Abstract
Based on longitudinal research across four panchayat elections in central Uttar Pradesh (UP), this article examines how panchayat elections shape rural politics. It attempts to address three questions: What role do panchayat elections play in rural politics? What strategies and tactics are deployed to mobilize voters? How do elected representatives consolidate their influence over electorates after elections? The findings reveal an interplay of continuity and change. Panchayat elections have become increasingly integrated with regional and state politics and are marked by intense competition, rising campaign expenditures and a new brand of contestants focused towards liquidity, bureaucratic access and political brokerage. Electoral participation demands financial capital, organizational acumen and calculated alliance building for candidates seeking upward political mobility. For affluent contestants, electoral participation provides an opportunity to consolidate influence and manipulate power for their own needs. Marginalized candidates assert their rights and challenge hierarchies of caste and power. Despite this transformation, caste, kinship and factional loyalties remain deeply embedded in the social architecture of electoral politics in UP, structuring mobilization and governance.
Introduction
India is the most populous democracy in the world, home to roughly one out of every six voting-age persons in the world (Kapur & Vaishnav, 2018). The success of Indian democracy hinges on the efficacy of elections. Holding regular and free elections gives voters the right to evaluate their representatives and vote them out of power if found wanting. Elections in India are renowned for their strong political engagement and some of the highest levels of participation worldwide (Michelutti, 2020). It is estimated that citizens’ participation increases as one moves down the democratic ladder. This is reflected in panchayat (village) elections, where the participation of citizens is higher compared to national or state elections (Banerjee, 2017).
Although electoral participation in rural areas is higher among marginalized castes, active political engagement and control over institutions have remained concentrated in the hands of upper and landholding castes. Two reasons have been posited for this phenomenon. First, in recent years, there has been an increase in government expenditure in rural areas (Krishna, 2002), with the centre and state governments contributing huge funds towards rural infrastructure and government welfare programmes, 1 making the position of pradhan (village headman) a lucrative one. This has motivated wealthy contestants to monopolize the headship of panchayats through clientelism, patronage and intimidation.
Second, village elections have become integrated with wider politics, as they provide an opportunity for affluent contestants to establish links with local politicians. These linkages enable local politicians of the district to obtain granular information regarding the village, and in the process gain political support. Panchayati Raj Institutions are a three-tiered system of rural governance linking villages to their respective districts. Its structural pattern makes members of each tier dependent on the other two (Sadanandan, 2017). For aspiring contestants, these links not only connect them to local leaders but also help them obtain funds for their campaigns (Collins, 2021).
Studies on Indian elections generally fall into two broad categories. In one, scholars emphasize the positive aspects of elections, viewing them as an expression of citizenship rights, empowerment, a means of political empowerment and an opportunity for voters to register their support for or opposition to the state. In her study of West Bengal, Banerjee (2017) contends that voting constitutes one of the few reliable rights upon which millions of voters rely. Voters participate not with the aim of securing any material benefit, instead treating voting as their dharma (moral duty), maulik adhikar (foundational right) or janamsiddh adhikar (birthright). By showing up to vote, they are seeing and being seen by the state, and reminding the elites they exist in large numbers and have the capacity to alter the fate of elections. Ahuja and Chhibber (2012) note that the poor view voting in terms of citizenship rights, as it provides people with momentary parity to reject or elect their political leaders. Lukes (1975) argues that elections are a way in which ‘a particular system reproduces itself’, as elections ‘express the symbolic affirmation of voters’ to accept the political system and their role within it. Jaffrelot (2006) notes that the use of electoral symbols on voting machines has allowed the Dalits and marginalized castes to vote without fear of retribution, thereby freeing them from social dependencies and playing a tangible role in the production of a modern and independent electorate. Sadanandan (2017) highlights the advantages of voting. Elections provide a low-cost method through which citizens participate in politics, while also offering a peaceful mechanism through which officials can be held accountable. Lastly, voting serves as a source of popular legitimacy, enabling citizens to engage at moments when politics directly affects their lives.
The second group of scholarship on Indian elections identifies them as ‘dirty’ (Ruud, 2001), as there exists a nexus between criminals, businessmen and politicians (Michelutti et al., 2023). Local dabangs (enforcers) contest elections directly or support contestants through money and muscle. For these enforcers, evading democratic norms is a usual affair, as there exists a link between criminal money and party machines; this makes them one of the biggest threats to political processes (Michelutti, 2020). Bussell (2019) highlights the role of sand mafia in Bihar’s village politics, showing how these actors operate as influential political entrepreneurs. They strategically back candidates who are aligned with their interests, leveraging their financial clout. In return, they draw upon substantial funding networks—often linked to political parties—where limits on election expenditures remain loosely regulated (Banerjee, 2019). Kapur and Vaishnav (2018) trace the linkage between money and politics by tracking cement sales across India during elections. During elections, there is a sharp fall in demand for cement, indicating a working nexus between builders and politicians. The cash fuelling the construction industry is redirected to politicians’ election campaigns, causing a temporary dip in cement sales. This partnership benefits both parties. On the one hand, politicians require somewhere to park their ill-gotten wealth, and often the best place is the construction industry, which is capable of absorbing large sums of money. On the other hand, builders require the patronage of politicians to continue their illegal business.
Studies on Indian democracy largely focus on national and state elections, with relatively little attention paid to rural politics. By examining four panchayat elections, this study tries to bridge this gap. It underscores the competitive nature of these elections and analyses the strategies and tactics adopted by contestants to reach favourable outcomes. It also examines the structure of domination that elected representatives deploy to consolidate their position within electorates.
The second section of the article discusses the research methodology. The third section describes the emergence of local governance in India and the history of panchayat bodies prior to the introduction of the 73rd Amendment Act. Case studies of four panchayat elections are presented in the fourth section, followed by a discussion on how they affect facets of rural politics. The structure of domination adopted by winners after elections is discussed in the fifth section.
Methodology
Case Selection
Uttar Pradesh (UP) plays an integral role in Indian politics, deciding who governs India every five years. 2 The state’s rural politics has undergone a significant transformation since the 1950s. With the failure of land reforms, 3 large landowners belonging to upper and traditional landowning castes established themselves in the central and eastern parts of the state (Hasan, 1998). The fusion of temporal and ritual authority enabled these castes to reinforce and at times reconfigure the notions of caste, class and gender privileges. These irregularities were felt within panchayats, which failed to provide an effective basis of democracy and accountability (Dreze & Gazdar, 2001). Despite the introduction of the 73rd Amendment Act of 1992–1993, panchayats in UP did not work with the notion of representation (Mangla, 2022). Elections were dominated by factional rivalries, at the expense of social concerns (Dreze & Gazdar, 2001). Factionalism remains a significant basis for political mobilization; its manifestation takes the shape of patronage, intimidation and clientelism (Dutta, 2012). Despite challenges confronting local democracy, there have been significant transformations in the voting behaviour of the marginalized castes. For these castes, elections represent an emancipatory process through which they acquire a sense of authority and individualization (Jodhka, 2023).
The Villages
Within UP, I decided to focus on the gram panchayat of Sarai Usrana, which had three villages—Raipur Raja (revenue village) 4 and Udoutpur and Madopur (subsidiary villages). 5 These villages are in the district of Sitapur, 90 km from the state capital, Lucknow. Fieldwork was conducted in two phases. The first phase was conducted in 2004–2005 for 14 months, which allowed me to collect information for the elections of 2005. The second phase of fieldwork was conducted in 2019–2020, during which I gathered detailed information on the upcoming 2020 elections. Between these two phases, I made several shorter visits to the field that enabled me to document the 2010 and 2015 elections. Each visit was structured around two stages—pre- and post-election—allowing me to systematically cover issues relating to campaign strategies and power dynamics.
I chose Sitapur as it is one of the poorest districts in central UP, with weak socio-economic indicators. 6 Politics in Sitapur is dominated by Other Backward Castes (OBCs) holding positions at the village and block levels. Most panchayats within this district have remained feeble (Dutta, 2024). They are shrouded in secrecy, with official documents rarely accessible to citizens; gram sabhas (village meetings) are rarely held, and elections are dominated by money, muscle and manipulative tactics.
Based on the household survey conducted in 2004–2005 and 2019–2020 (Tables 1 and 2), there was a rise of 43% in the total number of households in these villages, and 54% increase in the total number of electorates. The majority of the electorates were Yadavs residing in Raipur Raja and Madopur. Despite their large numbers, the Yadavs were never a political force to reckon with for various factions. The landed caste Thakurs, along with upper-caste Brahmins, voted en bloc until 2010, after which they were split into two factions. This rift between the Thakurs worked to the advantage of the Brahmins, who, during the 2015 elections, were successful in electing a Brahmin candidate for the apex post. A majority of the marginalized castes in Udoutpur and Madopur were regarded as swing voters. Electoral contestants did not take them lightly, as their political preferences were shaped by material inducements offered during elections.
Gram Panchayat of Sarai Usrana (2004–2005).
Gram Panchayat of Sarai Usrana (2019–2020).
Selection of Households
The main method of data collection was participant observation, which is conducive to studying panchayat elections as several informal practices during campaigning take place behind closed doors, in the shadows cast by formal institutions. Besides this, household surveys, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) were also conducted. A total of 88 sample households were chosen for this study. These households were divided into two categories: state and non-state actors. A total of 22 state actors were in the study, including the sitting pradhan, rozgar sevak (village assistant), gram vikas adhikari (village secretary) and bureaucrats stationed at the block office. The non-state actors included village households, former pradhans, election contestants and caste and faction leaders. Socio-economic and political data for these households were obtained through household surveys, followed by in-depth interviews. During initial interactions, respondents were reluctant to address informal practices such as vote buying or influence peddling; I applied techniques used in social anthropology and organizational studies to remove these barriers (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). To establish rapport, I met these actors several times before requesting interviews. Rapport-building happened over several interactions, such as over a cup of chai (tea), regular evening walks or in village squares.
Five FGDs with non-state actors were conducted. These meetings probed selected themes such as political pressure exerted by elites and faction leaders during elections, matters of transparency and accountability within panchayats, and difficulties of holding gram sabhas.
Local Governance in India
In 1882, the British colonial government introduced the Ripon Resolution on local self-governance. The resolution recommended the establishment of village institutions responsible for providing relief to villagers during famine and other natural calamities. Opposition to this resolution came from provisional governments and district collectors who undermined the importance of rural institutions (Tinker, 1968). Subsequent developments included the Royal Commission on decentralization and the Congress session held in Lahore in 1909, both of which recommended the establishment of local councils. Despite these initiatives, the idea of self-governing institutions remained largely on paper, with limited devolution of power or resources (Aslam, 2007).
After India’s independence in 1947, the government established various committees to look into the issue of decentralization. 8 It was only in 1991, after a lively debate in both houses of parliament, that the 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts came into effect (Bussell, 2019). The former focused on rural areas, and the latter on urban municipalities. The 73rd Amendment created three million locally elected village positions, thereby increasing the importance of panchayat elections (Kapur & Vaishnav, 2018). It established a three-tier structure of rural governance, with the lowest tier being the gram panchayat (local or village council), the middle tier panchayat samiti (block panchayat), and the highest the zila panchayat (district council) (Mathew, 2000). The amendment mandated regular elections every five years, reservations for marginalized castes and women, and a periodic auditing of accounts (Gaiha & Kulkarni, 2002). Following this Amendment, each state was required to conform its existing laws to the new constitutional framework. While most states undertook these legislative changes, two issues remained as challenges for most states of India: 9 the conduct and regularity of elections, and the extent of devolution of powers and resources to rural institutions (Gaiha et al., 2001). In UP, the Panchayati Raj Act of 1947 and the UP Kshetra Samiti and Zila Parishad Adhiniyam of 1961 were amended and came into force in April 1994. This amendment introduced several new provisions that enhanced the administrative capacity and powers of the panchayat, giving it a much greater role in the delivery of welfare services (Srivastava, 2006).
The efficacy of the 73rd Amendment Act varied across Indian states (Sadanandan, 2017). In democratic-deficit states like UP and Bihar, where the villagers directly elect the pradhan, local elites in these states have a greater role. Once elected, the elite interests tend to shape the functioning of the pradhan and the panchayats. Micro-level studies indicate that gram sabhas frequently fail to operate as deliberate bodies (Lieten & Srivastava, 1999). Reservations for women are notoriously prone to corruption by male relatives who exclude women from formal participation (Pal, 1998). Similar patterns are evident for marginalized castes, whose economic dependence on the elites constrains their political autonomy (Johnson et al., 2005). In these states, panchayats remain institutionally weak due to poor accountability mechanisms—limited community participation, restricted access to official records, cumbersome procedures for removing officials and absence of vigilant local press (Gaiha & Kulkarni, 2002). Together, these factors perpetuate corruption and elite capture.
In contrast, in relatively progressive states like West Bengal and Kerala, where village heads are chosen by elected panchayat members, accountability is mediated through the panchayat itself, creating greater pressure to broaden participation of poorer households. Bardhan and Mookherji (2007) demonstrate increased political voices of women, Dalits and Adivasis within the panchayat system in West Bengal. According to Crook and Sverrisson (2003), decentralization in West Bengal has been more effective in reducing poverty than in other Indian states. This is largely due to the state’s efforts to protect the interests of poor households against local powerholders. In Kerala—largely due to the efforts of grassroots institutions—the enactment of land ceiling laws, abolition of bonded labour and availability of sources of credit are some of the factors that have helped to dismantle the decades-old system of debt bondage (Johnson et al., 2005).
Village Panchayats
Prior to the implementation of the 73rd Amendment Act, informal governance in Sarai Usrana operated under the framework of the UP Panchayat Raj Act of 1947. However, in practice, authority remained concentrated in the hands of the local Thakur elite, whose members occupied the position of the pradhan. The pradhan’s responsibilities extended beyond administrative functions to include the resolution of petty disputes, theft, land encroachment, minor property conflicts, drunken brawls and marital disputes, including cases of domestic violence. Villagers preferred approaching the pradhan because this mode of justice tended to be quick, inexpensive and locally accessible. Srinivas (2002) describes such arrangements as ‘informal and flexible’, with group members having ‘no hard and fast rules’. These gram panchayat members mostly belonged to upper or landed castes and were given the right or duty to meet in a structured capacity to discuss, debate and decide the affairs of the village (Ananth Pur, 2007).
For these elites, electoral positions only further reinforced their dominance, as elections were conducted without secret ballots. Upper- and lower-caste men gathered at the baithak (open courtyard) of the Thakur pradhan, accompanied by polling officials. These officials would announce the contestants’ names, and the gathered villagers raised their hands in support. Women were largely excluded from participation. For the poor and disadvantaged sections, open voting made it difficult for them to go against the wishes of their patrons, as they depended on these elites for their livelihoods. Households from marginalized castes either abstained from voting or raised hands against their wishes. Only those aligned with the elites participated in these open votes, as their decisions were treated as final. As Singh (1969) documented in his study of Jaunpur (central UP) in the 1960s, informal structures of power continued to be in the hands of ex-zamindars, who settled social, economic and moral disputes. For these elites, this form of voting sustained a stable patron–client vote bank, where the poor were expected to align politically with their patrons.
This style of voting continued into the early 1990s. The first election under the norms of the 73rd Amendment Act was conducted in 1995, during which the largest Thakur landowner was unanimously chosen for the apex position. In December 2004, when I first visited the villages, the panchayat elected in 2000 was still in operation. Following the norms laid down under the 73rd Amendment Act, the seat of pradhan was reserved for a male OBC candidate and was held by Babulal Giri (henceforth, BG). In June 2005, when elections were declared, this seat was reserved for a female OBC candidate. Gayatri Devi (henceforth, GD), BG’s wife, was chosen for the apex post. In 2010, a male OBC candidate held this seat, while in 2015 it went to a Brahmin contestant.
The Art of Winning Elections
The 2000 and 2005 elections were won on the basis of shrewd leadership and the winner’s ability to manipulate his opponents. In 2010, the winner was able to garner support from his patronage networks. The 2015 election was competitive, 10 with nine contestants standing for the position of pradhan. Campaigning was expensive, with the three wealthiest contestants showcasing their money and political linkages. These contestants treated elections as an economic investment, as they hoped to reap their investments from the spoils attached to the office of pradhan.
2000–2010: The Decade of Babulal Giri and His Wife
BG was known among villagers as a shrewd tactician and a dishonest person. When he started his political career in the mid-1980s, he was landless and did not have the support of any local powerholder. Recognizing these limitations, he began establishing links with the largest landowner and his network of supporters. In 2000, benefitting from government’s affirmative norms as OBC candidate, and drawing on support from his mentor, from whom he acquired several political skills, 11 BG was overwhelmingly chosen for the apex post.
His main competition came from the Yadav community, who threatened to form a single coalition. If the Yadavs were to vote collectively, BG would not win. BG’s strategy was to convince a Yadav youth to contest the elections as well. This unemployed youth acted as a dummy candidate to peel off the votes of other Yadav factions. This youth remained neutral to all faction leaders, which earned him respect, and several Yadavs decided to vote for him.
In 2005, when the seat of pradhan was reserved for an OBC female candidate, BG quickly put forward his wife as the contender. GD was popular among the villagers, especially when compared with the other contestants. BG actively campaigned on behalf of his wife and relied on clever strategies rather than indiscriminately distributing benefits. He managed to convince a group of marginalized castes with false promises and intimidation. Although it is illegal to canvass 48 hours before the actual polling, BG and his loyalists decided to take this risk. As his supporter
12
described:
Babulal is a clever person … he mobilised a group of Harijans to vote for his wife. Initially when we went to their basti (locality) they were in no mood to listen to us. Some even remarked that they would vote for Sriram Teli (GD’s opponent). But when Babulal intervened saying that Sriram Teli was a dishonest person … and had a criminal record, they started taking him seriously. He showed some papers which he claimed to have obtained from the police station. Babulal informed them that if he (Sriram Teli) won, he might prosecute every Harijan household who voted against him.
By spreading false rumours, BG successfully distorted his opponent’s image. BG was also certain that his connections with the Station Officer (SO) of the nearest police station would pay off, as these marginalized castes would not check the authenticity of his claims or would be kept at bay.
The 2010 Election: Caste, Kinship and Factionalism
In 2010, the seat of pradhan was once again reserved for a male OBC candidate. Naresh Sharma (henceforth, NS) received a strong backing of three caste groups—the Yadavs, Brahmins and Thakurs. The leaders of these groups felt NS was an honest person who spent long hours working at a construction company in Lucknow. This image gave him a chance of winning. However, this support was not unconditional, as these leaders wanted to control the affairs of the village themselves.
After winning, for the first two years, NS relied on his mentors. During this period, he completed several developmental projects left incomplete by his predecessors. The quality of the mid-day meal improved, a dilapidated school building was renovated, and several MGNREGA 13 job cards were issued to poor labourers. Besides, roads and handpumps in Dalit localities were renovated. But apart from these positive developments, a portion of the funds was used to fulfil the wishes of his supporters. A Yadav faction leader managed to get the road connecting his residence renovated, while another leader persuaded NS to renovate the village community centre just before his daughter’s marriage. This illegitimate spending irked the Block Development Officer (BDO), 14 who threatened to initiate a magisterial enquiry. To resolve this issue, NS sought the assistance of BG, who was close to the BDO. Over time, NS and BG were able to suppress this issue. This tie-up benefited NS, whose personal wealth increased significantly. From a single-story house in the village, NS was able to construct a double-story house. He also set up a grocery store for his unemployed son, and purchased seven bigas (1.07 acres) of land. In this process, he lost his reputation among the villagers. Over time, the quality of mid-day meals deteriorated, with children served poor-quality kichari (a dish made of rice and lentils). The government contractor responsible for supplying construction materials under MGNREGA sold them at inflated prices, enabling NS to pocket the difference. Labourers who had earlier obtained job cards under MGNREGA were replaced with loyalists willing to pay graft to the pradhan.
The 2015 Election: The Power of Money
The elections in 2015 were markedly different. There was a drastic increase in election spending, averaging between ₹10 and 15 lakhs ($15,000–25,000) 15 for the top three contestants, whereas for others it was between ₹2 and 5 lakhs ($3,000–8,000). Furthermore, since the seat for the position of pradhan was unreserved, competition was intense, with nine contestants standing for the above pradhan. These contenders challenged the existing powerholders, altering traditional patterns of dominance. The top three contestants, who belonged to the upper castes, adopted various manipulative tactics, including distributing cash, liquor and gifts. Villagers who voted for these leaders were rewarded, whereas others not showing allegiance were punished.
Arvind Tewari (henceforth, AT), a Brahmin candidate, won the seat of pradhan, defeating his Thakur rival by a margin of eight votes. AT came from an affluent household, his father a farmer possessing 40 bigas (6.2 acres) of land, while his uncle was a lekhpal (a state functionary) and his younger brother a kotedar (proprietor) of several fair-price shops. 16 However, his father was considered by villagers to be greedy and involved in illegally procuring government fertilizers meant for below-poverty-line (BPL) households. 17 Meanwhile, his uncle was notorious for supporting the upper castes in illegal land deals. In a vindictive incident, his younger brother, just before the elections, penalized a group of BPL households whom he suspected of poisoning his buffalo by not providing their monthly quota of rations.
In contrast, his rivals, who were the Thakur brothers, were split into two opposing factions. Although this rift weakened their traditional caste base, both brothers drew upon their father’s accumulated wealth and longstanding local influence. While canvassing, these brothers, as well as AT, openly flouted expenditure limits. Although it was difficult to trace the precise source of funds, villagers believed that one of the Thakur brothers, in addition to their father’s wealth, also received financial backing from the local Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA), whereas AT was regularly seen canvassing with members of the local liquor mafia.
Campaigning was conducted in two ways. Formal campaigning included distribution of leaflets, organizing public meetings, entertainment programmes and street-corner rallies. Even weekly markets and temple compounds became organizing spaces. Informal campaign events included interacting with particular voters directly or through intermediaries, which is when vote buying—exchanging money for votes—happened; this is considered a common practice during elections in India (Vaishnav, 2017). Voters in this election were paid ₹500, and some were even paid ₹5,000. Youth gangs were organized to keep a check on voters who had taken money but were suspected of wavering in their allegiance.
Contestants also organized community feasts in which food and liquor were distributed to supporters. AT, rather than distributing actual bottles of alcohol, provided households with scraps of paper redeemable at local liquor outlets. For swing voters, desi daru (country hooch) was sufficient, whereas other households were provided with branded liquor bottles. On the contrary, his opponents resorted to direct methods of distributing liquor. A Yadav contestant disclosed that swing voters would only vote if they got something in return:
Passi and Chamars are the greediest of all castes. Unless you provide them with incentives, they will not support you. Last time I lost the elections because I committed the mistake of not visiting their locality. But this time, I am not going to repeat this mistake again. I have arranged 300 bottles of liquor to be distributed among these groups. A friend of mine who is closely working with me has promised to distribute these bottles … let me see how much they can drink.
18
After becoming pradhan, AT rarely showed interest in the development of the village. His aim was to recover his election expenses and to establish a credible group of supporters on whom he could depend to win the next election. As a result, AT directed his attention towards welfare schemes that offered opportunities for illicit gains. His main focus was the village latrine scheme under the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (clean India campaign) mission, the objective of which was to eradicate open defecation in rural areas and encourage BPL households to construct toilets within the periphery of their residences. The scheme operated under a reimbursement mode, where beneficiaries were expected to construct toilets with their own funds, to be later reimbursed by the state government through the office of the pradhan. Between 2017 and 2019, 400 new latrines were constructed in Raipur Raja, Udoutpur and Madopur. Two types of beneficiaries were chosen by AT under this scheme. The first included those willing to pay a bribe of ₹2,000 ($32) in exchange for a toilet. The second category included those who had taken a loan from AT and were repaying it with a monthly interest of 20%.
AT also took advantage of the COVID-19 sanitation scheme introduced by the Government of UP in April 2020, under which each panchayat in Sitapur was allocated a sum of ₹9 lakh ($14,285) to sanitize the villages twice a day and provide essential support to BPL households aimed at mitigating the spread of the disease. However, in reality, nothing was done to improve cleanliness, and only some BPL households were provided with face masks.
Discussion
Rural politics operates in environments where voters have intimate knowledge regarding contestants. Voters are able to gather whether the contestant or any member of his household had denied a favour to a villager based on personal rivalries, economic circumstances or family feuds. Therefore, village elections present an environment where personalized knowledge, family rivalries, honour and access to patronage play an important role. In recent years, panchayat elections have become integrated with state and national politics. This integration has brought about several noticeable transformations.
Caste, Kinship and Factionalism
Caste, kinship and factionalism remain significant bases of political mobilization in UP (Dreze & Gazdar, 2001). While caste and kinship are principal institutions of structuring allegiances and relationships (Dumont, 1988; Gupta, 2009), factions are quasi-groups (Yadava, 1967) or coalitions formed around social and economic rivalry (Dreze & Gazdar, 2001). Caste- and faction-based allegiances are felt across India but are particularly prominent in UP politics, where most state-level parties are segregated on caste and factional lines. Since panchayat elections in UP are not conducted under a political banner, caste and kinship become institutions through which most voting decisions are made. For the upper castes, elections are all about maintaining status, reinforcing their dominance over lower-caste agricultural labourers and ensuring continued access to patronage. The lower castes see elections in two ways—first as an opportunity to challenge the power structure, and secondly as a podium for lower castes to extract from upper-caste contestants benefits that they believe they are entitled to. This is evident from the remarks made by a Yadav contestant during the 2015 elections, who observed that unless material inducements are offered, lower-caste voters are unlikely to extend their political support. This is one reason that lower castes tend to vote as a group. Voting collectively enhances their bargaining power and magnifies the value of their votes. Because a bloc of votes can change the outcome, people organized as a group can bargain more effectively with candidates than individually (Chandra, 2009).
Factions hold considerable importance during village elections. Factional politics at the village level has been analysed by various scholars (Beals & Siegel, 1960; LeVine, 1961). During elections, factions are formed for a specific purpose, lasting till the objective is attained, after which they wither out and emerge again only when another objective has to be achieved (Yadava, 1967). In this study, the Yadavs, much like the landowning Thakurs, were split into two opposing factions that were not rigid or permanent blocs; rather, their boundaries were fluid, with overlapping social and economic interests. During the 2015 elections, the Yadav faction that supported NS drew members from multiple castes. This cross-caste coalition was formed with the objective of electing a candidate who could be amenable to their collective interests.
The Growing Figure of Pradhan
With the integration of the village into state or national political processes, rural leaders operate similarly to state-level politicians. They rely on patronage networks for material benefits in exchange for political loyalty (Chandra, 2004), thereby institutionalizing relationships of subordination and dependence within rural society (Heller, 2000). Elected rural leaders are different compared to traditional elites whose basis of power originated from landholding and a close network of tenants within the village. These tenants provided services to these elites in exchange for protection and support during times of distress. The elites could influence their voting behaviour and maintain a permanent vote bank (Frankel & Rao, 1989).
However, with the introduction of the 73rd Amendment Act, a new class of leaders emerged in the villages who may or may not be affluent, but have enough capital to launch a political career. They belong to the upwardly mobile middle class, with political and economic power acquired through government affirmation. As such, they are surrounded by powerful elites who have their own vested interests. These new leaders cultivate their programmes and political agendas, keeping in mind the demands and aspirations of these rural elites. Since the pradhan’s official position allows control over government resources, resources are distributed that disregard the preferences of his opponents. They operate as low-level brokers in charge of mobilizing voters in their area (Bussell, 2019). Besides cultivating ties with electorates, these elites enjoy a fair degree of influence in the villages; they maintain links with local politicians, block officials and external agents who help them accumulate funds or get preferred projects approved. All of this authority is dependent on their personal and economic status.
Although the institution they head is based on the principles of decentralization, in democratic-deficit states like UP, they become sites of egregious patronage and political interference (Brun & Diamond, 2014). This has resulted in non-elites being unable to sufficiently check the incidence of corruption and has allowed the pradhan to turn panchayats into an individual’s personal political domain. Martin and Hulme (2003) argue that societies characterized by patron–client relationships are more vulnerable to corruption and elite capture, as the nature of interaction between elites and non-elites precludes the latter’s right to claim their share of benefits. Therefore, elites tend to channel benefits towards those closely aligned with them. This arrangement also suits government functionaries within the BDO office who seek rents (Marcesse, 2018), as it facilitates collusion with the pradhan and enables decision-making in ways that serve their mutual interests.
Diminishing Importance of Vote Banks
Throughout rural UP, indeed across India, increasing access to education, availability of non-agricultural employment and politicization of poor labourers have decreased the weaker groups’ reliance on landed elites (Himanshu & Stern, 2016; Lerche, 1999). With the introduction of elections under the 73rd Amendment Act, these groups gained a new political resource, as the mere giving or withholding of votes could affect the fortunes of political aspirants (Scott, 1972). Kept out of decision-making for a long time by traditional panchayat leaders, these households could assert and imagine their votes as citizenship rights, no longer obligated to follow the instructions of their erstwhile patrons. Similar to urban voters, these groups vote or re-elect only those contestants who have delivered or who they think will deliver on their promises. This has placed their old patrons in a difficult position of having to listen to their constituents for once. When a contestant now approaches these groups, they pledge to follow their patrons’ choice of candidate but, on the day of voting, are free to vote according to their preferences. This shift in voting behaviour has altered the village power structure, as erstwhile groups can no longer rely on their consolidated past vote banks. Contestants must now actively cultivate their vote banks, just like urban politicians who work to build and maintain electoral support.
External Agents Within Panchayat Elections
Similar to state and national elections, panchayat elections have witnessed the emergence of contestants from the semi-cartelized economy in the states—brick traders, building contractors, owners of cement factories, sand contractors and transportation businessmen (Michelutti, 2020). Despite serious criminal records, these actors are prominent in elections, as they bring in money and muscle. 19 Elections have thus become costly affairs, with funds required at all stages—travel, advertising, rallies, polling agents and for various illicit purposes like vote buying (Bjorkman & Witsoe, 2018).
All this has helped contestants and their political and economic patrons in several ways. First, manipulative tactics dampen opponents’ spirits; in a poorly informed environment such as a village, voters fail to distinguish between good and bad contestants. Second, given the relatively short period in which election campaigns are held, kaaryakarta (volunteers) are needed to organize rallies, run advertisement campaigns, operate vehicles and recruit other volunteers. Since these contestants come with strong financial backing, they have the capacity to organize activities at short notice. For them, to plan their campaigning ahead, the election season starts a year before the actual voting and lasts for months after voting is completed.
During the 2015 elections, AT, along with one of the Thakur brothers, was supported financially by these external agents. This was distinctly different from the 2005 and 2010 elections, where contestants gathered support from their community, kin and factions; it was only after they won that they started reinforcing their dominance. One of the reasons for this was a change in policy by the UP government in 2012 that allowed developmental funds to be transferred to the joint account of the pradhan and his secretary (Mukerji, 2018). This policy financially empowered pradhans who earlier depended on the block office for most of their financial allocations. The 2015 election became a business deal for contestants, who invested heavily in their campaigning. They imposed checks and balances on voters suspected of taking money but not voting for their benefactor. Local youth were employed as spies to collect information post-election. Even when voters kept their allegiances private, these young men could guess who they voted for based on the money spent in that particular ward, calculating whether the money had worked to their leaders’ advantage. To a great extent, this monitoring process was successful, as it exerted dahav (pressure) over voters who had taken money from several contestants. This can also be interpreted as a demonstration of ‘muscle’ by three contestants over voters through their networks.
From Victory to Control: Domination After Elections
This section examines the structure of domination adopted by winners after elections. It describes the rationale behind choosing ignorant or scarcely literate panchayat members, the position of female members and the clever use of patronage and guardianship by the pradhan to establish himself among the electorate.
The study villages are divided into 13 wards, with each ward represented by a panchayat member who is responsible for its development. Successive pradhans in the villages have chosen two categories of panchayat members. The first is usually chosen from wards 5 to 13 (Tables 1 and 2). Since these wards are dominated by lower castes, pradhans have put forward contestants who are merely functionally literate and have little or no land at their disposal. Given their weak bargaining power, these contestants are ideal, as they tend to function as namesakes or token members, with limited participation in decision-making. However, if the member is not pliable to the pradhan’s interests, they are only approached when there is an urgent need. As a female panchayat member from ward 3, whose husband voted against AT, told me:
Since I have joined the panchayat, I have met the pradhan twice. Last time when I met him, he asked for my thumb impression on some documents. I refused … thereafter, I have not seen his face for the last ten months.
20
These members are approached by the pradhan whenever their thumb impressions or signatures are required on official documents. If they refuse to comply, their signatures or thumb impressions are forged.
The second category of members belongs to wards 1–4. These members mediate between the pradhan and the villagers. A majority of members under this category belong to upper or landed castes; even the Yadav households within these wards are allied to the sitting pradhan. These members serve as intermediaries for local distribution and patronage, informing leaders of villagers willing to pay bribes for government benefits. Some are provided with leases to village common land, whereas others are given responsibilities from where they could reap benefits. Suraj Bakash (henceforth, SB), a trusted associate of AT, was given the job of supervising MGNREGA labourers. This position allowed SB to include the name of his unemployed son within the muster rolls, albeit in an illegal manner. For AT, appointing a trustworthy person allowed him to monitor the labourers’ loyalty.
Position of Women Members
A World Bank study posits that women are more effective and honest in governance as they are more trustworthy and public-spirited (David et al., 1999). However, my empirical data indicate no major transformation has taken place to empower women candidates within panchayats. The only woman candidate who held the position of pradhan was GD, who replaced or arguably extended her husband’s position for the apex post. During her election, four contestants stood for the position, of which three were housewives. All candidates served as proxies to their male counterparts. After their nomination, their husbands or male relatives were the ones campaigning, gathering support on their behalf. A male supporter justified this practice to me, saying that it was not necessary for females to participate in campaigning when her husband or male supporter was working on her behalf. Whichever woman wins, she will have to follow the hokum (order) of her husband or male relatives. 21
Villagers rarely remembered the names of female contestants, as they were addressed by names of their husbands or close relatives, thereby forming a beti–biwi–bahu (daughter–wife–daughter-in-law) brigade (Lieten & Srivastava, 1999). The main reason for their dependence on male counterparts is a lack of knowledge of village affairs. With the exception of GD, whose main support came from her husband, a former pradhan, the other contestants remained confined to their household chores. These candidates were neither encouraged nor permitted to participate in election rallies, as their male counterparts insisted they were not in a position to address the concerns of villagers or respond to the queries of government officials. As one of the female contestants expressed about the strict patriarchal norms existing within the villages:
What can I tell you? I do not go anywhere. I am just working inside the house. I don’t like this, but this is how it is; women are treated like animals. Last panchayat elections, I could not even go to cast my vote because my husband decided that I should not involve myself in politics. Now that I have been chosen as a contestant, I can lend an ear to what is being said, but nobody has ever discussed anything with me.
22
Several factors contributed to GD’s electoral success in 2010. Her prior experience in interacting with government officials and addressing village-level problems worked to her advantage. She also benefited from strong networks of supporters loyal to her husband. This support base extended across the villages of Madopur and Udoutpur, and included agricultural labourers, beneficiaries of welfare schemes and upper and landed caste households. Finally, BG adopted a clever strategy of employing women who acted as close agents; since women maintained social interactions with villagers, they were in a better position to influence their voting preferences.
However, after becoming the pradhan, GD rarely visited the villages. Instead, her husband functioned as de facto authority, exercising control over administrative decisions and everyday governance. During this period, several new government welfare schemes were introduced, which further strengthened BG’s dominance. These schemes became a starting point for successive pradhans to reinforce networks of loyalty and influence.
Patronage and Guardianship to Mobilize Electorates
The appropriation of public resources and the dispensation of patronage play an important role in sustaining and nurturing the electorate after elections. Unlike vote buying, where the balance of power is in favour of the client, the person in charge of providing patronage and guardianship holds an official position that entitles him to distribute benefits (Singh & Hemrajani, 2018).
In my study, welfare programmes like MGNREGA, Prime Minister Awas Yojana (PMAY) and pension schemes were under the pradhan’s control and were used to generate political support. During BG’s tenure, 42 households were made beneficiaries of PMAY, out of which eight households received the full share of their money, whereas the rest were told they would receive their entitlement after BG’s wife was chosen for the apex post. In another incident in 2010, the UP government, based on its evaluation, provided food relief packages to BPL households. These packages included 20 kg of rice along with other food supplies. Each household was meant to receive one package, handed to the head of household, regardless of the number of members. An elderly widow whom I refer to as Shanti was living with her two adult sons. She did not receive an individual package, even though she identified herself as the head of household. However, both sons received packages, with the assumption that they would share them with their mother. Shanti raised this concern with government officials but was unable to pursue her case.
The nature of the distribution of these packets is indicative of two aspects. First, the pradhan was using discriminatory patronage to secure political backing. This quid pro quo meant that every supporter was treated differently. In Shanti’s case, her sons were preferred as they represented five eligible votes compared to her single vote. Second, the distribution of these benefits can be interpreted as vote buying, as when officials distribute these packets, they have pictures of the pradhan along with the local MLA. This enhances the public visibility of these leaders, as more packets exchange hands, the more these leaders are projected in a positive light.
Another type of patronage is guardianship, which relies on personal contacts and influence. In the villages, economically poor groups are more likely to seek guardianship from the pradhan compared to affluent groups, who have the means to get their work done from state functionaries. Two types of guardianship commonly exist—police security and mediation in courts. In the first case, a close adherence to the SO of the local thana (police station) is required, as this police functionary serves as a nodal point of contact between the public and the criminal justice system. SOs are considered ‘kingpins’ of localities under their jurisdiction. They have the capacity to use threats and force, and can deny citizens legitimate police services by refusing to take their complaints or filing First Information Reports (Jauregui, 2014).
In the second case, guardianship is provided on judicial matters that are long, arduous and expensive affairs; courts are often perceived as sites of corrupt state and inefficient institutions (Singh & Hemrajani, 2018). Villagers believe that one should go to court only after the disputant has exhausted all his remedies. Therefore, most villagers try to settle disputes via their elders, caste leaders or elected representatives. The usual practice is that whenever a dispute arises, the client approaches the pradhan. Upon satisfactory resolution, the client is required to pay kharcha panni (a tip or bribe) to his patron.
Conclusion
This ethnographic study of four panchayat elections in UP has traced both transformations and continuities in rural political life over the past two decades. Under the constitutional framework of the 73rd Amendment Act, several transformations are noticeable.
First, electoral politics have become competitive, monetized and closely integrated with state-level politics. In 2000, 2005 and 2010, elections revolved around caste, kinship and factional groups. However, in 2015, the scale of competition intensified. The office of the pradhan came to be viewed as an economic investment, with contestants adopting various manipulative tactics to steer electoral outcomes. This was a decisive shift in dominance, as these new contestants focused more on liquidity, bureaucratic access and political brokerage. Further, there were changes in voting patterns among the marginalized groups. Earlier, these castes served as permanent vote banks for upper-caste elites; these castes now bargained collectively, accepted inducements strategically and exercised autonomy within the secrecy of the ballot. Elections for these castes have acquired a new meaning—not merely as moments of compliance, but opportunities to assert citizenship and negotiate benefits.
There were also changes in the leadership profile. The traditional Thakur pradhan, who dispensed informal justice from his baithak, was gradually replaced by a new class of leaders. Figures like BG, NS and AT illustrate this tradition. Their authority is derived from their ability to manipulate bureaucratic procedures; forge ties with BDOs, police officials and government contractors; and strategically utilize welfare programmes to their advantage.
Despite these transformations, several continuities persist. Caste, kin and factions remain principal idioms of political mobilization. Electoral competition may have intensified, but caste-based and personal rivalries still structure alliances. Post-election governance continues to revolve around patronage and selective inclusion. Panchayat members are frequently chosen for their pliability, as authority remains concentrated around the pradhan and his close network.
These findings challenge a common assumption that corruption within panchayats cannot be solely attributed to decentralization. The evidence suggests that corruption reflects a broader culture in UP politics rather than an inherent flaw existing within the panchayat system. Practices such as inflating MGNREGA material costs, extracting bribes under the village latrine scheme, selectively distributing PMAY benefits, and colluding with police officials did not originate due to decentralization; rather, they are patterns observed in state elections as well.
In sum, this longitudinal study demonstrates that decentralization under the 73rd Amendment Act has transformed village politics by intensifying competition and expanding electoral participation. However, entrenched caste hierarchies, patronage networks and the wider culture of corruption in UP are barriers to the full democratic potential of the panchayat system.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.