Abstract
India faces a hostile geo-strategic environment of having two adversarial nuclear neighbors on her western and northern borders, namely Pakistan and China who share a collusive military partnership aimed at stultifying India’s rise as a pre eminent Asian power. The Kargil conflict of 1999, fought after the overt nuclear weaponization of India and Pakistan exposed India’s blunted conventional military capability in light of critical deficiencies of artillery, precision guided munitions as well as night vision devices. Despite confronting multiple crises relating to national security during the last fifteen years, successive governments have displayed perilous apathy regarding the urgently needed modernization of our armed forces. This article tries to analyze the security ramifications arising out of this neglect and the need to undertake sustained and meaningful defense reforms in view of our serious threat perceptions which must factor in the possibility of having to simultaneously fight a ‘two-front’ war in the near future.
Introduction
The most intrinsic necessity of any nation state to uphold its sovereignty is the attainment of the requisite military capability to defend its unity and territorial integrity from external aggression and maintain internal cohesion from subversive and secessionist elements. To achieve these objectives it is not only imperative to maintain a robust and potent military capability, but most importantly to periodically upgrade that capability in sophistication and lethality by induction of new weapon systems, commensurate with the changing threat perceptions to a country’s security. Since times immemorial, right from the ages of the great Greek and Roman Empires, to the modern age, states transcending varied historical epochs have always fallen back on their military when confronted with an existential threat. The military therefore is the most crucial protective armor of any sovereign country, which in times of eventuality does not think twice before sacrificing itself at the altar of national security, for preserving the existential identity of the state it represents. It is undoubtedly the fulcrum which holds the state in cohesion and that explains the proclivity of nation states to rely upon their armies when confronted with grave adversities. Reciprocally, therefore, it is an indispensable responsibility and solemn duty on part of any country to fulfil the requirements of its armed forces in terms of equipment and weaponry and more importantly strive for its holistic welfare.
The neorealist approach to International Relations conceives the international system as anarchic where there is no overarching authority to maintain order and guarantee security, and the constituent units, that is, sovereign states are acting according to the logic of self help, by increasing their capabilities vis-à-vis their rivals. States act as security maximizing agents because they face a security dilemma; given the increase in military capabilities of their adversaries, they have to act appropriately for safeguarding their own existence. Neoclassical realism argues that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the country’s relative material power which includes a combination of both military and economic leverages. Anarchy or the absence of a universal sovereign or worldwide government is the permissive cause of international conflict (Lobel et al. 2009: 4–5). Systemic forces create incentives for all states to strive for greater efficiency in providing security for themselves. Relative power distributions and trends set broad parameters for states’ external behavior (Lobel et al. 2009: 4–5).
Geographic contours have created a highly detrimental security environment for India. No other country in the world confronts such a hostile geostrategic location of having two adversarial nuclear powers, one on its western border, and the other on the north, namely Pakistan and China. Both these countries are embraced in a close strategic and politico-economic partnership. The rise of China as a major economic and military power is bound to upset the balance of power in Asia. China’s growing assertion of power in South Asia was a contributing factor in India’s decision to weaponize its nuclear program China is an emerging superpower which is engaged in the process of the world’s biggest military expansion, the sheer scale of which evokes deep concern throughout Asia-Pacific (The Economist 2012). China’s ascent as a regional hegemon and a future superpower has serious ramifications for Indian security. The Chinese today possess around 9,000 main battle tanks (MBT) in addition to long-range ICBMs, both land based, the DF-31 with 14,000 kilometers range and the submarine launched JL-2 with a range of 8000–10,000 kilometers strike range, besides hundreds of tactical ballistic and cruise missiles in addition to a potent air defense system. In comparison India has less than 3,000 main battle tanks, the obsolete Vijayantas still part of the arsenal and the T-72s (inducted way back in the 1970s) forming a major chunk of the fleet. Around 80 percent of Indian tanks do not have night vision capabilities (Singh 2012). The PLA Air Force has more than 3,500 aircrafts, while the Indian Air Force’s fighter fleet is fast dwindling made up of around 650 aircraft of which the obsolete MIG-21s forms a substantial part, and the Chinese operate around fifty-five submarines out of which five are nuclear powered (Singh 2012). India’s sole nuclear powered submarine, the Arihant has not been inducted yet and the long-range Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) crucial for a reliable second strike capability still years away from formal induction. Compared to the Indian Navy’s 140 ships, the Chinese have an arsenal of around 400 ships (Singh 2012).
Since her independence, India has been subjected to external aggressions both by Pakistan and China who have coveted Indian territory. The end of the Cold War has not ushered in any lasting peace on the subcontinent, with cross border terrorism aided and abetted by Pakistan since 1989 under Operation Topac, launched by the ISI to foment terrorism in Kashmir, continuing unabated till date. This has claimed thousands of lives of both Indian civilians and security forces besides causing colossal loss to property. Pakistan has perfected the technique of using terrorism as an instrument of state policy to inflict repeated assaults against vital Indian interests at a sub tactical level, and we have been unable to come up with a coherent strategy to combat it. The terror outrages in New Delhi, Bangalore, Mumbai, Pune, Hyderabad, and other Indian cities repeatedly over the course of the last two decades has exposed India’s vulnerability and lack of a contingency mechanism to deal with terrorism. The attacks on the Indian Parliament of December 2001 and the Mumbai outrage of November 2008 perhaps most glaringly exposed India’s inability to take even a limited form of coercive military action against Pakistan. Despite mobilizing its armed forces during Operation Parakram in 2002, India refrained from taking any punitive measures against Pakistan militarily, primarily because the Indian armed forces did not enjoy any significant qualitative conventional superiority over Pakistan, to convincingly inflict serious damage to terrorist training infrastructure and degrade the war waging potential of the Pakistan Army in a limited war before international pressure would compel India to cease hostilities. To fight and win a limited conflict under a nuclear backdrop demanded a comprehensive qualitative edge in weaponry and logistics which the Indian Armed forces were clearly lacking. Operation Parakram was mainly aimed as a compellence strategy to coerce Pakistan to put an end to cross border terrorism against India.
Years of governmental apathy regarding India’s defense modernization had clearly tilted the military balance from India’s favor to one of near parity with Pakistan, thereby adversely affecting the credibility of India’s military machine (Katoch 2012). The Kargil War of 1999 was India’s first limited conflict after the nuclear tests of the preceding year. India displayed exemplary restraint by not crossing the Line of Control (LOC) despite a grave Pakistani provocation when its regular troops intruded deep into Indian territory and occupied Indian posts across Drass, Kargil, and Batalik sectors. India was again at the receiving end of Pakistani perfidy and compelled to fight a war on its own territory. The Army executed Operation Vijay valiantly and the Indian soldier once again gave an exemplary display of his gallantry by defeating the enemy against insurmountable odds. However the lack of equipment exacted a heavy toll upon the Army. India lost many of its brave soldiers due to lack of weaponry like artillery locating radars, precision guided munitions (PGM), and night vision devices. From basic items like snow boots to ammunition for assault rifles and artillery shells for the howitzers, everything was scarce. It was any Army’s nightmare of being ill equipped, in arms and ammunition, compelled to fight a well entrenched, heavily armed enemy on its own soil. The gravity of the prevailing situation was reflected in the exasperation of the then Army Chief, General V.P. Malik’s statement to a journalist when quizzed about the situation on the borders, ‘We shall fight with what we have’ (Malik 2012). The tragedy of India is that the political establishment and the bureaucracy does not learn any lessons from our past history setting in pace a steady deterioration of our war waging and most importantly war winning capabilities. The armed forces in general and the Army in particular still grapple with serious deficiencies in the inventories even fourteen years after Kargil, thereby gravely imperilling national security. Newer threats have ascended on our strategic horizons like cyber warfare and militarization of space with laser based weapons and anti-satellite missiles. India, along with the United States and Eurozone countries has been a victim to Chinese hackers for the past few years. The recent cyber attacks against Indian defense and space establishments dealing with sensitive military data, leading to compromising of our critical defense secrets has exacerbated the need for setting up a dedicated cyberspace command (Bipindra 2013).
Pakistan unlike India, views its nuclear weapons as war fighting instruments intended for negating India’s conventional superiority. Tactical nuclear weapons (TWA) have a place of great importance in Pakistani strategic doctrine and the combat readiness of its armed forces. It has unequivocally refused to reciprocate India’s declared policy of No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. The testing of the 60 kilometer nuclear missile Nasr by Pakistan for the first time in April 2011 and subsequently in May 2012 and February 2013 has introduced a new and dangerous matrix of instability in the India–Pakistan nuclear deterrence structure by lowering the nuclear threshold to perilous levels. The Pakistan army proposes to use the Nasr missile to drop a low-yield nuclear warhead on Indian mechanized forces that have entered Pakistani territory with a view to stopping the Indian offensive in its tracks (Kanwal 2013). It therefore becomes imperative upon India to develop its second strike capabilities of assured retaliation to such levels of lethality, sophistication, and precision that Pakistan would be deterred from resorting to the use of TWAs as it would dawn upon the Pakistani strategic decision makers that the cost of such an action would far outstrip its putative advantages.
Strategic Myopia-cum-policy Procrastination Degrading India’s Combat Readiness
Any country’s defense modernization is guided by two important considerations: first, the need to maintain an effective and robust deterrence against its adversaries; and second, it should be concomitant with the geostrategic role a country wishes to play at the global level. Today the military has become an important instrument of foreign policy. In addition to defending a country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the military also plays a very important international geopolitics today. Its functions range from rendering assistance in transnational areas affected by natural calamities, undertaking humanitarian intervention missions in strife-torn regions ravaged by civil war or genocide, to engaging in peace keeping and peace enforcement under the auspices of UN. For performing these roles, countries systematically enhance the global reach, power projection and lift capabilities of their militaries. China commensurate with its ambitions of achieving great power status in the course of the next two decades or so, has been zealously striving for achieving global power projection capabilities for its military and also developing area denial/anti-access standoff weapons so that it can dominate the Asia-Pacific as a regional hegemon. From potent long-range missiles and new-generation nuclear submarines to expanding space, electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, China is pursuing long-term comprehensive military modernization designed to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity regional military conflicts (Pandit 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e, 2013f, 2013g, 2013h).
Deterrence is the attainment and maintenance of the requisite military capability (conventional or nuclear) by a state which would inhibit a potential aggressor from carrying out its hostile actions against it, as the aggressor would be convinced of the ensuing retaliation which would far outweigh the benefits of its attack. Deterrence is therefore the inducement of one party (the aggressor) to refrain from a certain action by means of a threat to inflict punishment which would convince the aggressor that it is in its self interest to desist from committing that action (Harkabi 2008: 9). Deterrence therefore rests on a delicate balance of anticipated gain or loss, and combat superiority in terms of men and machines. About the Kargil War, eminent security analyst Jasjit Singh had opined that it represented the failure of India’s conventional military deterrence (Chengappa et al. 1999). The brazen nature of the large scale intrusion deep into Indian territory and the subsequent diffidence on part of the political leadership to cross the LOC even in the face of mounting Indian casualties, coupled with crippling shortages of arms, ammunition, battle field and artillery locating radars, field artillery long-range rockets and howitzers, precision munitions, and laser-guided bombs made it inexplicably clear that India’s war fighting capability against Pakistan had been severely compromised due to procrastination in defense modernization. Had Kargil indeed escalated into a full scale war, far from achieving a convincing military victory, India would have found itself in the unsavory condition of a military stalemate. The virtual freeze on defense modernization since the beginning of the decade of the 1990s and the high attrition rate of weaponry coupled with lack of reliable spares since the dissolution of the Soviet Union were responsible for this perilous condition of defense preparedness.
As a military posture, India has adopted the policy of dissuasive deterrence against China and punitive deterrence against Pakistan. Dissuasion is a strategy of maintaining a required force level of conventional and if the need arises, nuclear weapons against, albeit a more powerful adversary who is discouraged from pursuing hostile intentions. The socio-economic constraints did not allow India to attain a numerical parity with China in conventional or nuclear force levels, but it is a matter of supreme national interest that we do keep the pace of our defense modernization at a numerical and technological threshold which corresponds to the unprecedented scale of the Chinese military build-up, and secure India’s deterrent posture. China’s grand strategy is to establish itself as the regional hegemon of Asia-Pacific capable of challenging and if the need arises, decimating American naval supremacy for the integration of Taiwan by use of force. The Chinese have been zealously pursuing the attainment of offensive and asymmetric capabilities (anti-access/area denial capabilities in military parlance) which includes development of anti-satellite weapons, cyber warfare capability, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and new generation ICBMs like Dong Feng 41 (DF-41) missile with Multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRV) capable of carrying ten nuclear warheads with a strike range of over 14,000 kilometers posing a grave threat to continental United States. The Pentagon itself views Chinese military might with growing alarm, given its development of the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile which can sink American aircraft carriers thereby irreversibly altering the strategic power balance in Asia (Gertz 2010). By 2014, China is expected to begin the sea trials of its new generation indigenously developed Jin Class Submarines which would be capable of launching the JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) having a strike range of 8000–10,000 kilometers (Gertz 2013). It is estimated by American strategic experts that given the PLA’s massive and sustained modernization by 2020, the power balance Asia-Pacific would be tilted in China’s favor, challenging decades of US military pre-eminence in the region (US–China Economic and Security Review Commission 2013: 233). By 2020, China could most probably have the largest naval fleet in the Western Pacific comprising nearly sixty submarines armed with long-range SLBMs, nearly seventy-five major surface combatant ships armed with lethal area denial capabilities which could effectively neutralize the US Navy’s ability to intervene in the region (US–China Economic and Security Review Commission 2013: 233). Apart from qualitative and quantitative enhancement of its conventional and nuclear military prowess, China has also been vigorously developing standoff capabilities in domains of space based weapon systems and cyber warfare.
In January 2007, it tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile successfully becoming only the third country after the US and Russia to have a proven capability to deploy space based assets in times of war. The acquiring of anti-satellite capability by China has serious security repercussions for India, which neither has any space based offensive capability, nor a defensive one (Kondapalli 2007). In May 2013, China carried out a second test of ASAT system with the missile reaching 10,000 kilometers above the earth’s surface, the highest sub orbital launch recorded worldwide since 1976 (Esa 2013). The Indian communication and remote sensing satellites in the lower earth orbit can easily be crippled by Chinese space weapons thereby rendering India completely incapable of either feeding data for missile launches, employing its fighter jets to pound enemy positions (fighter jets rely upon satellite links for combat missions), make operational deployment of the submarines, and above all coordinate strategic communications relating to nuclear second strike if India is subjected to a nuclear strike during a war with China. In short, the Indian armed forces would be completely handicapped in fighting a network-centric war and we would have to rely upon a foreign country for satellite signals, which can seriously jeopardize our security and strategic autonomy. China views military modernization as a key element of its ‘comprehensive national power’ and is engaged in the world’s most extensive program regarding time bound induction of new offensive weapon platforms. The 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, which is most commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398 is believed to be the main PLA cyber warfare unit which has carried out cyber sabotage, and theft of sensitive military secrets from computer networks in India, US, UK, France, Israel, Canada, Japan, and South Africa (The Hindu 2013a). China unveiled its indigenously developed stealth fighter aircraft, the J-31 in 2012, with an earlier version the J-20 being test flown in January 2011. In comparison, India’s fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) being developed in collaboration with Russia is expected to attain initial operational clearance tentatively only by 2019 and the probable year of induction remains uncertain (Pubby 2012).
India’s military gap with China both in terms of numbers and technology is alarmingly wide and increasing with every passing year. It is a failure of Indian diplomacy that we have been unable to exercise any strategic leverage upon Russia to prevent it from selling advanced weaponry to China which has accentuated India’s military weakness vis-à-vis China exponentially. China is procuring the latest Sukhoi-35 fighter jets from Russia which are not only a generation ahead in terms of weaponry and avionics as compared to India’s frontline fighter the Sukhoi-30 MKI, but also give the Chinese Active electronic scanned array (AESA) radar enabling the PLA Air Force to command complete airspace domination in times of a conflict. China is also buying the latest Amur class submarines from Russia which again represent a quantum jump in technology and lethality over the ageing Kilo class submarines in the inventory of the Indian Navy (Radyuhin 2013). It is already anticipated in India’s strategic circles that the military disparity with China has assumed gargantuan proportions for any meaningful dissuasion in military terms (Strat Post 2009).
The intensive militarization of the Tibetan plateau by China, with construction of ballistic missile silos at strategically located high altitude positions along the Sino-Indian border, constitutes an existential threat to India as in times of war, a Chinese missile barrage could devastate India’s land and air-based deterrent and even annihilate them, if China launches sustained missile assault given the disproportionate size of the Chinese and Indian missile arsenal. Let alone countering China’s massive build up the attitude of insouciance towards the critical aspects of defense modernization by successive political dispensations, have made India’s position militarily untenable, if a conflict does break out with China. The government announced in July 2013, of setting up a new mountain strike core to counter the Chinese military superiority. However even by conservative estimates, given India’s excruciatingly slow defense procurement processes and bureaucratic red tape, it will take a minimum of seven to eight years before this strike core can be equipped with the requisite weaponry and fully operationalized.
Even sixty-seven years after independence, India does not have a coherent security doctrine, either to deal with external adversaries like China and Pakistan or to counter the scourge of externally aided and abetted terrorism. Most of the key recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee relating to mitigation of systemic deficiencies that have been plaguing defense management in India have not been implemented. There has been no mechanism framed for ensuring time bound induction of critical military platforms indispensable for maintaining India’s combat edge. The service chiefs have not been accorded any status of authority for exercising their autonomy in framing policy inputs at the higher echelons of strategic decision making, leading to inadequate coordination and synergy in the security domain affecting relations between the Ministry of Defence and the military (Joseph 2013). The Naresh Chandra task force on national security which submitted its report in May 2012, has lamented the fact that in the absence of any coherent ‘National Security Strategy’ of India, the concept of long term strategic defense planning is virtually nonexistent, the maladies of which are manifested in the serious operational deficiencies stymieing all the three services making India extremely vulnerable to fight and win a limited war under hi-tech conditions (Pandit 2013d).
Deficiencies Plaguing the Indian Army
The propensity of adopting a policy of ad-hocism relating to military purchases, and absence of pragmatism and a coherent national security vision to modernize the armed forces in view of changing threat perceptions is a precarious strategic vacillation which can cost the nation dearly in times of an eventuality leading to a recurrence of a 1962 kind of a debacle (Pandit 2013h). Despite the crisis relating to paucity of arms and ammunition, India confronted in the wake of the Kargil intrusions, successive governments and the bureaucratic establishment have been sorely inept in dealing with exigencies relating to maintenance of a robust deterrent against both Pakistan and China. Fourteen years after Kargil, the Army is still severely handicapped in terms of weaponry, ammunition, reconnaissance capabilities, air defense, logistics, and also manpower relating to officer strength. Since acquiring the Bofors howitzers in 1986, the Army has not been able to induct a single artillery gun in the 155 millimeter category (Swamy 2012). Most of the original 410 Bofors howitzers are dysfunctional due to lack of spares and many have been cannibalized to keep the others functional. The result was a serious downgrading of India’s military dexterity against Pakistan, not to speak of China. The majority of the Army’s tank fleet is night blind, there is dearth of critical tank ammunition, long-range rocket launchers, infantry combat vehicles, precision guided munitions, tactical missiles, reconnaissance satellites, drones, air defense and anti-tank missiles, machine guns, anti-material rifles, and bullet proof jackets (Kanwal 2012). Years of paltry allocation to the needs of defense modernization has led to the situation that India’s armed forces, all three services are saddled with weaponry which has long been obsolete. The tank fleet essentially consists of the T-72 tanks which are again variants of technology of the 1970s and have been upgraded to maintain war worthiness but they have been plagued by operational problems relating to turret stability, dysfunctional anti-tank missile protection armor, and night blindness. The T-90 tank also purchased from Russia was inducted from 2001, but sufficient numbers have not been produced by the heavy vehicles factory at Avadi. The strike formations are protected by 1960s vintage air defense missiles. In the absence of either artillery or tank fleet modernization, the army is critically constrained in adopting a deterrent posture against Pakistan and responding effectively to decimate the Pakistani war machine if another 26/11 type outrage does occur. The Army has a shopping list of $50 billion (Rs. 2.2 lakh crores) to mitigate its deficiencies. However, the procedures for buying arms are so cumbersome that a classified army study says the force will be fully ready only a decade hence, by 2022. The Army has bought less than half the equipment it planned to acquire during the 11th Five-Year Plan period running from 2007 to 2012. Weapons not bought include artillery worth Rs. 20,000 crores, and air defense missiles worth Rs. 10,000 crores. These have left gaping holes in its preparedness. Hence, a projected surge in its combat ratio to 1:1.5—or a one-and-a-half time’s superiority in troops and equipment over the Pakistan Army—by 2012 has not materialized (Unnithan 2011a).
Deficiencies Plaguing the Indian Air Force: Contextualizing Pakistani Missile Capabilities
India faces a simultaneous ‘two front war threat’ from both Pakistan and China. In case such an eventuality indeed arises, given the importance of air power in twenty-first century warfare, the Indian Air Force (IAF) no doubt will have to shoulder the primary responsibility of effectively crippling Pakistan and sustaining an attrition campaign against China. It needs a minimum of fifty-five squadrons of fighter jets, which ought to be at least fourth generation air superiority fighters to fight a two front war and a minimum of forty-four squadrons to maintain a posture of effective deterrence against Pakistan (Unnithan 2011b). However the reality is in stark contrast to our strategic needs. The Air Force is compelled to fly the MIG-21s still today as a mainstay of its combat fleet due to the inordinate delay in fruition of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program (Pandit 2013g). Work on the LCA commenced in 1983 and till date it has been plagued by failure of the indigenous Kaveri engine, non-development of its missiles leading to ambiguity over its expected date of induction. The MIG-21 were inducted in way back in 1963, and though the government spent a huge sum on their so called upgradation, these fighters clearly way past their prime continue to exact a high and tragic toll in terms of pilot deaths. India signed successive deals with Russia to acquire around 272 Sukhoi-30 fighters but HAL has been unable to deliver the Air Force time bound supply of the jets due to dearth of adequate infrastructure. The MMRCA deal for the purchase of 126 Rafale fighter jets from Dassault Aviation Company of France has still not been signed due to ensuing price negotiations, although the Rafale was chosen as the winner of the deal in January 2012. In case the contract is signed by 2014, India will receive the first fighter jet only in 2017. However, given India’s notoriously protracted defense acquisition procedures, if the Rafale deal is delayed, then the Air Force’s fighter fleet numbers will dwindle rapidly in the time period 2017–22, leading to a precarious erosion in deterrent capabilities against Pakistan, and an irreversible conventional inferiority vis-à-vis China virtually making India, an acutely vulnerable target for our adversaries (The Hindu 2013b).
With both China and Pakistan bolstering their air forces, IAF certainly needs well-planned systematic inductions of fighters and helicopters, mid-air refuellers and transport planes, spy and combat drones, surface-to-air missiles, and advanced radars along with force multipliers like airborne warning and control system (AWACS) assets. China has five fully operational air bases for fighter jets in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and it is systematically testing new combat doctrines for an effective air to ground bombing campaign in the vicinity of Tibetan plateau (Krishnan 2012). The modern four and a half generation air superiority fighters in the Chinese arsenal like the SU-27, and indigenously developed J-10, and JF-17 have already accentuated India’s weakness in air power compared to the PLA Air Force. Most worrisome from India’s point of view has been China’s acquiring of Russian made SU-35 air superiority fighters armed with 400 kilometers range Ibris AESA radar and long-range beyond visual range air to air missiles (BVRAAM) with standoff capabilities, which is far superior to India’s SU-30MKI or the soon to be acquired Rafales and comes close to a fifth generation fighter in terms of its combat prowess as a platform. China’s own fifth generation stealth fighter, J-31 which has already undergone a flight test in 2012, supplemented by Russian supplied long-range air defense missiles, the S-300PMU1, and its indigenously developed AWACS—have already made the PLA Air Force one of the most potent air powers in Asia, much superior to the Indian Air force not only in terms of numbers but also technological dominance. The Chinese aim to shortly induct the deadly S-400 Russian made surface to air missile with a strike range of 400 kilometers and this coupled with the Sukhoi-35 fighter jets would truly enable Beijing to acquire area denial and anti-access capabilities against American forces if they try to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf in times of a conflict (Minnick 2013). The acquisition of these offensive air dominance platforms supplemented by highly sophisticated C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets by China has overwhelmingly tilted the air power balance in its favor vis-à-vis India by an exponential technological yardstick. It is sacrosanct for the Indian government to adopt a proactive approach by recognizing the growing gap in the air dominance and interdiction capabilities of China and India, as the former’s air force is nearly three times larger than that of India. It is imperative in supreme national interests, at the highest levels of strategic policy making in India, utmost priority should be accorded to bolstering the combat capabilities of the IAF on a war footing as China has clearly eclipsed Pakistan as India’s most menacing strategic threat (The Indian Express 2009). Today the Air Force is still compelled to fly obsolete MIG-21 as the mainstay of most of its fighter squadrons and is struggling to maintain a thirty-two squadron fighter fleet which has blunted India’s conventional edge over Pakistan significantly (NDTV 2013). Pakistan is bolstering its fighter fleet with both Chinese as well as American assistance. It is getting colossal amounts of US military aid for its assistance rendered in the Afghanistan war and strangely the Americans justify their military aid in the name of developing Pakistan’s ability to fight terrorists. Fighter jets like F-16s, advanced medium-range Sidewinder air to air missiles, attack helicopters, modern howitzers, maritime reconnaissance, and strike aircraft which Pakistan received under the US military aid packages are certainly not needed or used by any country to fight terrorists but in reality for overtaking India in conventional military prowess (Pandit 2010). China provided Pakistan with fifty of its newly and indigenously developed JF-17 fighter aircraft in 2011 and has also set up extensive production facilities for manufacturing the fighter aircraft at the Kamra aeronautical complex in Pakistan (Perlez 2011) China not only sells military hardware but also extends assistance in joint design, collaboration and production facilities in Pakistan for weapon systems. It has sold Pakistan the F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, F-7 fighter aircraft, early warning and control aircraft, tanks, air-to-air missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and extended cooperation in main battle tank production worth billions of dollars between 2007 and 2011 (The Economic Times 2013), thereby enabling Pakistan to attain military parity and aim for superiority vis-à-vis India.
Perhaps the most destabilizing development in the India–Pakistan balance of power has been the advent of the short range, 60 kilometer Nasr missile in the Pakistani Army’s inventory (Joshi 2011). Tested for the first time in April 2011, Nasr is a TWA which can be used with catastrophic effects against Indian Army’s advancing strike formations, during times of war. Through the development of this missile, Pakistan has lowered the nuclear threshold even further, given its stated policy of not acceding to a ‘Nuclear No First Use (NFU)’ with regard to India. Though not officially acknowledged, the Indian Army formulated a new doctrine for fighting limited war under a nuclear backdrop called ‘Cold Start’ in April 2004 (Ladwig 2007/08: 158–90), which aimed at rapid mobilization of the main strike corps at border launch pads and undertake deep mechanized thrusts into Pakistani territory and effectively crippling the enemy within 72–96 hours after the commencement of war. This mechanized thrust would be executed with self contained mobile battle units each having a high concentration of lethal firepower in form of T-90 tanks, 155 millimeter artillery, long-range rocket launchers, coupled with synergized air support. During Operation Parakram, the three major Indian strike corps had taken a long time to mobilize at the border leading to the loss of strategic surprise. Pakistan has developed the Nasr, with an avowed intention to nullify India’s limited war doctrine. It is however a different narrative regarding the operational implementation of Cold Start doctrine. Given the Army’s serious paucity of funds for modernization, coupled with the sheer incompetence and absence of strategic vision on part of the government to expeditiously pursue either the 20,000 crore artillery modernization program for acquiring self propelled and towed guns hanging fire since decades, or ensuring timely induction of the T-90 tanks and aiding them with night vision and missile firing capability, the Cold Start has all but remained a lofty concept on paper (Pandit 2011).
Since the early-1980s, China in contravention of international norms has been seriously engaged in the clandestine transfer of nuclear and missile technologies to Pakistan. The Chinese sold Pakistan their M-9 and M-11 and more recently the DF-21 surface to surface ballistic missiles with their assorted technology transfers and helped set up their production facilities within Pakistan (Rajain 2005: 295–97). These missiles were later rechristened as those of Hatf, and Ghauri series by Pakistan. The Sino-Pakistan strategic collusion is primarily aimed at containing India’s rise thereby obstructing her from assuming her rightful place in the comity of nations. China’s proclivity to constrain the rise of India, both economically and strategically, makes imperative upon it to cultivate Pakistan as a strategic counterweight to keep India stultified in its South Asian neighborhood and prevent its rise as an Asian power. Chinese hegemonic designs of dominating India is evident from the fact that since the mid-1990s it has been following the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy aimed at strategic encirclement of India. China has established so called listening posts on the Coco Islands of Myanmar whose main mission is the reconnaissance of Indian missile launches from the Balasore test range. China developed the Gwadar port west of Karachi and recently a Chinese company took commercial control of this port which can act as a launch pad for Chinese naval forces in the Arabian Sea, seriously impinging upon Indian security interests (The Times of India 2013). Gwadar’s strategic location can act as a force multiplier for Chinese submarines and surface combatants to intrude deep into India’s territorial waters facilitating Beijing to effectively choke India’s sea lanes of communication and destroy India’s vital shore based high value economic targets like oil exploration rigs, petrochemical plants, and atomic energy installations by missile assaults. China is developing the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, besides giving massive developmental aid and aiding physical infrastructure development in Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, Bhutan, and most recently in Afghanistan. China plans to perpetuate its hegemony throughout the Asia-Pacific, which is amply expressed through its aggressive stance on issues like the border dispute with India (whereby it claims the entire Arunachal Pradesh as its own territory), the Spratly Islands dispute (whereby it had military clashes with Vietnam and Philippines), to its support for the North Korean regime. It is noteworthy that while China has settled its contentious border disputes with countries like Russia, it has not initiated any such steps with regard to India.
Deficiencies Plaguing the Indian Navy
The massive expansion in China’s naval might has generated alarm across countries in the Asia-Pacific, ranging from Japan, Vietnam, India, and the ASEAN grouping, suspicious of Beijing’s motives, given its increasing belligerence of its assertive claims over Spratly Islands, debarring India from oil exploration with Vietnam in the South China sea, and the Senkaku Islands spat with Japan. The focus of the PLA Navy has been to develop ground attack and anti-ship missiles, a growing fleet of modern submarines, cyber, and anti-satellite weapons to destroy or disable another nation’s military assets from afar. Even the Americans have taken notice of China’s awe inspiring naval modernization aimed at creating a blue water navy capable of dominating the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, armed with offensive area denial standoff capabilities like DF-21A aircraft killer ballistic missiles (range more than 1,500 kilometers) and JL-2 submarine launched ICBMs (8,000–10,000 kilometer strike range) which have given China its first truly potent sea based nuclear deterrent capable of hitting mainland United States. In 2008, American satellite imagery revealed the existence of a secret but massive submarine base built by the Chinese in Sanya in the Hainan Islands in the South China Sea having the capacity to accommodate twenty of the latest Jin Class submarines. This base has serious security ramifications for India as being an underground facility that can hide the movement of submarines from spy satellites, is barely 1,200 nautical miles from the strategic Malacca Strait and an easy access route to the Indian Ocean could give China the capability to cut off Malacca Strait and the South China Sea for commercial traffic in event of a crisis (Pubby 2008). The growing Chinese asymmetry with India in naval power projection has posed formidable challenges for India’s deterrence posture against China (The Hindu 2012). In comparison to China’s inventory of seventy-nine major surface combatants, along with fifty-five submarines, five being nuclear powered ones, India has only thirty major warships and a fleet of only twelve ageing and technologically fast nearing obsolescence, conventional submarines out of which only 7–8 are combat capable at any given time (Pandit 2013c). The Indian Navy has been concerned about increasing Chinese strategic footprint in the Indian Ocean with China successfully establishing its presence in ports around India including Chittagong in Bangladesh; Sittwe and Coco Islands in Myanmar; Hambantota in Sri Lanka; and Gwadar in Pakistan, which gives it capability to access Indian waters a move known as ‘string of pearls’. In recent times, there has also been a surge in the disturbing trend of Chinese submarines and warships prowling the Indian Ocean Region, far away from their territorial waters (The Times of India 2013). Pakistan in its inventory has conventionally superior submarines in comparison to the Indian Navy. The Agosta 90 B class submarines of the Pakistan Navy which can fire deadly Exocet and Harpoon missiles are equipped with air independent propulsion technology allowing it to remain underwater for a long duration unlike India’s ageing Kilo class of submarines which have to surface every few days in order to recharge their batteries. The government’s apathy towards naval modernization, and especially the submarine fleet has ushered in a grave debilitation of India’s conventional deterrence even against Pakistan, where in case of a war breaking out now, India would be able to field only 7–8 ageing Kilo class submarines against relatively technically modern fleet of 5 Pakistani submarines (Pandit 2013e). The Chinese have signed a deal with Pakistan to sell six more advanced Qing class conventional attack submarines which will be armed with the 1,500 kilometer CJ-10K land attack cruise missile (LACM) thereby giving the Pakistani Navy its true sea based deterrent against India (Sengupta 2012). The Scorpene, submarine deal which India signed with France in 2005 for the construction of six conventional attack submarines with air independent propulsion technology at Mazagaon Docks, the first of which were supposed to be inducted by 2010–11 has been afflicted by massive delays. The Navy is keeping its fingers crossed regarding the tentative date of commissioning of the first submarine, expected only by 2017 (Mustafa 2013). The Indian Navy is entrusted with the pivotal role of defending India’s long coastline of more than 7,500 kilometers, a vast exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the vital sea lanes of communication which are vital for our energy security and trade interests. India’s legitimate sphere of strategic importance stretches from the Straits of Hormuz in the Middle East to the Straits of Malacca in South East Asia. The Indian Navy’s National Maritime Doctrine enunciated in 2004 gave a roadmap for building a blue water naval capability with around 200–50 naval assets, possessing the expertize of power projection, pursuing littoral warfare, and protecting India’s interests in the Indian Ocean Region. This doctrine envisaged creation of three carrier battle groups (CBGs) with surface platforms armed with long-range precision-guided weapons capable of anti-ship, anti-submarine and decisive land-attack missions, and laid great stress on the need for submarine based capability for effecting India’s minimum credible deterrence in form of nuclear second strike (Bedi 2004).
The Navy today is saddled with a dwindling surface as well as underwater fleet. It is forced to operate India’s lone aircraft carrier, INS Viraat, which is over fifty-five years old and way past its operational life thereby denting the Navy’s combat edge. There has been a huge delay both in terms of time and cost in inducting the Gorshkov aircraft carrier of Russia. The deal was signed in April 2004, and the carrier is expected join the Navy by early January 2014, whereas the original delivery date was 2008. The condition of indigenous warship building program continues to be worrisome. Project 15 A envisaged construction of three Kolkata class guided missile destroyers, the kneel of the first ship, INS Kolkata being laid down in 2003 and the year of commissioning being 2008. Till date there is no certainty on the induction schedule of the first destroyer itself, let alone the follow up destroyers, INS Chennai and INS Kochi. As per Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) estimates, the cost overrun for this project has been by a mind boggling 225 percent and that of Project 17 regarding construction of three stealth frigates by 260 percent (Shukla 2012). Pakistan has received the potent P3-C Orion maritime reconnaissance and strike aircraft from the US as military assistance for being an ally in the Afghanistan War. These aircraft are armed with Harpoon missiles, which if well aimed carries enough blasting power to sink an Indian warship. The Navy in view of this threat installed the Barak anti-missile systems on its frontline warships including the flagship aircraft carrier Viraat. The Navy is unable to procure an additional 262 Barak missiles because the CBI which has been investigating the original deal to purchase these missiles way back in 2001, has blacklisted the company, resulting in a catastrophic situation for the Navy, it being unable to maintain an anti-missile cover of its frontline warships, leading to the complete operational failure of Indian Navy’s war fighting abilities as its major assets been reduced to virtual sitting ducks for enemy action (Pandit 2013f).
Urgent Need for a Holistic Blueprint for National Security: Time Bound Modernization Drive
Any country can have sustainable socio-economic development only when it is secured both from external aggression and internal strife. It is a fallacious argument proposed by some so called developmentalist lobbies which argue for reduction in defense expenditure to sustain economic growth. Such elements are completely ignorant about the hostile geostrategic environment around India. The National Security Council must be entrusted with the task of enunciating a coherent ‘National Security Doctrine’ which shall provide a roadmap to deal with our external as well as internal security challenges. Regular strategic defense reviews should be carried out for the assessment of changing threat perceptions. The government must give supreme priority to allocating adequate budgetary support to all the three wings of the armed forces for meeting India’s threat perception. Despite successive Ministry of Defence annual reports highlighting the massive increase in China’s military capabilities, the Indian response has been totally incoherent and ad hoc to say the least (Pandit 2009). 2013 shockingly witnessed a sharp reduction in defense expenditure by a whopping Rs. 10,000 crores gravely affecting the modernization trajectory of the Indian Armed Forces already reeling under severe operational deficiencies (Pandit 2013a). In sharp contrast the Chinese have been significantly raising their defense expenditure (Krishnan 2013). The Government and the bureaucracy must involve the military in key decision making processes relating to induction of new weapon systems for all the three services.
Wars in the twenty-first century would be network centric with the availability and sophistication of C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets being the decisive factor in determining outcome of conflicts. India must at the earliest set up an Aerospace command with the requisite capability to defend the nation’s space based assets. All the three wings of the armed forces must have their dedicated reconnaissance and communications satellites. The expertize of ISRO can be exploited by the government for this purpose. The procurement of AWACS platforms for the Air Force and Navy must be expeditiously pursued.
A mechanism for time bound modernization program with continuous monitoring at the highest levels of the government must be immediately instituted. The government should accord top most priority to initiate the artillery modernization program of the Army, along with rapid procurement of advanced main battle tanks (MBT) air defense missiles, modern assault rifles, night vision devices, and long-range rocket launchers. The Rafale deal should be vigorously monitored for time bound delivery of the aircrafts. The need for around 700 modern helicopters for all the three wings of our armed forces in the attack, search and rescue and observation categories has also hanging fire since a decade or more. This deficiency needs to be mitigated at the earliest. India must strive to quickly induct its long-range missiles in the Agni series and seek to operationalize its ballistic missile defense shield.
The government must give adequate budgetary support and if required, engage in foreign collaboration to realize the development of a truly blue water Indian Navy operating three carrier battle groups (CBGs). The navy’s submarine building program also needs special emphasis. The Scorpene project should be completed at the earliest and the construction of the follow up sister submarines of INS Arihant must be granted all necessary budgetary support. India has still not developed a long-range SLBM on the likes of Agni-V missile which can cover the whole of China. The government must pursue this project with determination for securing our supreme national interests.
Initiating Structural Reforms in the Defense Sector
A key recommendation of the Kargil Review Commission was the creation of a post of integrated Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for better coordination between civil and military authorities and rendering strategic advice and policy options to the civilian leadership. Unfortunately even fifteen years after Kargil, this recommendation has not been implemented. The need of the hour is to develop a greater synergy between India’s civilian leadership and the military for a holistic management of our strategic needs. The Service Chiefs must be accorded deserving status in advising the government on policy matters having ramifications for national security. The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) which is India’s apex body managing its strategic deterrence ought to be made more representative in terms of powers accorded to the three Service Chiefs. The civilian bureaucracy should be sensitized by the government to be accommodative and responsive towards the needs of the armed forces. Years pass by in negotiating defense deals leading to critical deficiencies in the nation’s military preparedness and by the time a weapon system is finally inducted, it attains a level of technological obsolescence vis-à-vis the systems in the inventory of our adversaries.
The government must proactively and expeditiously implement the recommendations given by the chiefs of staffs committee for the creation of three new tri service commands pertaining to cyber defense, aerospace, and special operations (Pandit 2013b). Funding and acquiring of required assets for the creation of these new integrated commands should be pursued on a war footing.
Building a Robust Indigenous Defense Industrial Base
The need of the hour for India is to develop capabilities in indigenous weapon manufacturing. Today we have acquired the uneviable distinction of being the world’s largest importer of conventional military equipments. From assault rifles to fighter jets, tanks, and artillery to submarines, India is hopelessly dependent upon imports and consequently has had to face delays in receiving spare parts for the weapons purchased. A country like ours which nurses ambitions of assuming a role of global importance, can ill afford to be dependent upon external sources for meeting our security needs. A lack of indigenous defense industrial base impinges critically upon our strategic autonomy and our capability to protect our core security needs in the face of an eventuality. The government must immediately liberalize foreign investment in the defense sector, which would encourage international weapon manufacturers to undertake joint research, collaboration and weapon production with Indian defense PSUs, and enable technology transfers.
Restructuring the Functioning of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)
The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) must be held accountable for its failures to have repeatedly let the armed forces down regarding supply of high quality weaponry (Pandit 2012). From the Arjun tank and the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) to the missile systems like Nag Akash and Trishul, naval torpedoes, long-range surface to air missiles and sonars, the DRDO has incurred a huge cost and time overruns on most of its major projects failing to provide the armed forces with the weaponry they need. The DRDO has till date been unable to deliver Indian armed forces on a plethora of equipments it promised to develop like AWACS, self propelled artillery guns, air defense missiles, and radars. The government can invite foreign partners from friendly countries to technically collaborate with the DRDO following the Brahmos model for timely execution of indigenous weapon development projects. The organizational structure of the DRDO must be thoroughly revamped, its accountability fixed, and the cost and delivery deadlines of the weapon systems under design and development ought to be stringently monitored following the 2008 Rama Rao Committee recommendations. Major Indian technical institutes like the IITs and also the private sector should be encouraged to enter into collaborative partnerships with the DRDO. The defense procurement procedures must be simplified and ensured that weapon systems do not take an eternity to be delivered after the final contract is signed. Institutional safeguards must be formulated to ensure that investigation into corruption allegations in defense deals do not hinder the modernization of the military by blacklisting of the weapon supplying firms. Bofors which was blacklisted in the late 1980s led to the Indian Army being constrained from manufacturing the Bofors howitzers in India, as technology transfer could not be effected. The battlefield contribution of the Bofors in winning the Kargil War was immense but unfortunately even in face of severe artillery shortages, Indian ordnance companies are unable to manufacture the guns due to the firm being blacklisted.
India must shed its inhibitions in allowing foreign direct investment in the defense sector. Collaboration with countries like Israel, France and Russia in areas relating to development of ballistic missile defense, long-range air defense systems, anti-tank missiles, stealth jets, tanks, submarines, and warships should be optimally exploited. Our public sector undertakings have failed the Armed Forces in supplying hi quality weapons. Therefore Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in defense would be a catalyst for building a potent military manufacturing base in India.
Conclusion
Today India’s legitimate security interests extends to the need to protect her global seaborne trade, secure her overseas investments and assets for guaranteeing energy security, and ensuring the well-being of Indian expatriate communities worldwide, and the rapidly proliferating global investments of Indian capital. India also needs to augment her military capability to maintain strategic stability, peace, and security in her immediate neighborhood and if her supreme national interests so warrant, also undertake military intervention. As India aspires to take her rightful place in the comity of nations, in all probabilities she might have to shoulder the responsibility of rendering military assistance either in the aftermath of natural calamities or restore order in strife torn conflict zones globally. Above all, India needs to develop the requisite military capabilities to ensure the security of its region of core strategic importance stretching from the Straits of Hormuz extending to straits of Malacca.
It is the duty of the country’s political establishment to cater to the needs of the Armed Forces as warranted by supreme national interests. India can be made secure if the government displays the resolve and the requisite strategic foresight to take cognizance of the growing security imbalances in our neighborhood, especially with regard to China’s rise as a superpower. There is a popular adage which postulates that a more a country sweats in peace, the less it bleeds in war. India in 1962 learnt at a great cost, the perils of ignoring the realist dictum of vigilant modernization of armed forces in response to changing threat perceptions. If the political establishment does not shed its soporific vacillations regarding taking concrete action for meeting the needs of the military, history might repeat itself in its most tragic irony.