Abstract
On the face of it, the book proposes to assess South Asia’s post-tests nuclear politics, 13 years after the nuclearisation of the region a la Pokhran II tests by India and Chagai tests by Pakistan in May 1998. The volume does that and more. The focus of the book as is obvious from the title is the political dimension of the region’s nuclear weapons. Being an edited book it faces the inbuilt limitations of its edited cousins. There is a repetition, or, more appropriately, overlap, perhaps unavoidable in a voluminous version. That notwithstanding, the canvas is vast and difficult to point out any untouched issue related to the topic. The authors, all established analysts in the field, have made the best of efforts to fall into the theme and be extremely analytical.
The vast subject matrix has been streamlined into four sections: ‘Nuclear Deterrence and South Asia: Conceptual and Practical Dimensions’; ‘Doctrinal Developments’; ‘Nuclear Politics: Extra-regional Linkages and Consequences’ and finally, ‘Confidence Building and Nuclear Arms Control’. Basrur has one, a vast in-depth analyses of deterrence in India and Pakistan in the light of comparable situations under patterns in Nuclear Rivalry, to argue that the India–Pakistan case is very different from other rivalries because ‘weapons are not kept in a high state of readiness’ (p. 25) a difference important to show, ‘deterrence works at a very low level of capability’, and then lists the advantages including (it) ‘minimizes the risk of nuclear weapons being targeted by terrorists’ to conclude, appropriately, that ‘In the India–Pakistan’ rivalry, there is a bed of safety on which the nuclear-strategic relationship rests (p. 26). The chapter however ends abruptly with a suggestion, ‘a more thorough and consistent approach to minimum deterrence is needed’ (p. 27).
Sumit Ganguly’s chapter raises more questions than answers and his concerns for India’s interests in Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capabilities seem hyped up and therefore its implications conjectural. Equally sceptical can be his argument that the ‘current structure of civil military relations grants the armed services little or no role in the development of strategic weaponry’ (p. 37).
The chapter ‘Pakistani Nuclear Deterrent’ by Bhumitra Chakma is an extremely detailed one which has both facts and analyses of the issue: from its origin to ‘minimum deterrence posture’ as well as a ‘quantitative force building’ approach to build the deterrent. He explains how Pakistani concerns date back to the 1960s when Munir Ahmed Khan, former head of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, recollected that ‘Pakistan became increasingly apprehensive of India’s designs after the inauguration of Canadian Indian reactor and then after the completion of the reprocessing plant (in 1965)’ (p. 41); and ‘The adoption of a nuclear option’ policy which was, according to him, ‘a most visible shift in the Pakistan government’s thinking about nuclear weapons, which was reflected in its refusal to sign the NPT in 1968’. To him, Pakistan’s decision signified, amid others, ‘…that Pakistan had adopted a policy of “nuclear option” which meant that it would, should necessity arise build nuclear weapons in the future’ (p. 41). Chakma, thus, thinks differently from those debating on the origin of Pakistan’s nuclear intentions from 1972 (Bhutto’s Multan Meeting in the aftermath of the 1971 war) or 1974 (when India conducted its Peaceful Nuclear Explosion at Pokhran) and makes an interesting contribution thereby. He also makes a loaded speculation in saying that Pakistan would continue to block beginning of negotiations for the Fissile Materials Cut off Treaty ‘until it is politically feasible to do so against the pressure from the West’ (p. 53).
The second section deals with Nuclear Doctrinal aspects of the two countries (Pakistan, of course, has no formal one). The task is difficult because of the complexities of the region and tendency of the readers and analysts to compare it with the existing doctrines of the nuclear weapon states which have been in operation for more than 50 years for them. In the face of such a daunting challenge, the authors have made a good attempt. Swaran Singh has discussed the elements and summary of the doctrine, both draft and the final. He has also traced the implications in the light of India’s no-first use policy as well as Cold Start and Limited War Doctrines (pp. 66–67). The merit of the article lies in placing all the developments in a historical perspective to seek ‘an annual or biannual public review of nuclear doctrine by carefully selected NSAB’ and that ‘since the extremely destructive nature of nuclear weapons calls for them to be put under the sole control of people’s popular representatives specially the civilian political leadership…’, is not an undebatable proposition.
Taking a cue from his assertions that Pakistan has adopted a doctrine of massive retaliation, in the second chapter, Bhumitra Chakma says that to enhance its credibility of nuclear deterrence it would adopt a delegative control system which he says is ‘fraught with risks’. In the end, he concludes that the nuclear use doctrine of Pakistan is ‘determined by its perception of insecurity’. Ambiguity would remain an element of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine as it ‘served Pakistan’s strategic objectives in numerous ways and the Pakistani security community views its continued relevance even today’ (pp. 88–89). The chapter suffers from being overtaken by events, unavoidable in such subjects, but correctly assesses that Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is a ‘continuously evolving process’.
External factors considered in the book, forming the third section include the China factor, the United States and the region. As is obvious, the first two sections delve into causes and the third one studies it more as an impact. Binod Kumar Mishra questions the popular perception of China being the causal factor of India’s nuclear weapon programme saying that ‘it must be kept in mind that when India started her nuclear programme, China was yet to go nuclear…India’s nuclear programme, at the inception, was not linked to China’s nuclear programme’ (p. 94). The proposition is debatable as is his assertion that ‘India’s reference to China as the pretext for her own nuclear programme was nothing but a “perceptual security dilemma”’ (pp. 97–98). However, he concludes that it was ‘the aggressive posture of China which provided sufficient reasons for considering the weaponisation option seriously’ (p. 111). He also asserts that had China not played the game of balancing the adversary (Pakistan) ‘South Asia would not have been put on short fuse’ and that China’s ‘active involvement in the global proliferation and increasing nuclear politics of the region moving progressively towards weaponisation’ (p. 112). One may disagree with his interpretation of events and statements, but Mishra has done massive referencing in support of his arguments and indeed constitutes one of the most readable chapters in the book.
Chakma traces America’s role in the Kargil Conflict, which has also been discussed in great detail in the book, by saying that ‘the sole superpower at the time (US) took an active role in an international effort to diffuse the conflict and…as the conflict intensified, Washington concluded that the only way to prevent a full-scale war was to withdraw the Pakistani forces behind the LOC’ (p. 121). The Pakistani objective, Chakma argues in undertaking the Kargil conflict as to ‘attract the mediation of a third party—the US on Kashmir by creating the fear that nuclear war could break out if the international community failed to intervene’ (p. 124) and that ‘America’s deterrence diplomacy helped maintain crisis stability in 1999’ (p. 125). However, his conclusion that ‘the US will continue to play a pivotal role in the dynamics of Indo-Pakistani deterrence’ stands as contested as his argument that ‘it does not appear that India and Pakistan have established a reasonable level of deterrence/crisis stability’. The nuclear deterrence in this part of the world is established by having the capability itself, the massive destructive power of the weapon speaks for itself, whereas the numbers and quality of the weapon and delivery vehicles do not matter. The section on the impact on the region makes interesting reading as far as reactions of the neighbours are concerned. Bhutan’s a la fear about ‘Sino Indian strategic rivalry’ or ‘Sino-Pak collusion in nuclear field’ (p. 142) is significant and makes interesting the rest of the narrative, like that of SAARC and the India–Pakistan stability–instability arguments. The chapter ends abruptly, lacking any flash about ‘nuclear terrorism’ (p. 151) which says, without a detailed explanation, that ‘denuclearization of the region’ would be ‘the best way forward’, following the modality suggested in South-east Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty of 1997, however, with no attempt to compare or contrast the two situations!
The section on confidence building begins with Nicholas J. Wheeler’s article with a rather cumbersome heading: ‘I had gone to Lahore with a message goodwill but in return we got Kargil’: The Promise and Perils of ‘Leaps of Trust’ in India–Pakistan Relations, where India–Pakistan ‘leaps of trust’ are visualised through a security dilemma prism. On attempting to answer whether Sharif knew about Kargil (to follow Lahore), he discusses the two extremes, Nawaz Sharif knowing about it, as stated by Musharraf in his Line of Fire or the military keeping it a secret from him and preventing giving up anything on Kashmir; he seems to suggest the answer ‘lies in between the two extremes’ (p. 170) though more is stated in terms of raising questions than definitive answers. He concludes along expected lines, almost stating the obvious that ‘Ten years after the promise of trust that was briefly glimpsed at Lahore, New Delhi and Islamabad remain distrustful and suspicious of each others’ (p. 176).
The next two chapters are even more on a familiar narrative. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal talks of possible alternatives in nuclear confidence-building measures between the two countries. His suggestions include increasing ‘Strategic Warning Time’, non-deployment of nuclear weapons, Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres, deployment of conventional forces, mutual ban on nuclear exercises countering tactical weapons threat (more susceptible to use or theft), a nuclear data exchange agreement and bilateral monitoring (pp. 186–192). He of course makes a more realistic assessment that these alternatives may not be entirely successful ‘given the state of India–Pakistan bilateral relationships’ however provide a ‘leeway to avoid a looming arms race and potential nuclear dangers’ (p. 192). Bannerjee’s narrative on addressing nuclear dangers is more a collection and summary of existing facts: on nuclear doctrines of the two countries as well as existing nuclear CBMs between India and Pakistan and between India and China. He thinks a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty are likely to ‘move up the agenda of global politics’ and that ‘these issues are important in the context of regional confidence-building and nuclear risk reduction’. He also says if the ‘policies of these three countries are aligned it will have a significant impact on road to a common nuclear doctrine’ (p. 207). He, of course, does not bother to explain how important for a write-up of this nature is to keep in mind the differences in the nature of the doctrines (Pakistan does not have a formal one) and the fact that doctrines are rooted in security perceptions. There is a vast gap in the perception and stipulations of the three.
In the last chapter of the section, Chakma tries to analyse arms control challenges in South Asia, and that literally is the name of the chapter and presents a Western picture of the region and hence the arguments. His reasons (for arms control) include perceiving South Asia as ‘crisis and war-prone region and a probable nuclear flashpoint and that the two countries suffer serious human security challenges and the two allocate more resources to defence than social sectors’ (p. 213). The argument of likelihood of nuclear war ‘because of a preventive strike or strategic surprise attack, escalation from conventional wars; deterrence failure; accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and third party (terrorist) manipulation of computer system’ (p. 214) also reflect an influence of Western thinking on the subject. He believes use of ‘nuclear weapons in Indo-Pakistan war is likely which should be good enough reason to pursue arms control in order to reduce the likelihood of nuclear use’. This indeed is debatable, as is his stipulation that ‘the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001–02 military stand-off, which could have brought nuclear catastrophe to the region’ (p. 228). However, his plea for ‘serious scholarly discussion on arms control’ would make sense not because the threat is large but because the potentiality remains. Use of nuclear weapons has long been discounted, possibilities and potentialities notwithstanding. Mere existence of weapons does not threaten a region, after all it is a fact that nuclear weapons maintained peace in Europe for more than 50 years.
The difference in perception apart, most of the chapters in the book are very well written, researched and argued. It is almost like an intellectual tour on the subject of politics of the nuclear weapons, with equal focus on domestic as well as external factors; in other words, a must read for a scholar on the subject.