Friedrich A. Hayek's critique of rationalism is often deemed inevitably to lead to conservative conclusions regarding designed change in the social world. Indeed, Hayek produced plenty of arguments to discourage state intervention. After spelling out the main elements of his cognitive view of society with its typical stress on the limited role of reason, I elaborate on his multiple argumentative strategy against intervention to argue that the convincing premises of Hayek's thought, his social epistemology, in particular, (i) have no necessary connection with his normative and political convictions and (ii) are, in fact, at odds with the conclusions, leading to challenging these convictions.
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