Tracing the Pakistan–Terrorism Nexus in Indian Security Perspectives: From 1947 to 26/11

Introduction

On 26 November 2008, ten gunmen led co-ordinated terrorist attacks on a number of targets in Mumbai, resulting in over 160 deaths. The attacks were quickly declared by Indian authorities as being Pakistani in origin and funded by groups with links to Pakistan’s intelligence services. What had made the link between Pakistan and their support of terrorism so immediately strong within India’s political and strategic elites? This article explores the origins of this association and how it has become an enduring and entrenched part of India–Pakistan relations. Through an emphasis on norms, we find that the association of Pakistan with irregular warfare/terrorism has been present ‘since the very beginnings’ of each state’s independence, and gradually regularised through Pakistan’s behaviour towards India. In direct conflicts, this behaviour has invariably entailed initial infiltrations by irregular troops followed by a conventional troop influx—an approach employed by Pakistan in wars in 1947, 1965 and 1999. It has also been perpetuated via Pakistan’s ongoing support of various insurgencies and terrorist attacks against India, which have compounded this association, and entrenched a Pakistan–terrorism nexus within Indian national security perspectives.

Scholars have investigated the continued impact of international (and domestic) terrorism upon Indian security (Puroshotham and Prasad 2009; Swami 2004). Importantly, many analyses have focused upon how terrorism is potentially holding back India’s contemporary rise, especially in the Kashmir context (Dormandy 2007; Ganguly 2008; Wirsing 2002), as well as how it interplays with a nuclearised South Asia (Jindal 2003). Terrorism and its association with Pakistan have also influenced core tenets of Indian security from territorial and sovereign integrity issues, to India’s aspiration to be a great power. In particular, this significance is underlined when mixed with implications for Indo-US relations (Das 2005; Gaan 2007; Ragahavan 2009), rises in defence spending (Pant 2010) and India’s participation in global counter-terrorism regimes (Kumar 2007; Sasikumar 2010). The ongoing involvement of outside forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the current ‘war on terror’ emboldens this context, as does work that notes how both Pakistan and India have supported terrorism in South Asia (Kumaraswamy 2007).

More specifically, scholars have noted how terrorism remains a critical parameter within India– Pakistan relations (Bajpai 2003; Kamath 2002; Mukherjee 2009; Noor 2007; Talbot 2003; Tellis 2008). Although some scholars have focused upon the role of perceptions and the importance of history (Chellaney 2001; Jones 2008), they have not outlined the process by which Pakistan’s use of asymmetric warfare and terrorism originated, regularised and then became entrenched as a behaviour within India–Pakistan relations. Our analytical approach upon norms aims to fill such a gap. We also show how this behaviour and association has been present from the very origins of their relationship, rather than it being purely a manifestation of the weak power/big power syndrome that developed between Pakistan and India during the Cold War. Our emphasis therefore differs from more realist balance of power accounts, and we contend that the Pakistan–terrorism nexus is fundamental to Pakistan’s security practice, and is an essentially durable behaviour rather than being solely resultant from wider systemic dynamics between itself and India. Here, a norm is defined as ‘an entrenched and longstanding form of behaviour’, and security practice as ‘the accepted and habitual behaviours associated with how a state carries out its security policies’.

Several other scholars have also investigated the general historical confluence of Pakistan with international terrorism (Fair and Jones 2009/2010; Ganguly and Kapur 2009/2010; Riedel 2008), and have revealed unambiguous links between Pakistan and specific groups (such as Laskhar-e-Toiba [LET]) both in Kashmir and across India (Clarke 2010; Kalyanaraman 2010; Rath 2010; Swami 2003). This article links all these issues together to trace and exemplify the process by which Pakistan has become so associated with irregular warfare and terrorism within Indian elite perceptions. We especially note how the high frequency of this association has engrained perceptions, behaviours and responses, whereby ‘sensitivity to threats (is) exacerbated by recent attacks’ (Wolfers 1952, 486). Taking such an approach demands the use of norms because of its focus upon history, identity and culture, which realist accounts largely eschew and assume are constants between all states. Critically, we regard Pakistan–India enmity (and resultant behaviours such as the use of terrorism) as coming from their specific relationship—something that is not generalisable across or replicated in, for example, Nepal–India or Sri Lanka–India relations, despite these interactions also being essentially asymmetric in nature.

This piece’s analysis consists of four major sections. The first section introduces the theoretical conception of norms and details how they inform how behaviours are created, solidified and entrenched through interaction and the passage of history. The next section analyses the strategies employed by Pakistan during the 1947–1948 and 1965 Kashmir wars, in order to show the origins of how Pakistan and irregular warfare became associated together by India’s elite. Following from this analysis, the third section details the roots of the Kashmir insurgency in the late 1980s and Pakistan’s continued links to militancy and terrorism within India. The final section then investigates how the Pakistan–terrorism nexus had become fully entrenched within Indian elite mindsets by the 1999 Kargil conflict and contemporary acts of terrorism, as ultimately indicated by the events of 26/11 in Mumbai. We end with some conclusions on the persistence of the Pakistan–terrorism nexus as both a behaviour in Pakistan’s security practice and as an association within Indian security perspectives, and assess its prospective durability (as well as how to reduce this persistence) in the future. Given the heightening material and military asymmetries between these two states, appreciating norm dynamics can importantly indicate how negative strategic behaviours and associations may be overcome, therefore potentially improving India–Pakistan relations.

Norm Construction and the Analysis of Behaviour

As an analytical tool, the use of norms allows researchers to carry out ‘the historical reconstruction of social facts’ (Adler 2002, 109) in order to better understand the origins of certain policy behaviours and preferences. Approaching inter-state relations in this way critically recognises the importance of continuity and change within policy inclinations, and also underlines how interaction between states is the key influence upon these preferences. It is interaction that highlights the dominant behaviours which then become norms, whereby the frequency and style of interaction determines its relative ‘strength’. In addition, ‘norms affect not only actor interests but also the ways actors connect their preferences to policy choices’ (Kowert and Legro 1996, 463), indicating a mechanism through which state policy is influenced and entrenched through interaction. In our analysis, this entrenchment process is seen through the prism of repeated interaction and conflict between India and Pakistan, the scrutiny of which highlights Pakistan’s ongoing behavioural preference for, and choice of, the use of irregular warfare and terrorism against India, often regardless of wider system dynamics and alliances.

Such an approach has been applied elsewhere to foreign policy analysis to determine how national norms shape state behaviour, and has shown how ‘the preferences of agents are largely shaped by historically constructed identity norms’ (Checkel 1999, 108; Duffield et al. 1999). Within International Relations (IR) theory, these accounts predominantly reside within social constructivism and classical realism, and largely eschew competing realist approaches that give primacy to material, structural and ahistorical factors (Barkin 2003; Gilpin 1986, 305). Whilst such factors are doubtless important within India–Pakistan dynamics, especially given the historical involvement of external states in South Asia (and their influxes of associated aid), our account—of the formation of a particular behaviour derived through a specific state-to-state interaction—demands a more ideational approach. Importantly here, ‘norms, like genes, are instructional units’ (Florini 1996, 364) and directly inform interaction. Thus, an engrained norm can become a ‘collectively held prescription about the right way to think and act’ (Legro 1997, 36), becoming a core influence on the enactment of a state’s security practice. This stance has informed empirical research ranging from human rights (Caney 2001; Donnelly 1999; Risse and Sikkink 1999) to territorial integrity (Zacher 2001), conventional weapons proliferation (Eyre and Suchman 1996), landmines (Price 1998) and humanitarian intervention (Finnemore 1996).

Moreover, norm development is cyclical, maintaining old precedents and mixing them with new experiences, while being inter-generational and formed over time. Norms thus offer good leverage for explaining how threats are formed, remembered and recalled. Here we argue that it was Pakistan’s particular modus operandi (the initial infiltration of Indian territory by irregulars followed by conventional troops), which initially co-joined Pakistan with irregular warfare methods (including terrorism) in Indian elite perceptions. Repeated interaction, and the repetition of this behaviour, then provided its effective codification into Indian security perspectives. While the terms of reference have fluctuated—from freedom fighters to separatists to insurgents to terrorists—the essence of their threat to India, and their deployment by Pakistan, has remained consistent. Social learning provides some further critical insights here, whereby there is ‘a strong tendency to interpret information in a way that conforms to…prior expectations and worldviews, which increases confidence in existing beliefs and reinforces continuity in behaviour’ (Levy 1994, 290). This observation highlights how Pakistan’s use of terrorism is a behaviour that is now expected within India’s security, and how it has come to be a default position concerning their inter-state relations. It also underscores the difficulties inherent to overcoming such an association.

Legro has highlighted three useful central criteria concerning norm measurement: (a) how the norm is codified (specificity); (b) how long it is in effect (durability); and (c) how widely it has been accepted (concordance) (see Farrell 2002, 49–72). These criteria are employed in this article in order to trace how the development of a specific behaviour (Pakistan’s use of terrorism against India) became durable through its use over a long period (more than 60 years), and has ultimately become an issue of contemporary concordance (across different political parties in India). Legro’s three criteria are employed here as a heuristic device to highlight our analysis concerning how Pakistan’s use of terrorism first originated, how this action was repeated, and finally, how it became entrenched as a habitual Pakistani strategic behaviour. The very same process will also show how the Pakistan–terrorism nexus concurrently became a core association within Indian security perspectives. This theoretical approach furthermore acknowledges the influence of research concerning process-tracing (Haydu 1996; Kennedy 1988; Yee 1996), with the particular diffusion pathway employed here being ongoing India–Pakistan interaction, punctuated by repeated (direct and indirect) conflict.

Origins and Repetition: The Kashmir Wars of 1947–1948 and 1965

The origins of the Pakistan–terrorism nexus can be found in the aftermath of Partition in August 1947. Predominantly, Partition relied upon the Mountbatten Plan’s ‘basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims’ (quoted in Wirsing 1994, 13), in order to create Pakistan and India, respectively, whilst princely states were asked to accede to the contiguous geographical territory keeping the welfare of their subject in mind (Mansergh and Moon 1980). Apart from the movement of millions of people (and associated communal violence), Partition was accompanied by wider territorial problems as some of India’s 562 princely states sought independence rather than accession to either the newly established India or Pakistan. While most of these issues were quickly solved, the status of Jammu and Kashmir (Kashmir) became contested. With a Muslim majority and occupying 85,000 square kilometres of land on the India–Pakistan border, Kashmir’s maharaja Hari Singh harboured ambitions to establish an independent ‘Switzerland of the East’. Kashmir was to be a separate entity, autonomous from the influence of either the newly created states of Pakistan or India, and on this basis Singh postponed his decision on the question of accession.

However, Singh’s hand was forced in October 1947 when Muslim peasants rebelled against their Dogra Rajput (Hindu) landowners within Kashmir. In reaction, Pakistan sent an initial force of its own state-sponsored irregulars from the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) across the newly established border, as part of a ‘tribal invasion’ (Kapur 2005, 137) against India. These irregulars were largely paramilitary and local militias, who were then followed shortly afterwards by a second wave of regular Pakistani soldiers. In response, Singh signed an Instrument of Accession with India in return for her military intervention. After a limited conflict between the Indian and Pakistani forces, a UN brokered cease-fire was reached in the following year with Pakistan keeping roughly a third of Kashmiri territory and India the remaining portion (Ganguly 1994, 2001; Hewitt 2001; Malik 2002). Regarded by India as an ‘unprovoked aggression as part of a Pakistani plot to seize Kashmir by force’ (Chari et al. 2008, 30), Pakistan’s actions—both in style and substance—marked the beginnings of a behavioural legacy between the two sides. Importantly, for our analysis centred upon norms, the Pakistani behaviour had come from a particular interaction with India over the specific issue of Kashmir, rather than being linked to broader international power dynamics or asymmetries (as realists would prefer to contend).

The 1947–1948 War established a modus operandi that would be repeated in subsequent conflicts, and which engrained a clear specificity as per the Pakistan–terrorism association (and its origins) within Indian security perceptions. This modus operandi consisted of a primary stage involving an initial attack led by primarily Pakistan-sponsored irregulars (plus some Pakistani army regulars—see Khan 1975) that was then backed up by a second wave of entirely regular Pakistani troops. In 1947, the initial invasion by irregular forces was codenamed Operation Gulmarg, with their attack acting as the precursor to the Pakistani army’s formal intervention. In addition, the Pakistani authorities denied any links between the two invading forces, with the former being commonly cast as a liberation or freedom movement. These actions were further structured from Indian elite perspectives by an undergirding factor; the inherent threat that Pakistani actions posed to the sovereign integrity of India and the spectre of her balkanisation. Over the coming decades, these factors would become critically intertwined for both India and Pakistan, leading to a state of mutual demonization and fear (Ahmed 2002; Jaffrelot 2002).

The war of 1965 witnessed similar developments and stages, as another conflict between India and Pakistan erupted over Kashmir. Such repetition served to solidify Indian elite perceptions of an (emerging) association between Pakistani irregular and regular forces concerning the contested status of Kashmir. As such, the first half of 1965 saw 3,000 ceasefire violations across the Indo-Pakistani border and ‘India charged Pakistan with training guerrilla units to infiltrate Kashmir and “soften up” the state for invasion’ (Wolpert 1997, 374). After these initial forays, along with extensive troop movements against Indian positions, in April Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar. This operation initiated a guerrilla movement of 7,000 volunteers to instigate instability against the Indian government’s rule over Kashmir. Regular Pakistani forces then backed up this movement in order to liberate what they perceived to be an oppressed Kashmiri population (Ataov 2001, 126). To this end, Radio Pakistan declared the beginning of a ‘spontaneous war of liberation against Indian Imperialism’ (quoted in Wolpert 1997, 374) in August 1965 that threatened India’s territory in Kashmir.

India had again been infiltrated by Pakistani-sponsored irregular fighters in an attack orchestrated as a precursor to a regular Pakistani army invasion. Moreover, and in much the same way as during the 1947–1948 War, the attack was presented by the Pakistan’s elite as an independent liberation movement. For these reasons, the attack resembled that of 1947, and through the repetition of the same factors (as well as the co-joined territorial threat), it confirmed to the Indian elite a solidification of Pakistan’s aims and associated strategic behaviour. This repetition highlighted an incipient strategic behaviour in terms of two of the key criteria for norm measurement as elucidated by Legro—specificity and durability—and how they were key to forming an association between this behaviour and Pakistani actions within Indian security perspectives. Ultimately, the 1965 Pakistani attack was flawed and lost any element of surprise, as the Kashmiri population alerted the Indian army rather than supporting the incursions (Puri 1995, 226). In turn, India’s elite regarded the attack as an affront to its entire sovereignty (not just Kashmir’s) and under domestic pressure initiated offensive action into Pakistani territory. The conflict eventually ended with a UN-led ceasefire in September 1965.

The 1965 War underscored for India the association between Pakistan and the use of irregular warfare (particularly mujaheedin). Such an association also developed in Pakistan, whereby its leaders learnt that to ‘force a change in the situation through unilateral military action’ (Choudhury 1968, 279–280) was not feasible, especially as India had begun to proactively increase its military capabilities after its 1962 defeat against China. Even though the origins of using irregular combat had come in the more equalised, non-asymmetric period with India immediately after independence in 1947, this realisation increased Pakistan’s focus on a behaviour that became ‘morally justifiable…in the rhetoric of politicians…and in subsequent recollections of the war’ (Schofield 2002, 112). Moreover, it emerged as a distinctive strategic behaviour with which to counteract India and regain Kashmir. Insurgency by ethnic groups against the Indian government also became commonplace around this period, and reflecting the nascent Pakistan–terrorism nexus, many of these separatist groups (such as the Mizo and Naga) received critical support in their efforts from bordering East Pakistan.

In the aftermath of Pakistan’s elections of December 1970, and with East Pakistan opposition groups calling for independence for ‘Bangla Desh’, martial law was declared and evidence of Pakistan’s use of irregular fighters again surfaced. As such, scholars cite how the Pakistan army used radical Islamic militants to aid their severe suppression of the independence movement through Operation Searchlight, resulting in thousands of deaths (Cohen 2004, 194; Haqqani 2004, 357). In turn, even after their loss of East Pakistan in 1971 (aided by India’s support of Bengali freedom fighters, which presaged the creation of Bangladesh), the virtue of using irregular warfare as a strategic behaviour remained present in Pakistan. In particular, because the 3 July 1972 Simla Agreement created a de facto border between India and Pakistan (the Line of Control—LoC), the use of conventional military action was made more difficult and predisposed the use of asymmetric warfare. Consequently, Pakistan perpetuated its strategic behaviour by continuing to support separatist movements in India, including aiding Punjabi Sikhs in the early 1980s who wanted to establish an independent Khalistan. More presciently, for Pakistan’s elite Kashmir became ‘an icon of revenge for 1971 on India’ (Muni 2002, 28).

The Brasstacks Crisis of 1986–1987 further evidenced the continued impact of the association of Pakistan support for irregular warfare within Indian security perspectives. Launched in November 1986 as a year-long exercise for the Indian military, Brasstacks was based upon the premise ‘that the insurgency in Kashmir had reached unmanageable proportions and that Sikh militants had declared Khalistan as an independent nation, encouraging Pakistan to make a “final push” to detach both Kashmir and Khalistan from India’ (Chari et al. 2008, 44). This basis clearly resembled the events of 1947–1948 and 1965, conflated them with Pakistan’s support of various separatist groups and presaged the coming insurgency in Kashmir from 1989. The core rationale for the Brasstacks exercises substantiated the presence of an association between Pakistan and her support of irregular warfare within Indian security perspectives, and at the same time, reflected the importance of learning and experience in the formation of norms. Brasstacks therefore acts as evidence of both engrained precedents and critically expectations concerning Pakistani behaviour (primarily their use of irregular warfare) within Indian security thinking.

Entrenchment: Pakistan Invests in the Kashmir Insurgency

As foreshadowed by Brasstacks, by the mid-1980s there was a rising state of alienation in Kashmir towards the central Indian government. Fuelled by electoral malfeasance, crude nationalism and the increasing majoritarian stance of the Indian National Congress (INC) to reassert it power against indigenous political groups (Das 2001, 41; Jalal 1995, 80), discontent against the central government increased. High unemployment and discrimination additionally led to the economic stagnation of the state, compounding the situation (Das 2001, 46; Schofield 2002, 143). In response, many sections of the population became supporters of azadi (‘independence’). Strikes and occasional attacks began in July 1988 and by August the violence had escalated, aided by an inadequate police force and state administration. New Delhi responded by dissolving the state legislative assembly in February 1990, placing the state under Governor’s Rule (which reasserted central political control) and deploying its army and paramilitaries to counter the nascent insurgency. These actions were reinforced by new counter-insurgency legislation in the form of The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act.

While the situation in Kashmir deteriorated, Indian politicians quickly emphasised Pakistani involvement in the insurgency. Much of this emphasis came from the precedents of previous conflicts, with the Kashmir insurgency appearing to exemplify the association that correlated Pakistan with irregular warfare and mixed it with a territorial threat. Initially in this case, past events overtook the present, demonstrating ‘how existing beliefs create a disposition to draw analogies from prominent analogous situations that are consistent with those beliefs’ (Leng 2005, 111). Therefore, in the primary stages of the Kashmir insurgency, Indian officials regarded any incidence of unrest as a potential precursor to a full-scale invasion by regular Pakistani troops. In this way, the Indian elite revealed the fundamental strength of this association in their security practice.

While not initially instrumental in the Kashmir insurgency, Pakistan nevertheless ‘took maximum advantage of it once it was in progress’ (Wirsing 1994, 115). Replicating the strategy it had used in Punjab (and Assam) in the early 1980s, Pakistan’s policy served as ‘an ideal case study of proxy arming as an extension of policy by other means’ (Ataov 2001, 125). Under Operation Topac, Pakistan again used irregular warfare methods aimed at regaining territory (Kashmir) from India. As with earlier conflicts, Pakistani officials also denied any association with them. This approach was complemented by the launch of Plan K2M in 1991, which aimed to initiate a ‘synchronized terrorist offensive across India by Sikh and Kashmiri separatists and Pan-Islamist jihadists’ (Mahadevan 2012, xvi). Although backed up by the more discrete use of official Pakistani resources (this time in the form of Pakistan’s intelligence service—the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate [ISI]—rather than an explicit follow-up invasion by the Pakistani army), the modus operandi established over the preceding 40 years remained broadly in place. Additional Pakistani support ranged from establishing training camps in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir to setting up madrassas and using Kashmir as a market for Pakistani arms manufacturers (Cohen 2004; Widmalm 1997, 109).

Support of the Kashmir insurgency not only entrenched the Pakistan–terrorism nexus within Indian perceptions but also revealed how the nexus had become an established part of Pakistani security practice. Thus, with its own set of historical precedents (in particular a need to avenge their 1971 defeat) Pakistan desired ‘a war of revanchism’ (Majumdar 2004, 121). While the nexus could now be regarded from the Indian viewpoint as an engrained association, it had also concurrently become an engrained behaviour from Pakistani perspectives. This behaviour had been validated by a successful jihadi strategy employed against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan throughout the 1980s, which seemingly proved the potential of the Pakistani approach. Reflecting the necessary norm-building criteria of specificity, durability and concordance, it had been India and Pakistan’s ongoing interaction, history and learning that had bought them to this confluence. The high frequency of conflict since Partition had set out enduring conflict (whether through proxies such as separatists, insurgents or terrorists, or direct warfare) as the core characteristic of India–Pakistan relations—intrinsically believed, and periodically (self-)reinforced, by each side. Within this interaction, Pakistan’s preferred strategic behaviour was that of using irregular warfare.

From its inception, the Kashmir insurgency spilt over into other parts of India with evidence of Pakistani, Kashmiri and Afghan militancy in India’s north-east provinces (Ataov 2001; Devotta 2003; Ganguly 2006; Saikia 2002). Each new outbreak of violence confirmed their association with Pakistan, compounding their significance and resonance within India’s security practice. As such, during this period, the association of terrorism with Pakistan in the context of Kashmir became commonplace, and was argued to have been a central reason for ‘the compound crisis of 1990’ when thousands of Indian and Pakistani troops amassed against each other across on LoC (Chari et al. 2008, 80–117). The 1990s saw continued terrorist attacks within India, such as the coordinated multiple bomb blasts in March 1993 in Mumbai. Allegations of Pakistani culpability for this attack, including planning and sanctuary of those involved, were made shortly afterwards by Indian officials (Economic Times 1993, 17 April). Reflective of these concerns, government spending on police and paramilitaries continued to rise in the early 1990s (Bajpai 1998, 157–197).

Concordance: Kargil, the NDA and Domestic Terrorism

The year 1998 saw the coming to power of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition led by the chauvinist, militaristic and nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). With an ideology based upon the supremacy of the Hindu nation, the BJP continuously cast aspersions on the loyalty of Indian Muslims to India, deeming them to be linked to Pakistan, and by extension (through insurgency in Kashmir and elsewhere), connected to terrorism (Hansen 1996). Indian Muslims were blamed for Partition and the violence that accompanied it, and were seen as an ‘enemy within’, whom the BJP blamed for bombings, terrorism and insurgency within India (Golwalkar 1966, 232–265). In reaction to the same historical events but with a Hindu nationalist (Hindutva) slant, the BJP had also developed their own engrained belief that associated Pakistan with irregular warfare and terrorism. Often more virulent than the INC, the BJP wanted to legislate against terrorism and secessionist movements, particularly those linked to Pakistan (BJP 1996 Manifesto 2005, 275).

BJP’s historical and enduring conflation of Pakistan and terrorism, marked a degree of concordance with the beliefs of India’s elites and India’s underlying security perspectives prior to 1998. Such concordance across India’s major political groupings served to further entrench the Pakistan–terrorism nexus within Indian security. Consequent events in Kargil in 1999 seemingly confirmed Pakistan’s continued preference for a strategic behaviour based upon infiltration followed by invasion (Krishna and Chari 2001; Malik 2007; Singh 1999; Tellis et al. 2001). Initiated through Operation Badr (the Indian-designation but known in Pakistan as Koh Pemah), a combination of Pakistan-sponsored jihadis and Pakistan paramilitaries from the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) infiltrated the LoC in late 1998, occupying Indian positions abandoned for the winter. These forces included veterans of the Afghan war and members of militant religious parties based in Pakistan (Chari et al. 2008, 118). The aim of the operation was to sever links between Kashmir and Ladakh, while gaining more territory from Indian controlled Kashmir. Thus, at Kargil, Pakistan was employing the same strategic behaviour employed in 1947 and 1965 (and from 1989 onwards) for the same strategic end.

Once Indian forces discovered the incursion, a conflict was fought from May to June 1999 resulting in all Pakistani forces being expelled from the region. During and directly after the war, Pakistan blamed the incursions entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind showed the involvement of the Pakistani paramilitaries. Thus, Pakistan’s established modus operandi, which had originated in earlier conflicts, had not been substantially altered, as evidenced by the repeated deployment of elements of the Pakistani military. Some observers did note however some degree of Pakistani restraint at Kargil, whereby the irregulars were not reinforced as in 1947 and 1965 (Chari et al. 2008, 142). This restraint suggested a more pronounced desire for Pakistani separation from the attack (at least publically) as well as a fuller tilt to irregular warfare (be it separatism or terrorism). The mutual nuclearisation of India and Pakistan in 1998 had also resulted in a situation whereby Pakistan could ‘continue to provide support for Kashmiri militants struggling against Indian rule without fear of retaliatory invasion’ (Hoodbhoy, quoted in Majumdar 2004, 133; Leng 2005, 166). This factor additionally reinforced Pakistani beliefs in the continued efficacy of their approach, which displayed concordance with the views and actions of their previous leaders, and their overall security practice.

After Kargil, India witnessed an upsurge in domestic terrorist attacks, most notoriously the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC814 from Kathmandu to New Delhi on 24 December 1999 by militants supported by Pakistan. These events crystallised Pakistan’s association with terrorism even further, reaffirming its existence, entrenchment and solidification in India–Pakistan relations. When the Agra summit of July 2001 failed (after Indian calls for Pakistan to refer to stopping ‘cross-border terrorism’ rather than ‘terrorism’ were rebuffed), the nexus was confirmed (Baral 2002, 289–302). Agra’s failure was quickly exacerbated by a suicide bomb attack on 1 October 2001 on the provincial legislature of Indian-administered Kashmir in Srinagar, and then on 13 December 2001 when terrorists launched an attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi. Indian authorities attributed both attacks to Pakistan-supported terrorist organisations (namely, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba), and explicitly linked this association with threats to India’s democratic political basis, which underscored even further the threat raised by the Pakistan–terrorism nexus.

Fearful of more (conventional) Pakistani attacks—a belief symptomatic of her experience in previous conflicts and of ‘lessons from the past’ concerning Pakistan’s preferred modus operandi—Indian troops were amassed on the Pakistan border through Operation Parakram. Presented as ‘a strategy of preclusive defense’ (Sáez 2003, 187), it was the biggest mobilisation of Indian forces since 1971. Tensions simmered throughout 2002, and were aided by widespread Hindu–Muslim violence in Gujarat in 2002, during which BJP officials argued that the violence had been instigated by terrorists at the behest of Pakistan’s ISI (Chenoy et al. 2002). A militant attack on an army base in Kaluchak in May 2002 then sparked a full-blown crisis, provoking heavy artillery and machine-gun exchanges across the LoC. The crisis was buoyed by demands from Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee for ‘a decisive battle’ (quoted in Sáez 2003, 189). India’s reaction to these events underlined the strong association between Pakistan and terrorism amongst India’s elites, and also displayed further concordance across different political groups (the INC and the BJP). Thus, Pakistan continued to be regarded as ‘an established headquarters of terrorism’ (BJP National Executive 26.09.02, 2005, 39), through its links to major terrorist attacks against India.

Facing what seemed to be an imminent nuclear conflict that threatened its hunt for Osama bin Laden, the war on terror and its troops in Pakistan, the US maintained pressure on both sides to peacefully resolve their differences. This pressure made India regard US policy towards Pakistan as contradictory, with an official stating, ‘how can we talk with cross-border terrorism still going on?…when the US…urges us to talk, that is a double standard on terrorism’ (Brajesh Mishra, quoted in Bowers 2004, 31). Such comments led observers to conclude in June 2002 that threats of escalation were ‘in fact a well-thought-out attempt by India to end Pakistan’s support for terrorism in Kashmir’ (Zakaria 2002). This strategy successfully linked Pakistani involvement in Kashmir to both international terrorism and nuclear weapons within international (predominantly US) foreign policy mindsets, which when co-joined with the 11 September 2001 attacks, effectively internationalised the longstanding association within India’s security perspectives that linked together Pakistan and the use of terrorism against them.

Despite these continued terrorist attacks, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee defused the tension by re-establishing communication and diplomatic links on 6 May 2003. During the same period, Pakistan offered an unprecedented ceasefire along the LoC, which India reciprocated in November 2003. These developments led to the meeting on 6 January 2004 of Musharraf and Vajpayee in Islamabad at the annual South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit. The meeting resulted in the Islamabad Declaration, whereby Pakistan publicly committed to stop supporting terrorism. By confirming a longstanding Indian association concerning a longstanding strategic behaviour used by its neighbour, at the time the declaration represented a critical watershed in India–Pakistan relations. ¹ Subsequently, Pakistan made a number of concessions relating to cross-border terrorism (including the banning of several groups and reducing the number of training camps) and used them to help resurrect the India–Pakistan Composite Dialogue. In addition, by displaying restraint towards Pakistan, the issue of terrorism became tied to India’s responsibility as an emergent great power, confirming its continuing lynchpin status within India’s security practice.

Although India–Pakistan relations appeared to improve, they continued to be beset by acts of terrorism. Providing their own sub-set of specificity, durability and concordance, these included more attacks in Mumbai, such as the multiple train bombings of 11 July 2006 and the sustained attacks of 26 November 2008 (known in India as 26/11). In particular, the 26/11 attacks replicated features noted in the attacks of 1 October 2001 in Srinagar and on 13 December 2001 on the Indian Parliament. These shared attributes included cell phone calls made to Karachi before the attacks; grenades and detonators with markings from a Pakistani subsidiary arms company; large quantities of dried fruit and prepaid cell phones (the latter factors pointing to a planned hostage scenario) (Chari et al. 2008, 149–152). While no longer escalating to the involvement of Pakistani troops, these continued associations confirmed the enduring and critical (although evolved) presence of the Pakistan–terrorism nexus within India–Pakistan relations, as well as a confirmation of Pakistan’s investment and belief in such a strategic behaviour. The attacks in Mumbai of 13 July 2011 only served to underscore this enduring and continued association among the Indian elite concerning the Pakistan–terrorism nexus.

Conclusions: Overcoming the Past?

From the first Kashmir War of 1947–1948 to the Mumbai attacks of 26/11, the association between Pakistan and their use of terrorism against India has entrenched itself within Indian security perspectives. Through the repeated modus operandi of infiltration by Pakistani-sponsored irregulars followed by regular Pakistani troops aimed at gaining Indian territory, a recognisable strategic behaviour emerged against India. Decades of insurgency (often, although not always Pakistani-sponsored) deepened this association and stressed the ongoing correlation of Pakistan with terrorism. In turn, the Kargil conflict of 1999 and the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament only served to verify this link, and made it the central lynchpin of India’s security practice. Although official rhetoric to describe the central actors has evolved (from militants and freedom fighters to separatists and terrorists), the association and nexus has remained firmly in place, as evidenced from Indian policy concerns during events such as Brasstacks and Operation Parakram.

Through our use of a frame of analysis employing methods of norm creation, this article has highlighted the historical precedents present within India and Pakistan’s interaction that have normalised the presence of the Pakistan–terrorism nexus as an accepted behaviour (for Pakistan) and association (for India). Through these precedents (and the tri-step norm-creation process of specificity, durability and concordance), we have been able to see how ‘historical legacies are interpreted, recovered and constituted within the limits set by contemporary interests and constraints’ (Bajpai 1998, 158–159). It is these legacies that can act as recurring forms of action, substantiating experiential precedents and presaging future behaviour. Furthermore, our analysis has shown how a state’s experiential past can impact on its relations with other states and on its own self-image—elements which realist accounts would miss due to their ahistorical and non-cultural focus.

As Hudson notes, by highlighting a ‘predictable cultural propensit(y) of thought, reaction and action’ (1997, 18), we have therefore pinpointed a ‘cultural syndrome’ in Indian security perspectives whereby Pakistan is associated with supporting terrorism. This finding goes beyond merely explaining that the association exists, and has instead elucidated why and how it is so deeply engrained within India’s security practice. At the same time, we have explicated a similar process at work in this regard within Pakistan’s strategic behaviour (and hence security practice). As Wendt argues, ‘people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them’ (1992, 394)—with the passage of time and the repetition of events making any such meanings difficult to reverse. Concerning the Pakistan–terrorism nexus, this observation jointly explicates not only India’s entrenched acceptance of this association but also how it has become Pakistan’s preferred strategic behaviour versus India.

In addition, we have explicated how a state’s security practice can be seen to be dependent upon ‘precedents and shared symbolic materials,…(which) structure practices, and orchestrate the collective meaning of history’ (Ashley, quoted in Hopf 1998, 179). The India–Pakistan-terrorism case acts as an instructive example of this argument, whereby the repetition of certain narratives has emphasised certain patterns of behaviour. India’s historical relations with Pakistan (primarily seen via the conflicts of 1947–1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999 plus various domestic insurgencies) thus built up consistent precedents concerning the Pakistan–terrorism nexus—leading to its association, acceptance and eventual normalisation. It is the strength of this association from independence to the present day that gives the nexus its persistent resonance within Indian and Pakistani security practices and consequent/connected strategic behaviours. As acts of terrorism continue to occur in India, the Pakistan–terrorism nexus will continue to be an essential part of Indian security, having serious and durable implications for stability in South Asia, and being an association that is intrinsically hard to overcome.

Finally, we must note that although norms encourage ‘certain dispositions and orientations whilst opposing and delegitimising others…(this) process…is neither deterministic in its operation nor totally hegemonic in its consequences’ (Campbell 1992, 10). Thus, norms can only be taken as indicators of strategic preferences and policies, and which can also evolve and morph in the light of new interactions, experiences and precedents. In addition, as India’s often automatic linking of Pakistan with terrorism shows, over-association can obscure strategic objectivity, and allow for the dangerous dominance of perceptions over on-the-ground realities. Thus, recognising the processes by which such a negative behaviour has become entrenched, also indicates the process by which such behaviours can be reversed through the engraining of more positive interactions. Sustained and heightened peaceful interaction over an extended time period could help to circumvent such habits through the creation of new precedents based upon stability rather than conflict. This assertion is particularly relevant given the continued heightening asymmetries between the two states, with India rising to the higher echelons of the international hierarchy and Pakistan dwindling at the bottom. However, as Pakistani support for terrorism continues and India downplays the indigenous roots of its more complex terror threats (especially Naxalism), it is difficult to see how the two states’ shared and conflict-ridden past will be overcome. When others (such as the United States) have also accepted the Pakistan–terrorism nexus, and thus, Pakistan’s preferred strategic behaviour, this viewpoint is only reinforced, and will deepen in significance within South Asian and international politics for the near future.