Abstract
As part of the political wheeling and dealing to secure her appointment as Commission President in July 2019, Ursula von der Leyen ‘turned green’ and promised to launch a European Green Deal (EGD). 1 In December 2019, she followed up on that promise. The EGD was set to become a central pillar of the von der Leyen Commission. At that point, one could be forgiven for being skeptical: the Commission has a habit of announcing grand plans that slowly wither away. Four years later, however, the EGD has an impressive track record. The legislative machine of the EU has churned out a constant stream of new rules to combat climate change. These include a new EU climate law, a new Emission Trading System, a carbon border adjustment mechanism, and several sets of rules on renewable energy production and efficiency.
And yet, it is doubtful that the EU will meet its targets for 2030 and 2050 (a 55% reduction of emissions compared to 1990 and climate neutrality, respectively), as the EGD depends too much on the Member States for its implementation, and political opposition to speeding up mitigation measures seems to be growing. This editorial examines the paradox of the European Green Deal: the EGD can simultaneously be seen as a ‘motor of integration’ that has made climate mitigation a key pillar of European integration and yet unable to make the EU reach its climate goals.
The EGD in European integration
To understand the significance of the EGD and to evaluate its success, we may first look at the EGD from the perspective of European integration, by examining its origins beyond von der Leyen's initiative. The EGD can then be seen as a response to the growing awareness in recent years of the perils of climate change. This awareness strengthened demands for legal and political action, demands which the EU was well-equipped and well-positioned to address, for several reasons. Firstly, climate change mitigation obviously goes beyond what any country can achieve on its own, as it requires a coordinated effort. Secondly, mitigating climate change is primarily a matter of re-organizing economic relations. The EU holds many competences that are essential for the green transition. Thirdly, the EU was in search of an opportunity to present itself in a positive light after a decade of crises. From the Euro-crisis to the migrant/refugee crisis and Brexit, the EU faced several existential threats. The embrace of climate change as a central topic demonstrated the strengths of the European project, especially in the eyes of a younger generation. 2 Lastly, when the EGD was launched, the EU had already had some experience with climate policy, for example through the Emission Trading System (ETS). Launched in 2005, the ETS had necessitated several tweaks over the years to become an effective tool to reduce emissions. Therefore, the EGD did not signal a political or economic change of direction, but rather an intensification and broadening of the EU's approach. From this perspective, the fact that von der Leyen ‘turned green’ was neither surprising, nor transformative: the political momentum was there, and the necessary tools were readily available. Indeed, many aspects of the EGD build upon rather conventional aspects of European integration, with a focus on market integration, economic efficiency, stimulating innovation and product regulation. In this sense, the EGD is ‘business as usual’ for the EU. 3 Already since the Single European Act, the EU had an environmental integration obligation (which also covers change mitigation). This obligation can now be found in Articles 11 TFEU and 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In its current form, it requires that environmental protections be integrated in all EU policies. In this respect, the EGD can be seen as finally living up to that promise.
However, this is not the whole story of the EGD. When von der Leyen launched the EGD in December 2019, the first known cases of COVID-19 had appeared in China. The ensuing pandemic would have major social and economic consequences. Italy was the first country to be hit in Europe, leading to long lockdowns and worries about the economic consequences of the pandemic. During the Euro-crisis, the state of the Italian economy was a key concern, but this crisis was different, not in the least because this time the European response was not burdened by a ‘blame game’. Within months, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF, part of NextGenerationEU) was negotiated; it would provide subsidies and loans to the Member States which were financed through borrowing by the EU. Given the severity of the crisis that had hit the EU, it is noteworthy that the pandemic did not divert attention from the EGD. The economic uncertainty of the situation could have propelled arguments for slowing down the green transition, as had apparently happened during the Euro-crisis. 4 Instead, the green transition appears to have been an enabler for the RRF, as it solved the issue of what these new EU funds would be used for. Although the RRF stabilized the economic situation in the EU, by engendering trust as to the EU's response, the immediate purpose of the funds was unclear. How could the EU prevent Member States from abusing the newly created funds? The green transition provided a clear objective. As a result, the requirement was introduced that Member States use 37% of their funding for the green transition. 5 The RRF is a big step in European integration because of its size and the source of the funding, but for its functioning it builds on existing instruments and goals, with a primary role for the green transition. 6
The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent European response resulted in another economic shock. Energy prices soared, contributing to high inflation and increases in the costs of living. Again, one might have expected that this would have led to a lowering of climate ambitions. The EU's main response, RePowerEU, combined the goals of reducing the EU's dependence on Russian fuel imports and reducing energy use and increasing the production of renewable energy. 7 This merging of green objectives with economic objectives is also clearly visible in the proposed Critical Raw Materials Act, which aims to reduce supply chain risks, especially from China. 8 The proposed act seeks to protect several strategic economic sectors, first and foremost is the growth of renewable energy. Rather than that the crises distracted from the ambitions of the EGD, the EGD appears to have informed and given shape to European action in times of crises. The EGD reshapes existing EU policies and drives new policies.
A politics for the long term
A second question regarding the EGD is whether it has set the EU on a viable path towards climate neutrality. Is the EU living up to ‘this generation's defining task’, as the Commission put it? 9 The scorecard is mixed. The European Court of Auditors (ECA) recently noted that the EU's goals and ambitions for 2020 were met with a significant margin. 10 With regard to the target for 2030, the ECA was unconvinced: ‘we found little indication so far that the ambitious 2030 EU targets will be translated into sufficient action.’ 11 This concerned the National Energy and Climate Plans of the Member States for the period of 2021–2030. This strikes at the heart of the EGD: despite the ambitions and action at EU level, a lot of the responsibility for climate change mitigation in the EU is placed on the Member States. The main task for the EU in this regard is the ETS, which covers around 40% of emissions in the EU. 12 Member States remain responsible for the rest, their individual targets set on the basis of the Effort Sharing Regulation. The ECA noted that the Member States especially fail to identify the sources for the funding of the green transition. 13
Hence, it is in the Member States that opposition to climate policies is most relevant, even if, when vocalized, it is not expressly directed at the EU. Although the actual rolling back of policies – as recently announced in the United Kingdom, for example – seems to be rare in the EU, the adoption of new policies does appear to have become harder in several countries. 14 One response to the wavering of Member States’ environmental commitments might be to look to the tools for the enforcement of EU law, such as the infringement procedure. The EU targets for the Member States are legally binding. 15 However, focusing on the legal aspects of enforcement might be unwise. The road to climate neutrality is long, and it is doubtful whether sticks, rather than carrots, will entice Member States to adopt the necessary policies. Avoiding antagonism amongst the Member States is relevant not only with regards to the goals the Member States have to reach, but also to new legislation that will have to be adopted over the coming years.
This political pushback should not come as a surprise. The EGD will bring about significant economic and social changes: indeed, that is its purpose. However, these changes obviously create winners and losers on a personal, local, regional and national level. The EGD does incorporate some social justice components through the Just Transition Mechanism, which also encompasses the Just Transition Fund. 16 Member States can apply for funding on the basis of Territorial Just Transition Plans. These plans identify which territories are most negatively affected by the green transition and how the funds shall be used and supervised. Overall, the sums available for these territories appear to be too small to truly compensate the economic losers of the green transition in Europe. Moreover, the Member States’ central role in the actual use of these funds conceals their origin – the EU. Too little, too hidden. Be that as it may, even if the Just Transition had been setup on a larger scale, it is doubtful it could prevent the growing political opposition to speeding up the green transition, which is not motivated by economic concerns exclusively. Patterns of economic production and consumption are deeply ingrained in everyday life, and as the green transition undoubtedly affects those patterns, it is bound to raise opposition. A key question for the green transition will thus be how to engage with such opposition to accelerating the transition.
This is an urgent question, as there appears to be little time to take stock and recalibrate. For example, a decision needs to be taken soon on the EU's target for 2040. The European Climate Law sets targets for 2030 and 2050, with a process in place to adopt an intermediate target for 2040, which envisions a role for the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change. This Advisory Board recently recommended the target be set at a reduction of emissions of 90–95% compared to 1990. 17 Of course, with an ambitious new target comes the need for new policies to reach it.
Conclusion
The EGD has mainly been discussed in terms of policy, not in terms of its meaning for the EU as such. 18 After a decade of crises, it is understandable that there is little desire to start a constitutional debate about climate policy. Ultimately, why would such a debate even be necessary? The EU has been able to adopt ambitious climate policies without running into constitutional problems. A constitutional debate might only slow things down, one might fear. This seems naïve, given the daunting task ahead. Achieving climate neutrality requires a significant overhaul of the European economy in a relatively short time period. In the European Union especially, where economic issues are at the core of its constitutional law, that cannot be just a matter of policy.
Although the EGD is now at the heart of the European project, it remains unclear if its goals will be reached. That should trigger reflection on the EGD's modus operandi. The setting of an emission reduction target for 2040 should provide a good opportunity for such reflection. Should the EU continue to place the bulk of the responsibility for mitigation on the Member States, or should it take on more responsibility itself? How does the green transition affect the legitimacy of European integration? Does the green transition affect the institutional balance, for example by requiring more coordination between European actors? If the EGD is indeed about the finalité of European integration, as Chiti states, 19 a constitutional debate is overdue.