Abstract
Individuals choose camouflage as a dominant response when a state’s political conditions worsen, particularly when a democracy turns authoritarian. Individuals hide their private preferences to survive under oppressive regimes. This paper argues that in many circumstances camouflage is the most rational, cost-minimizing reaction to oppression. The paper identifies five kinds of costs that induce individuals to resort to four different ideal types of camouflage: (1) avoidance of contact, (2) minimal participation, (3) restricted cooperation, and (4) full engagement with the oppressive regime. Camouflage is particularly advantageous as the costs of exit or voice are often high. Therefore, a large majority of citizens disagreeing with the ideology and policies of a regime are likely to camouflage.
What is camouflage?
Benito Mussolini, in 1922, and Adolf Hitler, in 1933, took over power rather unexpectedly and immediately imposed oppressive regimes. Today, Putin in Russia, Xi in China, and Erdogan in Turkey also impose oppressive measures. Indeed, a considerable number, if not a majority, of the population feel burdened by the ideology and actions undertaken by these regimes. Nevertheless, there has rarely been an uprising of people dissatisfied with an oppressive political situation.
This paper argues that camouflage is a rational response by individuals to a decline in the performance of institutions, particularly when democracies turn authoritarian. Such a development is topical: “Attacks on democratic institutions are spreading faster than ever in Europe and Eurasia, and coalescing into a challenge to democracy itself” (Freedom House, 2021). The oppressed individuals hide their feelings, views, and behavior, so it is difficult for the government, its administration, and the secret services to identify and punish them for their lack of support. In contrast to camouflage, exit and voice, as discussed by Hirschman (1970), are rare events because they are costly for individuals to undertake. In contrast, many individuals use camouflage due to the low cost it incurs.
The term camouflage is rarely employed in a social context; it is used mainly in the military sphere. It refers to hiding personnel and material from the enemy. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines it as “concealment by means of disguise.” The Cambridge Dictionary refers to “something … that makes an animal, person, building, etc. difficult for enemies to see against the background.” The Collins Dictionary is broader “if you camouflage something such as a feeling or a situation, you hide it or make it appear to be something different.”
This paper addresses the deterioration when a formerly more democratic regime becomes authoritarian or dictatorial. Camouflage here analyzed refers to hiding, disguising, or concealing one’s views about the government. Citizens privately disagree with the ideology and actions of the politicians in power and their administration in a nondemocratic setting. The cost of camouflaging under most conditions is low compared to actively opposing an authoritarian regime.
Five kinds of costs imposed on individuals by oppressive political regimes are distinguished. They consist in (1) psychological costs due to a difference in preferences between an individual and the government; (2) costs due to a difference in preferences to other members of society; (3) the subjectively expected punishment costs imposed by the government for adopting camouflage rather than wholeheartedly supporting the new regime; (4) adjustment costs when individuals adopt camouflage; and (5) economic costs as camouflagers may lose their job, their pensions may be reduced or abolished, and their career prospects may be limited.
Individuals are considered to be rational cost-minimizers who react to oppression by choosing a situation where they can reduce the net costs (i.e., the costs compared to possible benefits) of oppression as much as possible. When one kind of cost is exceptionally high, individuals seek to reduce this burden by performing a type of camouflage that significantly lowers that cost. For instance, individuals much averse to punishment choose the type of camouflage that makes the risk of being punished by the government to be especially low. The varying extent of these costs and the assumption of cost-minimizing individual behavior makes it possible to formulate empirically testable propositions. They suggest how people resort to the kind of camouflage that reduces the net cost of oppression by the regime. Four types of camouflage may result: (1) avoidance of contact; (2) minimal participation; (3) restricted cooperation, and, as an extreme case, (4) full collaboration with the oppressive regime. But that does not mean identification with, or full support of the oppressive regime.
The four types of camouflage distinguished overlap to some extent and should therefore be considered “ideal types” (following Roth et al., 1978; see also Johnson, 2000). Individuals choosing one of these versions of camouflage are subject to psychological biases such as awareness (people may not exactly know what the government intends to do) or framing (the government may present their intended policies in an unduly positive way). Most importantly, the inertia bias relates to thinking and acting in familiar ways (Eichenberger and Frey, 1989; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), inducing individuals to avoid explicit decisions. They therefore do not decide to explicitly oppose the oppressive government. Another bias is noise (Kahneman et al., 2021), referring to random factors which may disturb rational decisions, leading to unpredictable outcomes. Moreover, various intensities of loyalty (Hirschman, 1970) also impact individuals' decisions.
Individuals' decisions to camouflage when democratic conditions deteriorate may be related to the “moral foundation” literature (Haidt, 2007, 2012; Graham et al., 2009). It identifies a set of basic human values, some of which may explain individuals' preferences for camouflaging when subjected to an authoritarian regime: People who value liberty greatly may resort to camouflage because it at least partly preserves their possibilities to act. When loyalty to the state is people’s most important human value, camouflage is a welcome option as the oppressive regime is not needed to be directly criticized but only tolerated.
Individuals whose basic human value is authority-based may see camouflage as an appropriate strategy. The regime’s actions are not actively opposed. Examples are governmental measures against smoking, drinking, or gambling. Such measures may be acceptable even if imposed by a disliked government. Finally, individuals that strongly object to the ideology and actions of a regime purposefully resort to camouflage to become active when the oppressive regime weakens. They consider the possibility of actively and publicly opposing such a regime as slim or even nonexistent. They avoid the danger of being incarcerated or even killed before the regime crumbles. When hiding and appearing to be like any other citizen, one can decide later whether one wants to come into the open. When the oppressive government does not show any weakness, the camouflaging individual can just stay in this position and can leave future possibilities open.
Section II of the paper analyzes the various kinds of costs with which an oppressive political regime burdens individuals (for other applications, see Frey, 2022: part 4). Section III shows how reactions to the various costs identified lead to four camouflage types. As a consequence, empirically testable propositions are formulated. These propositions may be empirically tested. Section IV compares camouflage to Hirschman’s (1970) well-known responses to declining organizations by exit and voice. Section V studies the possible reactions by autocratic regimes, and Section VII concludes.
Costs of camouflage
Five different kinds of costs (C1 to C5) are distinguished, burdening individuals when they are subject to a change from a democratic to an authoritarian regime.
Psychological and social costs
C1: These costs measure the essential difference between individuals' private preferences, whether intrinsic or adopted, to the ideology and actions of the oppressive regime. Having to disguise one’s moral values under oppressive political conditions violates one’s convictions and therefore has psychological costs. Private preferences diverge from public preferences (Kuran, 1987, 1990, 1995). Individuals want to be able to reveal their political views without restrictions. If the regime induces or forces them to support its ideology and policy, camouflagers suffer the psychological costs of split cognitive dissonance. If individuals take the new regime’s position to be very different from what they wish, C1 is large. In contrast, C1 is low if individuals displace these differences due to indifference or are even prepared to justify them, becoming cynical and sanctimonious.
C2: When individuals deviate from the general opinion of other members of society, they incur a loss, measured by cost C2. This cost matters as people dislike showing preferences other than popular opinion. Camouflagers are members of a silent collective or group movement in which networks and reputational cascades are critical (Howitt and Wintrobe, 1995; Sunstein, 2019). Individuals are often uncertain about what others think; they tend to believe others hold different opinions (e.g., Epley et al., 2001; Cialdini, 2007; Coultas, 2004). Pluralistic ignorance (McFarland and Miller, 1987) is a phenomenon that occurs when people wrongly believe that everyone else holds a different opinion from their own. This misjudgment results in a false consensus (Marks and Miller, 1987). To give an example from today’s Russia: “The main reason people support Mr Putin is that they think everybody else does, the need to belong is powerful” (The Economist, 2022: 18). This uncertainty also arises when the evaluation of a new regime differs within the family and among friends and acquaintances. Another cost factor arises when people of other nationalities and languages rule the new regime.
Material and economic costs
C3: This cost captures the subjectively expected punishment by government for adopting camouflage rather than wholeheartedly supporting the new regime. Depending on the regime, this punishment may take many different forms, ranging from simply being censored, to a monetary fine, to imprisonment or even the death penalty. In an authoritarian system, people fear being denounced, creating a general atmosphere of uncertainty and thus costly circumstances.
C4: Individuals are faced with adjustment costs when they adopt camouflage. They may have to invest time and effort in this action. The adjustment costs are high for individuals strongly opposing the ideology and actions of the new regime. Conversely, they are low for individuals who believe that politics is irrelevant to their lives or if they can repress the differences between their preferences and that of the oppressive regime. General lethargy also keeps cost C4 low.
C5: Individuals resorting to camouflage may fear economic costs. They may lose their job, their pensions may be reduced or abolished, and their career prospects may be limited.
Types of camouflage
Depending on the size of these costs, C1 to C5, individuals react differently to an oppressive regime. As rational actors, they compare these costs to the possible benefits and move into that type of camouflage that keeps net costs as low as possible (Becker, 1962; more recently Taleb, 2018).
Type (1): camouflage by avoidance of contact
Individuals whose private preferences deviate strongly from the oppressive regime (C1 is high) seek to eschew contact with the government and its administration. They seek to become invisible to the regime and hide among other people reacting similarly. Such camoufleurs seek to pursue their lives the same way as before the democratic decline. They hope to avoid being troubled by the oppressive regime. They must have the opportunity to move to camouflage with little cost. They seek options to avoid punishment (C3 is high) by positioning themselves beyond the power of the government.
The most extreme possibility is to leave the country: in Hirschman’s terms, to exit. An example is Willy Brandt, later the German Chancellor, who fought the Nazi regime from outside Germany. However, this decision often entails considerable costs (in this case, C4 is substantial). Moving to a new country involves much uncertainty about whether it is possible to secure a reasonable income and to establish valuable personal contacts. In many cases, exit is prohibited by the oppressive regime, or foreign countries do not allow entry. A less costly strategy in terms of C4 is to disguise oneself in an isolated part of the country where the regime is unlikely to intervene. Yet another option is to stay where one is but to resort to “inner emigration,” a psychological situation in which one seeks to abstain from political and social interactions.
Even if an individual manages to keep cost C4 low, this type of camouflage is only feasible if one does not depend on an income source controlled by the oppressive regime (C5 must be low). Establishing contact with other opponents of the regime risks being identified and punished. Costs C2 arise when the camouflaging individuals (sometimes wrongly) believe that they are in a small minority dissatisfied with the political conditions.
Proposition 1 on camouflage by avoidance of contact
Individuals with high psychological costs due to the ideology and actions of an oppressive regime resort to avoidance of camouflage in the form of emigration, isolation, or inner emigration, provided this abstention is possible at low cost, and they do not depend on income sources controlled by the government.
An example of this type of camouflage is Konrad Adenauer (1876–1967). Before Germany was taken over by the Nazis, he was the First Mayor of the city of Cologne. He was immediately deposed after the Nazis came to power because he was known to disagree with the Third Reich. He withdrew from political activities but was nevertheless arrested after the uprising of 20 July 1944. After the end of the War, in May 1945, the US occupational forces reinstalled him as First Mayor of Cologne. He became active in national politics, becoming Chairman of the Christian-Democratic Union (CDU) and the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949–1963). Adenauer can be considered an influential politician who camouflaged for a dozen years and played a most significant role in politics immediately after the oppressive regime’s end.
Other examples of avoidance of contact are German artists and academics
Who, during Nazi rule (1933–1945), resorted to inner emigration (German: Innere Emigration). They disagreed with the regime for various reasons but did not leave Germany or Austria (see Klieneberger, 1965; Wenke, 2010). They carried the costs of not being able to pursue their former work, as most of them were prohibited from writing and publishing in the Third Reich. The best known is Stefan Andres (1906–1970), who in 1936 wrote the best-selling novel Greco malt den Grossinquisitor. He spent the years from 1933 to 1949 in Positano, Italy, and camouflaged, not least to protect his Jewish wife.
Type (2) camouflage by minimal participation
Individuals who disagree with the new regime (C1 is high) but who see no possibility of avoiding its power (C4 is high) can try to participate to a minimal extent in the activities of the oppressive regime. They may choose an “obfuscating” strategy, revealing as little information as possible about what they really think (Chorus et al., 2022). Individuals seek to avoid punishment by participating in rallies and demonstrations celebrating the regime and other rituals, such as flying a flag supporting the regime. Such camouflage keeps the cost of expected punishment (C3) low. It will only be undertaken by socially independent individuals (low C2). This type of camouflage by minimal participation makes it possible to keep one’s job and possibly pension rights, but the career prospects are somewhat limited (C5 is medium).
Proposition (2) on minimal participation
Individuals who cannot avoid the oppressive regime but who strongly dislike it can choose to participate as little as possible in public activities. Disguising is possible if the individuals care little about the opinion of other members of society and provided the economic costs of such behavior are not very high.
Due to government pressure, individuals can be forced to participate in activities supporting the totalitarian regime. Such behavior is well documented for the Soviet Union and its end (Yurchak, 2005). A further example is Solomon Perel, born into a Jewish family, who camouflaged as an ethnic German to evade death by the Nazis. At 16, he was captured by the 12th Panzer Division and convinced the soldiers that he was an ethnic German. He also survived the Hitler Youth boarding school. However, the costs of the constant fear of being detected and losing his identity were enormous (Perel, 1997).
These are other examples reflecting the second type of camouflage.
Alcide de Gasperi (1881–1954) was a strong opponent of the fascist regime in Italy and therefore was imprisoned for 16 months. After being released, he camouflaged himself by working in the library of the Vatican. After the fall of the fascist regime, he became Minister of Foreign Affairs and, from 1945 to 1953, Prime Minister. Although de Gasperi paid for his opposition to the regime by being incarcerated, he may still be considered an example of a politician engaging in camouflage by minimal participation in an oppressive regime.
Leszek Balcerowicz (*1947) served as an academic during Poland’s communist period. He worked at the Central School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw and was a member of the communist party from 1969, but left it when the government declared martial law. Balcerowicz thought about establishing a free economy and society but considered this activity a "pure hobby.” He did not believe that the communist regime would end within his lifetime. But when the moment came in April 1989, he was ready to take up high political positions and to put his ideas into reality. He was Deputy Prime Minister from 1989 to 1991, and from 1997 to 2000; he became Chairman of the National Bank of Poland (2001–2007). Balcerowicz is an excellent example of minimal camouflage and a successful political activist after the dictatorial communist regime faltered.
Vaclav Klaus (*1941) served as a clerk and forecaster in a bank during the communist regime of Czechoslovakia. He strongly disapproved of the communist dictatorship but kept silent. After the regime’s fall in November 1989, Klaus became Minister of Finance and Prime Minister from 1992 to 1997. Afterward, he served two terms as President of the Czech Republic (2003–2013). He is another example of a person who camouflaged by participating as little as possible in the communist regime and then rising to high political office.
Type (3) camouflage by restricted cooperation
Individuals resort to restricted cooperation if their personal preferences deviate from the oppressive regime and if they do not find it very costly to adjust to the regime’s ideology and actions (medium C1). This reaction is low cost for lethargic individuals. They essentially remain passive. They fear punishment greatly if they do not collaborate and seek to lower it by signaling agreement with the regime (high C3). 1 These individuals also want a good economic position and are interested in a career (high C5). By actively participating, they want to be popular with the general opinion as they see it (high C2).
Proposition (3) on restricted cooperation
Individuals not strongly disagreeing with the new regime’s ideology and policy expect severe punishment if they are not in line with the government. They follow what they believe to be the general mood in society by participating in the activities of the oppressive regime in a restricted way.
An example of this type of camouflage is Erich Kästner (1899–1974) who wrote famous children’s books such as Emil und die Detektive, Pünktchen und Anton, Das fliegende Klassenzimmer and Das doppelte Lottchen. The Nazis burned his books, and he was prohibited from writing. However, under a pseudonym, he contributed to the story of some films, such as Drei Männer im Schnee and Münchhausen, and did quite well financially. After the War, he rose to be the president of the P.E.N. Center (1951–1962) and was appointed its honorary president.
The arguably most important painter of the 20th century, Pablo Picasso, from June 1940, stayed in his studio in Paris during the whole period of the Nazi occupation. He engaged in active social contacts but refrained from political activities, although he later claimed to have been in contact with the resistance. After Paris was liberated in August 1944, the local press celebrated Picasso as an icon of artistic resistance, and the international media followed suit. Picasso strongly supported this identification as a fighter for freedom but, in fact, was camouflaging.
Camouflaging by extensively participating in the regime’s activities may even turn the economic costs negative, into a benefit. The government might reward individuals who, despite their psychological costs (C1), are prepared to act in the regime’s interest. Examples of governments behaving this way are plentiful. Most generals did not share the Nazi ideology in the German Third Reich but participated fully in the War. 2 Hitler was fully aware of this and corrupted them with Dotationen, large cash payments, and manors with extensive land. Examples include Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb, who received 880,000 Reichsmark, and Colonel General Heinz Guderian, who received a country estate worth no less than 1.24 million Reichsmark. 3 Other examples are artists such as Arno Breker, who received 800,000 Reichsmark (Ueberschar and Vogel, 1999). In the now defunct German Democratic Republic, the Communist regime attempted to integrate individuals by handing out no less than 152 state awards and 10,000 other awards (Fehlauer et al., 1985: 131–137).
Type (4) camouflage with full collaboration
Individuals' private preferences may differ from the ideology and actions of an authoritarian regime. However, they aim to show dispassion by disregarding the difference or succumbing to government propaganda. Type (4) camouflage is an extreme case. Individuals collaborate fully, and in this respect do not camouflage, but they still do not publicly signal complete agreement with the regime in power (C1 is positive but low). By voluntarily and fully participating in the regime’s activities, they overcome the fear of expected punishment (C3 is high). They participate in this reduced form of camouflage because they want to pursue a career under the present regime and, if possible, also after that. They want to achieve significant social and economic prominence (C2, C4, and C5 are high). By actively and fully collaborating with the regime they can strongly reduce these costs and may even turn them into benefits.
Proposition (4) on full collaboration
Individuals who privately do not share the ideology or policy of an oppressive regime but who strongly want to pursue an economic and social career and are much afraid of punishment camouflage by actively collaborating with the regime’s activities.
An example of camouflaging while fully cooperating in a leading position with a dictatorial regime is Albert Speer (1908–1981). He was an architect who claimed to be solely interested in designing impressive buildings. Hitler, who considered himself to be an artist, greatly liked Speer and gave him the opportunity to plan huge constructions in Berlin and Nuremberg (Kitchen, 2015). Moreover, he appointed him Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production with extensive competencies and corresponding power. Speer claimed to have succeeded in this position (Speer, 1970). He disguised himself as an apolitical technocrat. Speer established the myth of having been a “good Nazi” (Van der Vat, 1997). In fact, Speer joined the Nazi party and assured Hitler of his “unconditional loyalty” even at the very end of the War (Schmidt, 1984). He was intensely interested in social and economic success and was not concerned about the slave labor he employed in armament firms. At the end of the War, in February 1945, Speer considered that he might become a kind of “Minister of Reconstruction” in postwar Germany (Schmidt, 1984). The Nuremberg Trial did not follow this dream and condemned him to 20 years of imprisonment. Speer is a good example of a person willing to do anything in order to become socially and economically prominent while trying to uphold a minimal degree of (perceived) distance from the official regime.
In some cases, camouflagers, including former members of an authoritarian government, may be able to become active and successful under new democratic conditions. Examples include several people in Adenauer’s government in Germany after World War II, such as Hans Globke (chief of the Federal Chancellery) and Reinhard Gehlen (director of the Federal Intelligence Office). Adenauer made these appointments even though he was no Nazi, but he needed them as competent administrators (see Bevers, 2009; Lommatzsch, 2009; Sontheimer, 2003).
Kazimir Malevich founded the avant-garde Suprematism Movement and is a pioneer of Geometric Abstract Art, primarily known for his painting “Black Square” (Hilton, 1992). He is an example of a painter and art theorist in Stalin’s Soviet Union who was no firm believer in its ideology but used the Soviets to push through his artistic ambitions. After October 1917, he became Chairman of the art section of the Soviet in the city of Moscow and professor at a major academy in Leningrad. Malevich is an example of an intellectual and artist who fully collaborated with a dictatorial regime though he did not share its ideology.
Empirical testing
It is challenging to test propositions (1) to (4) once sufficient and reliable data are available. The problem is that camouflage cannot easily be observed because individuals do not state their true opinion in a survey because it is costly to reveal. Camouflage thus is difficult to measure, and it may thus be helpful to consider variables closely connected to the various types of camouflage. Moreover, the propositions refer to an equilibrium reached when the individuals have undertaken the adjustments necessary to minimize the five kinds of costs. It usually takes time to reach this new equilibrium. Data collected in most cases only capture the movement toward the equilibrium, which may take considerable time. Accordingly, econometric estimates identifying the costs of, and reactions to, failing states are difficult to undertake.
Experiments may help us to analyze at least some aspects of the four propositions advanced. In psychology, related aspects have been tested by laboratory evidence. The most famous experiment is by Milgram (1963, 1974). His study explored the effects of authority on individuals. The results suggested that people are highly obedient and strongly influenced by authority. However, more recent investigations question Milgram’s findings on methodological grounds and even reject some of the conclusions (see the extensive discussion in Bregman, 2021: 159–178). A well-known and fundamental problem with laboratory experiments is the difficulty of generalizing the results to the level of society (see Harrison and List, 2004; Levitt and List, 2007; List, 2009). Camouflage is rarely an isolated individual decision; social factors are also influential. Constructing experimental situations in the lab that can convincingly capture such general social conditions is challenging.
Narratives (e.g., Shiller, 2019) may also be helpful in illustrating the process leading from various costs to the four types of camouflage. In this text, examples illustrate the various types of camouflage. They may be useful to present the four types of camouflage in a lively manner and illuminate their dependence on costs. Examples may be taken to be part of a specific narrative.
Comparison to exit and voice
Albert O. Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (1970) deals with the options of emigrating (exit) or protesting (voice) when the performance of institutions deteriorates. This book was one of the most essential in the social sciences of the 20th century. 4 It has greatly influenced thinking in economics, political science, and sociology. The distinction between exit and voice has led to extensive literature (e.g., Barry, 1974; Dowding et al., 2000; Foxley et al., 1986; Gehlbach, 2006; Graham and Keeley, 1991; Kim and Pfaff, 2003; Rokkan, 1974). Hirschman extended his analysis in various publications (e.g., Hirschman, 1974, 1976, 1980, 1993). Both exit and voice can be undertaken to a different degree. It is possible, for instance, to exit an oppressive country while making an effort to be able to return quickly as soon as conditions improve. The term “loyalty” in the title of Hirschman’s book does not indicate a third alternative action but a moderating variable that influences individuals' choice between the two responses of exit and voice (see Graham and Keeley, 1992).
The response to declining organizations by resorting to exit is closely associated with economics. Hirschman speaks of “the economist’s bias against voice and in favor of exit” (Hirschman, 1980: 448). Indeed, it is the only strategy that standard economics considers. When a firm’s performance declines, the customers and employees can exit, leading to a loss for the firms affected. Shares can be sold when the stock market performance is unsatisfactory. As a reaction, these firms make an effort to improve their performance.
The exit response has little effect on an authoritarian regime. Exit may even be beneficial to an oppressive regime because it rids them of an opponent. In addition, exit has other costs. People leaving a country are in a worse situation to return and become politically influential. Those individuals who exited during the reign of the oppressive regime may even be considered traitors; those who remained during challenging times tend to discriminate against them.
Voice is a reaction to democratic decline closely associated with political science and may take many forms, ranging from voting and contacting politicians to demonstrations, uprisings, and revolutions (Opp, 2022). By openly protesting, a few people want to reveal their “expressive” position (Kuran, 1995). Protesting against an authoritarian regime typically leads to high costs. In contemporary Russia, Boris Nemtsov has been murdered, and Alexander Navalny was the object of a murder attempt, and has been heavily punished with a lengthy prison sentence. The cost of voice differs strongly according to the option chosen (Hirschman, 1980: 446).
Voice is influential only under some favourable conditions. An oppressive government has many ways of imposing high costs on those raising their voice so that their voice is silenced: by throwing them into prison or killing them. Camouflage is only then less efficient than voice if those raising their voice successfully depose the oppressive government, which is rarely the case. In contrast, camouflaging people are readily available to become active against the government once there are signs that it is no longer firmly in power.
In his book, Hirschman (1970: 76) considered exit and voice to be alternative strategies: “Exit options can sharply reduce the probability that the voice option will be taken up widely and effectively” (see also Hirschman, 1980: 434). When people exit, their voice is strongly reduced or even disappears; when they raise their voice, it is more effective if done within the country than outside. Interestingly enough, in his article analyzing developments in the German Democratic Republic in World Politics in 1993, Hirschman revised his view and acknowledged that exit and voice might be complements. When especially well-known individuals are forced or induced to exit, people remaining in the country view that action as a clear indication of dissatisfaction with the regime. This insight tends to persuade some people to raise their voice.
Hirschman’s title and analysis consider the effect of loyalty on exit and voice. The more loyal people are to their country, the less they resort to exit, and the more they engage by raising their voice against the decline of the state. People thus remain with deteriorating organizations to help improve them. However, in such a situation, the voice option leads to costs imposed by the government in the form of a prison sentence or even the death penalty. The costs may be so high that voice is not a rational strategy. Hirschman argued that exit rather than voice is the option chosen in this circumstance. He assumed that “exit is generally costless” but later corrected this: “I took the costlessness of exit too much for granted” (Hirschman, 1980: 431, 439). In many cases, the costs of exiting are quite high. The migrants often lose their property, emigrate to a new country where they may have no personal contacts, lose their relationships with friends and family, and may not find a suitable job. It may be hard to find a country that accepts a migrant, and it may well be that no good economic position can be found. Cultural adaptation may be burdensome. Furthermore, family members remaining in the country may incur costs because the government may punish them. All these consequences are difficult to predict, which further raises exit costs.
Camouflage presents a set of viable alternatives to both exit and voice as responses to decline. The costs of behavior differ markedly depending on the type of camouflage that is chosen. Camouflage is not simply “no-exit” or “no-voice” but differs in various cost dimensions from the processes of exit and voice. To publicly protest or emigrate is very costly in most circumstances. Dictatorial regimes typically impose high costs on protesters. Furthermore, opposing the regime may meet the disapproval of other members of society. Resorting to exit imposes high cost on the individuals exiting. Camouflage is a low-cost strategy that avoids these costs of voice and exit.
Camouflage is typically a personal decision. It is rarely a strategy organized by institutions, not least because this would provide the oppressive government a better chance to observe and punish the people engaging in it. In contrast, voice taken alone is almost certainly ineffective. Therefore, it is typically launched collectively, often organized by a political party or interest group. Camouflage and exit are similar in that they do not depend on any institutional background but are taken privately.
These arguments suggest that camouflage differs from both exit and voice. This also becomes apparent when considering changes over time. The more people engage in voice, the less likely they are to exit. In such cases, voice and exit are substitutes. These are the interactions proposed by Hirschman (1970). The more people resort to camouflage, the less they want to emigrate because the exit costs are high. The more people engage in voice, the less they accept camouflage as an acceptable alternative.
As long as an autocrat is in full power, it is rational for individuals to conform and hide in a collective (Snyder, 2017, chap. 1; Sunstein, 2002, 2019). When individuals believe that the regime is crumbling, they have two options. They can remain camouflaged until the oppressive regime falls. This is the wait-and-see strategy. Alternatively, they can start to oppose the regime, initiating a general revolt. The authoritarian government cannot predict when this will happen. It should be aware that some individuals are resorting to camouflage but find it difficult to know their number and, most importantly, their willingness to give up their camouflage (see a similar argument in Kuran, 1995).
Reactions to camouflage by autocratic regimes
Authoritarian governments tend to react to camouflage with two strategies depending on the autocrats' beliefs about the heterogeneous preferences and consequent reactions in the population. The autocrats may believe that people more or less agree with the regime as they camouflage. The politicians have little or no information about how many people disguise their private preferences and whether the costs imposed on them are large enough to prevent revolt. Nevertheless, if people remain quiet and passively accept the government’s policies, oppressive governments may believe that people will not change their behavior. In this case, the strategy expressed as “As long as you are not against us, we do not care” tends to work. The aim is to disengage individuals and undermine any form of self-organization (The Economist, 2022: 16).
Some autocrats may fear that camouflagers tend to rapidly and unexpectedly switch their views and behavior when they believe the regime has lost power. This is a potential threat to the regime. In this case, autocratic regimes find it rational to follow the strategy “If you are not publicly for us, you are against us.” They try to move individuals to type (3) or, even better, to type (4) camouflage. The autocratic governments will mainly do so by increasing the threat of severe punishment in the hope of inducing people to remain in camouflage. They also try to induce individuals to publicly exhibit symbols such as the Nazi swastika or the “Z” symbol in Putin’s Russia. The cost of not explicitly supporting the regime rises, keeping individuals in camouflage. However, this governmental reaction of imposing higher costs and driving more people into camouflage makes it even more difficult for autocrats to be well informed about people’s genuine attitude towards the regime.
Conclusions
Camouflage is an essential and widely used reaction to worsening conditions in a democratic state when it becomes more authoritarian. However, camouflage may also be used in other organizations such as parties, interest groups, and clubs. It is also a popular reaction to employees' dissatisfaction with their superiors.
For most individuals, the possibility of disguising their private preferences is the most cost-minimizing strategy. Individuals are well aware that the cost of camouflage is often low compared to the alternatives of exit and voice, which are very costly. This is a significant reason why resorting to various types of camouflage is the rule rather than the exception. To camouflage by being as silent as possible (type 2 camouflage), or only cooperating to a limited extent (type 3 camouflage), has the advantage that no definitive decision has to be taken; the most important thing is not to get into problems with the government. In contrast, the reactions of exit and voice discussed by Hirschman (1970) require an explicit, complex, and costly decision by individuals.
Four types of camouflage are distinguished in this paper: (1) avoidance of contact, (2) minimal participation, (3) restricted cooperation, and, as an extreme case, (4) full collaboration with the oppressive regime. They should be considered "ideal types.” In reality, they are not strictly separable because they overlap. The intention is to illustrate that camouflage does not take one form but that the different cost factors imposed on individuals produce a variety of forms of camouflage. Further identification of types of camouflage as a response to the decline in firms, universities, and other organizations is a rewarding topic for future research. More profound empirical knowledge is desirable to analyse the various camouflage types and compare them with other responses to decline, such as exit and voice.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The paper benefitted greatly from the most insightful suggestions by the Editor in Chief, Andreas Flache, and the referees. I am also grateful for helpful discussions about camouflage especially to Andre Briviba, as well as to Martin Beglinger, Matthias Benz, Sandro Bieri, Conradin Cramer, Jens Drolshammer, Reiner Eichenberger, Lars Feld, Gerd Folkers, Allan Guggenbühl, Jürg Helbling, Louisa Hizli, Fadi Mansour, Simon Milligan, Louis Moser, Peter Nobel, Margit Osterloh, Fabian Scheidegger, Friedrich Schneider, Hans-Werner Sinn, and Oliver Zimmer.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
