China’s Digital Expansionism in Africa and the US Counter-Strategies

Conceptual Context of the Study

Geopolitics continues to influence contemporary international relations (IR). The recorded history of IR possesses key features of the existence of geopolitical rivalry for territory, power and influence among the existing and emerging great powers in its scope. Geopolitics, which deals with the power and influence over territory and space, is ‘future-oriented’, and helps to understand the unchanging fundamental interests and behaviour of states. States need to protect their territory, secure resources and manage their populations (Dodds 2019: 5–6). In classical geopolitics, a state is conceived as a ‘living organism’, and therefore, its borders are also conceived as ‘flexible’. Borders of states change as states expand their territories with their growing strengths at the cost of declining capabilities of other states (Mamadou 1998: 239). Hence, geopolitics is a kind of ‘… struggle over the control of geographical entities with an international and global dimension, and the use of such geographical entities for political advantage’ (Flint 2022: 36). States have competed against each other ‘… to gain advantage, often relative to others believed to pose a challenge or threat, through the self-interested pursuit of contested goods such as power, security, wealth, influence, and status’ (Mazarr et al., 2022: 18). Geopolitical rivalry among states exists for both offensive and defensive objectives of maximising power and influence over other states and regions (Sabet 2015: 163). In other words, states engage in organised campaigns against rival states to gain different geographical, economic, political and strategic advantages in specific areas. Moreover, rigorous and persistent rivalries prevail between the states willing and seeking leadership of the international system (Mazarr 2022: 3; Brands 2022). Such rivalries often fuel alliance formations among states to counter the real or perceived threat from rival states and sometimes also to gain relevant advantages in specific areas. The geopolitical rivalry between Britain and France prevailed at the beginning of the nineteenth century due to their opposite geopolitical interests. After the end of the Second World War, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) resulted from a direct clash of geopolitical interests between these rival powers in the twentieth century to gain control over different strategic regions of the globe. Both sides had used trade as a tool for obtaining access to strategic natural resources and also gaining influence over the other states (Lacey 2017: 13). In the twenty-first century, this geopolitical rivalry is prevailing between the existing hegemon, the United States and the emerging great power, China. Great powers do not only endeavour to be the strongest, but their ultimate intention is to be the hegemon or the only great power in the international system (Mearsheimer 2006). Therefore, contrary to its official stand, it is eventually seeking to lead the global system, for which it is maximising its power. China, in its rivalry with the United States, is using digital technology as a strategic tool to gain its geopolitical interests of seeking global leadership in the digital space (Committee on Foreign Relations 2020). Digital geopolitics is a reproduction of classical geopolitics in the digital domain between these two rival states. Digital geopolitics is occurring in the digital domain as rival states are contending for dominance over the artificially created virtual space while consolidating their control over the physical space in different parts of the globe. The United States is devising counter-strategies to contain China’s strive for global digital leadership. Thus, digital geopolitics deals with the competition for supremacy over the digital space. It is based on digital technologies and has emerged as a key component of the global geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China.

Context and Structure of the Study

In reality, China, due to its assertive and expansionist regional and global activities, is being viewed as a revisionist state in contemporary IR. Beijing officially claims neither to be involved in the arms race and military expansionism nor to support hegemonies, aggression, expansion and encroachments perpetrated by one country against another. It affirms a vision to come out of the Cold War mentality, build an outlook for a zero-sum game and restructure the IR based on ‘win-win cooperation’ (State Council 2011). Nevertheless, contrary to its official claims, China is pursuing its logic of power maximisation and is involved in geopolitical rivalry with the United States. Beijing finds it difficult to accept the US hegemony in IR and, hence, works towards creating a China-centric Asian and global order. In this direction, China is using its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a main instrument to enhance its power and position in the global system. The BRI, which contains the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) and the Digital Silk Road (DSR), was started in 2013. It is a trans-continental initiative of infrastructure development investments by China that has been joined by 140 countries (Nedopil 2021). Under its two BRI projects—the SREB and MSR—Beijing has made huge investments in the infrastructural development of roads, railways, airports, seaports and power plants in Asia, Africa and Europe while embracing colonial practices. As the ‘biggest official creditor’ of the globe, its state-sponsored loans given to financially vulnerable countries have provided a credible leverage for Beijing to advance its geopolitical interests while pushing the loan-recipient countries into the sovereignty-eroding debt traps of China (Chellaney 2021).

Being a revisionist power, China is striving for global technological leadership. It intends to disrupt the existing global hierarchy and reshape the existing global digital order. Thus, it is ‘… competing to control international data, its movement, and, by extension, the production, distribution, and consumption of resources and ideas internationally’ (Bruyere 2022a: 3). It has emerged as a significant power across the global standards system and, also, in the main standards bodies, as Chinese experts are occupying the top positions in the Inter-national Telecommunication Union (ITU), the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) (Tugendhat and Voo 2021: 8). Moreover, China has devised the DSR component of the BRI as its major strategic tool for expanding its global communication connectivity, altering the global digital order and becoming a global cyber superpower (Helberg 2021; Hillman 2021). Using such modus operandi, as part of the DSR, China is developing critical digital infrastructure from the ocean floor to outer space to strengthen its connectivity with the world and promote a more Sino-centric digital order. As DSR-related activities of China challenge the dominance of the digital value system of the United States, it has sharpened the on-going Sino-US geopolitical rivalry (Chan 2019; Ghiasy and Krishnamurthy 2021). The Sino-US rivalry also prevails on the African continent, as many countries on the continent have become part of China’s digital expansionism. Hence, in this context, the present article, briefly describing the global context of the DSR project of China, explains how China is involved in its digital expansionism in African countries and what are the implications of Beijing’s growing digital presence for the African countries? Besides, the article also describes US initiatives taken to counter the Chinese moves to establish global technological supremacy.

The present article is divided into six sections. The first introductory section briefly explains the conceptual context and the digital revisionist context of the study, which is primarily focused on China’s DSR project in the African context. In addition to this, it also contains research questions, research methodology, sources and the organisation of the study. The second section provides a brief description of the global context of the DSR initiatives of China. The third section elaborates on the African context of China’s growing digital expansionism. The fourth section examines gains, losses and threats from China’s digital expansionism to African countries. The fifth section explains counter-initiatives of the United States to contain Chinese digital expansion in a global and African context. The last section discusses the conclusion of the study and also contains recommendations to counter China’s digital expansionism.

Research Methodology

From research methodology’s perspective, this study is descriptive, analytical and prescriptive in nature. Using the descriptive-qualitative approach, this study has been developed on the basis of the content analysis method. This study is descriptive as it describes the global and African context of Chinese activities related to the DSR. It becomes analytical while explaining the consequences of China’s DSR-related activities in the global and African context, and the counter-moves of the United States contain digital expansionism. It also becomes prescriptive, as its concluding section contains suggestions to counterbalance the Chinese digital expansionism. Both primary sources—official documents, statements and speeches of the United States and Chinese and African countries—and secondary sources—books, articles and opinion columns—available in digital and non-digital forms—have been consulted for the completion of this study.

African Countries’ Gains from China’s DSR Initiatives

China’s DSR-related projects are enhancing digital connectivity in the African continent, assisting the countries in achieving universal access and participation in the global digital economy. It has boosted the growth of small and medium-sized companies in the digital space and improved productivity and service quality in various fields, leading to economic growth. China’s digital cooperation agreements with African countries entail comprehensive knowledge and technology transfer mechanisms and promote research and development cooperation. Moreover, China’s investments have generated some quality jobs for the local youth of African countries (Kadi 2019). Digital infrastructure enables African countries to utilise these technologies to enhance their economic growth, offer opportunities to diversify their economies and reduce their dependence on oil and gas resources. In addition, African countries’ local private sectors have benefitted from Chinese capital inflows and their technological expertise (Agbebi 2022).

Digital connectivity has fostered citizens’ participation, coordination and sharing of information for collective actions such as protests and demon-strations in African countries. Democratic countries, especially Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius and South Africa, that have stable political systems are procuring the Chinese surveillance technology to enhance the law enforcement capacity of state forces, as these products are relatively less expensive primarily because of the extensive subsidies given by the Chinese state and are easily obtainable in African markets (Feldstein 2020). The DSR initiatives of creating smart and safe cities offer a wide range of solutions to African countries in dealing with crime and terrorism and fill the prevailing e-government and e-governance gaps. For example, the ‘Smart Burkina’ initiative funded by China is augmenting its digital connectivity, facilitating the e-government and strengthening the surveillance system, which could assist Burkina Faso in dealing with its security issues, including terrorism (Agbebi 2022). Countries like Zimbabwe are facing US sanctions and, therefore, are purchasing such tools from Chinese companies, as Western companies are not supplying sensitive digital equipment to such countries due to their reputational and legal constraints (Feldstein 2020).

Losses and Threats from the DSR

China’s government argues that its DSR projects in Africa are based on ‘friendship’ and ‘win-win cooperation’ with African countries (Adegoke 2021). China’s growing digital presence in African countries not only offers them huge growth opportunities but also has considerable economic, political and geo-strategic implications for them. The digital infrastructure developed by Chinese companies has come with control over data flows, which China can use for its strategic objectives (Hemmings 2020: 9). Hence, the expansion of digital networks in African countries through DSR initiatives has considerable economic, political and geo-strategic implications, due to which the DSR has been facing various criticisms around the globe.

Chinese are being seen as ‘new colonialists’ in Africa (Chaudhury 2021). A majority of African countries are either least developed or developing countries and are technologically in a disadvantageous position. Due to this, these countries are vulnerable to China’s digital colonialism. China is using digital technology to achieve its social, economic and political dominance over African countries. If its technology companies are establishing internet networks, promoting economic growth, offering jobs and providing access to education and healthcare facilities, then in this way, they are also providing unparallel benefits and power to the offering country, that is, China. In the past, colonisers had incentivised indigenous local populations with goods and services while, as Wright opines, ‘imposing their values, ideologies, and norms of behavior, as well as extracting and exploiting their personal data. China is fast becoming a digital dictator; exploiting foreign data for profit and corporate gain’ (Wright 2021: 89). Now, African countries are getting incentives from Chinese companies in the form of digital goods and services. Chinese are fulfilling the digital requirements of African countries as well as creating a debt trap for these countries through the DSR-related unsustainable loans and investments in these countries (Chaudhury 2021). African countries have borrowed from Chinese financial institutions. Many of these counties may be unable to return their loan amounts to China’s state institutions, which can force them to compromise with their sovereignty. Operations at the port of Djibouti in East Africa have been handed over to China due to non-payments of its infrastructural loan. Amidst the existing assertive behaviour of China in IR, loans given for the DSR project to African countries are promoting the neo-colonialist agenda of Beijing in Africa. Chinese control over ports can threaten free global sea trade via the Suez Canal, as 10 per cent of global oil exports and 20 per cent of commercial products navigate through the Suez Canal by travelling close to the African country (Kadi 2019).

Chinese companies are dominating the digital space of African countries, containing the local African companies’ capabilities to compete, control and dominate the domestic markets. Control over digital data has significant economic value as it can be a critical productive force for countries to maintain their competitive position within the global value chains (Hoffman 2022: 12). However, due to their control over data flow, Chinese companies have a better understanding of African markets. Therefore, they can manipulate the market for their own benefits. These companies can identify and eliminate local competitors from markets while curtailing domestic companies’ capabilities to gain the economic benefits of the data produced in the region. That is why local mobile device manufacturers like Condor of Algeria and Evertek of Tunisia are facing stiff competition from Chinese mobile-producing companies such as Oppo and Vivo. China is pursuing its path of becoming a global technological power by providing political and financial support to its companies. In contrast, African firms need adequate funds and protections from their respective governments to be potential technological giants (Kadi 2019).

Through its digital infrastructure, Beijing, as it is being argued, is also spreading ‘digital authoritarianism’, promoting an ‘illiberal political order’ and pursuing ‘data colonialism’ around the world, including Africa. By exporting ‘digital authoritarianism’ through its digital infrastructure, it is guiding the recipient countries to use technology to curtail individual rights and repress their populations (Cheney 2019; Committee on Foreign Relations 2020). According to this view, domestically, China has used digital tools to enhance its control over society, sideline political opponents and dissents, disseminate propaganda and disinformation and also foster economic exchange without liberal human rights. Hence, China is exporting and transplanting such technology-based enablers of repressive rule across borders in African countries. State agencies often rely on surveillance, censorship, social manipulation, internet enclosures, cyberattacks and targeted persecution (Erie and Streinz, 2021). Chinese companies have exported digital tools with advanced surveillance capabilities to 13 African countries. Out of them, nine countries—Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia—are implementing smart and safe city projects with the participation of Chinese companies, especially Huawei. In these projects, these countries are deploying advanced surveillance tools containing tracking devices and video cameras to increase the capabilities of their security forces. However, these tools are being deployed to subvert democratic processes in these countries. These tools provide extraordinary capabilities for state agencies to promote political authoritarianism in African countries (Feldstein 2020). For instance, countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe are using these tools to suppress collective actions, protests and opposition movements against ruling regimes (Agbebi 2022). Huawei has reportedly assisted the Ugandan and Zambian governments in spying and curtailing the political opposition.

DSR projects are also assisting China in promoting its strategic objectives of imposing its model of technological sovereignty in African countries. Beijing has organised a series of training for African governments’ officials and media personnel, particularly in Morocco, Egypt, Kenya, Libya and Nigeria, on new media and information management, which are instrumental in cultivating its followers for pursuing the internet policies of China (Agbebi 2022). After these training sessions, influenced by China’s social media and internet regulations, officials of these African countries have pursued their governments to adopt repressive cybersecurity laws and control social media. Egypt adopted China’s internet governance model by passing its cybercrime law in 2018 and blocked numerous websites of media organisations (Kadi 2019). In June 2021, Nigeria banned Twitter in consultation with the Cyberspace Administration of China and intended to adopt the Chinese model of internet governance. Hence, as the Chinese model of internet sovereignty is gaining grip in some African countries, some worrisome trends have emerged in African countries, especially in Nigeria, Congo, Senegal, Eswatini and Uganda, which have limited media and blocked internet services during elections and political protests against ruling regimes (Agbebi 2022; Govender 2021). Countries like the United States, Britain, France, Germany and Italy are members of the Wassenaar arrangement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. These countries can restrict the exports of such technologies and also put pressure on their companies not to export the technologies that curtail civil liberties in the recipient countries. However, China is not a part of this crucial arrangement, which controls the misuse of exported technology by receiving countries against their own people. Hence, the DSR initiatives offer connectivity, governance and development-related benefits, along with the risks of misusing these technologies to suppress democratic processes, norms and values in African countries. It consolidates China’s diplomatic and strategic influence on the DSR participant countries in Africa (Agbebi 2022).

China’s dominance in the global communication market is enhancing its capabilities to shape global and regional cyberspace governance. Beijing is increasingly joining forums to work together on new digital trade rules and mechanisms for cooperation on digital economic governance. In 2021, China has applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA). The US is not a part of these agreements. But these agreements contain strong and enforceable provisions on data flows and digital trade (Cory 2022: 84). Besides this, China is boosting its financial institutions and companies, particularly giant and advanced companies, to actively participate in international standard-setting organisations and promote Chinese standards through their business practices. It had listed its standards as prerequisites for contracts with foreign countries and carrying out foreign aid programmes. Its foreign aid law in 2008 had stipulated that projects receiving aid from the Chinese government are required to fully embrace Chinese standards while receiving aid from it. Although the Chinese law was revised in 2016 to relax the regulations for adopting Chinese standards, nothing has changed politically as its financial entities and enterprises are promoting these standards through their business practices (He 2022: 7). Hence, Chinese companies, through their DSR projects, are promoting Chinese digital standards in African countries.

African countries’ increasing dependence on China for internet services provides data traffic-monitoring opportunities for Beijing and feeds its intelligence collection. Telecom companies have installed Chinese digital surveillance instruments without adequate legal safeguards to avoid these tools’ abuse and misuse. For example, in 2018, confidential data from the internet network of the African Union (AU) headquarters was reportedly diverted every night to Shanghai between 2012 and 2017. Since then, the AU has acquired its own servers and refused to accept the Chinese offer to configure them. No doubt, China is not the only country using the internet for spying, as the US intelligence agencies have access to many people’s data in the United States and abroad, which is held and transmitted by its tech companies. Yet amidst the absence of strict data protection regulations, African countries’ dependence on Chinese companies for supplying digital equipment and developing technological capabilities that are involved in cyber-spying is a threat to these countries’ data sovereignty (Kadi 2019; Wright 2021: 89).

China’s digital expansionism can have unprecedented consequences for the maritime industry, as through DSR initiatives, it is connecting all the seaports constructed under the BRI. These seaports are to be integrated with all critical maritime routes, including Africans, into a global supply chain under the same electronic communication platforms that can affect shipping operations. In other words, the DSR is also introducing digital integration between maritime and land-based digital platforms along the BRI (Wheeler 2021). The DSR platform coordinates with and facilitates the digital integration of all providers that conduct trade along the BRI (Wheeler 2021a). Digitally speaking, China is committed to unifying ports and their logistic operations under the same electronic communication platform, including rail transport, to create a single multimodal system. The difficulty lies in the ability to digitally integrate all ports that form the route. The main challenge lies in the development of a standard electronic data interchange (EDI) and an application programming interface to allow different operational data systems to communicate with each other (PierNext 2020).

In other words, all the digital infrastructure being developed by China in Africa are its strategic investments to achieve its geopolitical objectives in the Dark Continent. China’s monopoly over the digital infrastructure development project in Africa is disadvantageous to these consumer countries. As Perrino (2023) also observes:

Its availability of granting loans, goods and gifts has a price. … Beijing is building [and supplying] everything that the African market is demanding, ranging from infrastructures to knowledge and e-clouds, hence monopolizing these strategic sectors. The animosity of the Dragon in Africa is resulting in concern about the possible political consequences of opaque investments, espionage records, power and know-how asymmetry, and collaboration with likeminded authoritarian partners.

Thus, the DSR projects are creating a dependency between China and technology-receiving countries of Africa for its digital goods and services and enhancing China’s geopolitical influence in these territories.