Abstract
Since the enactment of the 1982 Burmese Citizenship Law, the Rohingya Muslims have been stateless, and they are attempting to become Burmese citizens. In Myanmar, ethnic identity continues to be the most politically significant marker stratified by government policy. Despite Myanmar’s official recognition of 135 minority groups, ethnic identities are fixed in exclusionary terms like Buddhist or non-Buddhist, Bamar or non-Bamar. Ethnicity and religion, therefore, have played a significant role in the formation of Myanmar’s national identity, that systematically excludes the Rohingyas. Hence, religion and ethnic identities are often contemplated as the major reason for the Rohingya crisis. However, contrary to the popular perception, this article argues that, along with the ethnic and religious aspects of the Rohingya conflict, the geo-strategic and economic aspects of the conflict must also be addressed with seriousness, as the conflict has occurred under a variety of political and economic conditions. It investigates the role of resource geo-economics of the Myanmar government and military forces in the recent conflict. Furthermore, this article examines China’s and India’s vested geo-strategic and economic interests in Rakhine. Findings from the research imply that the persecution and displacement of the Rohingyas may be linked to the resources and geo-strategic factors present in Rakhine.
Keywords
Introduction
Often, the ethno-religious differences between the majority Buddhists and the minority Rohingya Muslims are considered as the pivotal factor of the Rohingyas’ persecution in Myanmar (erstwhile Burma). To illustrate the ethnic and religious identities of the Rohingya Muslims, Rahman (2015: 288–295) argues that the cultural and societal principles of the Rohingyas have generated a separate stand of them from the rest of the Buddhist-dominated Myanmar. Consequently, Rahman (2015: 288–295) specifies that it forms the political factors of conflict and asserted that the political authority of Myanmar is patronizing the Buddhist natives against the Muslim Rohingyas because of the ethno-religious differences among the two races. To a greater extent, the blooming of nationalism among the Buddhists and its influence in the articulation of Myanmar government’s anti-Muslim policies are notable causes of Rohingyas’ persecution. The direct involvement of the Government of Myanmar and the formulation of anti-Muslimism policies designated a state-sponsored campaign against the Rohingyas as stated by Lei (2019). Denial of citizenship, forced displacement, and conflict arising from the discrimination of the Rohingyas occurred as the Myanmar state perceived them as a security threat. This ethnic security forms a significant factor of the Rohingya issue other than the political factors involved in it (Ware and Laoutides 2018). It is often argued that this security dilemma would be resolved only by the inclusion of the ethnic status of the Rohingya Muslims by the state.
The aforementioned proposition that is mentioned albeit makes no attempt to interconnect between the geo-strategic and resource factors or even the contemporary Rohingya crisis. The approach of political economy creates a wider scope to analyze the Rohingya crisis as a geo-economic consideration than studying it as only an ethno-religious problem. Elucidating the perspective from the political economy approach, it is surveyed that the marginalized population often faces environmental and social insecurities for the misuse of natural resources. Being situated at the tri-junction of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia, these securities have further threatened the Rohingyas in Myanmar. The Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine, those who are not acknowledged as citizens in Myanmar, have faced the injustices like other minorities on the issue of distribution of natural resources, which has now resulted in a decades-long conflict between the Burmese government and ethnic minorities over the issue of claiming the ownership over local natural resources.
Ethnic conflicts and civil wars around the world initially started in the 1990s, which was fueled by the issue of natural resources (Mwanika 2010). Even in developing nations, where resources are available in plentitude, lack of proper governance and legal mechanisms would lead to ethnic conflicts. The studies conducted on the Rohingya ethnic crisis yet cannot reach to any conclusion relating to the matter of interdependence between ethnicity and resources. In this study, we focus mainly on how natural resources spur identity-based ethnic conflicts. Within a bounded framework, this article tries to interpret the crisis of the Rohingyas’ and not to focus on other ethnic minorities in Myanmar. The study endeavors to explicate on how the Rohingya crisis is vehemently associated with the geo-strategic deliberations and natural resource management grounded on the qualitative analysis and make use of both the primary and the secondary data sources.
Origin of the Rohingya Crisis: A Brief Historical Account
The Rohingya crisis, like many other ethnic conflicts, is a legacy of colonialism. Monks have played a key role in anti-colonial and nationalist mobilizations in colonial Burma since the 1920s. They initially targeted the colonial government and the authoritarian regime, but some monks later shifted their focus to minorities, specifically Indians, Rohingyas, and Muslims (Bertrand and Pelletier 2017). The Rohingya crisis exemplifies both vertical and horizontal conflict. It is a vertical conflict between the Rohingya community and the state. The ethnic composition of Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims differs. In this context, it may be argued that the preservation of cultural diversity becomes more challenging for the sovereign states due to globalization. According to Cowen (2002), globalization has brought harmful and destructive effects on local and traditional cultures, including the ethno-religious minority groups who still adhere to their cultural and religious differences. Over the years, the Myanmar state has exploited cultural and religious differences between Buddhists and Rohingyas in order to gain popular support from Buddhists. In addition to the conflict with the state, the Rohingyas are involved in a horizontal conflict with the Buddhist Arakan community. According to the Buddhists, their mission is to protect and promote Buddhist values in Myanmar. They accuse Muslims, particularly the Rohingyas, of attempting to drive Buddhism out of Myanmar (Walton and Hayward 2014). As a result of its vertical and horizontal nature, the Rohingya crisis is distinct from other conflicts in Myanmar. For centuries, the Rohingya Muslims have lived in Buddhist-majority Myanmar. They are one of the world’s most vulnerable refugee ethnic groups. The term Rohingya is derived from ‘Rohang,’ the ancient name for Arakan (now Rakhine). The Rohingya community’s traditional homeland is Myanmar’s Rakhine state, which is located on the country’s western coast. Their dialect, ‘Ruaingga,’ is distinct from other Myanmar languages. Though the identification of Rohingya became widespread in the early 1950s, Muslims in Arakan have a long history dating back to the MraukU dynasty (1430–1785) (Basu Ray Chaudhury and Samaddar 2018). The Rohingya people believe they have been in Arakan since the twelfth century (Ty 2019). During British rule in South Asia, there was a significant migration of labor from present-day India and Bangladesh to Myanmar, where they eventually settled. Following Myanmar’s independence from the British in 1948, the Union Citizenship Act was enacted, which declared the majority of Rohingyas to be “illegal” and denied them citizenship. The first displacement of Rohingya refugees began in 1978, when 200,000 fled to neighboring Bangladesh. However, the state of Myanmar has denied the 1978 displacements and stated that the state authorities are not responsible for people crossing the border from Rakhine to Bangladesh. The Rohingyas became stateless in Myanmar after the Citizenship Law of 1982 denied them Myanmar citizenship. The Citizenship Law of 1982 distinguishes three types of citizens: full citizenship, associate citizenship, and naturalized citizenship. There are 135 officially recognized ethnic groups in Myanmar, which are divided into 8 major national ethnic races: Bamar, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan. The Burmese government, on the other hand, does not recognize or include the Rohingyas among the 135 officially recognized ethnic groups in Myanmar, and denies them citizenship. The 1982 Citizenship Law discriminates against the Rohingyas, labeling them as noncitizens and leaving them vulnerable to human rights violations by the Myanmar government and nongovernmental actors. It undermines Rohingyas’ identity and paves the way for racial hatred and violence against the entire community. Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law is more than just a tool for depriving Rohingyas of their rights. It is one of the factors that contributes to prejudice and violence against the Rohingyas. It has also prompted military genocide against the Rohingyas, as well as violations of their human rights—the Myanmar government’s attempt to establish itself as a ‘tyrannical government (Ullah 2011). Later that year, the Rohingyas were given the identity of ‘resident foreigner,’ and they were given ‘white cards,’ which gave them the right to vote and temporary residence permits. However, the Rohingyas were not granted equal legal rights as Burmese citizens as a result of these ‘white cards.’ Later in 2015, following the pressure from the Buddhist nationalist groups, these cards were revoked taking away their voting rights.
The communal riots took on new dimensions in 2012, when three Muslim men raped and killed a Buddhist woman, followed by the killing of ten Muslims by the Buddhists. Following that incident, Rakhine Buddhists began to target Rohingya Muslims. Nearly 140,000 Rohingyas were killed or forced to flee their homes as a result of the riots. Following the attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a radical Islamic militant group, on thirty police stations in Rakhine state in 2017, violence against Rohingyas erupted once more. The Myanmar government claims that Rohingya Muslims are attempting to establish a sovereign Muslim nation on the Myanmar–Bangladesh border. The Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), founded in the early 1980s, grew in response to state-led exploitation of the Rohingyas. The RSO’s strategy is identical to that of terrorist organizations like the Taliban and the Kashmir-based ‘Hizb-ul-Mujahideen’ (Organiser 2021). For the Myanmar state, Rohingya Muslims have ties to Islamist terrorist organizations. In light of this, the government’s decision to deport illegal immigrants like the Rohingya Muslims is justifiable (Ibid.). As a result, the Myanmar government retaliated with the so-called terrorist-cleansing operations (Knuters 2018). Myanmar has approximately 2 million Rohingyas, with approximately 800,000 of them residing in northern Rakhine state. The United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has registered nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees and asylum seekers. The majority of them have sought refuge in Bangladesh (860,000), Malaysia (101,000), India (18,000), and other countries, with smaller numbers in Indonesia, Nepal, Thailand, and other places. An estimated 600,000 Rohingyas remain in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, 142,000 of whom are internally displaced (UNHCR 2021). The Rohingyas claim Myanmar citizenship as a natural right, and they are entitled to all citizenship rights, including the protection of the state. However, the government and non-Rohingya people refer to them as ‘Bengali’ and ‘illegal immigrants,’ implying that they are not a part of the national political community and have never been a part of Myanmar’s history (Klinken and Aung 2017). The Rohingyas are excluded from the dominant Buddhist community’s imagined nation. Myanmar’s Ma Ba Tha monks saw the Muslim Rohingyas as ‘threats’ to the state and the Buddhist religion. As a result, it is urged that the Rohingyas’ political and civil rights be limited (Islam 2019). Myanmar’s national identity should exclude the Rohingyas. Burmese aggressive religious nationalism, or political Buddhism, excludes and persecutes minority groups perceived to be non-Burman and non-Buddhist (Knuters 2018). The Bangladesh government, on the other hand, maintains that the Rohingyas did not originate in Bangladesh (Farzana 2017). Indonesia and Malaysia have been hesitant to offer asylum to Rohingya refugees who have attempted to reach both countries. This attitude toward the Rohingyas shows that Muslim solidarity remains a symbolic statement, driven primarily by indigenous audiences, and has failed to provide effective protection for the refugees (Missbach and Stange 2021). From the state to social authorities, the Rohingyas are denied their human rights (Faye 2021). We do not deny the ethno-religious dimension of the Rohingya crisis, which has existed since 1948. Aside from the ethno-religious dimension and issues of human rights violations, the geopolitical issue and resource politics have been intricately linked with the Rohingya refugee problem in Myanmar since the early 2000s.
Natural Resources and the Conflict in Rakhine: Revisiting the Roots of the Rohingya Crisis
Religion and religious identities were the primary causes of ethnic conflicts all over the world after the end of the Cold War (Fox 2000). Ethnic conflicts based on religious identity, such as those between Arabs and Israelis, conflicts in Northern Ireland, separatist movements in India’s Kashmir province, and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, have both domestic and international implications (Ibid.). Religion serves as moral legitimacy in multicultural and multireligious societies, mobilizing citizens based on their religious affiliations (Kadayifci-Orellana 2009). Similarly, the Rohingyas’ ethno-religious minority status has made them targets of political violence perpetrated by both the dominant Rakhine Buddhists and the Myanmar government. According to Thawnghmung (2016), Rohingyas claim as a Myanmar ethnic nationality is also to blame for the resurgence of communal violence in Rakhine state, despite the fact that the ethno-religious dimension played a significant role in the Rohingya crisis. Other factors, like mismanagement of national resources and discrimination against minorities, are equally important and are closely linked to ethno-religious violence. Historically, ethnic violence in Jharkhand (India), Northern Thailand, and elsewhere has highlighted the link between natural resources and ethnic violence (Fox and Swamy 2008). The interaction between ethnicity and resources, particularly the geographical location of resources, is critical for understanding ethnic conflicts (Nillesen and Bulte 2014). Natural resources are the primary source of income for many ethnic tribes in a developing country like Myanmar. As a result, different ethnic groups have the right to use these natural resources as collective goods. Furthermore, the Rohingyas live in a region that is particularly resource-rich in comparison to the rest of Myanmar. The Myanmar government believes that the natural resources of Rakhine province are solely used by the Rohingyas; thus, it is violating the principle of collective goods and regards the Rohingya as a threat to its natural resources. Therefore, resource politics can help us explain the Rohingya crisis as a struggle for control of natural resources. However, there are no prospects for resource sharing or peace talks between the Rohingyas and Myanmar because the state does not recognize the Rohingya identity. Along with the Rohingyas’ ethnic and religious identities, the geographical location and natural resources of Rakhine province are critical to understanding the crisis’ trajectory.
Geo-strategic Interests of Foreign Powers in Rakhine
Natural resource exploitation frequently results in environmental and social insecurity for marginalized populations. This sense of insecurity has grown in Myanmar, which sits at the crossroads of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. Decades of conflict have been ongoing between the Burmese government and ethnic minorities who live in the country’s resource-rich mountain region, claiming ownership of local natural resources (Simpson 2014). As of 2015, Myanmar had 3.2 billion barrels of oil and 18 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, majority of which are located in ethnic areas like the Rakhine province. In terms of proven reserves, Myanmar was ranked fifth in the world. The discovery of massive energy reserves in Rakhine in 2004 piqued global interests from major powers around the world (Hossain 2019). The distribution of natural resources based on ethnicity causes injustice to minorities, particularly those who are not recognized as citizens, like the Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine—a natural gas-rich state with geopolitical significance for regional connectivity and a potential hub for the exchange of goods, services, and technology. Myanmar, as a resource-rich country, has attracted intense international attention for its socioeconomic development, which has piqued the interest of major powers like China and India, as well as Russia, the Middle East, the USA, South Korea, and some parts of the geopolitical West (Naing 2013). Rakhine state is located in Asia at a crossroads known as Myanmar’s “Western Gate.” It is a gateway to South and Southeast Asia, as well as the Buddhist–Muslim world, and is bounded by three geopolitical meeting points: India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. It has a land area of 36,700 sq. km and its capital is Sittwe. They were historically isolated from other kingdoms due to their geography and were protected by the forests and mountains of the Arakan Yoma. Habitat developed along the Bay of Bengal’s coastal strip. Rakhine is a strategic choke point for both Myanmar’s neighbors—China and India. It is Myanmar’s eighth most important province in terms of natural resources, economy, and business. Despite its abundant natural resource deposits, Rakhine is one of Myanmar’s poorest and least developed provinces. Only three roads connect the Rakhine to the rest of the country: Ann, Toungup, and Gwa (Naing 2013). A large portion of Myanmar’s natural resources is concentrated in ethnic minority borderlands, and these resources are frequently exported to neighboring countries. The Rohingyas, who have been declared foreigners by Myanmar’s government, mostly live on the western outskirts of the resource-rich Rakhine state. According to Rakhine ethnics, they have more foothold over the natural resources than any other Myanmar ethnicities (Levesque 2008).
Daewoo International signed an agreement with Myanmar in 2000 to explore its sea areas and market its underwater gas reserves. Finally, in 2004, gas fields were discovered in Rakhine, attracting the attention of a few countries interested in developing oil and gas pipelines. Because of China’s ever-increasing energy demand, it attempted to access Myanmar’s energy reserves. Later, in 2008, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) obtained purchasing rights from Daewoo via a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Myanmar Ministry of Energy. The production began in 2013, and the supply transit route passed through areas where there were high ethnic tensions between the Myanmar Army and Rakhine Rohingyas. Locals faced a variety of threats as a result of the project, including forced displacement, forced labor, and human rights violations. On the site of the Shwe Gas Project, two CNPC subcontractors were shot and killed. According to a Land Acquisition Profile report released by Daewoo, the total land acquired for the project would be 37 ha. Later, it was discovered that more land had been lost and destroyed as a result of the project’s side effects. Until today, lands are confiscated and purchased at exorbitant prices for pipeline routes, forcing villagers to sign perplexing and complicated contracts written in a non-native language. This sparked widespread outrage among the local villagers and ethnic groups who resided in those areas. They are forcibly removed from their homeland because they believe their resource rights have been violated (Environmental Justice Atlas 2019). However, India, which has direct land and sea connections with Myanmar, is attempting to maintain a cordial relationship with Myanmar for its own security interests (Heugas 2017). Onshore projects have been funded by companies from India, China, France, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Russia, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Vietnam. While some companies are involved in exploration, 70,000 acres of farmland were confiscated in 2010 for the project. Farmers whose land was confiscated died or moved to other areas to find work, and some were killed, raped, and forced to flee to neighboring countries (Hossain 2019). Myanmar’s vast cultural and ethnic diversity, combined with high poverty, has resulted in the emergence of various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) like ARSA, each claiming a high level of autonomy as well as recognition of identity and rights. Myanmar has a long history of armed conflict as a result of ethno-nationalistic insurgencies in the country’s resource-rich borders, like Rakhine state. Over time, both the government and rebel groups have generated revenue through land control and the sale of natural resources such as jade, timber, opium, poppies, rubber, bamboo, crude oil, and agricultural products. For years, the Myanmar government has attempted to gain control of the border areas. Some EAOs signed a cease-fire agreement with the national military in the 1980s. Despite the fact that the cease-fire did not result in a political agreement on how natural resources would be managed, profits were shared (Woods 2019). The Union of Myanmar has recently passed laws and policies aimed at revitalizing the country’s agricultural and resource-based economies in order to attract large-scale foreign investments. The government pushed for greater economic participation. When the government grants commercial companies commission, the Tatmadaw militarizes the area and secures a corridor to the nearest main road to prevent non-cooperating EAOs from gaining access. This resulted in abuse, and economic and political grievances against the ethnic minority population in the area. Since 2012, ethnic tensions have resulted in a harsh military response by the Tatmadaw against the Rohingyas, which has resulted in killings, destruction of private property, and the suspension of humanitarian aid. Aung San Suu Kyi signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015, but the agreement excluded some of the major EAOs, so the military-aided armed clashes continued in contested areas, particularly in Rakhine state (Ibid).
In response to the severe military crackdown on the Rohingya population in northern Rakhine, an organized resistance movement called Harakah Al-Yaqin (HaY), which means Faith Movement, emerged in 2016. It later adopted the English name and transformed into ARSA. Despite being a Muslim organization, ARSA has no Jihadist agenda, no religious target, and no intention of imposing Sharia law. It, on the other hand, targets Myanmar’s armed forces. The primary goal of ARSA is to put an end to the persecution of Rohingyas. The first military operation by ARSA on 9 October 2016 indicates a shift in region dynamics with further reinforcement of violence. Tatmadaw used military helicopters to launch air strikes and set fire to villages. Subsequently, in August 2017, ARSA marked another escalation of violence. Those attacks were carried out in order to ensure a military clearance operation. Under Sub-Section 5 of Section 6 of Myanmar’s Anti-Terrorism Law, the Myanmar government designated ARSA as a terrorist organization. Land and resource sectors are a major point of contention in Myanmar’s peace talks. As a result, the question of who has use and management rights over the country’s natural resources and how revenues from their exploitation will be distributed remains unresolved, fueling armed conflict (Baron-Mendoza 2017). Myanmar’s first democratically elected party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), returned to power in 2016 for another 5 years, with Aung San Suu Kyi serving as de facto leader. When the Rohingya crisis hit hard in Rakhine, Aung San Suu Kyi avoided condemning the systematic violence against Rohingyas (Woods 2019).
Myanmar’s Resource Geo-economics in Rakhine
Myanmar’s political and economic interests in Rakhine played a role in the forced displacement of the Rohingyas. Land confiscation is common in Rakhine, with military juntas taking land from landholders without compensation since the 1990s. Land grabbing is a common feature for development, military base expansion, large agricultural projects, tourism, and infrastructure. Thousands of people were forced to flee their homes as a result of these developments, both internally and across borders. Myanmar implemented economic and political reforms in 2011, opening the door to foreign investment. Violence against Rohingyas in Rakhine state quickly escalated. Meanwhile, the Myanmar government enforced farmland management and distribution laws. As POSCO Daewoo entered the government-contracted market, it aided large corporations in profiting from land grabs (Forino, Meding, and Johnson 2017). Both China and India have long been interested in Rakhine’s resources. Since the 1990s, Chinese companies have been exploiting timber, minerals, and rivers in the north. The Chinese and Indian interests in Rakhine state are part of the larger India–China relationship. The interest includes infrastructure and pipeline construction, job security, oil and gas revenues, and transit fees for Myanmar. CNPC constructed a transnational pipeline linking Sittwe, Rakhine’s capital, to Kunming, China. Another pipeline is planned to transport Middle Eastern crude oil from Kyaukpyu port to China. The Rakhine State Neutral Advisory Commission urged Myanmar’s government to conduct a comprehensive impact assessment. Previously, Myanmar was heavily reliant on China for economic and political support, but it is now partnering with India for investment and influence. India financed and built the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, which connects Northeast India to the Bay of Bengal. The Rakhine coastline is strategically important for both India and China. As a result, the Myanmar government has a vested interest in clearing land for future development in order to spur rapid economic growth (Ibid).
The Importance of Rakhine in China’s Energy Calculus
Daewoo, a South Korean company, discovered 4.5 trillion cubic feet of gas deposits off the coast of Rakhine in 2004, which sparked Chinese energy interest in the Rakhine region (Soh and Nam 2018). In December 2008, CNPC and Daewoo International signed a 30-year hydrocarbon purchase and sale agreement to extract gas offshore the Bay of Bengal. As a result, oil and gas pipelines were constructed from the Shwe gas fields in the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan Province in China. Daewoo International Oil, Natural Gas Corporation Videsh of India and Gas Authority of India, Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, and Korea Gas Corporation are all partners in the Shwe gas pipeline project off the coast of Rakhine state (Lama 2020). A 793-km pipeline project that connects Ramree Island in Myanmar’s Rakhine state to Ruili in China’s Yunnan Province, and a 1,727-km gas pipeline that connects Guizhou, Chongqing, and Guangxi provinces in China. The China–Myanmar gas pipeline began construction and became operational in July 2013, producing natural gas and condensates at a rate of 700 million cubic feet per day (Arakan Oil Watch 2010). Shortly afterwards, Myanmar’s market began delivering natural gas via off-take stations in Yenangyaung, Kyaukpyu, Mandalay, and Taungtha. By 2019, China is expected to import 3.4 million tons of natural gas from Myanmar, valued at US$1.76 billion (Lama 2020). The pipeline’s construction has triggered a multitude of human rights concerns such as Burmese military persecution of the Rohingya Muslim minority, illegal land confiscation of Rohingyas, and forced labor to speed up pipeline construction.
China seeks to establish a presence in Rakhine state not only for its natural resources but also to serve as a focal point for China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Chinese government has already allocated US$40 billion to the Silk Road Fund, which aims to develop trade networks from China to other regions (Sarker et al. 2018). Building of Kyaukpyu deep seaport surrounded by excellent natural conditions was a demonstration project under the BRI framework. China has begun construction on Kyaukpyu port, a 22 million tons of annual capacity oil terminal with a US$4.5 billion budget. According to the 2018 data, CNPC owns 50.9 per cent of a natural gas pipeline that serves 16.3 per cent of China’s gas consumption (Samsani 2021). China’s strategy to link Kyaukpyu port with Kunming allows oils from the Gulf States and Africa to be pumped into China via offshore fields, bypassing the Malacca Strait. The pipeline construction in Rakhine state also contributes to China’s geopolitical strategy by providing an alternative transport route to the Malacca Strait (Munir 2020). It intends to develop Kyaukpyu in Rakhine into a maritime economic hub with a deep seaport and an industrial park. A total of 379 million cubic feet of gas are exported to China per day, out of a total of 400 million cubic feet produced per day. A 771-km pipeline runs from the Bay of Bengal in Rakhine state, where the Rohingyas have been forced to flee (Hossain 2019). In terms of bilateral trade, China is without a doubt Myanmar’s largest trading partner. By 2019, China accounted for thirty two per cent of Myanmar’s exports and thirty five per cent of its imports of vehicles, machinery, metal products, and telecommunications equipment. China–Myanmar bilateral trade was worth US$12 billion in 2019. China accounts for nearly one-third of Myanmar’s US$36 billion trade (Samsani 2021). China’s economic influence in Rakhine is evident in two major projects: the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and the gas pipeline. The project reflects China’s desire to gain access to the Indian Ocean in order to improve global connectivity. The north and northwestern parts of Rakhine have been hit the hardest by violence. The increasing capability of ARSA to carry out attacks outside its stronghold has prompted Beijing to raise concerns about the security of infrastructure invested in development projects. Kyaukpyu port connects the Silk Road and the BRI’s maritime belt.
In recent times, Chinese interests in Rakhine are motivated by China’s own energy diplomacy. China has prioritized two major energy projects in the Rakhine state: the Kyaukpyu SEZ and gas and oil pipelines project that will connect Rakhine with China’s Yunnan region. From the Chinese point of view, both of these projects provide China wider access to the Indian Ocean, as well as the potential for improved global connectivity. Therefore, both projects have been tied to the BRI, which was launched in 2013. However, neither project has yielded significant profits for the local Rakhine community. Local Rakhine residents have expressed their dissatisfaction with the projects and blame these projects for an increase in social problems like prostitution and violence against women. Moreover, locals are also of the opinion that Chinese investors have failed to deliver on their promises to provide community development initiatives and protect local livelihoods. In short, extractive ventures by the central Burmese government are likewise seen as robbery by the Rakhine, who receive no benefit from the selling of their own natural resources (Joy 2018).
Later, in 2017, when the insurgency broke out, China’s bilateral response to the crisis supported the Burmese government that openly praised Myanmar’s military crackdown in Rakhine. Because the Rohingya crisis is an internal sovereign matter, publicly commenting on it would be a violation of China’s official foreign policy principle with Myanmar, potentially jeopardizing the investment projects. As a result,
while China’s strategic positioning on Rakhine may make it Burma’s closest friend at the moment, the interests that underpin that “friendship” mean the country is unable—and, most likely, unwilling—to address the fundamental issues that have led to such a profound crisis in the state’ (Ibid).
Therefore, the Rohingya crisis provides an opportunity for China to assert its dominance over Myanmar’s foreign relations, garner popular support in Myanmar, and rise to power. As there underlies the Chinese interest for security in the region to end the Rohingya crisis.
Contemplating India’s Intentions Over Rakhine
India’s vested interest in Rakhine is to utilize Rakhine’s natural resources and to protect this geo-strategic location, which is critical for India’s Act East strategy. GAIL (India) Limited and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh have partnered with Daewoo in the Rakhine province for an exploration project in 2004. Daewoo discovered the Shwe Gas reserve, and Indian energy enterprises like GAIL and ONGC turned it into a natural gas development project (Toppo 2016). There have been proposals to build a 6900-km-long gas pipeline connecting India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. This project is a vital component of India’s Hydrocarbon Vision 2030 that will link India’s north-east, Siliguri, and Durgapur with Myanmar (Sittwe) to Bangladesh (Chittagong) and other north-eastern states. A total of thirteen pipeline routes with a total length of 6,900 km are proposed (Lall 2006). In 2005, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar held a Tripartite Ministerial Meeting in Yangon, Myanmar, at which they agreed to import natural gas from Myanmar via Bangladesh in the newly explored oil and gas fields in Rakhine. The pipeline route was decided by mutual agreement between the three governments. They agreed to establish a Techno-Commercial Working Committee to facilitate collaboration, investment, and cooperation in the development of natural gas resources. This trilateral approach was thought to be a significant policy shift in terms of regional cooperation. This was an inter-subregional initiative because it brought together three countries for a specific project from the cross-regional groups of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). However, the agreement could not be implemented because India refused to agree to Bangladesh’s demands, like a corridor for the supply of commodities from Nepal and Bhutan to Bangladesh via Indian territory; transmission of hydroelectricity from Nepal and Bhutan via Indian territory; and the adoption of necessary measures to reduce trade deficits between the two countries (Lama 2020). The entire deal fell through due to some serious political reasons. Later, in 2011, a framework agreement was signed between India and Bangladesh to address Bangladesh’s demands, but the trilateral pipeline deal could never be reprocessed after 6 years (Hong 2011). In addition, an alternate route through Northeast India, bypassing Bangladesh, was planned for 2005. The length was expected to be 1,575 km with a budget of US$2.3–3 billion, which was three times the budget of the Myanmar–Bangladesh–India (MBI) pipeline, which was 900 km with a budget of US$1 billion. The deal, however, did not go through because the cost of the Myanmar–India pipeline outweighed the cost of the MBI pipeline. The tripartite pipeline project was delayed due to disagreements between India and Bangladesh, prompting Myanmar to sign a MoU with PetroChina in 2005 despite the fact that Indian conglomerates like ONGC and GAIL co-own both natural gas and oil fields that supply pipeline flow to China. Later, both India and China agreed to collaborate in securing oil resources abroad. However, the trilateral gas project was a significant opportunity missed by India at the subregional level (Toppo 2016). In 2008, India signed another major project, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, with an estimated budget of US$500 million, to facilitate trade between the two countries. The Indian government believes that the Kaladan project, as part of its ‘Look East Policy,’ will strengthen economic ties with Myanmar and the rest of Southeast Asia (Chatterjee 2014). The port’s construction began in 2010 and was scheduled to be completed in 2014. It was later scheduled to be operational by December 2016 (Datta 2020). The project, which represents a 539-km shipping route, aims to connect the ports of Kolkata and Sittwe via the Bay of Bengal. Deepwater Sittwe port (US$120 million) is being built at the mouth of the Kaladan River, connecting the port of Paletwa. This project further attempts to bridge the highway between Paletwa and Myeikwa on the Indo-China border, connecting the Indian state of Mizoram. In 2016, India announced the establishment of a 1,000-acre SEZ in Sittwe, competing with the Kyaukpyu SEZ, in order to counterbalance China’s influence in the region (Datta 2020). Several factors influence India’s response to the Rohingya crisis. As an essential component of India’s Act East Policy, India seeks Myanmar as a partner in the fight against insurgents in Northeast India and aspires to connect the territory to the Bay of Bengal via Rakhine’s Sittwe Port. The increased Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean, as well as China’s recent agreement with Myanmar on the Kyaukpyu seaport in Rakhine, bring challenges for India. In international forums, China has backed Myanmar’s government in its response to the Rohingya crisis. If India criticizes Myanmar’s security forces, it may push Myanmar closer to China, resulting in significant investment and business losses with Myanmar. As a result, India’s position in the Rohingya crisis demonstrates that India wishes to maintain friendly relations with Myanmar, and commenting against Myanmar security forces could result in significant economic losses for India (Taufiq 2019). Because of Rakhine’s geographic and economic significance, both India and China have made significant efforts to improve relations with Myanmar and influence its foreign policy. Both India and China have achieved different outcomes as a result of their differing political and economic agendas. The struggle for control of resources in Rakhine appears to be intensifying in the future. China currently holds the most privileged position in Myanmar, but India’s political agenda and economic policies may challenge China’s influence. In the end, Myanmar will be the biggest winner because it will reap the most benefits from both major powers. China and India will continue to exert influence in Myanmar, despite the fact that they are confronted with a number of challenges, including the Rohingya crisis and international condemnation for their views (Ibid.).
As Indian energy conglomerates have capitalized on Myanmar’s natural resources, Indo-Myanmar trade relations have improved over time (Rieffel 2010). When the military crackdown in Myanmar began in 2017, India declared the Rohingya conflict to be an internal matter and expressed sympathy for the Myanmar government. India was reluctant to raise the issue publicly for fear of pushing Myanmar closer to China. Instability in Rakhine has made India concerned about the impact on its interests, such as the development of Sittwe Port, the Kaladan Project, and a road construction project to connect Northeast India. Because of India and China’s growing security cooperation, India did not want to upset Myanmar. For the time being, we can say that India’s vested economic, security, and geopolitical interests in Rakhine influence India’s response to the Rohingya crisis.
Conclusion
Along with the issue of Rohingya’s ethno-religious identity, geo-strategic factors are therefore critical to understand the current trajectory of the Rohingya crisis. In recent years, India and China, as well as other major powers like Russia and the West, have aggressively courted Myanmar for its resource and energy potential. The presence of China and India is more visible in Myanmar than anywhere else in South Asia. Both are most visible in the troubled province of Rakhine. The resource-rich Rakhine province plays an important role in both China’s’ silk route’ diplomacy, the land-based Silk Road, and India’s Act East Policy. The location of Rakhine province in the Indian Ocean, as well as its billion-dollar infrastructure project, explains China and India’s desire for regional stability. Under military rule, the minorities tried to protect their natural resource interest by force or activism with the help of exiled members who later formed activist diasporas like ARSA (Simpson 2014).
Arakan Buddhists in Rakhine have recently faced a similar problem. Despite the fact that the Myanmar central government recognizes them as an ethnic minority, they continue to feel marginalized in the country. They also assisted the Tatmadaw in carrying out attacks against the Rohingyas during the crisis. Following the forcible expulsion of Rohingyas from Rakhine, tensions are rising between Arakan Buddhists and the Bamar-dominated Tatmadaw. In 2018, clashes between the Myanmar Army and the Arakan Army (a Buddhist rebel group) resulted in the displacement of 200,000 Buddhist civilians. The conflict is about both economics and Bamar’s dominance over Arakanese. In Myanmar, resentment of the Bamar ethnic group, which controls the central government, military, and economy, is growing. As a result, resource rights can either be productive or destructive for a nation, potentially harming a specific segment of the population (Gorvett 2019). As a result, we can conclude that the conflict cannot be viewed solely from a religious standpoint, but that resource politics is also at work behind the persecution of ethnic minorities. The Rohingyas are denied citizenship because their identity is contested under the 1982 Myanmar Citizenship Law, despite the fact that their ancestors have lived in Myanmar for centuries—an impoverished agrarian community that relies on farming for a living. The main issue that the Rohingyas face is that they cannot own land in Rakhine because they are not citizens. The Myanmar government confiscates farmlands for onshore development projects, leaving the Rohingyas landless and uprooted. According to Medecins Sans Frontières (MSF), at least 6,700 Rohingya people were killed in the month following the outbreak of violence, including 730 children under the age of 5 (Hossain 2019). China defended Myanmar’s government in the aftermath of the Rohingya crisis, in which the Tatmadaw carried out a brutal ethnic cleansing campaign. As China has a significant economic interest in Rakhine, it is defending Myanmar from UN sanctions. On the other hand, India’s interest is growing in Rakhine as a key component of its ‘Act East Policy’ and as a new competitor of China in the Bay of Bengal. The development strategies have shifted in response to the change in government. As large sections of Rakhine’s population remain rural, there is little evidence of benefit to local communities. In conclusion, it may be argued that the ethnic and religious differences between the majority Buddhists and minority Rohingyas, the 1982 Citizenship Law, ARSA’s attack, and other factors all played a role in inflaming the conflict. However, Rakhine’s geo-strategic and economic factors, which were neglected in the previous studies, could be the underlying causes of the resurgence and massive escalation of the Rohingya crisis.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
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