The Value of Epistemic Justice

Introduction

Epistemic injustice refers to the injustice committed while evaluating and accepting knowledge claims. Since everyday interpersonal engagements often consist of claims to knowledge in one way or the other, epistemic injustice becomes a pervasive phenomenon. This article discusses epistemic injustice as an everyday phenomenon and suggests ways to foster epistemic justice by tackling the two major sources of epistemic injustice.

The first section begins by discussing two cases from everyday life and dwells into various ways in which epistemic injustice is committed. The second section argues that there are two major sources of epistemic injustice: competitive tendencies and susceptibility to biases. The last section deals with some ways to foster epistemic justice. This includes developing the capacity to attend to things in an open, diffused and non-judgmental manner. This ability, we argue, can help in establishing a more harmonious relationship with one another and consequently makes room for less biased thinking.

Epistemic Injustice in Everyday Life

Two Major Sources of Epistemic Injustice

The cases of epistemic injustice discussed above point to a close connection between establishing power relations and undermining knowledge claims. As Foucault famously analyses, whether it be everyday petty tendencies to dominate or large battles, knowledge is an integral part of these struggles (Rainbow, 1991). When knowledge becomes a means to have power, many forms of knowledge can get sidelined. Epistemic injustice arises when knowledge remains a tool to gain or maintain power. When the statements of Cleena are not taken seriously by her colleagues and spouse, it amounts to an exercise of power over Cleena. That means, her lower status is maintained by ensuring that her voice is not given equal status. Similarly, when Queenie’s longing for a different gender identity is not given any respect, it amounts to the insistence that she conforms to a particular way of life. This is a matter of dominance of some ways of living. In all such cases, there is clearly a refusal to treat the other as an equal partner in dialogue. Even the term epistemic oppression is used in this regard (Dotson, 2014).

Even when societies were presumably egalitarian, dominating tendencies must have been present. Egalitarian society, as Christopher Boehm (1993) observes, is not one where no one tries to be dominant but one in which there is a strong cohesion amongst most members to check the dominating tendency of some. That means, in egalitarian societies, the rank and file protect themselves from being subordinated by exercising constant vigilance over alpha-type group members. It is claimed that hunter-gatherer societies were much more egalitarian than contemporary societies. As Bruce Knauft puts it, ‘in simple societies, the pervasive ethos is one of active cooperative affiliation among diverse group of relatives and nonrelatives’ (Knauft, 1991). As societies became more complex, this would have changed, and stratification and hierarchy must have become significant. This can be explained in terms of the ambivalent account of human nature, according to which there are both competing and cooperative tendencies in human beings (Boehm, 1989; Sober & Wilson, 1998). Thus, in simple societies, competitive tendencies could be less, but complex societies structurally support such tendencies. Given the predominance of hierarchical structure and wide acceptance of competitive outlook, epistemic injustice becomes pervasive in contemporary societies.

In addition to dominating tendencies, susceptibility to cognitive biases and distortions is another factor resulting in epistemic injustice. There are several studies indicating the presence of implicit biases when we make a judgment (Beeghly & Madva, 2020; Brownstein & Saul, 2016). Jennifer Saul argues that whenever we judge a person, bias due to her social group or any such identity can affect our judgment (Saul, 2013). We may have a stereotype about a social group that all members of that group are of aggressive nature. Then whenever we come across a person who appears to belong to that group, we may end up making an instantaneous judgment about her behaviour. But our judgment can be far away from reality. This tendency to make fast judgments can be understood in terms of fast and slow thinking (Evans & Keith, 2013, Kahneman, 2011). According to the dual-processing accounts of the mind, there are fundamentally two ways in which our mind functions: The first one is automatic and fast without any feeling of voluntary control, and the second one is effortful and slow. Kahneman calls them System 1 and System 2, respectively. Since System 1 works on the basis of automatic associations and shortcuts, it hardly does justice to the rules of reasoning. This gives rise to various biases and distortions in cognitive processing, resulting in epistemic injustice.

Since System 2 cannot handle all the cognitive processing given the shortage of its resources such as working memory, automatic processing goes on most of the time. Association is one major way through which the automatic system makes judgments. Then when a particular group is associated with certain behaviour, whenever we come across a member of that group, the judgment immediately follows that her behaviour is in a particular way. Since the whole process takes place automatically, the person has conscious access only to the final judgment and not to the processes forming the judgment.

Given the process of automatic association, System 1 is able to reach a conclusion on anything that it comes across. Hence it is said that we do not get ‘stumped in mental life’ (Kahneman, 2011, p. 97). This happens because whatever we come across can be automatically associated with many things, and this does not leave any room for getting stumped as far as involuntary processing is concerned. Further, this kind of automatic processing goes on without any logical check, and therefore biases and distortions can crop up at any point. Consider what is known as confirmation bias. This amounts to the tendency to look only into instances that confirm the belief we hold. This, in turn, underlies our tendency to believe in, say, astrology or palmistry. When an astrologer says you are lucky this year, it is easy to find instances from one’s life that confirm this statement.

Since System 1 works mainly through automatic association, it is possible to feel that we understand most of the things we encounter. Gullibility is common because, as Daniel Gilbert argues, when we understand something, we believe that too (Gilbert, 1991). Although conceptually there is a clear distinction between comprehension and belief, in actual practice, this distinction need not be maintained. Believing becomes the default option because for System 1, whatever it sees is all there is. To suspend belief is to entertain the possibility that there can be more things to know, but this is something that is not normally done in the automatic functioning of the mind. As a result, we are normally prone to many biases and distortions, which result in epistemic injustice.

Fostering Epistemic Justice

What is clear from the above discussion is that there are two major sources of epistemic injustice: One is the dominating or competitive tendencies present in human beings, and the other is susceptibility to cognitive biases and distortions. As far as the former is concerned, it may be possible to check the dominating tendencies by means of cooperative behaviour. But what are the requirements to have cooperative behaviour?

Before trying to answer this, let us have a look at the second source of epistemic injustice: the pervasiveness of biases and distortions. It is the tendency of the automatic system to jump to conclusions by fast processing that is largely responsible for the prevalence of cognitive biases. Such processing is certainly needed for ensuring biological survival because any possible threat to the body needs to be handled without spending time for reflection. In such a context, as Edward Wilson says, false positive is only an inconvenience, whereas false negatives can be catastrophic (Wilson, 1999). That is to say, if we automatically judge a stimulus to be a threat that turns out to be benign, it is only an inconvenience. But if we judge a stimulus to be benign but it turns out to be a threat, then that can be catastrophic. Given this difference, it is advantageous to have, say, confirmation bias or illusion of validity. But as far as modern life is concerned, in the life worlds of Queeni and Cleena, direct threats to the survival of the body have come down, and therefore it is possible to reduce fast processing. But this does not happen normally, and, therefore, biases and distortions continue.

Even if we do not face direct bodily threats regularly, our habit of reacting to any stimulus with a fight-or-flight approach continues. When the self is understood as something to be protected or expanded, there is indeed some kind of estrangement or alienation between the self and the world. It is the world from which the self wants to protect itself. Similarly, the self wants to expand or aggrandize itself from the resources in the world, whether it be other human beings or any other thing. Expansion need not be simply by acquiring wealth; it can be by means of recognition, fame and many such things. The presence of so many such things to look for is one factor that makes our society complex, and complex societies, it may be recalled, are much more hierarchical. When the self wants innumerable things from the world, there is, what Miri Albahari calls, a thick psychological boundary between the self and the world (Albahari, 2006). This boundary results in the self-being pitted against other-selves and the world at large, and, as a result, there is hardly any scope for genuine cooperation. Then whenever we come across a stranger or whenever someone disagrees with one’s view, a threat is perceived, and a fast reaction follows. Then accepting Cleena’s view is seen as a threat by her colleagues, and this threat is warded off by outright rejection of her views. The ‘might’ becomes ‘right’ and committing epistemic injustice turns out to be a routine matter. Further, whenever such a fast reaction takes place, and primary concern is not towards truth per se but towards achievement or success, biases and distortions are expected.

The upshot of the above discussion is that the mechanisms that were evolved for biological survival are co-opted for psychological protection when one understands oneself as a mental entity. As a result, even when there is no threat to bodily survival, a fight-or-flight approach is adopted, giving rise to fast reactions permeated with biases and distortions. If the way we understand ourselves determines the way we relate to the world and our reactions to whatever we come across, then revising the way the self is understood can help in nurturing cooperation and checking dominating tendencies that result in epistemic injustice. Further, this can be conducive to cultivating a state of mind that will be less susceptible to cognitive biases and distortions because it opens up space for slow thinking.

Reducing the thickness of the psychological boundary with the world is one way to revise how the self is understood. Instead of conceptualizing oneself as psychologically separate from the world, it is possible to treat oneself as integrally related to all that exists around. When an individual viscerally realizes herself to be simply a part of all that exists, there is no longer any thick psychological boundary of the self with the world. Then another individual or the world at large need not be looked at as a competitor or as a resource to fulfil one’s requirements. This requires making use of the second type of attention that McGilchrist talks about: open or diffused attention without looking for anything in particular. This, in turn, can facilitate the feeling of connectedness with all that is around and appreciating the whole of which we all are parts. It is a matter of direct contact with all that is around without much verbalizing. In other words, it does not reduce the vast field of existence to a story in our minds. Recognizing oneself and others as equal parts of the whole can help in reducing competitive tendencies and make our engagements more and more just—epistemically speaking. As long as the narrow, focused attention is predominant, the whole is hardly paid attention to, and the rest of the world is approached with an instrumentalist perspective. Giving equal importance to open, diffused attention changes this way of looking at the world.

Apart from doing justice to different forms of knowledge, it can develop less competitive modes of existence which, in turn, provide ample scope to reduce biases as well. When the requirement of fast processing comes down, slow thinking, which is less biased, can take over. In fact, evidence from studies on mindfulness precisely points to this possibility. Mindfulness is primarily a matter of paying attention to all that takes place in the present without making instantaneous judgments. One definition given to mindfulness is ‘the act of noticing new things’ (Langer, 2000). This can help in looking at a person without immediately judging her in terms of stereotypes. Non-judgmental awareness of all that takes place in the present, whether it be internal or external, is the central feature of mindfulness practice. When the normal habit of fast reaction is suspended, slow thinking, which is less susceptible to cognitive biases, is facilitated. In fact, there are some controlled studies that show how mindfulness helps in reducing cognitive biases (Langer & Maymin, 2021). Looking at another person as a competitor itself is a form of judgment and when such judgments are suspended, interaction can become more epistemically just. The point is that when the other is not automatically perceived as a competitor, there is hardly any need to adopt a fight-or-flight approach. This, in turn, can facilitate slow thinking and foster cooperative behaviour. Thus, mindfulness can be a tool in the task of combating epistemic injustice by reducing both cognitive biases and dominating tendencies.

Since epistemic justice requires valuing knowledge in its own right, it is closely aligned with how we carry out education. Nurturing non-competitive tendencies and openness towards whatever unfolds are of immense significance in this regard. As Oren Ergas (2017) says, education has to directly address the mind of the learner because education is a process through which society equips the human mind with certain beliefs. This can be understood with the help of the metaphor of a kaleidoscope through which all of our knowledge and understanding get coloured by society’s beliefs. That means ‘education’ shapes our ‘mind’ in a particular way to understand and perform in the world. Most of the knowledge, judgments and opinions we make are the result of the education we get. Education hardly equips us with the ability to overcome biases and distortions in everyday thinking. Moving in this direction requires, as Ergas (2017) points out, understanding the way the mind functions. Our minds can be shaped to see the world based upon any narrative. The human mind can be developed and shaped in any manner (plasticity) but, from the very beginning of childhood, it gets pruned and shaped by a particular society’s beliefs and norms. In this process, Ergas claims, the mind is reduced from universality to particularity. Hence, he calls for unpruning the mind with the help of mindful attention and contemplative inquiry. This will help to free the mind from societal colouring so that it can make judgments that are more objective and just.

This point can be elucidated further with the analysis of how the ossification of the notion of knowledge makes us overlook many important things taking place in and around us. As Ergas points out, the educational system considers knowledge as something to be found in textbooks and this, in turn, results in the gross neglect of lived experience, which always unfolds in the present moment. Knowledge is seen as ‘out there, not in here’ (Ergas, 2017, p. 97). That means the notion of knowledge that is accepted in the context of education is often restricted and results in preferring one way of looking at the world. Thus, education itself engenders epistemic injustice.

To balance the excessive focus on one type of knowledge, Ergas suggests the adoption of inner curriculum. It amounts to paying attention to the whole field of inner experience comprising thoughts, emotions, hopes, worries, prejudices, or any other mental state. A typical educational setup does not give importance to these dimensions because knowledge is seen as ‘out there’, and the student simply has to get it. Inner curriculum, on the other hand, does not lead to any fixed knowledge but provides an avenue to look at things as they are without trying to reach anywhere. It helps in appreciating the role that inner processes play in the overall experience, including the production of knowledge. It is a matter of knowing oneself in addition to acquiring knowledge of the world. Knowing oneself is not a case of acquiring any objective knowledge but a matter of remaining open to whatever arises internally. It is knowing as a process and not knowledge as a product. In other words, inner curriculum does not have any fixed curricula to be followed and mastered. It is a matter of suspending judgments about oneself and remaining open to whatever occurs in the form of thoughts, feelings or sensations. This can even include suspending conclusions about the nature of the self as a fixed entity. Many thoughts are about external things, and therefore inner curriculum becomes a matter of paying attention to all that is in and around. This amounts to the deployment of open, diffused attention and challenges the ossification of knowledge by giving more importance to the process of knowing than to the product called knowledge. This can result in a more balanced and accommodative approach, making one realize that ‘in here’ and ‘out there’ are not sharply separate but continuous. Such a realization amounts to the reduction in the thickness of the psychological boundary of the self with the world.

The importance of the inner curriculum in reducing epistemic injustice can be elucidated by looking into how attention constructs our reality. As William James famously said, ‘for the moment what we attend to is reality’ (as cited in Ergas, 2017, p. 28). Our whole experience, knowledge and memory are nothing but the collection of numerous moments of attention over something. As our attention is limited in terms of temporal and spatial parameters, it is necessarily selective. Ergas uses the metaphor of ‘flashlight of attention’ to describe it. There are numerous things available at a given moment to pay attention to, but only those things become part of our experience upon which this light of attention shines. When we approach the whole field of our present moment experience with questions like ‘what is this?’ or ‘what is going on?’ (Batchelor, 2011), the whole sense of reality can undergo change. That means many things ordinarily dismissed as irrelevant may become significant and part of our reality. This is because, in everyday life, most of us hardly approach whatever we encounter with this attitude of curiosity because knowledge is seen as something to be obtained through some fixed ways. When attention is not narrow, the sense of reality gets broadened and accommodates much more than what is usually the case.

This expanded sense of reality can reduce the psychological boundary of the self with the world, which, in turn, can foster cooperation by reducing the tendency to look at one another as competitors. When the world is no longer seen primarily in terms of ‘what is in store for me’ there is indeed much more scope to look at one another as equal parts of the whole. That means, Cleena’s colleagues and spouse can listen to her completely without making judgments hastily. This is the ability to engage in a dialogue. Dialogue, as David Bohm puts it, is a matter of flow of meaning where no participant tries to win (Bohm, 2007). It is a matter of total listening which requires suspending the usual pattern of habitual reactions. That means the participants are interested in knowing the truth only and the whole process of dialogue becomes a mutual collaborative pursuit of truth. When there is no longer any attempt to dominate or win, the fight-or-flight response is not required, and this can reduce fast processing. When the need for fast processing is reduced, there can be a reduction in the susceptibility to biases and distortions. That means, overcoming dominating tendencies and nurturing cooperative behaviour can help in reducing cognitive biases as well. Thus, inner curriculum along with open, diffused attention can play a significant role in reducing epistemic injustice.

Conclusion

Epistemic injustice is pervasive and affects various aspects of our lives. The tendency to compete and dominate, along with the susceptibility to cognitive biases and distortions are two major sources of epistemic injustice. One way to reduce them is to develop normally neglected ways of paying attention, such as open, diffused attention. This, in turn, can reduce the separative feeling associated with ordinary self-conception and give room for a more harmonious relationship with one another. This, in turn, facilitates the kind of thinking which, while proceeding slowly, is less susceptible to cognitive biases. This can contribute to the task of ensuring epistemic justice in everyday engagements.