China in the Shadow of Russia: Covert Tools for Expanding China’s Influence over Kyrgyzstan’s Security

Relevance

The threats of terrorism and extremism are important factors in the interactions of the Central Asian states both at the intraregional level and in their interactions with non-regional actors. Traditionally, Russia acts as a key player in these interactions. It has a military infrastructure in three of the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) and provides the lion’s share of arms to the region, with Russia accounting for 62% of all military equipment and ammunition supplied to Central Asia (Jardine & Lemon, 2020).

The PRC’s place in regional security has largely been confined to the multilateral format of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) with its declared focus on the fight against the ‘three forces of evil’—extremism, terrorism and separatism; these remain vital given the ongoing problems in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region [XUAR], an area that borders several Central Asian states. Beijing’s primary influence has been in the economic sphere and with the complex of projects that fall within the framework of the One Belt, One Road [OBOR] project. Corenburg (2014) have concluded that this division of influence ensures stable interactions between Russia and China, with the former acting as a guarantor of regional security and the latter assuming the role of leading economic partner.

China’s global military potential, however, has expanded dramatically since the second decade of the 2000s and this potential has reshaped China’s position toward Central Asia. According to ChinaPower (2021) a project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the global sale of Chinese arms grew from $0.6 billion to $1.04 billion from 2008 to 2018, respectively, an increase of 1.7. This growth was related to increased expenditures in the military sphere. China spent only $0.09 billion in this area in 2008; spending expanded to $0.3 billion in 2018, a rise of 70% in ten years (SIPRI, 2021). As a result, according to SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (SIPRI, n.d.) China currently ranks fifth after the United States, Russia, France and Germany in terms of the volume of exported arms according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

An equally important indicator of its increased military power is the projection of Chinese military might outside the boundaries of the state, something that, in turn, testifies to the revolutionary transformation of China’s military strategy. The Chinese Communist party proclaimed the doctrine of ‘active defense’ after coming to power in 1949—this ensured internal security and mandated non-interference in the internal affairs of other states together with a refusal to establish military bases abroad or join military alliances (Dreyfuss & Karlin, 2019; see also Chase & Erickson, 2009). China started to pivot from this in 2017 by setting up a PLA base in Djibouti to support Chinese military units participating in the UN peacekeeping missions, humanitarian missions, and disaster relief missions in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden (Cabestan, 2019). The Chinese side termed it a structure of material and technical support (‘support and supply facility’) rather than a full-fledged military base in accordance with Ministry of National Defense (Li, 2019) of the PRC, a white paper published in 2019 by the Information Bureau of the State Council of the PRC. It defined the construction of military and logistics infrastructure as critical tasks when the PRC is conducting military operations.

These shifts stimulated discussions in the world expert community about the change in the status quo between Russia and China. Experts raised questions about the intensification of PRC activity in Central Asia and, accordingly, about the outcome and nature of changes in its interactions with Russia. The lack of official comment from both Beijing and the Central Asian states on the deployment of the Chinese military in the region complicates this analysis and, in turn, highlights the importance of obtaining an objective picture of current realities.

Literature Review

In general, existing work on China’s growing presence in the Central Asian security sphere is rooted in analyses that take comprehensive and diverse approaches to explaining its causes. That said, the existing literature can be divided into three categories, depending on the focus of the authors’ attention and the factors that inform the analysis:

studies that focus on economic determinants (the need to protect their economic assets);

The first category would include the recently published articles of a senior researcher at the American Council on Foreign Policy, Stephen Blank (2020, 2021), where he suggests that regional security concerns are ultimately rooted in anxieties over economic development, particularly those related to OBOR projects in the Central Asia region that are designed to build the Chinese economy. At the same time, he notes (Blank, 2021) the current balance in relations between Moscow and Beijing but stresses that the increased influence of the PRC in regional security—manifest in the creation of a network of military bases—threatens to undermine Russia’s positions in the long term.

Sergey Sukhankin (2020), a researcher at the Jamestown Foundation, also emphasises the importance of economic determinants, noting that Central Asia is central to OBOR implementation. It is also a strategic geo-economic area for the PRC given that four of six OBOR ‘corridors’—designated pathways for trade and transport—transit Central Asia. Sukhankin (2020), like Blank, draws casual links between Beijing’s increased emphasis on security in the region and the need to protect OBOR economic projects from terrorist and extremist groups operating in the area and undergoing training in Afghanistan, though he makes no reference to the XUAR.

The works of Jardine and Lemon (2020) fall into the second category. They link the growth of the Chinese military presence in the region to the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan, which actualises the threat of terrorist and extremist infiltration into the territory of the PRC and the problematic XUAR region. To support their assertions (Jardine & Lemon, 2020) of increased military involvement, they cite data on the volume of arms transfers and note the increased number of exercises conducted in the region, the creation of institutional mechanisms (the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM), and the deployment of Chinese military assets in the area (including the military facility in Tajikistan)).

The works of Lemon and Jardine (2020) boast considerable data on the type and quantity of weapons supplied by the PRC and Russia to the countries of the region as well as information on the exercises conducted in the region. There remain questions, however, about the quality of Chinese weapons, which, according to the ChinaPower (2021) project, are replicas of Russian models exported at low prices and inferior in their technical characteristics. Given this, the increase in Chinese arms sales to Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over 2014–2018 may be related more to calculated economic benefits than to any desire to build strategic relations with Beijing.

Raffaello Pantucci (2021) has also defended the thesis that Beijing is exclusively concerned about narrow security issues related to the XUAR and notes its transformation into a primarily regional security actor while commenting on the absence of any ambition to drive ‘Russia from its sphere of influence’.

The report of Niklas Swanström (2015) falls into the third category, where he emphasises that the PRC’s increasing presence in the Central Asian security sphere is a natural trend subordinate to any goal of gaining leading positions in the region and only partly related to the situation in the XUAR. Swanström (2015) stresses that Beijing did not object to the regional military domination of Russia, when its military potential was nascent, but maintains its approach to security changed as the armed forces of the PRC developed. A more narrowly focused military-force approach evolved into a broader strategy assuming pre-emptive measures to ensure political stability and socio-economic well-being and to favour an independent China with potent economic influence. Swanström (2015) interprets SCO as an institutional mechanism that Russia used to exercise control over the PRC and that China employed to strengthen its regional influence without arousing the suspicion of Moscow.

It should be noted that there is no consensus in the expert community on the nature of China’s influence in the region at present and no clear understanding of the causes and consequences from the point of view of Sino-Russian relations, however many changes might be noted. The available literature analyses China’s influence in the security sphere from sources external to the region. They work from the outside to understand internal dynamics. The information experts interpret is primarily derived from databases compiled by research institutes, the media, or from expert assessments in the form of analytical notes or reports. There is a lack of information and contextualisation from internal sources (including military and law enforcement structures), something that would allow researchers to grasp internal security concerns and then place them in a broader context and to indicate both the limits and specifics of Beijing’s influence on the countries of the region and the prospects for Sino-Russian interaction.

The purpose of this study is to fill the gaps in this academic research by analysing the PRC’s military actions in Central Asia from the standpoint of political conditionality. The authors’ hypothesis is that Beijing’s role in Kyrgyzstan’s security is increasing with the growth and diversification of China’s non-institutional mechanisms and instruments. These include those of a humanitarian character as well as the various mechanisms for military–political cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, the latter comprising a series of extra-institutional arrangements that might ultimately sanction the activities of military contractors and private military companies in the region.

Methodology

This study is based on data obtained in the course of desk research and from more than 20 in-depth interviews conducted with specialists in the military field, including employees of the security agencies of Kyrgyzstan, representatives of international organisations like the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and SCO, as well as with personnel who have completed PRC military training courses. Interviews were conducted in Bishkek from January to May 2021 through personal meetings, as well as using zoom technologies—with interviewers that were not located in Kyrgyzstan.

Theoretical and Conceptual Frame

In this study, security is considered in the narrow and ‘traditional’ understanding of this term (Collins, 2013; see also Kaldor & Rangelov, 2014)—as military tools used to prevent and end violence within the framework of the foreign policy of the state, with these encompassing military actions, deterrence, alliances, arms control, and so on. Accordingly, the state is a security referent object (an actor or object that is in a threatened positions and requires protection) in the system of international relations, with its security necessitating both military operations and offensive deterrence (compellence) as well as offensive and defensive actions aimed at demonstrating the threat of violence or limited use of military force (limited force) as opposed to large-scale military action (Jakobsen, 2013, p. 241).

This conceptual framework is consistent with the theoretical approach—offensive realism—that informs this study. According to Mearsheimer (2001, p. 21), the state always strives to maximise its power in the international arena. This necessitates building up military potential and expanding influence in the economic and political spheres (converting economic and political capital into military capital). The reasons for this maximisation—often carried out to the detriment of other rival states—are rooted in the anarchy intrinsic to the system of international relations, a system in which no international structure can ensure the national security of the state. Nothing guarantees its survival which, in turn, drives the need to build and expand power, on the one hand, while also underlining the dangers of maintaining the status quo, on the other (Mearsheimer, 2001). States act aggressively to reduce existential threats in the external environment by increasing their strength and influence and because they mistrust one other. ‘Power is the currency of great power politics’, Mearsheimer (2001, p. 160) writes, ‘and states compete with each other for it. It is as important to international relations as money is to the economy’.

As to the PRC, Mearsheimer (Ebbighausen, 2020) points out that Beijing’s ‘peaceful rise’ is a contradiction in terms, noting that further economic growth will lead to military rivalry between the United States and the PRC and to possible military clashes in the future.

Mearsheimer (Ebbighausen, 2020), however, primarily analyses the US–China relations in Southeast Asia and ignores the Russian vector of China’s foreign policy, which plays an important role in the Central Asia region. He only points out (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 162) that Beijing needs Russia to be weaker military as a ‘neighbour’ and ‘worthy competitor’ (peer competitor), which is important to China from the point of view of ensuring national security. This, in turn, presupposes the establishment of regional hegemony.

The Context of China’s Growing Influence on Security Issues

An explicit indicator of China’s gradual ‘maximisation of power’ in the region is its changing military–political interactions with the Central Asian republics. These changes are indicated by the following facts, which have been listed in chronological order:

Beginning in 2001, China carried out multilateral cooperation within the framework of the SCO;

The security agencies of Kyrgyzstan and China have actively cooperated over the past 5–7 years, with the two countries routinely carrying out joint military exercises and the Kyrgyz Republic receiving humanitarian aid from China. The PRC is actively involved in the training of young security officials in Kyrgyzstan and in strengthening the military infrastructure of the country. Some publications pointed to Chinese activity in internal political processes after the October 2020 crisis in Bishkek, noting its alleged financing of politicians and electoral programs and its efforts to promote the agendas of private military companies and safeguard infrastructure projects. It is clear that China is exerting critical influence in smaller Central Asian countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Its military and political significance is expanding in the region under the pretext of its struggle against ‘terrorism, extremism and separatism’.

Military Education as a Long-Term Mechanism for Building up the Military and Political Influence of the PRC

One aspect of the intensifying military and political cooperation between China and Kyrgyzstan is Beijing’s financing of military training. It is difficult to compile statistics of nationwide significance. Our data nevertheless demonstrates the growing, but still small, presence of students in China.

As the statistics from Ministry of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic demonstrate, Russia is the undisputed leader in the training of Kyrgyz military personnel, followed by Kazakhstan, Turkey, and China (Figure 1). It is noteworthy, however, that there were no cadets from the Ministry of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic in China in 2015. Observers noted the beginnings of cooperation in 2016, the dynamics of which grew gradually over 2017 and continue to this day. The range of institutions in which Kyrgyz cadets study is similarly small and includes the PLA Mechanised Infantry Academy in Shijiazhaong, the PLA Polytechnic University in Nanking, the Kunshan Branch of the Information Engineering Academy and the Medical Academy of the Navy in the city of Shanghai. The Russian institutions that train Kyrgyz security forces, in contrast, number more than 20.

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Figure 1.

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic

Interviews with Kyrgyz personnel who underwent military training in the PRC suggest that Beijing is betting on the gradual cultivation of a loyal pro-Chinese elite. Those interviewed emphasised the tangible advantages of Chinese, as opposed to Russian, educational programs. There is financial support in the form of scholarships ranging from $500 to $1,000 per month, with awards for academic excellence, whereas scholarships are not always provided for military training in Russia (a graduate of the PLA Infantry Academy, personal communication, March 2021). There are also numerous non-financial incentives in China, with institutions posting names to the honour board, awarding certificates, and so on. Those participating in military–political study noted the quality of Chinese dormitories, which are equipped with everything necessary for effective study.

‘Our hostel was equipped with all amenities. This included facilities for activities and entertainment such as swimming pools, football fields, tennis courts, billiards but also services in the form of banks, hairdressers, etc., which meant students did not need to leave or interrupt their studies,’—noted a graduate of the PLA Polytechnic University in Nanjing (personal communication, April 2021).

Our experts noted the interactive approach of military education in China while also pointing to sophisticated technical equipment, financial incentives, and the opportunity to participate in cultural outings and to visit attractive tourist destinations in China (a graduate of the Shanghai Military Medical University, personal communication, February 2021).

In terms of integrating students, China focuses on the concept of ‘one family’ in which everyone can achieve success ‘together’. This is according to experts interviewed by the authors. Those who studied in China remarked on the supportive attitude toward foreign students. Those receiving military education in Russian institutions (a participant in CSTO exercises and events, personal communication, May 2021), in contrast, noted an emphasis on integration based on notions of ‘brotherhood’ outside the borders of the post-Soviet space. This is evidence of a lingering Soviet discourse on the friendship of nations, one that emphasises a vertical relationship between ‘older’ (Russian) and ‘younger’ (non-Russian) brothers, something that introduces tension in relations with economically weak countries.

Chinese educational training is sustained through online communications with the teaching staff and colleagues of Chinese institutions, though this communication is informal rather than something institutional or official (a graduate of the Shanghai Military Medical University, communication via Zoom, April 2021). The participants in Chinese military training, as well as with exchange graduates from Confucius Institutes (personal communications, March 2021) also note that Chinese military training is not fully respected owing to difficulties with the nostrification of diplomas from China, which can cause problems when applying for work and create doubts about the expertise of China trained specialists. The Russian approach to nurturing the military elite in Kyrgyzstan is more sustainable, with a network of ready-made personnel organising internships and events.

A significant drawback of Chinese military training is the limited ability to apply practical skills. Russian weapons are far more prevalent in Kyrgyzstan than Chinese arms, though this may indirectly force Beijing to consider increasing exports of Chinese arms in order to create a more stable system of military–political cooperation with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (a graduate of the PLA Infantry Academy, personal communication, March 2021).

Humanitarian Aid as a Covert Tool for Maximising Military Presence in the Region

The military presence of China in Central Asia is also evidenced in the provision of humanitarian assistance to the security agencies of the republics. It is not simply a matter of Chinese arms exports, military exercises, training, and structures like QCCM. It is difficult, however, to provide an objective assessment of the scale of this assistance. There are no databases with precise information on the websites of state bodies in China and Central Asia. The only source of information is data from the mass media and articles by experts from leading analytical centres that aggregate this information.

According to the Carnegie Moscow Center (Umarov, 2020), Beijing allocated $30.5 million in military aid to Kyrgyzstan from 2014 to 2017 for the purchase of military equipment and hardware. More specifically humanitarian military cooperation includes: (a) building apartments for the regular officers of the armed forces of the Kyrgyz Republic (Kucera, 2014); (b) constructing checkpoints and a training centre for border guards on the Tajik-Afghan border in addition to an officers’ club in Dushanbe; and (c) directly transferring military equipment to Kyrgyzstan free of charge, though it should be noted that the volume of this assistance, as well as its technical characteristics, can be judged only by information derived from the media.

It is noteworthy that local security experts see no threat to national security from China building apartments for military officers. ‘Due to the political instability in Kyrgyzstan, surplus funds from the construction of apartments were redirected to Tajikistan’, an expert who wished to remain anonymous stated. ‘The countries of the region are more likely to compete for Chinese investments that fill in gaps that neither our authorities nor Russia can fill’, noticed a security expert Ibraimov Murat (personal communication, March 2021).

The Russian presence in the region, in contrast to that of the PRC, is formalised in international agreements that make it ‘legitimate’. As a result, it focuses on expanding the military potential of its bases in the region—the joint military base in Kyrgyzstan and the 201st military base in Tajikistan—and provisioning military equipment free of charge. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reported in 2020, for example, that it had reinforced these facilities with new military transport helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles. Russia similarly bolstered the military and technical capacity of the Tajik army in 2019 with 300 armoured vehicles, artillery mounts, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, and air defense systems. It plans to transfer anti-aircraft missile systems and additional unmanned aerial vehicles to Kyrgyzstan in 2021.

In this environment, the provision of humanitarian assistance is an effective mechanism for the PRC. It allows China to quietly expand its military presence in the region while cultivating the favourable image of an external actor who does not interfere in the internal affairs of states, something usually associated with the deployment of military facilities.

Advantages of Non-institutional Cooperation Between the PRC and the Countries of Central Asia

Russian experts often refer to the absence of any significant institutional frameworks when stressing Beijing’s limited influence on security issues in Central Asia and assessing its military and political presence in the region. Examining the issue from the Chinese perspective, however, makes it easier to assess the benefits of this kind of cooperation. The lack of institutionalisation means China’s activities are not limited by the norms of international law. If its relationships are extra-institutional, they do not fall under the category of interstate organisations, which are subject to international law and to a series of corresponding rights and obligations clearly defined in constituent acts (conventions, statutes, statutes, treaties).

The ongoing military and political cooperation between China and Kyrgyzstan is regulated by international private law, that is, national legal systems, and governed by intrastate relations and is not subject to the international laws that regulate interstate relationships involving military and technical cooperation. Emphasising humanitarian aid makes it possible to conceal statistics on imported equipment and hardware. This contributes to a lack of transparency and facilitates the corruption schemes common in cases of undeclared aid. The authors of the study encountered serious obstacles in calculating and systematising China’s humanitarian assistance in the military–political sphere; information in open sources is extremely limited and government agencies claim that information on imported equipment is confidential. If we speak in the context of the Chinese principle ‘taoguangyanghui’—to ‘hide capacities’ or ‘to keep a low profile’, then the absence of institutionalised military–political cooperation in Kyrgyzstan makes it possible for China to shape the ‘rules of the game’ to its advantage while not openly challenging Russia’s position in the region.

Private Security/Military Companies and the Safe City Project as Elements in PRC Security Policy in the Region

This dimension of PRC policy blurs the boundaries between the military and civilian spheres, allowing the PRC flexibility and adaptability in determining its presence in the region and enabling it to build influence in the economic, political, and military spheres simultaneously. There are about 5,000 private military companies in the PRC at present according to expert estimates. They employ 3 million people and provide security services (consulting, security, personnel training, etc.) to private and state-owned business companies (Arduino, 2019, p. 94).

Private Chinese security companies have two characteristics indicating close association with the PLA. First, they received permission to provide their services abroad in 2010. This coincided with large-scale transformations in the PLA, and in particular, with reductions in the number of armed forces in accordance with anti-corruption (Yan, 2019) and optimisation initiatives. Former employees of the security agencies form the backbone of these companies and their staffs. Arduino estimates that 50% of the staff of Cityguard, one of the largest private security companies in China, is comprised of former police officers, with an additional 30% being former military personnel (Arduino, 2019, p. 100). It was stated (TopWar, 2019), that Shandong Huawei Security Group recruits former special police and PLA officers. The founder of Zhongjun Junhong, which has operated in Kyrgyzstan since September 2016, is a former PLA general. It is noteworthy (Yan, 2019) that the company has a local license to use weapons that it purchases in China, even though this is in violation of Chinese law (TopWar, 2019), which prohibits private security companies from using arms.

There are, second, recorded instances of these companies interacting with Western military contractors. An example is the Hong Kong-based security, logistics and insurance company Frontier Service Group, which cooperates with CNPC’s divisions in Kazakhstan. The company was founded by former Navy SEAL Erik Prince, who headed the American private military company Blackwater, renamed as Akademi (Yan, 2019). It should be noted that the company provides training at Beijing’s International Security Defense College. The program is based on training that Prince originally developed and implemented for Blackwater employees in North Carolina and reflects experience gleaned from the company’s participation in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its employees served as military contractors to the US Department of State and Defense in these conflicts (Arduino, 2019, p. 100).

The Safe City project is also linked to the expansion of the PRC military presence in the region. The Pentagon (Capaccio & Leonard, 2020) published a list in 2019 of twenty Chinese companies associated with the ‘government of the PRC, the army, or the defense industry’. The Chinese military either controls or founded these companies. They include Huawei Technologies and Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co, both of which are involved in implementing the Safe City project in several countries in the region (Marat, 2021).

China has launched the Safe City system in almost all countries of Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan, and it has become an effective mechanism for influencing security and military issues. The second phase of the Safe City project, which the Chinese firm Shenzhen Sunwin Intelligent Co. Ltd. is implementing, is commercial in nature, with its success depending on the number of recorded violations. This commercial component—the driving imperative of the business activity of any company—is associated with corruption schemes. The Chinese company estimates the costs of the second phase of the project to be 2.7 billion KGS ($31.8 million), which is 3.2 billion KGS ($2.9 million) lower than the announced tender amount. That said, authorities have detained the ex-minister of digital development for extorting bribes from Shenzhen Sunwin Intelligent Co. Ltd. in the amount of 2.7 billion KGS ($2.4 million), which were paid to extend the contract. Deputy of the Jogorku Kenesh, R. Mombekov has also stated that the company submitted falsified bank guarantees for the tender, with these indicating that it deliberately undervalued its services while, in fact, paying the full amount through shadow mechanisms. A situation is emerging, as a result, in which the Chinese will neither support nor understand the desire of the Kyrgyz authorities to reduce fines. It has become equally clear that Chinese manufacturers are not interested in selling universal cameras, the result being that most cameras are being installed on roads to record traffic violations. Even if Russian companies implement the second phase of the project, all its equipment and servers were made in China, which also makes the problem of leaked information critical and very real.

At present, developed countries view Safe City projects as integrated systems for responding to and preventing emergencies, offenses, and illegal border crossings. ‘There is still no unified approach to understanding this system in Kyrgyzstan, however, or any single understanding of how it should function. The emphasis is only on the collection of fines’, said Azamat Burzhuev, an expert in information technology and cybersecurity (personal communication, May 2021). Any broader interpretation of the project is currently hindered by the complicated bureaucratic process involved in obtaining access to ‘Safe City’ data and by the inability of government agencies to share its information.

The very concept of a ‘Safe City’ necessitates not only processing but analysing big data to optimise something like road infrastructure or traffic analysis. The BIG DATA analytics agency fulfils this function in Kazakhstan, and information is continuously available to it on a real time basis. There are still no agents and no structure in place in Kyrgyzstan to analyse the aggregate data, however, access to which is still very limited. What is more, the regulatory framework governing Safe City and the use of big data is outmoded and does not match modern realities.

China fully funded another grant project as part of an agreement between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Chinese company CEIEC in 2019, with the parties collaborating on round-the-clock video surveillance to ensure public safety. The Chinese company CEIEC handled equipment delivery, setup command centres, and provided advice on the installation of equipment, all at its own expense, though mistrust has marred the project. ‘The company’, a security expert noted in an interview, ‘prioritised putting face-recognition cameras for round-the-clock surveillance in areas with concentrated ethnic Uyghur populations or where people from the XUAR trade, including at the Madina market in Bishkek’ (an official of Kyrgyzstan involved in the implementation of Safe City, personal communication, May 2021). This prompted Kyrgyz security forces to mistrust Chinese contractors and led them to suspend further installation of cameras with facial recognition.

The Safe City system is focused primarily on satisfying the interests of Chinese companies—their desire to reap commercial benefits—and meeting the concerns of Beijing, which include: (a) combating Uyghur separatism; (b) forcing the Kyrgyz state into debt and into a position of dependence on China, a policy being carried out with full awareness of the difficult socio-economic situation in the republic, which does not allow for tax hikes to repay funds invested by Chinese companies; (c) obtaining access to the personal data of the population of Kyrgyzstan. The entire project assumes a high level of awareness among government departments in Kyrgyzstan about the specifics and mechanisms of its implementation (which is by no means limited to the installation of CCTV cameras). Its effectiveness depends on this awareness. Without it, the system will have no value for the republic.

Conclusion

Analysis of the PRC’s actions in the region’s security sphere suggests that Beijing is gradually ‘maximising its power’. Proceeding from Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism, this ‘maximisation’ is being carried out in Central Asia in a non-aggressive, covert manner in relation to Russia, which still occupies a leading position in this area (including in education and the supply of weapons). This would make any attempt to alter the balance of power in the region through open confrontation ‘irrational’ and explains Beijing’s choice to wait for a more suitable opportunity to challenge its hegemony. Beijing is also maximising its power through non-institutionalised interactions, which are more beneficial in comparison with institutionalised relationships and because there is no body in the anarchic system of international relations—a system in which the norms of international law do not guarantee restrictions on state actions–that can ensure the national security of the PRC except for the PRC. The absence of an institutional framework for military–political cooperation frees China from coordinating its policies with other players and enables it to keep a low profile, providing it the opportunity to build positive and effective ties with military elites without provoking Sinophobia in the broader public.

Our in-depth interviews have also shown that China is working to address issues that the Kyrgyz authorities cannot solve and that Russia or other important players, for various reasons, are unable to address. In these conditions, Beijing is betting on: (a) its ‘safe city’ system, which allows it to address critical internal problems (Uyghur separatism, terrorism) while also advancing its goal of influencing the security sphere by accessing the data of Kyrgyz citizens and deepening the republic’s financial dependence on China; (b) its educational programs for Central Asia security service employees, who comprise human capital—representatives of a military elite loyal to China, which in the long term might translate into lasting Chinese influence in the region.

The overwhelming majority of our respondents confirmed the thesis of China’s growing influence in the field of security while also expressing their opinion that the Kyrgyz republic needed to deepen military–political cooperation with China to offset Russia’s declining military position and its diminishing ability to finance militaries in the region. The limited opportunities for those Kyrgyz military officials who train in China to apply their skills and knowledge will, in turn, require Beijing to increase financial investments for military–technical equipment, something that can be done by categorising arms sales and shipments as humanitarian aid, which does not require accounting and transparency. Chinese policies in the region are meant to produce a military and political elite in Kyrgyzstan that is loyal to China, one that will lobby for the presence of Chinese private military companies in the country and support the operation of its military contractors.