows that the commissariat, like in 1804, relied on merchants in the Swedish realm rather than to continue purchase goods from merchants in Hamburg or Lübeck.
However, the king's decision to send an army contingent back to Lauenburg in Mecklenburg, again required the commissariat to negotiate with merchants in Lübeck for the delivery of goods. This time they did not procure goods from Pauli and Sohn. Instead, they turned to the merchant C.H. Suckau, who provided pork, cheese and herring for 3,563 pc. The commissariat also procured dried bread from the merchant house Gotthilff and Fritz for 2,886 pc. Additionally, other merchants sold red wine and French brandy. 69 All of these purchases show that it was relatively easy for the commissariat to return to the market in Lübeck, probably because the British subsidies improved the commissariat's credibility and its capacity to arrange relatively swift payments.
The position of the Swedish contingent became precarious after the twin battles of Jena-Auerstädt in October 1806 when Napoleon defeated the Prussian army. French forces pursued fleeing Prussian troops north westward toward Lübeck, and the Swedish contingent came caught in crossfire. Subsequently, over a thousand men were captured by the French army and only 400 men were transported back to Stralsund on ships provided by the merchant Wallis junior. 70
The actions of the French army resulted in the control of Hamburg and Lübeck, but Napoleon wanted to dominate all major German ports in the Baltic to prevent British trade in the region. He therefore ordered 15,000 troops to Swedish Pomerania, which started a siege of the fortress in Stralsund that housed around 11,000 regular and 3,000 militia troops. Around 8,000 French troops were involved in the siege, while the rest of the force was located around Anklam on the border between Prussian and Swedish Pomerania. 71
For the general and governor-general of Swedish Pomerania, Hans Henric von Essen, who had been handed the command of the troops when the king left for Sweden in September, it became crucial to ensure that the fortress had sufficient supplies during the winter. On 30 October, he therefore ordered that the strongest arrangement should be made to ensure that 8,000 troops had the necessary supplies for four months. He also stressed that the procurement should be made at the best available prices, but it was not necessary to maintain a specific proportion between the different goods. Basically, everything that was available should be purchased and brought into Stralsund and all of the supplies in the other crown storehouses in the province should be brought to the town. 72 Concurrently, the commissariat calculated that the supply of bread, flour and grain was greater than what was needed, but there was a shortage of 800 barrels of peas, 57,800 kilograms of salted pork and 567 barrels of herring. Moreover, some of the stored beef and butter had been in the storage facilities since 1804 and had lost some of its nutrition, but it could be served to the soldiers if necessary. 73
Another problem emerged following Napoleon's capture of Hamburg, the primary financial centre dealing with transfers of British subsidies as well as payments between Sweden and Swedish Pomerania, namely the difficulty for the commissariat to receive sufficient funds to pay suppliers and the army. In response to this challenge, it was proposed that Swedish bank notes should be transferred to the province to function as a means of payment, but also that soldiers and officers should receive goods in kind rather than monetary payments. However, it was stressed that such arrangements required that the inhabitants in Swedish Pomerania would trust the value of the bank notes and not open opportunities for speculators to profit from value differentials between currencies. If the Swedish bank notes lost value against the Pomeranian courant, it would be the soldiers who would lose out. In December 1806, a total of 75,000 riksdaler in small denomination notes were sent to Stralsund from Malmö. The commissariat was cautioned not to send the notes into circulation too quickly to maintain their value. The king also stated that similar transfers would take place on a monthly basis. 74 Additionally, low denomination tokens were issued, which could only be used by soldiers who bought their food from local hawkers, and by the hawkers when they purchased the food items from the crown warehouses. 75 These measures were a way for the commissariat to meet the demand for more money in circulation.
The French siege of the fortress in Stralsund was unsuccessful since they could not prevent the arrival of ships to the harbour. Thus, two ships from Ystad with a total of 1,410 barrels of oats entered in January, and in February one ship from Gothenburg with 150 barrels of herring arrived. Likewise, the merchant Peter Herman Friedrich Reimer arranged a shipment from Ystad with herring, beef and cheese in March, and the same month the merchant Johann Heinrich Israel brought in a ship from Copenhagen with herring, butter and flour. 76 Additionally, the crown arranged for the transport of foodstuffs from Gothenburg in early March. 77 In other words, the capacity of the Swedish contractor state ensured that the fortress could withstand the siege and provide the essential foodstuffs and fodder to the army and the civilian population.
In early spring the French contingent left Swedish Pomerania to concentrate their efforts on the fortress of Kolberg in Prussian Pomerania instead. Subsequently, the Swedish army advanced and took control of the whole of Swedish Pomerania, as well as Ückermünde and Wollin on Prussian territory. Another contingent also went into Mecklenburg and cleared the town of Rostock of French forces. The Swedish general Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt, who commanded one of the two columns of troops, was eager to advance even further against the French troops, but the other general Hans Henric von Essen was more cautious. He therefore negotiated a truce with France in April 1807, which guaranteed Swedish control of the whole of Swedish Pomerania. 78
Although the British government disliked the truce with France, it was still committed to its ally and agreed to pay further subsidies as well as to the deployment of a force of 4,000 Hanoverians in Swedish Pomerania. A deal with Prussia was also struck regarding the deployment of a cavalry force of around 5,000 men on the island of Rügen. 79 All of these measures show that the truce was seen as temporary and that the allies were planning for a campaign throughout the summer and autumn. The increase in the number of soldiers in Swedish Pomerania also put new pressure on the commissariat to procure the necessary resources. At the end of May, Wirsén calculated what was needed to feed 15,000 men from the Swedish army as well as 6,200 Prussians during four months from June to the end of September. He concluded that there were available resources in the warehouses or arrangements had already been made to procure more, but a further 5,489 barrels of wheat, 2,338 barrels of rye, 7,745 barrels of barley and 32,842 barrels of oats had to be acquired. 80
Some of the required resources came from Ystad through the efforts of von Platen. On 31 May and 2 June two ships with a total of 1,408 barrels of oats, 254 barrels of beef and 42 barrels of rye arrived in Stralsund, and on 29 June a further 500 barrels of oats arrived. The Prussians also helped by sending 129 lasts of oats and 72 lasts of rye from Pillau in East Prussia. Additionally, the Prussians sent a ship from Riga with 112 barrels of rye. 81 Additionally, merchants in both Stralsund and Lübeck provided necessary resources. For example, the merchant Gotthilff in the latter town sent a representative to Stralsund offering to sell significant quantities of foodstuffs to the Swedish crown despite the French control of the town. According to customs records in Lübeck, no ships departed from the town directly to Stralsund. Instead, many skippers listed neutral destinations in Denmark and Holstein, which indicates that Gotthilff used his connections in these locations to provide 235,884 kilograms of salted pork, 150,535 kilograms of smoked pork, and 87,210 kilograms of tobacco to Swedish Pomerania. Likewise, the merchants Reimer and Israel in Stralsund provided wheat, rye and barley to the coalition's war efforts. 82 These figures show that the local Pomeranian merchants could deliver grain, but it was more difficult for them to get hold of pork and tobacco. Hence, it became necessary for the commissariat to use merchants in Lübeck, who had established contacts in neighbouring Denmark and Holstein.
However, before these resources of the Swedish contractor state could be fully used the situation changed again when Napoleon defeated a Russian army at Friedland in June 1807. This victory meant that the French could focus more of their resources on the war against Sweden. Gustavus Adolphus, who had arrived back in Swedish Pomerania in May, refused to yield to French demands and retreated into Stralsund. The French forces, under the command of Marshal Guillaume Brune, who had around 50,000 men at his disposal, started the siege of Stralsund at the beginning of August. Since the military situation was deemed to be untenable in the long run the king ordered the evacuation of Stralsund and the forces retreated to the island of Rügen from where Swedish naval ships took the army back to Sweden. 83
In total, Swedish losses and prisoners totalled around 6,000 men during the whole campaign; the largest losses came in the summer of 1807. According to Pär Frohnert, the campaign was not without importance. Swedish Pomerania served as a bridgehead for allied troops going into Northern Germany, and French troops were intermittently tied down as they had to defend against the coalition forces. 84 The Swedish forces were never involved in any major battles, and it must therefore primarily be seen as an expeditionary force to support the larger coalition partners and to show Britain that Sweden was committed to the cause of the anti-Napoleonic coalition. In other words, it was not large enough to meet any French army head on, and it was never intended to do so.
Conclusion
The Swedish supply system during the campaign against Napoleon, 1805–1807 was based on a series of warehouses which were supplied by local resources, but also with supplies that originated further away. Thus, there were beef, butter, cheese and pork that came from Denmark and Holstein, herring from Denmark or Norway, oats and beef from Scania, rye from Livonia, salt from the Mediterranean and wine and brandy from France. These supplies arrived in the warehouses through the assistance of merchants in places such as Lübeck, Stralsund and Ystad. The fact that the merchants had contacts in several towns meant that the mobilization efforts were not dependent on only one or two locations. In other words, like the British Victualling Board, the Swedish contractor state did not rely on one dominant fiscal-military hub or one or two leading merchants to provide the supplies. 85 The British subsidies were key in this regard, because they ensured that the Swedish state became a reliable partner that could honour its contracts and pay the suppliers on time. In other words, the subsidies helped to strengthen the mutual interactions between the merchants and the state whereby the merchants profited from selling goods to the state, while the state gained access to information, knowledge and business networks that otherwise would have been difficult to get hold of. The main strain in the relationship between merchants in Stralsund and the Swedish state concerned the issue of exports. While the merchants wished to keep their export options open, the state sought to ensure that the army had access to grain supplies by restricting exports.
The Swedish system of supplies functioned in a similar way as the supply systems of other European states. It depended on a network of warehouses. The fortress of Stralsund was the main depot, and functioned as a base for the operations, and it was supported by merchants in the town who specialized in the grain trade. Other, more subsidiary magazines were located further away along the lines of operations close to the river Elbe. However, instead of relying on long supply lines from the main depot in Stralsund to the subsidiary magazines, the smaller warehouses were stocked by local merchants in places such as Lübeck. Thus, the findings are in line with the argument put forward by John Lynn and others about the importance of magazines for sustaining warfare, but they do not support the argument that local magazines were dependent on transports from main depots. 86 This reduction in the need of transports created flexibility in the supply system and in the military operations. But unlike van Creveld, who argues that local magazines were supplied by contributions on enemy territory, the Swedish storehouses were operated by market mechanisms. 87 Thus, the Swedish system was not based on forceful extraction of resources from enemy territory. It was only by a commitment to swift payments that the Swedish state was able to get merchants in Hamburg and Lübeck involved in the delivery of goods.
The Swedish contractor state could not, however, function in the same way during the campaign in Finland in 1808–1809. Although Britian continued to pay subsidies and there were local magazines with goods, the limited local resources together with poor roads and enemy states blocking access to key markets in the Baltic region, made warfare more difficult. 88 For instance, the Swedish state could not rely on the expertise of the merchants in Stralsund and Lübeck, and following the British attack on Copenhagen in 1807 and the subsequent decision by the Danish king to join Napoleon, it was no longer possible to purchase goods from markets in Holstein and Denmark. In other words, like all supply systems, the ability of the Swedish supply system to function was dependent on the geographic location of the campaign and the interactions between state officials and merchants regarding the procurement of goods on transnational markets.
Frohnert, Hårdstedt and Nordhagen Ottosen argue that Sweden lacked the necessary resources to wage war on a large scale in the beginning of the nineteenth century. 89 But the choice to only participate with a limited expeditionary force, and not the whole Swedish army, was not driven by resource constraints. Instead, it was a political decision based on the need to reduce military and political risks. By largely financing the war effort with British subsidies, it was possible to participate in the conflict together with allied forces without having to organize a total mobilization of available resources or having to change the internal political status quo between the king and the elite. However, this strategy did not eliminate risk. As in other situations, small states which participate in military conflicts with major powers do not have control over the coalition or its priorities. The outcome of the campaign was therefore affected by decisions in the major capitals and not by the king or other Swedish officials. This became apparent after the battles of Austerlitz, Jena-Auerstädt and Friedland, and even more so after the treaty of Tilsit in 1807 between France and Russia when the former ally, Russia, turned against Sweden to take control of Finland. The interests of the major powers prevailed, while the minor powers had to adapt to the changing circumstances.
Footnotes
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Jan Wallanders och Tom Hedelius Stiftelse samt Tore Browaldhs Stiftelse (Grant Number P20-0268, P18-0160).
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.