A WPS National Action Plan for India?

Introduction

Speaking at the open debate on ‘Women, Peace and Security: Towards the 25th Anniversary of Resolution 1325’ at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in March 2023, India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN), Ruchira Kamboj said: ‘It is our collective responsibility to take the Women, Peace and Security journey forward at a pace that fully harnesses its transformative potential’ (UNSC, 2023, p. 24). The 25th anniversary year of the passage of the resolution is an opportune time to reflect on the ways in which India has contributed to the fulfilment of this responsibility. The most well-known contribution is the first all-female Formed Police Unit sent by India, which was deployed as part of the UN Mission in Liberia in 2007. India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has described this as ‘a pioneering initiative that had an indelible impact on both the host community and the broader UN framework’ (Jaishankar, 2025). India has also contributed resources for training to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers and participated in deliberations relating to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda at the UNSC (see Basu, 2022). On the international stage, it has presented itself as a strong WPS advocate.

Unlike 112 countries (as of 2024) that have adopted National Actions Plans (NAPs) (PeaceWomen, 2025), India has not adopted a NAP for the implementation of Resolution 1325 and subsequent WPS resolutions. Barring a couple of exceptions, there have been no initiatives to develop a WPS NAP for India, neither by successive governments nor by the civil society actors that work in the conflict-affected areas. This may be surprising for those who would expect the government to demonstrate its commitment to international policies by adopting a NAP, in light of the country’s aspirations to become a global power and specifically its quest for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Furthermore, in many parts of the world, civil society organisations have taken the lead in advocating for the adoption and implementation of NAPs, but this is largely not the case with the vibrant feminist peace community in India. Is it then possible to envisage the adoption of a WPS NAP by India in the near future? The article seeks to answer this question.

The discussion is primarily divided into two sections. The first section presents an overview of the emergence and evolution of NAPs, highlighting the reasons underlying states’ decision to adopt these policy mechanisms. The second section focuses on the Indian government’s stance on the agenda, both in the international and domestic contexts. Further, it examines the response of the feminist peace community in India to the WPS agenda, especially in relation to the development of a WPS NAP. There are brief references also to relevant developments in the South Asian region. The concluding section considers the scope for the adoption of a WPS NAP in India. It is contended that this cannot be expected in the Indian context, following the government’s position vis-à-vis its larger foreign policy considerations and, importantly, the divergences within the feminist civil society itself on WPS. The article does not aim to provide a comprehensive picture of India’s engagement with the WPS agenda nor a detailed discussion of feminist peacebuilding work in different areas in the country but explores instead the possible reasons for why India does not have a WPS NAP.

WPS National Action Plans

There is a general consensus that, while the impetus for the development of the WPS agenda has come from civil society and relevant UN actors, its effective implementation is not possible without the political will and resources of member states. The operational paragraphs of Resolution 1325 (UNSC 2000a) urge/call upon/invite member states of the UN to contribute to its implementation through increasing participation of women, and incorporating gender-sensitive provisions relating to, for instance, protection and rights of women in their peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. Subsequent resolutions have further highlighted the role that states can play. This includes Resolution 1889, adopted in 2009, the first WPS resolution to make a reference to NAPs; of course, as Jacevic (2019, p. 274) points out, the Council had started recommending NAPs by 2002. Resolution 1889 (UNCS 2009) welcomes ‘the efforts of Member States in implementing its Resolution 1325 (2000) at the national level, including the development of national action plans, and encouraging[es] Member States to continue to pursue such implementation’ (emphasis in original). Laying out the significance of NAPs, the Global Study on the Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325, which was published on the 15th anniversary of its passage notes: ‘these plans, when they are successful, provide an opportunity for national stakeholders to identify priorities, determine responsibilities, allocate resources, and initiate strategic actions within a defined time frame’ (Coomaraswamy, 2015, p. 240). In principle, WPS NAPs are relevant for all states, conflict-affected or otherwise, as these can potentially provide direction towards realising sustainable peace in domestic contexts and meeting international commitments—as laid out in the WPS resolutions—for the maintenance of international peace and security (see George et al., 2019, p. 318).

Denmark was the first country to adopt a WPS NAP in 2005, five years after the passage of Resolution 1325. It was followed by a number of other European countries, including two permanent members of the UNSC, that is, the United Kingdom in 2006 and France in 2010. In the Global South, Ivory Coast was the first to adopt a NAP in 2008, soon after the end of a civil war but during ongoing political unrest in the country. By 2015, more than 50 countries spanning both the Global North and South had adopted NAPs, and as noted earlier, 112 member states had adopted NAPs by the end of 2024. In India’s vicinity, Nepal and Afghanistan were the first two countries in South Asia to have adopted NAPs in 2011 and 2015, respectively. Since then, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have also adopted NAPs in 2019 and 2023, respectively.

As concrete manifestations of a state’s commitment to the WPS agenda, NAPs have drawn substantive attention from feminist peace practitioners and scholars who have commented on larger trends as well as the effectiveness of these policy mechanisms in specific country cases (e.g., Haastrup & Hagen, 2020; Hamilton & Shepherd, 2020; Jacevic, 2019; Miller et al., 2014). The PeaceWomen project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom was one of the first to monitor the implementation of the WPS agenda, including through NAPs. While noting that more than 50% of UN member states have adopted NAPs, it also points out that approximately 30% of these NAPs have expired in 2022 or before (PeaceWomen, 2025). There is then a question mark against these states’ commitments going forward.

With regard to funding implementation, in their 20-year assessment of NAPs, Hamilton and Shepherd (2020, p. 13) highlight that ‘most budgets either have no or very little specification of how the NAP-producing country intends to fund their NAP activities’. This finding is consistent with the Global Study’s observation, five years earlier, that more often than not member states did not earmark funding for NAPs (Coomaraswamy, 2015, pp. 246–247). Later analysis conducted by UN Women in 2024 reveals that only 29 NAPs had ‘included a budget at [the time of] adoption’ (UN Women, 2025). Qualitatively as well, NAPs tend to present a narrow view of the WPS agenda, compared to that of civil society advocates, and may even be ‘an obstacle to meaningful local ownership’ of the WPS agenda (in the context of Liberia and Sierra Leone, for instance, see Basini & Ryan, 2016). Furthermore, in the Global South, these are often shaped by funding and guidance from actors from the Global North (in the context of South Asia, see Basu, 2024), which may impede the articulation of more organic iterations of the WPS agenda. In view of the challenges identified in the design and implementation of NAPs, Resolution 2467 (UNSC, 2019), which as of May 2025 is the second last WPS resolution to have been adopted, ‘encourages Member States to adopt, and regularly refresh, fully funded national action plans to progress the Women, Peace and Security agenda’ (emphasis in original). Thus, despite wide-ranging critique, NAPs continue to be deemed significant since such plans demonstrate commitment on the part of the member state. A more thorough examination of the relevance and effectiveness of WPS NAPs is beyond the scope of this article. The remaining part of this section focuses on the question of ‘why’ states adopt NAPs or why they do not, as the answer would help address the puzzle regarding the absence of NAP in the case of India.

In her discussion on the global diffusion of WPS NAPs, Jacqui True identifies a range of factors that affect their adoption by member states (2016, pp. 310–319). These include, among others, socialisation of states through participation in intergovernmental organisations and through transnational advocacy, ‘period effects’ with anniversary events and global meetings functioning as catalysts, availability of international funding, as well as domestic factors such as degree of democratic governance and the numbers of women in power (True, 2016). As such, the impetus for the adoption of NAPs may come from the state itself or local civil society actors; particularly in the Global South, it can also come from international actors such as UN agencies and donor organisations that lend assistance to conflict-affected countries (see Basu et al., 2020, p. 8). For states, in addition to communicating their commitment to the WPS agenda through NAPs, the policy mechanisms can also be used to gain legitimacy in the international domain (see Basu & Nagar, 2021, p. 216). This can strengthen their voice and position in multilateral deliberations, and/or help bring in resources for post-conflict recovery. For countries interested in NAPs, UN agencies and donor organisations as well as local and international civil society actors have provided support for design and implementation. Toolkits for drafting NAPs have also been developed over the years (e.g., Lippai & Young, 2017).

In the early years, NAPs tended to be adopted by two sets of member states: countries in the Global North that provided international assistance in conflict zones and conflict-affected countries, primarily in the Global South. The NAPs were outward-oriented NAPs that were built on foreign policy considerations, while the latter were ‘inward-looking’ and focused on the domestic context. In certain cases, especially in the Global South, NAPs have incorporated issues relating to sustainable development, climate change and disasters that were not originally part of the WPS agenda (e.g., Hamilton and Shepherd, 2020, pp. 11–12), in an effort to make it more meaningful for national contexts. Some evidence regarding the orientations (outward or inward) presented by Hamilton et al. also disaggregates NAPs on the basis of the government agency identified as the lead in the NAP. The authors note:

National Action Plans coming out of countries in Africa and the Middle East, and to a large extent Oceania, account for the vast majority of Gender/Women NAP leads, whereas NAPs from Europe, North America and South America are overwhelmingly more likely to have Foreign Affairs as a lead agency or to take a whole-of-government approach. (Hamilton et al., 2021, p. 7; also see Miller et al., 2014, pp. 10–11)

Over time, countries have gone on to design NAPs that include both domestic and international considerations. Of particular interest, in view of India’s position discussed below, are the NAPs of two of the five BRICS countries (prior to the 2024 expansion). Brazil adopted its first NAP in 2017 (renewed in 2019) and the second one in 2023, and South Africa adopted its WPS NAP in 2020.

At the same time, it is notable that more than 40% of UN member states have chosen not to adopt NAPs. As emerged from a report, albeit a non-consensus document, of the WPS Study Group of Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, that included representatives from countries both with and without NAPs (including India):

[T]he development or lack of WPS NAPs reflect principled positions. Some governments believe the WPS agenda requires a stand-alone action plan. Others think it should instead be actively linked with pre-existing national development plans and processes to meet the global Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) agenda or national gender equality commitments under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which pre-date the WPS agenda. Representatives from countries without a NAP pointed out that the absence of a NAP does not indicate a lack of support for WPS, but rather their own interpretation of how to ensure that the goals and visions embedded within the WPS pillars are successfully integrated in all areas of life. However, it was also pointed out that states may not want to engage with the language and specific mechanisms entailed in implementing a WPS NAP due to concerns around external scrutiny into domestic affairs or a desire to keep particular political issues and forms of conflict off-limits. (Pacific Forum and CSCAP, 2021, pp. 1–2)

Member states, thus, may be more amenable to certain international policies over others, for example, CEDAW over Resolution 1325 on gender-related issues. They may also choose to implement select aspects of policies that are in keeping with their foreign policy stance, and eschew those that are incompatible. Importantly, member states with sovereignty concerns may be reluctant to engage with international policy mechanisms in ways that would make them vulnerable to observations or intrusive actions of external actors. Such concerns trump the legitimacy to be gained from international actors and domestic civil society through implementation or the promise of technical and financial resources. These aspects are explored with respect to India in the next section.

WPS NAP for India?

Knowledge regarding the institutional home of Resolution 1325, the UNSC, is particularly significant to understanding the position of the Indian state and civil society on the WPS agenda. As one of the founding members of the UN, successive governments have supported the organisation and, more generally, multilateralism, including on issues relating to gender equality and matters of international peace and security; by this count, it would be reasonable to expect strong support for the WPS policy architecture. However, especially in relation to security, India is deeply suspicious of global policy interventions that could potentially impinge upon its national and regional interests. As has been pointed out, ‘this is a direct result of what it perceived to be a bitter experience dealing with the Security Council over the Kashmir issue’ (Roy-Chaudhury, 2008, p. 344). And, the civil society, wary of the Council’s preferences for militarised policy responses, has been ambivalent about engaging with the WPS agenda (see Basu, 2016). This section sets up the question regarding a WPS NAP for India against these positions held by key actors in the peace and security domain in the country.

Before it came to identify itself as an advocate, India was somewhat circumspect about the WPS agenda, as evident in its statement at the open debate on WPS in the Security Council, which preceded the passage of Resolution 1325 in 2000 (see Basu, 2022, p. 89). At a time when the Council was expanding its mandate to maintain international peace and security, India was among those countries that called upon it to stay within the limits of ‘areas which are properly within its mandate’ and, in the context of Resolution 1325, these were identified as ‘the impact on women when peace breaks down and their role in conflict and its resolution’ (see India’s statement in UNSC, 2000b). Its own attempts to shape the evolving WPS agenda came to focus on the two primary thematic areas of its interest—peace operations and counter-terrorism. India went on to co-sponsor three WPS resolutions, that is, Resolutions 1888, 1889 and 1960, as well as Resolution 2538 on women in peace operations; it also held an open debate on WPS during its Presidency of the Council in November 2012, when it was serving as a non-permanent member in 2011–2012 (Basu, 2022, pp. 90–91). Through its contribution of female peacekeepers as well as its support for WPS at the UN, India has demonstrated its commitment to the agenda.

India’s engagement with the WPS agenda has been described as ‘part of a strategy to strengthen its normative position in arguing for a permanent seat on the UNSC’ (Sapiano & Singh Raghuvanshi, 2024, p. 685). The brochure for India’s (successful) campaign for a non-permanent seat for the years 2021–2022 included ‘the iconic image of India’s first all-female police unit deployed in the UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia together with Liberia’s former president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’ is illustrative (Klossek, 2021; see Government of India, 2020). Considering that India’s support to the WPS agenda has grown over time, the adoption of a NAP to further bolster this association seems conceivable. However, as Kirby and Shepherd point out, India ‘has famously resisted the development of a NAP, while undertaking actions easily interpreted as in line with WPS provisions and principles (2024, p. 123). A deeper analysis of India’s engagement can shed light on why it has not adopted a NAP and is unlikely to do so in the future. The answer lies in the nature of India’s WPS engagement, not just its outward orientation but also the shape that this orientation has taken over the years.

India has invoked the WPS agenda mainly at the UNSC, at WPS-related meetings and in the context of UN bodies that focus on peace operations. Its contributions have focused on the development of international normative understanding of the agenda and, relatedly, on the issues in specific situations that have been identified as threats to international peace and security. To the extent that the domestic domain is brought into the Open Debates, the country statements highlight Indian women’s political participation, especially at the local level. As Hamilton et al. note as well,

India often speaks of the high turnout of female voters, gender quotas in the ‘grassroots level panchayats—locally elected self-governing bodies across the country’ and its ‘gender-based budgeting [which] has proved beneficial for the mainstreaming of gender perspectives in policy implementation across sectors’. (2021, p. 749; also see Basu, 2022, p. 91)

This showcasing of relevant legislation and initiatives promoting women’s political participation is meant to shore up India’s image in the international arena. Relatedly, India has deflected attempts by Pakistan to raise concerns regarding violence against women in the country and especially Kashmir (e.g., see Hamilton et al., 2021, p. 752). WPS implementation is thus envisaged in the international domain, pointing to the ‘outward’ orientation of India’s engagement.

There is, however, variation in the ways in which ‘outward-oriented’ member states have engaged with WPS. In their analysis of BRICS countries’ statements at the WPS Open Debates, Hamilton et al. write:

There is … a clear split between South Africa and Brazil on the one hand, which frame themselves as proactive in fostering international WPS partnerships, and China, India and Russia on the other, whose international engagement is much more limited and distanced, expressed in unidirectional rather than reciprocal arrangements, particularly in relation to, for example, the provision of resources or training. (2021, p. 752, emphasis added).

In keeping with its principled stance on non-intervention, India does not engage directly with states on WPS and instead contributes through multilateral mechanisms, such as UN peace operations that have international sanction and legitimacy. Its position on WPS has evolved with India becoming open to wider policy implications of the agenda over time (on WPS and counter-terrorism, for example, see Basu, 2022, p. 89). Regardless, without permanent membership of the Security Council, which would enable it to have a decisive vote in all of the forum’s decisions, India continues to have a cautious outlook on expanding the Council’s mandate, including through the WPS agenda. Following these foreign policy considerations, it is understandable that its engagement has been both ‘limited and distanced’, as noted by Hamilton et al. (2021) above.

Countries also adopt NAPs to guide the implementation of the WPS agenda in their domestic context. India has been clear, however, that there are no conflicts within the region; places like Kashmir and the Indian Northeast where there is ongoing political violence are referred to as ‘disturbed areas’ by the Ministry of Home Affairs. As such, there is no scope for domestic implementation of Resolution 1325 within the country. In this regard, Kirby and Shepherd write that ‘Indian WPS practices suggest that the government’s denial or reluctance stems at least in part from the definition of conflict and the extent to which a NAP would sit uneasily in the context of ongoing violence or “disturbance”’ (2024, p. 124). Any formal recognition of the relevance of WPS inside the country could open up questions regarding the nature of violence/conflict in the regions (Kirby & Shepherd, 2024). Relatedly, as Rajagopalan (2016) points out in the context of South Asian countries, ‘to adopt an NAP was seen as an admission that there were conflicts within the State, an admission that would invite unwanted international attention to internal issues’ (p. 2). India is fiercely protective of its sovereignty and has, therefore, sought to ensure that its engagement remains outward-oriented.

WPS-related events hosted by the government or associated institutions in the country have focused on gender training for UN peacekeepers, and foregrounding the role of female peacekeepers. In February 2025, the Ministry of External Affairs organised a conference for women peacekeepers on ‘Women in Peacekeeping—A Global South Perspective’, in collaboration with the Ministry of Defence and the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in Delhi. In his statement during the inaugural session, the External Affairs Minister took note of the 25th anniversary year of the passage of Resolution 1325 and stated that the conference ‘reaffirms[ed] our collective commitment to enhancing and empowering the role of women in peace and security’ (Jaishankar, 2025). The United Services Institution of India, a think tank associated with the Indian defence forces that hosts CUNPK, has organised a number of WPS programmes, including in collaboration with intergovernmental actors like UN Women and the European Union; the focus has remained on peacekeeping (see UN Women Asia and the Pacific, 2025; USI, 2025). Notably, the more contentious policy agenda of WPS and counter-terrorism, which has featured prominently in India’s statements at the Security Council’s open debate, has not received similar attention (if any) by the government in deliberations within the country. The Government of India, therefore, has circumscribed the domestic discourse on WPS to UN peacekeeping.

With the kind of engagement that the Government of India has had with the WPS agenda, a NAP would not be of much use. First, its contributions to international implementation have generally been part of multilateral initiatives that are developed at the UN. In this respect, it would seem sufficient for India to bring its general foreign policy considerations into these discussions, without having to invest in a NAP that would invite international scrutiny. Second, in the domestic context, no policy direction is required, as there has been no formal acknowledgement about the possibility of policy implementation within the country. By focusing primarily on peacekeeping at WPS events held in Delhi, intergovernmental agencies have generally aligned with India’s stated interests in this policy arena. Finally, another set of actors are crucial in relation to the agenda—the civil society. Where states have been reluctant to engage with WPS and/or adopt NAPs, civil society has advocated for the adoption of NAPs and WPS implementation. However, except for a single instance, there has been no attempt to advocate for a WPS NAP for India. This ambivalence of civil society in India is discussed below.

Conclusion

The first WPS NAP was adopted by Denmark on the fifth anniversary of Resolution 1325. Since then, major anniversaries have become occasions for more countries to introduce their own NAPs; the 25th anniversary in 2025 will likely be another significant milestone in this respect. As has been contended in this article, India’s approach to the WPS agenda has been shaped by strategic considerations, and given these priorities, it is unlikely to adopt a NAP to mark the 25th anniversary. The government has focused on an outward-oriented implementation strategy, primarily engaging through multilateral initiatives, making a NAP to guide its international efforts not particularly necessary. Additionally, as much as India maintains a cautious stance on Security Council resolutions that could potentially impinge upon its national sovereignty and regional interests, it is also careful about any involvement in the domestic affairs of other countries in the broader international context. Within India, intergovernmental organisations have collaborated primarily on peacekeeping issues, a key area of the country’s engagement with WPS. While civil society actors in India have explored the implications of the WPS agenda for local concerns, their position has generally been ambivalent. As a result, there has been no sustained advocacy for a NAP in the country. Looking ahead, it is expected that ongoing participation in international peacekeeping and multilateral dialogues will continue to shape India’s engagement with the WPS framework.