Abstract
India–China relation is witnessing its worst phase after the 1962 War. Recent aggression by the Chinese forces in the Galwan valley and killing of at least 20 Indian soldiers have posed serious security concerns for India. This article studies nature of threat China poses to India’s security and the latter’s choices to respond to it. In doing so, this article explores the theories of the balance of power, balance of threat and of balancing behaviour associated with realism. It argues that China is a threat to India’s security in the South Asian region as well as to its larger economic and geopolitical interests in world politics. Current realities of world politics restrict India’s choices, and if it has to survive and find its rightful place and increase influence in world affairs, it has no choice but to balance Chinese behaviour and not the power. This is a shift from the Waltzian analysis, which focuses on the balance of power. This article argues that when states do not have adequate internal capabilities to balance a state, they need not necessarily align with the threat (bandwagon) or with another great power to counter the threat. In an interconnected world, they have the choice to balance the behaviour of states that pose a threat by performing soft balancing. India has the choice to balance Chinese behaviour by making a regional alliance in the Indo-Pacific region, and it will be in India’s interests to carry out soft balancing. This article problematizes the proposition suggested by Rajesh Rajagopalan, in India’s Strategic Choices: China and the Balance of Power in Asia, that, to balance China, India should align with the United States. This article concludes with the argument that alignment with the United States is a perilous affair, and it shall give rise to greater insecurities. The more favourable alternative for India is to balance Chinese behaviour through soft balancing via Indo-Pacific.
I. Introduction
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to changes in India’s foreign policy towards a more active engagement with the outside world. Last 30 years have witnessed a dramatic change in India’s foreign policy. 1 These changes vary in nature and character. Some of these changes include opening of India’s economy in 1991, signing of the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India–China border areas in 1993, testing of nuclear weapons in 1998, signing of the Civil Nuclear Agreement with the United States in 2008 and closer ties with the United States of America and Israel.
This period also witnessed India’s rise both economically and militarily in the region. India’s gross domestic product (GDP) has grown from $266.502 billion in 1991 to $2.597 trillion in 2017 (World Bank, 2017a). It surpassed France in 2018 and became the sixth-largest economy in the world after the United States ($19.4 trillion), China ($12.2 trillion), Japan ($4.8 trillion), Germany ($3.7 trillion) and the United Kingdom ($2.62 trillion) (World Bank, 2017a), and is expected to perform better in the times to come (Rao & Kadam, 2016; TOI, 2018). Indian defence expenditure has risen from $8.6 billion in 1996 to $63.9 billion in 2017 (SIPRI, 2017; World Bank, 2017b). Currently, India spends 2.49% of its GDP on defence (World Bank, 2017b). Even besides the magnitude of its defence expenditure, India is taken seriously at global platforms and international organizations. Superpowers such as the United States are cognizant of its importance and are willing to cooperate with it more earnestly than ever before. Its status in nuclear order has risen (Jung, 2017), and the United States has recently placed India in Strategic Trade Authorisation 1 (STA 1) list. 2 India is keen to be a part of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), for which it has been given a waiver in NSG in 2008 (WSWS, 2008), though China opposes its inclusion therein (Economic Times, 13 July 2018). India aspires to have a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (Choedon, 2007; Murthy, 1998) and has already joined organizations such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
All the above changes have transformed India’s image from a poor third-world state to a rising power (Cohen, 2002, pp. 31, 35; Tellis, 2016). At the same time, India’s rise coincides with China’s rise, which has the second-largest GDP in the world, worth $12.2 trillion (World Bank, 2017a), and spends 1.909% of its GDP ($228 billion) on defence requirements (World Bank, 2017b). China’s economic capacities, along with a large military allocation, and boundary dispute provide India reasons to fear it. Despite tension around the boundary dispute, some scholars make a case for mutual understanding and cooperation (Singh, 2008).
The impact of the rise of China in international politics is hotly debated. Scholars with different theoretical orientations perceive China’s rise differently. However, most of them recognize its rising status in international politics and acknowledge its impact on world politics. 3 China’s rise has not been taken positively across the globe; most states rather fear its rise. This seems truer of China’s neighbours, especially those that have boundary/territorial conflicts with it. India is one such neighbour that shares a considerably long border with China and has had a dispute over it. China claims the territory of Arunachal Pradesh (a state in India). India and China were at war in 1962, and from then onwards have lived with suspicion and continuous rivalry. In 1992, both signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India–China border areas, which paved the way for trade and other opportunities. Some states in South Asia are manoeuvring their strategies which diminishes India’s influence in the region (Yasmin, 2019). However, the rise of China is certainly a reason for worry among many states in Asia (Huang, 2012). India is also apprehensive about China’s rise (Rajagopalan, 2018; Yee, 2011). The recent aggression by the Chinese forces in the Galwan valley in India’s union territory Ladakh and killing of at least 20 soldiers have cemented the fear of the rising China for India (Singh, 2020).
Given the above background, this article explores the rivalry between India and China in the 21st century. It will try to answer the following questions: Why is China a threat to India? Does India have any other choice than balancing Chinese behaviour when it cannot balance Chinese military and economic capabilities? Why is soft balancing a better strategy and why does it suit India’s interests? Why is an alignment with the United States a risky and costly choice, and why should India find an alternative? What are the difficulties associated with soft balancing and regional balancing, and what are the ways to overcome them?
This article is divided into five parts. The second section deals with the rise of China in international politics and the various theoretical interpretations associated with it. It also deals with the theoretical aspects of balancing, which include concepts of balance of power, balance of threat, balancing behaviour and soft balancing. The third section deals with the question of China as a threat to India. The fourth section explores the various possible responses to the threat that China poses. It investigates the logic of bandwagoning, non-alignment and hedging. It also ponders into different balancing strategies to balance Chinese power and threat. The fifth section examines the logic and rationale of soft balancing as a strategy to balance Chinese behaviour. The final section will conclude with a way forward for India.
II. Theoretical Shift in Balancing: From Balance of Power to Balancing Behaviour
The United States dominates world politics owing to it being the largest economy, an expenditure of 40% of their GDP on defence and a substantial investment in R&D (World Bank, 2017b). China comes next in terms of capabilities. America’s dominance in international politics was cemented with the disintegration of the USSR. Realists (Waltz) believe that in anarchy, the balance of power re-occurs, and that it is the phenomenon that occurs most regularly. This is known as balance of power as an outcome. After the Cold War, scholars in IR debated about unipolarity and possible balancing against the United States. 4 Waltz predicted about the balance of power against the United States in the future. Other interpretation of balance of power focussed on balancing the behaviour of the superpower. The first is a bound to happen, the other is a process and an act from threatened states. Critics of Waltz recognize the utility of structural realism but find his realism inadequate when it comes to explaining foreign policies of states or balancing the behaviour of the state (Walt, 1987). Brooks and Wohlforth (2008, 2015–2016) find his theory inoperative as the United States has crossed the threshold of the balance of power. Therefore, balance of power is neither useful to explain the current unipolarity in the system nor can it be employed to study the balancing behaviour of states in regions such as Asia. To analyse balancing at the local level, we need to treat balancing as a behaviour, not as an outcome, as suggested by Susan V. Martin (2003).
The following paragraphs explain the concept of threat and balancing as behaviour.
Kenneth Waltz, in Theory of International Politics (1979), proposes his theory of balance of power. This theory assumes ‘that anarchy leads to the formation of balances of power through the competitive international politics that it engenders’ (Martin, 2003, p. 69). Anarchy constraints ‘each state to rely on itself for its survival. It also forces it to use any and every means at its disposal to achieve survival and security. A rough balance of power forms as states compete for the relative power necessary for security’ (Martin, 2003, p. 69; Waltz, 1979).
Stephen Walt modified Waltz’s theory and argued that power is an important part of the equation, but it is not the only component (Walt, 1987, p. 21). He argues that
it is more accurate to say that states tend to ally with or against the foreign power that poses the greatest threat. For example, states may balance by allying with other strong states if a weaker power is more dangerous for other reasons. Aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions are the factors which impact the threat factor in international politics. (Walt, 1987, pp. 21, 22)
He also argues that strong states balance against a threat, but states with significantly small capabilities bandwagon with the threat because they have no other choice (Walt, 1987, pp. 25, 29). He observed that under most conditions, balancing is more a common phenomenon than bandwagoning (Walt, 1987, p. 33).
However, Martin argues that systemic theories (Waltz’s balance of power theory) fail to explain state behaviour in particular. Waltz himself and others have argued that neorealist theory is not, and cannot be, a theory of foreign policy. Under most circumstances, a theory which uses only systemic variable cannot be a theory of foreign policy because it involves variables at the unit level. 5 Waltz explains, ‘An international political [i.e. systemic] theory can explain states’ behaviour only when external pressures dominate the internal disposition of states, which seldom happens. When they do not, the theory of international politics needs help’ (Martin, 2003, p. 66). Thus, there is a need to move beyond the systemic level.
Martin suggested changes to the Waltzian theory to fashion balancing into a strategy instead of having balance of power merely as an outcome (Martin, 2003). He suggested a shift from prioritizing outcomes to the motivation of state behaviour, identifying motivations which focus on countering the threats and including elements other than power in the sources of threat. On the basis of this adjustment, Martin’s idea of ‘balancing’ can best be understood as actions carried out by a state to counter an external threat (Martin, 2003). This definition leaves plenty of scope to categorize a threat and choices to counter it. It does not restrict the threat only to a military one, neither does it limit the response to military or hard balancing. Hard balancing refers to a strategy in which states build and update military capabilities and maintain formal military alliances with other states to counter the capabilities of their key opponents (Paul et al., 2004). This provides enough room for soft balancing too.
Soft balancing is generally understood as a tacit and informal alliance by the threatened states against states that might pose a threat in the future. It involves
ententes or limited security understandings with one another to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power. Soft balancing is often based on a limited arms buildup, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions. These policies may be converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition becomes intense and the powerful state becomes overtly threatening. (Paul et al., 2004, p. 3)
Hard balancing focuses on augmenting the military power of the state against the threatening state; soft balancing, on the other hand, aims at undermining the relative power of the threatening states through bilateral and multilateral coordination (He & Feng, 2008).
Martin’s idea of balancing focuses on balancing behaviour, and it does, in fact, open up possibilities for strategies other than military alliances. These other strategies are soft balancing and regional balancing strategies, both of which focus on countering a threat.
In today’s times, hard balancing is always a difficult choice. Soft balancing is a more likely choice when the power gap between the most powerful and the another state is sizeable. Hard-balancing efforts will also ‘likely elicit immediate politico-economic retribution from the hegemon’ (Paul et al., 2004, p. 15). Apart from this, breaking ties with the most powerful state, when economies of the two states are heavily interdependent, will have a considerable cost in economic terms, thus diminishing the possibilities of hard balancing (Paul et al., 2004).
To summarize, if a state feels threatened by the activities of another state, it ideally should balance against the threat. However, such a balancing strategy need not only follow arms build-up or external military alliances. This is so because here our concern is to counter a threat, not the means of countering. Moreover, as has been discussed earlier, when a state does not have enough material capabilities and its economic fate is linked to the other state, it is advisable to focus on balancing the behaviour of the threatening state. And, if the behaviour of the threatening state can be balanced by soft balancing (‘pursuing limited, tacit or indirect balancing strategies largely through coalition building and diplomatic bargaining within international institutions, short of formal bilateral and multilateral military alliances’ 6 ), then that choice should be explored, since costs associated with soft balancing are far lower as compared to hard balancing, as discussed earlier. Moreover, here, issue-based cooperation is also possible.
III. Identifying the Threat from China
China, rather than the United States, is perceived to be a greater threat by states in Asia, and there are reasons for the same (Friedberg, 2000; Roy, 1994, 2005). China’s military capabilities outsize India’s by at least four times (World Bank, 2017b), and so does its GDP (more than five times larger than India). It also poses a threat to India’s sovereignty, its sphere of influence in South Asia and international organizations (by opposing India’s entry into NSG and UNSC) (Economic Times, 13 July 2018). China’s current military capabilities (i), its territorial claims in South China Sea and its military projection (ii), its geographic proximity to India and territorial dispute in Arunachal and Kashmir (iii) and its aggressive behaviour and intention via China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (iv) place China in the category of a threat for India (four criteria used by Walt, 1987). Recent Chinese aggression in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh region has confirmed the fear from China. There is no clarity on the real status of the incursion as scholars differ on the presence of Chinese forces on Indian soil and its repercussions 7 (Fravel, 2020; Jacob, 2020; Rajagopalan, 2020b; Sethi, 2020; Singh, 2020). Apart from military and economic capabilities, China also intervenes in India’s sphere of influence, i.e. Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan (Mourdoukoutas, 2017; Xavier, 2018). China’s Belt and Road Initiative violates India’s sovereignty (Ayres, 2017); it encircles India from all the sides through ports in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and interferes in free waters by claiming ownership of the South China Sea. This amounts to aggressive behaviour and intention. However, this is not a new phenomenon. China has been doing this for a long time, and it is part of China’s Great Game (Malik, 2006; Scott, 2008, p. 4). Furthermore, as Scott points out, ‘India’s military and security perception of China has long been one of deep distrust, current official rhetoric notwithstanding’ (Scott, 2008, p. 4). India stands for a ‘democratic and rules-based international order, in which all nations, small and large, thrive as equal and sovereign’ (MEA, 2018). This is in sharp contrast to the vision of the Asian order dominated by China (Kang, 2003).
Current Chinese activities violate the foundation of any country’s foreign policy, i.e. military security, economic well-being and international world order (Bandyopadhyay, 2003). In the backdrop of the Chinese threat, India has to deploy means to buy security and preserve the foundation of its foreign policy. These foundations are reiterated from time to time and include strategic autonomy, non-interference in its area of influence, envisioning an Asia free of any hegemony, and democratization of international organizations (MEA, 2015; MEA 2018 PM at Shangrila). To achieve these ends, a state employs a combination of means: defence, diplomacy and communication (Bandyopadhyay, 2003). In this context, India faces the dilemma of alliances, balancing and policy option to curtail the Chinese threat in an American unipolar world with China as a revisionist power and challenging American hegemony.
IV. Responding to China’s Power and Threat:
Bandwagoning, Non-alignment and Hedging?
Faced with a threat in its neighbourhood, India has to make choices about how it will deal with it. The literature on alliances in international politics has categorized such a choice into six sections: non-alignment, hedging, internal balancing, regional balancing, aligning with China or aligning with the United States (Rajagopalan, 2017, p. 9). Rajagopalan (2017) suggests, ‘although India will probably employ a combination of these approaches, it is likely that even such a combination will lean consistently in the direction of one particular approach’ (p. 10). Out of these six choices, three (internal balancing, regional balancing and alignment with the United States) fall in the category of balancing. The remaining three fall in the category of bandwagoning, neutrality and hedging. We would first explore bandwagoning, neutrality and hedging.
Alignment with the source of the threat is an available route before India, and there are some examples in history that demonstrate this choice being made. Randal Schweller has argued that states bandwagon for profit and they do not necessarily balance against the threat (Schweller, 1994). Common economic interests are one such incentive. As India–China trade has reached a historic $95.54 billion, it provides an incentive for cooperation (Livemint, 2019). Scholars argue that India and China should cooperate for mutual benefit. Some of them say that India should join China’s flagship BRI project. In their view, India is to gain from this project (Sanwal, 2019). However, there is no significant theory that favours this option conclusively. Generally, there are two motives for bandwagoning with the threat. Walt in The Origin of Alliances argues, ‘In the first, bandwagoning is chosen for defensive reasons, as a means of preserving one’s independence in the face of a potential threat. In the second, a bandwagoning state chooses the leading side for offensive reasons, to share the fruits of victory’ (Walt, 1987, p. 21). In general, we should expect, concludes Walt, ‘balancing behaviour to be much more common than bandwagoning, and we should expect bandwagoning to occur only under certain identifiable conditions’ (p. 29). Since India is a state with a nuclear capability, it cannot be termed as a weak state. It also enjoys the option of joining other powers in order to balance China. Thus, bandwagoning with China is an anomaly in the history of internal politics. Not many states in the past have bandwagoned with the threat, rather they have balanced against them as demonstrated by Walt. Thus, India needs to follow the pattern of history rather than transgressing it. It would not be in the interest of India’s security to bandwagon with China, for it will lead to China taking over the reins definitively.
The other choice of non-alignment has also lost relevance in the post-Cold War world. Some have declared the end of non-alignment and some have hoped for the same (Pant & Super, 2015). One critic points out Non-alignment 2.0’s failure to understand the relevance of power in international politics (Rajagopalan, 2012). China’s current military capabilities, its geographic proximity to India and continuous intervention in the Indian sphere of influence make non-alignment a bad choice. When there is a real threat, it needs to be balanced rather than evaded. Non-alignment will be considered a sign of a weak state at a time when India needs to counter Chinese aggression and its aspiration of hegemony in Asia. Moreover, there are signs that India is not interested in non-alignment (Ganguly, 2016; Pant, 2016). Hedging, which falls in-between balancing and bandwagoning, would be less attractive to any policymaker as this carries the significant security cost in the future. This unattractiveness is rooted in growing Chinese power and continuous threats despite India assuring China (Goh, 2006; Lim & Cooper, 2015; Rajagopalan, 2017, 2019, 2020).
Balancing Chinese Power and Threat: Hard Balancing?
Once it is established that to counter a threat, balancing is the most appropriate and safest choice, we move further to the multiple ways of balancing a threat. Balance generally has two strands: hard balancing and soft balancing. Hard balancing refers to a strategy in which states build and update military capabilities and maintain formal military alliances with other states to counter the capabilities of their key opponents (Paul et al., 2004, p. 3). Hard balancing has two aspects: internal balancing (developing military capabilities) and external balancing (making alliances—both with the United States and states in the Indo-Pacific region). Hard balancing aims at balancing the power of the threatening state. However, it comprises the following complexities which are hard to resolve.
Balancing: Internal and External
Internal balancing
Internal balancing is generally believed to strengthen defence capabilities to balance the power and behaviour of a threatening state. However, internal balancing demands a robust economy (with a sustainable, high GDP), an advanced level of scientific and technological capacity, and an integrated system to train experts and forces in military operations (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2015–2016). However, India’s current GDP and defence expenditures highlight India’s weakness to develop defence capabilities at home. Certainly, these gaps indicate India’s incapacity to balance China internally only at present. In the years to follow, the crucial task still will be to translate economic capabilities into military capabilities, which takes a long time to materialize. India’s nuclear weapons can deter a Chinese advance towards India’s territory, but it cannot stall China from entering India’s sphere of influence.
External balancing: Alignment with the United States
Several policymakers and scholars favour external balancing (Rajagopalan, 2017). The United States’ military and economic capabilities, its amicable relations with and eagerness to align and cooperate with India, a shared threat in the form of China, and its continued support of India for NSG and UNSC are some reasons for the desirability of this possibility. Its capabilities attract India’s policymakers and scholars, as it is always beneficial to share cordial relations with a strong power. India need not fear the United States the way it has to fear China because America is physically distant from Indian territory, and the two states do not share any territorial disputes. American power is also not perceived to be as aggressive as China’s because China interferes in India’s sphere of influence while the United States does not. India’s military capabilities will also be strengthened with military cooperation with the United States. Moreover, it has the potential to curb the rising Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific and South Asia. C. Raja Mohan, India’s topmost foreign policy analyst, observed that, ‘India’s core objective of expanding its comprehensive national power is more likely to be achieved in collaboration with the US and the West than with China’ (Raja Mohan, 2014). Ashley Tellis has also advocated for strong Indo-US cooperation and the incentives for cooperation, according to him, are:
preventing Asia from being dominated by any single power, countering terrorism, arresting the further spread of weapons of mass destruction, promoting democracy, encouraging the diffusion of economic development, preserving global commons, especially the sea lanes of communication, promoting energy security, and safeguarding the global environment. (Tellis, 2005, cited in Raja Mohan, 2006)
These advantages cannot be ignored, and this is the most favourable option among the five described above, as it secures India’s interests in the face of China’s aggression in the region. The Council on Foreign Relations has stressed the need for Indo-US cooperation as this will bring peace, stability and security by maintaining a favourable balance of power (CFR, 2011). One scholar suggests moving beyond bandwagoning for profit to bandwagoning to balance against China. Rajesh Rajagopalan writes:
so far this relationship has looked more like a profit-driven bandwagoning relationship than one based on the requirements of balancing. A relationship based on balancing would have stressed military cooperation much more, But an alignment with the United States as considered here is different in that it would involve seeking a partnership based on the common need to balance China rather than simply continuing a profit-driven bandwagoning relationship, as bandwagoning by itself is not a strong basis for a partnership. (Rajagopalan, 2017, p. 26)
Rajesh Rajagopalan identifies the following benefits of Indo-US alignment: this helps India balance China, it is the most viable way of endeavouring to ensure that no single Asian power rules, the United States’ ability to advance Indian interests in multilateral forums is useful, there will be no major disputes with the United States, and finally it would boost India’s technological and military capabilities (Rajagopalan, 2017, pp. 27–30).
Challenges and demerits of India–United States alignment
The complex interdependence logic of international politics discourages hard balancing against China, thus indirectly discouraging Indo-US alignment. India and China trade ties have crossed the $90 billion mark. Paul has mentioned that when economic fates of two states are interlinked with each other, hard balancing is discouraged (Paul, 2005, p. 15). Similar concerns are echoed by Vikash Chandra (2018): ‘India needs to strike a balance between the declining America and rising China. It will have to learn how not to turn China from an adversary to an enemy’ (p. 420) The gap in both economic and military power between India and China also discourages India to favour hard balancing as the cost of building military strength is more than its cumulative gains. The other most challenging issue in alliance with the United States is with regard to the trust of the alliance partner. The United States for some time had been helping India at global forums, but the recent Donald Trump-led administration has been harsh on India–United States trade relations. Some have called this tension a mini-trade war (Bown, 2019).
India’s proposed alignment with the United States is based on the assumption that power is the ultimate solution to deter a threat, which in turn led to a strategy of balancing Chinese power. Moreover, as India does not have enough internal capabilities, it should align with the most powerful states to balance threat from its immediate neighbour, i.e. China. However, this assumption does not take into consideration the balancing of behaviour approach proposed by Martin. It discounts other strategies to balance a threat. Thus, as analysed above, India’s alignment with the United States is an arduous, perilous and costly affair. It generates more security issues than it does resolve. Some other challenges associated with the Indo-US alignment are as follows.
The first challenge is that it may complicate India’s relation with China further. India and China share a disputed border that measures 3,488 km (MHA), over which they have fought a war. Both also share smaller states (Nepal and Bhutan) as neighbours. China can penetrate into these smaller states by providing aid and other benefits to them (Upadhyay, 2018). China’s interference in India’s area of influence amounts to an attack on India’s primary goals regarding its foreign policy. Inviting the United States to the Asian theatre contradicts the Chinese vision of the region which resembles the idea of Asia for Asians (Godbole, 2015, p. 300). This contrasting vision could further lead to distrust among the two powers, and eventual rivalry and conflict. The United States at this moment cannot help India in managing influence in Nepal and Bhutan, for the former does not have enough influence on these two neighbours of India, neither do they find a mention in its strategy. This complication and the consequent dilemma over security might lead to a crisis for India at its western front too. China has been cooperating with and been helping Pakistan for a considerably long time now. Moreover, China values its alliance with Pakistan (Haqqani, 2019). They are developing close links in defence and other strategic policies (Maini, 2018). This could lead to strong ties between Pakistan and China, thus resulting in additional insecurity at both the Chinese and Pakistani fronts for India. India is not ready for a crisis at either of these fronts (Singh, 2019) nor can an American alliance buy it security at its borders. America has been trying hard to control and influence Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy, but it has failed on all counts. In addition, China has more influence in Pakistan than the United States has (Sareen, 2019). 8 The recent CPEC and Gwadar Port has amplified Chinese presence in Pakistan. This also indicates a close relationship between China and Pakistan. This will further lead to an arms’ race, an area in which India is underprepared.
Secondly, India will lose its claim of a rising or great power in the times to come. No state in the history of the world has ever become a great power by aligning with another great power. Great powers have made alliances, but they have done so only after having sufficient capabilities at home. Britain, the United States, Japan, Germany and the Soviet Union are suitable examples. If India is truly interested in becoming a great power, it should improve its long-term economic, military and technological capabilities, and should form alliances with smaller states to intercept threats which it cannot deter alone. Bandwagoning is performed either in the face of a threat (Walt, 1987) or because of benefits (Schweller, 1994). However, in the case of India, the United States does not pose a threat, nor does India have much to benefit from the United States to achieve larger goals. So, aligning with the United States is a self-defeating strategy.
Thirdly, it will also curtail India’s strategic autonomy, a core principle of India’s foreign policy since Independence. India is a rising power with sufficient potential that may be fruitfully utilized. It has numerous features that may be influential in international politics, and in strengthening its relations with other nations. By entering into the balance of power politics, India will lose its strategic autonomy.
Fourthly, India will be the minor partner in this alliance, and this is in opposition to its desire to be the bigger partner in regional balancing. Finally, what will happen if the United States finally dissociates from India after some time? India’s future will be jeopardized, antagonizing China, which may behave harsher than ever before. India will also have economic costs to pay as a consequence. Moreover, what if at that stage, other possible allies of India’s have joined other forces and are unwilling to cooperate with it simply because they will have formed an unfavourable opinion of India as a state which hankers after easy solutions in power politics and skirts around difficult ones such as regional balancing.
External balancing: Military alliances in the Indo-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific region includes the arc from India in the east, Japan in the north and Australia in the south-west. All the states falling within this range are part of the Indo-Pacific. Most states in the region feel threatened by China’s rise and its dominance (Roy, 2013; Sethi, 2018). They all have reasons to balance against China. India’s choice of balancing China with these states has the following advantages: less possibility of provoking China, strategic autonomy, larger partner in the alliance, economic advantages and legitimacy. 9 There are two ways of hard balancing China via Indo-Pacific. The first includes an India–Japan–Australia mini-lateral (Joshi, 2017), and the other is a larger coalition of the states of the region balancing China with the help of regional actors which feel threatened by China’s rise. Though the latter is a desirable option for India, it has its drawback, which is that the power gap between all the alliances put together and China alone is too vast. Other drawbacks include the problem of free-ridership, challenges of coordination, defection, hiding, entrapment and inability of this alliance to balance China in multilateral institutions (Joshi, 2017, p. 1; Rajagopalan, 2017, pp. 19, 20, 21). These coalitions can keep doors open for the United States as well. However, as stated earlier, all the states put together in the Indo-Pacific region have far less military capability and economic capability than China’s. China’s defence budget of 2016 was $145 billion, while the combined budget of Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam in 2016 was about $147 billion (IISS, 2017; Rajagopalan, 2017, p. 21). This makes hard balancing a highly onerous task. Geography and the challenge of coordination compound the problem in the area of regional balancing. Free-riding and ‘entrapment (weaker powers could conceivably engage in military adventurism against China which could drag alliance members into an unnecessary conflict)’ (Rajagopalan, 2017, p. 22) will be a constant problem in regional balancing. Even if a regional alliance helps India in balancing China militarily, the regional balancing approach likely could not counter China’s power in multilateral institutions. Therefore, it is almost impossible to balance Chinese power simply with India’s alignment with Indo-Pacific. All the above-mentioned concerns will thwart possible cooperation on hardcore security issues.
V. Balancing Chinese Behaviour: Exploring Soft Balancing in the Indo-Pacific
If we shift our focus from balancing Chinese power to balancing Chinese behaviour, we could find possibilities of cooperation among India and Indo-Pacific states with regard to balancing Chinese behaviour. As illustrated earlier, there could be two ways to balance China with the help of Indo-Pacific: one, hard balancing by having military alliances with the states in the Indo-Pacific, and, two, soft balancing, which focuses on balancing Chinese behaviour by carrying out soft balancing against China.
As explained by Martin, ‘balancing can best be understood as actions taken by a state to counter an external threat’ (Martin, 2003, p. 70), and to balance a threat a state or a group of states can use any means available to them. When balancing China through hard power becomes complicated and unrealistic, states should opt for soft balancing. Soft balancing relies on
ententes or limited security understandings with one another to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power. Soft balancing is often based on a limited arms buildup, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions. These policies may be converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition becomes intense and a powerful state becomes a threatening one. (Paul et al., 2004, p. 3)
Moreover, Indo-Pacific as a region provides the most conducive avenue to use soft balancing against China to check or balance its threatening behaviour.
Strengthening Soft Balancing
If we look closely, we find that apart from the not being equal in power all combined together, all the other four disadvantage of regional balancing (entrapment, free-riding, coordination and the ability to counter China’s power in a multilateral institution) are generated by factors other than power. Power is an important aspect but not the be-all and end-all for balancing. Disadvantages of entrapment, free-riding, coordination and the ability to counter China’s power in a multilateral institution are not merely a function of power. These need strategic thinking, negotiations, diplomacy, understanding between each other and communication. Yogesh Joshi demonstrates that India–Japan–Australia mini-lateral has the potential to resolve the problem of free-riding and entrapment (Joshi, 2017). All three states have enough resources and capabilities to avoid free-ridership. Even other states, which are not wealthy enough to contribute financially in the coalition, should be allowed to participate in the cooperation. Bigger states have to take responsibility, and India, Japan and Australia are the states of significance in the region.
The problems of hiding and defecting are more serious than free-riding and entrapment for Indo-Pacific (Joshi, 2017). The threat of Chinese power, combined with its capabilities, geographical proximity and its current behaviour, suggests that the big states in the region will balance against China rather than participate in hiding and defection. 10 The smaller states might opt for defection and hiding, but their role should not be exaggerated. Small states do behave differently, and sometimes if they do not have the opportunity to balance, they do bandwagon with threat, hide and defect. India–Japan–Australia can lead this coalition and expect others to cooperate, offering them a platform, rather than expecting leadership from smaller states. China-dominated Asia is going to hurt big states, and they do not have the choice of bandwagoning, defection or hiding. Their coalition may send out the message that they prefer a liberal security order rather than Chinese hegemony, which may also work as a deterrent against revisionist power (Joshi, 2017, p. 8). However, it requires experts and policymakers to fully commit to these complex issues.
Thus, India, along with other big states in the region, could provide a platform for coordination among the states in the region. It could also communicate to China that they are not in opposition of its rise, but that they are in favour of a democratic world order which respects the sovereignty of each nation-state, and that they would resist the violation of such a world order collectively. There already exist multiple forums in the regions such as ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN. This forum, along with the India-US-Japan-Australia Quadrilateral Initiative or QUAD, can be used more frequently to counter Chinese behaviour. Given that China’s economic interest is linked with these countries, it would not be easy for China to go against all of them unilaterally. Seeing the current Chinese military might and threats in Ladakh, India has a choice to be more assertive in the South China Sea (Mohan, 2020; Pai, 2020).
Rationale of Soft Balancing
India opting to carry out soft balancing against China via Indo-Pacific has certain advantages over its alignment with the United States. These could be identified as follows:
First, India will be able to balance China without a direct alliance with the United States. This will give enough space to smaller partners to put forth their concerns independently. This coalition is motivated by threat rather than profit. This is an ideal case of threat and balancing. Most states in the region fear Chinese power, it is proximate to them, and it has both aggregate and offensive power.11 Communicating the existence of threat among the member states can solve the problem of coordinating. By adopting this choice, India can avoid the disadvantages of aligning directly with the United States to balance China. These disadvantages have been mentioned earlier.
Secondly, India will be able to manage and balance China without provoking it. It would also be able to conduct interest-based engagements with China. China, as a rising great power, has remarkable capabilities, and it is exercising those capabilities to increase its influence in the region and abroad. However, India’s aim does not coincide with that of China and the United States. Through soft balancing, India would be balancing China’s military and economic capabilities but would be balancing its behaviour. India’s economy is interlinked with the Chinese economy, and India currently has an annual bilateral trade of $84.4 billion (TOI, 7 March 2018). India, along with others, signals and communicates to China that it has no intention of hampering China’s interests as long as it does not interfere in India’s core interest. Moreover, China, as a rising power, with a highly complex web of economic interdependence, is unlikely to oppose all the states.
Thirdly, apart from security interests, India and other members of the region share interests in other areas too, such as economy, trade, science and technology, and education. Chinese threat could unite all of them. In the FY 2016–2017, trade between India and Japan reached US$ 13.61 billion (MEA, 2017). This trade has the potential to grow. Trade between India and Australia stood at $27 billion in 2017 (Tang, 2018). Indo-ASEAN trade had also reached a high of $71.6 billion in 2016–2017 and hoped to reach $100 billion by 2020 (Gupta, 2018). Trust can be built through cooperation, given that countries of the region have remarkable trade and economic potential. India’s Look East and Act East policies are aimed at similar concerns. This will serve two of India’s interests together: security and economy. States of the region also share a cultural affinity with India, and India can utilize its soft power to penetrate the region. Fourthly, India need not worry too much about defence expenditure at this stage. Once it has accumulated sufficient dollars and grown economically, it can build defence capabilities. This would help India avoid unnecessary spending.
Fifthly, India is interacting with almost all the states in the region regularly. Bi-annual meeting of ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit provide a platform to discuss various common agendas. India does not have conflict or enmity with any of the states in the region. It is also not perceived as a threat by any of the member states of the region; this gives it an advantage over others in bringing them all together. It is up to India to utilize this opportunity. This will also allow India to build capabilities for internal balancing. India can also negotiate with the United States for help in bolstering India’s position in international organizations as India balances China. This will also allow India to retain its strategic autonomy. India will be a larger and equal partner in the coalition rather than being a secondary or less significant partner in the United States alignment. It will improve India’s status in the region as well as in international politics. By cooperating with these states, India can also convey to Nepal, Bhutan and other South Asian countries that India’s presence need not be feared for it stands for a democratic world order. The Look East Policy, which is now named Act East Policy, serves precisely this function.
VI. Conclusions
China’s rise is real, and so are the threats associated with it. China is an imminent threat to India too. However, India does not have enough internal capabilities to balance Chinese power and threat. Choosing to align with America to balance Chinese power is an uncertain and untrustworthy enterprise. It can potentially weaken the relationship between India and China, with India becoming far more insecure in the future than it is today. Rather than balancing Chinese power, it would be more prudent for India to focus on balancing Chinese behaviour. To balance Chinese behaviour, India would need a respectable amount of power, though power is not the only solution to balancing Chinese behaviour. India has the alternative of balancing Chinese behaviour through limited security understanding among the Indo-Pacific states, conducting regular defence exercises in the region, moving Indian navy in waters other than the Indian Ocean, building collaboration in ASEAN and ARF, and condemning threatening and offensive Chinese behaviour at multilateral forums, i.e. soft balancing. Hard balancing is generally a safer choice, but in the absence of military capabilities, states have to adapt to using other strategies. For India, a more worthwhile choice would be to balance China by making soft alliances in the Indo-Pacific and to counter Chinese behaviour with their help, since India cannot afford to challenge China unilaterally. There are costs to unilateral challenges which India is not ready to bear. It is advisable to continue with the current interest-based engagement with China while balancing its threatening behaviour at multilateral institutions and building alliances with other threatened states in the Indo-Pacific. This would require commitment from the Indo-Pacific states; however, aggressive Chinese behaviour would force them to form alliance against the China. However, to avoid trapping and free-riding, states need to establish a robust dialogue forum.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this article was presented at the All India International and Area Studies Convention 2019, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. This article benefitted from the suggestions made by Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan at various stages and Professor CSR Murthy and Dr Archana Negi for making comments at the convention. I also thank Mr Vikas Chandra for reading the draft and his comments. Critical insights and comments provided by the anonymous reviewer at the Millennial Asia helped this article become more focussed.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.