Political Transition in Ethiopia and Renewed Trajectory of Ethio-Russian Relations

Abstract

Ethiopia has external relations with Russian. The relation between the two countries was strengthened with Cold War superpower rivalry and regime changes in Ethiopia in 1974. Their relation again revived after the 2018 political transition in Ethiopia. Hence, this research aimed to address whether the political transition in Ethiopia has opened new avenues for strategic partnership with Russia or recalibrated an existing relationship within a changing geopolitical context. To achieve this objective, the researcher employed a cases study approach with geopolitical and foreign policy analysis and theoretical perspectives. Accordingly, this research revealed that the Ethio-Russia relation is complex and multidimensional in nature. This is because the relation between the two countries encompasses historic, military, cultural, diplomatic, economic, balance of power, geopolitics, long-term structural question, sovereignty risks and playing-off outcomes, diversifying strategic partnership and each other’s non-alignment positions.

Keywords

Political transition Russia–Ethiopian relation renewed trajectory Ethiopia Russia

Introduction

One of the important issues in recent times is the analysis of historical courses and the external relations of Ethiopia and Russia that go back to the Middle Ages. Russian presence in the Horn of Africa entails crucial importance particularly for Ethiopia. The situation of the world during the Cold War (1947–1991) between the Soviet Union and the United States was the most interesting chapter in modern world history and political order. The then bipolar system, superpowers armed with nuclear weapons and missionary ideologies, communism and liberal democracy sought to dominate the world. Hence, Soviet Union appeared as a chief player in the region during the early 1960s when it established close relations with Somalia though Moscow has viewed the Horn of Africa as an imperative power prognostication since the 1930s.

The Soviet Union’s relationship with Somalia collapsed during the 1977–1978 Ogaden War, as the USSR and Cuba willingly supported the Ethiopian army. Soviet Union opposed Somalia’s effort to destabilise the Horn of Africa instigated by the interest to annex Ogaden. Thus, the interest over Ethiopia’s Ogaden region precipitated a foreign policy shift. The USSR saw the war as an opportunity to establish closer relations with Ethiopia (Ramani 2020). This strategic shift unveiled that the Soviet Union sought to promote socialism on an ad hoc basis in the Horn of Africa and lacked a consistent regional strategy. On the other hand, the United States saw USSR’s revival in the Horn of Africa enabled to transform the region into a zone of Cold War confrontation throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Mohamed 2021).

Since the end of the Cold War, Ethiopia remained an ally of the United States, which lasted nearly 30 years (Mohamed 2021). But very recently, the bilateral relation of Ethiopia and the United States declined, and instead, Ethio-Russian bilateral relations strengthened. Accordingly, this research seeks to explore how the political transition in Ethiopia since 2018, marked by leadership change, internal reforms and shifting domestic power dynamics, has influenced the renewed trajectory of Ethio-Russian relations. It aims to investigate the extent to which Ethiopia’s evolving political landscape has reshaped its foreign policy orientation towards Russia, with particular attention to changes in diplomatic engagement, economic cooperation and security collaboration. By examining these dimensions, the study will reveal whether the political transition has opened new avenues for strategic partnership with Russia or merely recalibrated an existing relationship within a changing geopolitical context.

Methodology

This research adopted a detailed case study approach just to facilitate an in-depth assessment of the Ethio-Russian relations. By focusing on Ethiopia as a single case within the broader context of post-Cold War geopolitical realignments, the study aimed to uncover the specific political, economic and strategic factors that influenced the bilateral engagement. The case study approach allows for a contextualised analysis, tracing Ethiopia’s political transition, foreign policy recalibration and its implications for renewed ties with Russia. Through this focused lens, the research investigates key events, policy decisions and diplomatic exchanges, offering nuanced insights that may not emerge through broader comparative methods. This methodology is particularly well suited for understanding complex international relations shaped by both internal transformation and external strategic interests.

Data were collected through a combination of document analysis, including government policy papers, official statements, academic literature and media reports from both Ethiopian and Russian sources. This research incorporated the analysis of elite interviews with media, policymakers, diplomats and regional experts to provide in-depth insights into the motivations and implications of bilateral engagement (Policy Studies Institute 2023).

Theoretical Framework

To provide a more comprehensive examination of the revitalised trajectory of Ethio-Russian relations, this study integrates theoretical frameworks from foreign policy analysis and geopolitical theory. Within the domain of foreign policy analysis, the research applies role theory as a key analytical lens. As Ethiopia sought to redefine its international role amid internal reforms and external pressures, it increasingly adopted a self-ascribed identity as a sovereign, autonomous regional power resistant to Western intervention. This role shift was intensified by growing tensions with Western actors over human rights and conflict issues, pushing Ethiopia to seek alternative partnerships that aligned with its evolving foreign policy posture. Russia promoted a multipolar world order, emphasised non-interference and emerged as a compatible partner that both reinforced and validated Ethiopia’s new role. Through strengthening diplomatic, military and economic ties, Ethiopia and Russia have mutually benefitted from relationships shaped by strategic interests, shared narratives of sovereignty and resistance to Western dominance. To further strengthen the analytical framework, this study incorporates the balance of power theory from a geopolitical perspective. This theoretical approach offers a valuable lens for examining Ethiopia’s political transition and the evolving dynamics of Ethio-Russian relations. By assessing shifts in regional and global power structures, the balance of power theory helps illuminate the strategic motivations behind the deepening ties between the two nations. As Ethiopia undergoes internal political shifts marked by leadership changes, ethnic tensions and conflict in regions like Tigray, its foreign policy has sought to diversify alliances to counterbalance traditional Western influence, particularly from the United States and the European Union. In this context, Ethiopia’s strengthening ties with Russia can be seen as a strategic move to recalibrate its external alignments and avoid overdependence on any single bloc. Russia, in turn, benefits from engaging a pivotal African state to offset Western dominance in the Horn of Africa and enhance its global positioning.

Historical Overview of Ethio-Russian Relations

The historical ties between Russia and Ethiopia trace back to the fourteenth century, when Ethiopian, Armenian and Coptic monks established religious connections in Jerusalem. The Russian Orthodox Church, sharing Eastern Orthodox Christianity, became part of this network (Mohamed 2021). Early records, such as those by the Russian pilgrim Vasily Pozdnyakov in the 1550s, mention encounters with Ethiopians, highlighting a perceived .religious unity between Russians and African Christians (Denisova 2021). By the seventeenth century, diplomatic efforts emerged, driven by shared religious customs and mutual geopolitical interests. Ethiopia sought Russian support against Ottoman threats, while Russia viewed Ethiopians as exemplary Christians. However, Ethiopia’s geographic isolation and Ottoman control over its coast hindered direct relations (Denisova 2021). Despite this, religious exchanges facilitated political engagement, with Russian travellers visiting Ethiopia (Denisova 2021). Beyond religion, Russia recognised Ethiopia’s economic potential, noting its resources such as cotton, coffee and gold (Mohamed 2021). Russian experts assisted in gold mining and geological surveys, while Ethiopian students received training in Russia. After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Soviet-Ethiopian relations cooled, though Ethiopia hosted anti-Bolshevik Russian exiles who served as government advisers (Anderson-Jaquest 2002). In later years, bilateral relations strengthened due to shared anti-Western stances and strategic interests. This historical foundation laid the groundwork for future Soviet influence in Ethiopia, blending religious, economic and political ties.

Ethio-Russian Cultural Relation

Russia and Ethiopia are multi-ethnic empires with traditionally orthodox Christian ruling elites; from the nineteenth century, they developed a special relationship that outlived changing geopolitical and ideological constellations. Russians were fascinated with what they saw as exotic brothers in the faith, and Ethiopians took advantage of Russian help and were inspired by various features of modern Russian statecraft. The religious-ethnic identities and institutionalised religion have grounded persistent dreams of global political order. Orthodoxy was the spiritual basis of an early anti-Western type of globalisation and was subsequently co-opted by states with radically secular ideologies as an effective means of mass mobilisation and control (Rupprecht 2018).

The Ethiopian monarchs were interested in finding a strong ally in the person of Russia in the fight against Porte, which was threatening not only the Russians but also Abyssinia; in addition, the Ethiopian Church hoped for the support of Russian Orthodoxy in repulsing religious expansion both from Turkey and from its vassals, as well as from Portugal, which, having established itself in the sixteenth century in the Horn of Africa, sought with the help of the Jesuits to plant Catholicism in Ethiopia and thereby subordinate it to its religious and political influence (Denisova 2021).

In the meantime, the perception of the Ethiopians as exemplary Christians had spread in Russia, and Christianity became the state religion in Ethiopia in the fourth century, but the Russian-Ethiopian contacts were irregular and mostly indirect. However, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire had become a major international power with giant foreign policy ambitions and had also developed its own interests in the Horn of Africa (Denisova 2021).

The cultural ties between Russians and Ethiopians began in Palestine, where Russian pilgrims encountered Ethiopian monks in the fourteenth century. A 1370 account describes Ethiopian monks performing at Jerusalem’s Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Russia’s long-standing interest in Ethiopia included alliances against the Ottoman Empire, predating Peter the Great. Amharic was even taught at Kharkov University. Ethiopian, Armenian and Coptic monks in Jerusalem fostered inter-religious networks, linking with the Russian Orthodox Church, which shares Eastern Christian traditions. These connections endured for centuries, strengthening cultural and religious exchanges (Mohamed 2021; Yakobson 1963).

Russian religious and political interests in Ethiopia date back to centuries, driven by shared Orthodox Christian ties. In the nineteenth century, monk Porfiry Uspensky urged Russia to strengthen ties with Ethiopia, both to support a fellow Orthodox nation and to counter Ottoman and British influence. Russia also opposed Catholic powers like Italy, aligning with Ethiopia against colonial threats. Over time, Russia provided military, humanitarian and developmental aid, reinforcing bilateral relations. Today, Russia backs Ethiopia against Western-supported pressures, standing with its government amid international challenges (Brind 1983; Mohamed 2021; Ramani 2020).

Ethio-Russian Relation in the Derg Regime

In 1974, Mengistu Haile Mariam had become the leader of the Derg and administered Ethiopia until 1991. The Derg dramatically suppressed all oppositions in Ethiopia and their supporters, and declared Ethiopia as a Marxist state allied with the Soviet Union (Yared 2020). The Mengistu regime was in desperate trouble due to internal and external enemies that took action to accelerate its demise. Civilian opposition groups began to wage urban guerrilla campaigns to demoralise and discredit the Derg. Somalia was too committed to assist ethnic Somali living in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region in their efforts to separate from Ethiopia to achieve their old-age irredentist claim.

The Ethio-Somalian conflict remarkably played an important role for Moscow to determine policy over these countries (Oğultürk 2017). By an astonishing manoeuvre, the Derg in 1977 confirmed the intention to engineer Ethiopia’s socialist transformation in accordance with the principles of scientific socialism. Such courses of revolutionary reform altered Ethiopia from a defensive stance to an offensive direction (Oğultürk 2017). Russia confirmed that Ethiopia had huge economic potential with untapped natural resources and labour. The provision of arms, military advisers and medical aids had created important and positive effects on relations between Russia and Ethiopia during the Italian-Ethiopian war.

Until 1977, Somalia had been an ally of the Soviet Union. In November, Somalia announced that it had abrogated the 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union and that it had suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba. Since then, the Soviet Union adopted that Ethiopia is its principal ally in the Horn of Africa. In late November, USSR launched a massive airlift and sealift of arms and other military equipment to Ethiopia (Ramani 2020).

In addition, about 17,000 Cuban and 1,000 Soviet military personnel arrived in Ethiopia and were deployed in the Ogaden front.1 Thus, the interest of old relationship between Soviet and Ethiopia increased, as Gorbachev’s New Thinking assumed more practical dimensions. Between 1985 and 1987, the relation between Soviet Russia and Ethiopian was mirrored as similarities in ideological imperatives because the new Soviet views took time to filter down and both parties wanted to restore civilian rule in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, signs of impending change were apparent. Gorbachev’s new priorities for improving relations with the United States under New Thinking, coupled with Reagan’s renewed interest in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s, restructured Soviet-Ethiopian political relations (Anderson-Jaquest 2002).

By the early 1978, Soviets were favouring Ethiopia and supplying their new ally. In addition, Cuban troops as well as ‘volunteers’ from other communist nations such as North Korea and Yemen came to support Ethiopia. In response, the Somalian government requested assistance from the United States and received massive military supports (Yared 2020). But, prior to 1977, the United States fought Somalia, allying with Ethiopia, and the Soviet Union assisted Somalia in contradiction of Ethiopia (Elizabeth 2004).

Later on, the Soviet Union armed Ethiopia immensely, provided military advisers and incited Ethiopia against Somalia, while the United States moved to support Somalia. Hence, with Russia’s unwavering support, Ethiopia won the war, and Somalia’s irredentist claim backed by USA ultimately failed. (ibid.). The Cold War era and the subsequent East-West competition led to the deterioration of Ethiopia’s relation with that of the United States and its replacement by Soviet Union (Schraeder 1992).

As a reinforcement of the relation of the two states, the Friendship Treaty concluded in 1978 and was technically still in force after Mengistu’s administration collapsed in 1991. The Soviet-Ethiopian relation was supposed to be a mutually beneficial and cooperative arrangement conducted (Anderson-Jaquest 2002). According to the present-day scene, Russia is a game-changing partner of Ethiopia concerning international, geopolitical and regional interests (Ramani 2020).

Ethio-Russian Relation Between 1991 and 2018

In the post-Cold War era, Ethiopia’s foreign policy and strategy are significantly influenced by the prevailing universal model that is mainly characterised by market economy and liberal democracy as widely observed in the EPRDF’s foreign policy. Although the United States maintained to reinstate itself as a main partner of Ethiopia’s external relation, it never had a monopoly as it had before between the 1950s and 1970s. United States influence declined in the Horn of African region because new powers such as china, India, Russia, and Turkey emerged (Anderson-Jaquest 2002).

In the 1990s, following the downfall of the Derg and the disintegration of the USSR, the leadership and diplomatic relation or focus of Ethiopia moved towards the United States. In this political departure, the Soviet Union withdrew from Ethiopia corresponding with the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist client state in Moscow. Although Russian aircraft and rockets were used by both Ethiopian and Eritrean military forces during the Ethio-Eritrea war in 1998–2000, Russia remained a peripheral player in the Horn of Africa until the 2008 piracy crisis (Ramani 2020).

After 1991, the new government of Ethiopian which assumed power allied with the United States in the fight against what the United States calls international terrorism. Ethiopia has sent its troops to Somalia, claiming to fight terrorism. Ethiopia was involved in unpopular war and finally pulled out of Somalia without gaining tangible results (Metaferia 2009). Notwithstanding US financial, technical, military and material assistance, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world as the US support to Ethiopia has been inadequate to wrestle the severest challenges. Due to this, the Ethiopian government has also subscribed to the US policy of globalisation and neoliberal economic policy has little way to benefit the poor.

Ethio-Russian Relation Post-2018

Recently, Russia has started moving fast to build its strategic relationship with Ethiopia (Stig 2021). As of summer 2019, Russia has signed military cooperation agreements with the state of Ethiopia (Paczyńska 2020). Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has also established strong ties with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. Russia has also assumed the role of a dialogue facilitator in one of the region’s most important disputes, the so-called Egypt–Ethiopia–Sudan competition over Nile River water access. Somalia and Ethiopia are actively courting Russia as a security partner.

Although Russia’s resurgence in sub-Saharan Africa has gained widespread attention in recent years, the United States has designated Ethiopia as a strategic partner, which regularly carries out counterterrorism operations. So, Russia’s deployment of security forces in the Horn of Africa can conflict with US interests in the region. France also feared Russian power projection on the Horn of Africa and partnership with Ethiopia as that of the United States (Ramani 2021).

Russia has expanded its diplomatic involvement in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. Russia expressed its support for a resolution of the GERD dispute led by the African Union (TASS 2020). While the Western countries favour Egyptians’ interest over the Nile Water use, Russia has offered only technical assistance to the GERD’s conflicting parties and refrained from inserting itself into the Nile dam dispute as a mediator. Instead, Russia balanced the views of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia for multilateral opportunities.

Russia’s balancing strategy has been positively received in Sudan and Ethiopia but has created latent frictions with Egypt. Russia has persisted with this non-interference policy as it has largely prevented a spillover of tensions over the GERD to other areas of cooperation with Egypt and believes that its position will help consolidate its partnership with Ethiopia (Korybko 2021).

Currently, Sudan has a troubled relationship with Ethiopia, caused both by outstanding border issues and by GERD construction, which is hampering Sudanese water supplies through the Nile River. Thus, the future relationship with Ethiopia will be defined vis-à-vis Russian-Sudanese relationship. If Russia clearly goes with Ethiopia, Sudan will go to team America. Ethiopia is nevertheless another example of Russia’s pariah strategy.

Moscow stood with Addis Ababa in its fight against the pandemic and showed concern for Ethiopians. Besides, the leaders of the two countries had a telephone conversation, and one of the issues was cooperation to combat the pandemic. Mutual support between countries facing a common threat is very important (TASS 2020).

Underlying Factors, Motivations and Implications of the Ethiopia–Russia Relationship

Geopolitics

Russia’s Involvement on GERD Dispute

Russia did not clearly articulate its position in the initial years of the GERD dispute although Egypt accused it of siding with Ethiopia (Prantner & Al-Naggar 2002). Although Sudan has recognised Moscow’s GERD position, Egypt’s disquiet with Russia’s handling of the dispute has undermined this balancing act. Russia also views Ethiopia as a valuable arms client, as it has regularly purchased Russian weapons since the 1998–2000 Badme War with Eritrea, and favourably regards Ahmed’s domestic reforms.

In April 2018, Russia signed a security agreement with Ethiopia, which addressed counterterrorism, anti-piracy and peacekeeping. Hence, in December 2019, 1,000 Ethiopian army officers travelled to Russia for naval training (Prantner & Al-Naggar 2002). Russia has supplied strategic weapons both as a potential defence against any Egyptian strike on the GERD and to aid government forces in Tigray (Smith 2021).

Russia reacted to the Nile water crisis during the UN Security Council’s discussion. Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, announced in the extraordinary session called for by Egypt and Sudan its support for Ethiopia’s position on the Renaissance Dam crisis (Middle East Monitor 2021a). The speech of the permanent Russian representative to the United Nations, Vasily Nebenzya, rejected the threatening messages from Egypt and Sudan. The representative stressed that Russia would not allow any military action against Ethiopia (ibid.).

Russia supported Ethiopia’s position emphasising on the resolution of the ongoing differences among Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, by the tripartite negotiation mechanism, brokered by the African Union (Middle East Monitor 2021b) Russian also asserted its willingness to work with Addis Ababa to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on the GERD dispute with Egypt and Sudan (Egypt Today 2021).

Russian ambassador Georgiy Borisenko appeared on Egypt’s Ten TV to respond to local media campaigns against his country. Much of the criticism stemmed from Moscow’s unfriendly stance towards Cairo during UN Security Council deliberations on the GERD (Hassanein 2021). Amidst the strongest bilateral tensions seen in years, Borisenko emphasised the important points: first, Russia will pursue a balanced policy regarding the GERD and will mediate disagreements between its allies in Cairo and Addis Ababa if asked. Second, Moscow deeply appreciates its military cooperation with Egypt but is concerned about the country’s participation in a June military exercise in the Black Sea region alongside the United States and Ukraine (ibid.).

Moscow’s GERD stance has made Cairo fear it is being taken for granted despite all, leading some in Egyptian policy circles to suspect that Russia will demand even more concessions before offering fuller support at the United Nations. Apparently, Sisi’s camp is unwilling to front further concessions. However, the question is how much this disrespect (if real) actually affects Russian policy towards Cairo.

Domestic Needs

Ethio-Russia’s Military Agreement

Russia has historically enjoyed warm relations with many African countries, as their economic and ideological ambitions often align and their ties are bolstered by a mutual mistrust of the West (Gopaldas 2023). For Russia, Africa is a useful theatre in which it can distract the attentions of the West from its own regional ambitions and force Western countries to spread their diplomatic, military and financial resources more thinly to assuage fears of Russia’s growing presence on the continent (Gopaldas 2023). Much of the balance of Russia’s exports to Africa is made up of military equipment and arms. The biggest buyers on the continent are Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco and Uganda (Gopaldas 2023).

In 1991, the advent of the EPRDF in Ethiopia and the collapse of the Soviet Union strongly reshaped Ethiopian-Russian relations, as Moscow reduced its engagement in Africa and Addis grew closer to the West as compared to the Cold War times (Marks 2020; Reuters 2022). While the ascent to power of Abiy Ahmed in 2018 had seemingly brought the Ethiopian government closer than ever to its Western partners, the war in Tigray severely damaged these ties (CRU 2022). This combination of increasing needs within Ethiopia and decreasing support from Western countries has set the stage for increased Russian engagement in the country (ibid.).

It is gratifying that today Russian-Ethiopian ties are acquiring more intense dynamics. Along with the strengthening of interaction in already traditional areas, they are opening up new spheres of multifaceted cooperation. The broader cooperation is collaboration in the “peaceful atom” sector, meaning the use of nuclear energy technologies for nonmilitary, civilian purposes (Terekhin 2024). A solid legal framework for its development was laid during the Russia–Africa Summit in October 2019, when an agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ethiopia on cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy was signed (Zelelew & Nigussie 2019).

Ethiopia and Russia signed military cooperation agreement in 2021 after discussing several areas of partnership for 3 days. The agreement signed was believed to have a paramount significance in transforming the long-standing relations between the two nations to a higher level and transforming the capacity of the national defence force in knowledge, skill and technology spheres (FBC 2021).

Motivation

Ethiopia’s Position in Russia–Ukraine War

Ethiopia abstained from the UN vote condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ethiopians also queued up to volunteer for Russia’s side during the Russo-Ukrainian War. As Ethiopians have learned the hard way (one would hope that they have learned), in needless wars, everyone loses in the end. For Ethiopians, who have gotten their own problems with political uncertainty, civil war and economic shock, the Russian-Ukraine war could be seen as merely something happening in a distant place but streamed to their homes on TV and through social media feeds (Shewaferaw 2024). What is unfolding in Ukraine is a war of aggression, as 141 countries agreed last week at the UN general assembly (ibid.).

Ethiopia’s Motivation in Diversifying Strategic Partnerships

Ethiopia’s pursuit of diversified strategic partnerships stems from its desire to reduce dependency on traditional Western allies while enhancing its geopolitical and economic flexibility. Following strained relations with the United States and European Union over human rights concerns, particularly during the Tigray War (2020–2022), Ethiopia has sought closer ties with alternative powers such as China, Russia, Türkiye and the UAE (Reuters 2023). This shift aligns with Ethiopia’s long-standing policy of non-alignment and its ambition to leverage South-South cooperation for infrastructure development, trade and security (MFA 2022). By engaging with BRICS nations, Ethiopia aims to access alternative financing mechanisms like the New Development Bank, mitigating the conditionality imposed by Western-led institutions (Brookings Institution 2024). Additionally, partnerships with Russia and China provide military and diplomatic backing, crucial for Ethiopia’s internal stability and regional disputes, such as the GERD negotiations (Al Jazeera 2024). The diversification strategy also reflects Ethiopia’s broader goal of positioning itself as a key player in the Horn of Africa while balancing competing global influences. Strengthening ties with non-Western powers allows Ethiopia to attract foreign direct investment in critical sectors such as energy, manufacturing and transport (World Bank 2023). However, this approach carries risks, including potential alienation from Western aid and trade preferences, which remain vital for Ethiopia’s economy (IMF 2023). Ultimately, Ethiopia’s multi-vector foreign policy seeks to maximise sovereignty, development opportunities and geopolitical leverage in an increasingly multipolar world (Carnegie Endowment 2023).

Russia’s Position Against Western Involvement in Ethio-Tigray War

Russia is increasingly in a close relationship with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The strategy continues to bear fruit due to the increasing decline of the relation between Ethiopia and United States, owing to Ethiopia’s ongoing war in its own Tigray region intense since early 2020. The United States criticised the Ethiopian government as it denied access to Tigray to humanitarian workers. Ethiopia also lost the propaganda battle in the West because several of US-backed analysts of East African affairs have past ties to Tigray, which perhaps created some bias in analyses against the Ethiopian government.

Although human rights violations were the defining feature of the Tigrean regional forces, the reverse was revealed to the international community against Ahmed’s government. Russian influence-building in Africa was also at play in Ethiopia. Russia has provided support for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government after Western governments hesitated at his forces’ military response to an insurgency in northern Tigray (Shewaferaw 2024).

Russia has also coordinated with China on thwarting calling for the suspension of violence in Tigray. Russia’s support for non-interference in Tigray, which contrasted with the United States’s imposition of sanctions against Ethiopian officials and security personnel, has been widely praised by Ethiopian Prime Minister Ahmed’s most loyal supporters (ibid.).

The US put sanction against some Ethiopian officials who Washington blamed for alleged human rights abuses in the country’s restive Tigray province. The background context is that members of the previously most important party of the former Ethiopian ruling coalition, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, paved the way for successful Russian-Ethiopian cooperation and, accelerated as it may be, could serve as a proof for why other African countries should follow in Addis Ababa’s footsteps by reaching out to Moscow as a pragmatic balancing partner with Beijing (Korybko 2021).

Russia has diplomatically supported Ethiopia, backing non-interference in Tigray in the UN Security Council, and their position was generally viewed with favour by the Ahmed regime. The new friendship between Russia and Ethiopia is fragile. Prime Minister Ahmed might be weakened by a long war in Tigray, and the end of his regime will hurt the Russian engagement strategy. The recluse strategy Russia is pursuing is far from ensuring victory and it lacks the military and economic strength to launch and maintain intervention. Russia today is simply not strong enough to be a game changer on the battlefields of Tigray as Russia itself faces a protracted war with Ukraine (Stig 2021).

An appreciation was given, because Russia understands very well that the conflict in Tigray is a domestic problem that should be resolved by the Ethiopian government without any external interference. It is better to pave conducive environments to solve the problem and not by negating the government’s efforts and supporting terrorist groups since some had ‘been caught red-handed under the disguise of humanitarian aid recently’ (Russian News Agency 2022).

Western counterparts condemned Abiy Ahmed’s call for restraint and diplomacy to end the war in Ukraine, and it would have attracted more attention if the Ethiopian prime minister had not stained his laurels with the blood of his own people. Reports of hideous war crimes committed by his forces and those of his Eritrean allies against civilians in the rebel northern province of Tigray make a ridicule of his appeals for nonviolence in other parts of the world (Ghosh 2022).

It was revenge, as the attempt of the UN Security Council approval for a statement calling for an end to violence in Ethiopia’s embattled Tigray region and to spotlight the millions in need of humanitarian assistance was dropped after objections from India, Russia and China. The press statement would have been the first by the United Nations’ most powerful body on the Tigray crisis, which is entering its 2 years. Fierce fighting reportedly continues between Ethiopian and allied forces and those supporting the now-fugitive Tigray leaders who once dominated Ethiopia’s government, and there is growing alarm over the fate of Tigray’s people (Lederer 2021). While other members of the United Nations wanted to label the federal government of Ethiopia on prejudiced justifications, the representatives of the Russian government discussed with regional administrators and showed commitment to rebuild and rehabilitate war-torn communities and work together on higher education and urban development projects in the region (Addis Standard 2022).

Russia has supplied strategic weapons both as a potential defence against any Egyptian strike on the GERD and to aid government forces in Tigray. Gains by the Tigray Defence Force (TDF), which has captured parts of the Afar and Amhara regions, make the provision of desperately needed weapons all the more important for Addis Ababa, and Moscow is likely to oblige to such a request, possibly on a buy-now-pay-later basis (Smith 2021).

As Ethiopian ally, Russia together with China and India had opposed sanctions on Ethiopia projected by the UN Security Council and the move backed by the United States and other Western countries. The action of the United Nations and other Western powers made such upsetting from the assumption that Ethiopia has been fighting the forces of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) after the group attacked federal army bases stationed across Tigray last on 4 November 2020, according to the Ethiopian government (Smith 2021).

Implications of Ethio-Russian Relations

Positive Outcomes and Potential Risks

The deepening relations between Ethiopia and Russia carry significant geopolitical, economic and security implications for both nations, as well as for the Horn of Africa and broader international dynamics. Ethiopia’s growing ties with Russia signal a move away from traditional Western partners, potentially reducing US and EU influence in the Horn of Africa (Reuters 2023). As both countries are now BRICS members, their partnership strengthens the bloc’s presence in Africa, promoting a multipolar world order (Brookings 2024). Ethiopia may leverage Russian diplomatic support in disputes with Egypt over the GERD and tensions with Sudan (Al Jazeera 2024). Russian military supplies, including drones and air defence systems, could enhance Ethiopia’s counter-insurgency capabilities but risk triggering an arms race in the region (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2023). If Russia’s Rosatom assists in developing Ethiopia’s nuclear energy programme, it could reduce energy dependence but raise debt sustainability concerns (IMF 2024). Increased Russian investment in mining and agriculture could boost Ethiopia’s exports but may not offset potential losses in Western trade privileges (World Bank 2023). Ethiopia risks losing US and EU aid, trade benefits (such as AGOA) and IMF/World Bank financing if perceived as aligning too closely with Moscow (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2024). Greater Russian involvement could escalate proxy tensions, particularly if rival powers like the UAE or Egypt deepen ties with opposing blocs (International Crisis Group 2024). Hence, while Ethiopia–Russia relations offer strategic benefits—military support, alternative financing and diplomatic leverage—they also entail risks, including economic dependency and geopolitical friction. Ethiopia must carefully balance its partnerships to avoid isolation while pursuing its development and security goals.

Long-term Structural Implications

The Ethiopia–Russia relationship could establish a groundbreaking model of South-South cooperation by merging Russian security exports with Ethiopia’s regional leadership role. Unlike traditional North-South aid frameworks, this partnership emphasises mutual strategic interests rather than conditional development assistance (Acharya 2023). Russia provides advanced military technology and diplomatic backing, while Ethiopia offers access to African multilateral platforms such as the AU and IGAD, creating a symbiotic exchange of hard power for soft influence (Stuenkel 2023). This model challenges Western-dominated security architectures by demonstrating how middle powers can leverage regional alliances to bypass traditional gatekeepers of international order (Deych 2023). If successful, it may inspire similar partnerships across the Global South, further eroding the monopoly of established powers over conflict mediation and peacekeeping norms (Patey 2023). However, this emerging paradigm risks exacerbating the fragmentation of global governance, particularly in sensitive domains such as arms proliferation and humanitarian law. Russia’s willingness to supply weapons without political conditionality undermines multilateral export control regimes, while Ethiopia’s regional stature lends legitimacy to these transactions (Hurst 2023). The partnership also tests the resilience of humanitarian intervention norms, as both nations share scepticism about the Western-led responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrines (Allison 2023). Long-term viability hinges on translating short-term gains such as Ethiopia’s military modernisation and Russia’s African foothold into institutionalised cooperation in energy, trade and technology transfer (Kortunov 2023). Failure to do so may reduce the relationship to a transactional arms-for-influence arrangement vulnerable to geopolitical shifts (Larionova 2023).

Conclusion

Ethiopia and Russia have shared a long-standing bilateral relationship, with early contacts dating back to religious interactions in Palestine and the travels of Russian explorers in the fifteenth century. However, formal diplomatic ties deepened only during the Cold War, particularly after Ethiopia’s 1974 regime change, when the Soviet Union became a key ally. The relationship declined in the post-Derg era as Ethiopia’s new leadership aligned more closely with Western powers, particularly the United States, which had supported the TPLF during its insurgency. This shift underscores a recurring pattern in African political culture, where liberation movements often maintain loyalty to their foreign backers in exchange for economic, technological and military support. However, since Ethiopia’s political transition in 2018, the Ethio-Russian relationship has experienced a significant revival. Russia has emerged as a crucial strategic partner, supporting Ethiopia amid multiple crises including the COVID-19 pandemic, internal conflicts, droughts and the GERD dispute. Most notably, Russia played a pivotal role in countering Western pressure on Ethiopia, particularly in the face of accusations from the United States, Egypt, Sudan and other Western-aligned powers. While the West condemned Ethiopia’s government during the Tigray conflict and sought to influence the GERD negotiations, Russia, alongside China and North Korea, provided diplomatic resistance in international forums, shielding Ethiopia from coercive measures. This study demonstrates that the Ethio-Russian relationship is not merely a continuation of Cold War era ties, but a recalibrated partnership shaped by contemporary and geopolitical dynamics in international structure. Russia’s support has been instrumental in safeguarding Ethiopia’s sovereignty against external interference, reinforcing the strategic importance of their alliance. Moving forward, the relationship is likely to remain multidimensional encompassing military, economic and diplomatic cooperation while adapting to shifting global power structures. Ultimately, Ethiopia’s engagement with Russia reflects a pragmatic foreign policy approach, balancing historical ties with present-day strategic necessities in an increasingly multipolar world.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Note

References

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