Untangling expectations and sacrifices: Ultra-Orthodox men in Israel and the religious club model

The ultra-Orthodox community in Israel

Ultra-Orthodox Judaism traces its origins to the 19th century in Europe (Carvalho et al., 2017; Friedman, 1991). The Enlightenment movement’s rise, combined with modernization and secularization trends in Central and Western Europe, prompted many Jews to embrace new customs, attire, and lifestyles diverging from traditional Jewish orthodoxy. A significant number were drawn towards secularism, with some even converting to Christianity.

In an effort to curb this shift away from tradition, orthodox Jews fortified their communities with a more conservative framework and minimized exposure to external influences that might weaken their faith and traditions. This steadfast adherence to tradition was a pivotal reason for the ultra-Orthodox leadership’s staunch opposition to Zionism and the establishment of the State of Israel. Yet, due to historical events that decimated and impoverished ultra-Orthodox communities, most ultra-Orthodox leadership found it pragmatic to collaborate with Zionist institutions and, indeed, since Israel’s establishment, the ultra-Orthodox have been active participants in its political sphere. Ultra-Orthodox parties have played a prominent role in most coalition governments since 1948, and this became especially notable after 1977 when a right-wing coalition replaced its left-wing predecessor. This political strategy provided ultra-Orthodox politicians the leverage to negotiate benefits for their community, such as exemptions from mandatory military service, reduced health insurance fees, government allowances, and financial support for Yeshiva students (Gal, 2014).

Indeed, the State of Israel has played a crucial role in nurturing an ultra-Orthodox autonomy, complete with independent judicial, communicative, and educational systems (Berman, 2000; Cahaner, 2009). The seclusive ultra-Orthodox education system, in particular, prioritized religious studies over secular ones. This emphasis soon led to educational disparities between the ultra-Orthodox and the broader Israeli populace, also resulting in a decline in professional competencies within the ultra-Orthodox community, which in turn affected their integration into the labor market (Berman, 2000; Cahaner, 2009; Friedman, 1991). Moreover, in a bid to maintain orthodoxy, men are incentivized to pursue religious studies within the Yeshiva framework for married men (“Kollel”). This pathway offers an alternative to conventional employment as Kollel students benefit from state-sponsored tuition and other exclusive financial perks and benefits.

Israeli ultra-Orthodox men employment dilemma

For many young ultra-Orthodox men, making career decisions is fraught with complexity. On one hand, departing from the Yeshiva to enter the employment market offers a pathway to improve their family’s financial well-being and fulfill personal aspirations. Conversely, given the strong emphasis on sacred studies from an early age, stepping into the labor market can be interpreted as a departure from devout religiosity. Such a move may also entail significant “costs”. Opting for employment over continued sacred studies might jeopardize their membership in a prestigious “religious club,” which offers its members numerous benefits. Additionally, this choice might subject them and their families to societal penalties and sanctions (Berman, 2000). The ensuing chapter delves deeper into the advantages of the ultra-Orthodox “religious club” and the potential repercussions of diverging from its path.

This internal conflict manifests in prominent employment disparities between ultra-Orthodox men and their non-Orthodox Jewish counterparts. In 2003, the employment rate for ultra-Orthodox men aged 25–64 stood at 35% (Cahaner and Malach, 2022), a stark contrast to the 78% rate for non-Orthodox Jewish men (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). As financial challenges within ultra-Orthodox families intensified, more ultra-Orthodox men ventured into the labor market. Yet, significant disparities persist between them and their non-Orthodox Jewish peers. Over the past two decades, while the employment rate for ultra-Orthodox men increased to 52.5%, it remains substantially lower than the 90% rate observed for non-ultra-Orthodox Jewish men (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2019).

Religious club goods model

The concept of a “club model” provides a theoretical framework explaining the social integration of groups that distance themselves from dominant cultural norms. This model is particularly relevant to cults and religious minorities (Carvalho and Sacks, 2021). The canonical religious club model was developed by Iannaccone (1992, 1994) and later expanded by Berman (2000). Within this model, rigorous social collectives, termed “clubs,” collaboratively generate goods and services benefiting their members, which include religious services, charitable activities, and communal insurance policies (Carvalho, 2020). However, this collective production faces the challenge of “free riders” – members of the community who benefit from the collective’s products without contributing to their production. In extreme cases, such behavior could lead to a complete cessation of production, causing the community’s fragmentation. To counteract this, religious clubs set higher admission criteria and necessitate significant sacrifices from their members. These stipulations, like investing time and resources or adhering to particular norms related to attire, ceremonies, and other restrictions, ensure that only genuine contributors join (Carvalho, 2019). Such constraints both act as a screening mechanism and to discourage engagement in non-club activities (substitution effect). The model further suggests that group-level sanctions amplify these effects (Berman, 2000; Carvalho, 2019; Carvalho et al., 2017).

The religious club model has been successfully applied to provide insight of various sects and denominations around the world, ranging from Catholics (Berman et al., 2018) and Mormons (McBride, 2015) to the Amish (Choy, 2016; Wang, 2009, 2020) and Muslims (Berman and Laitin, 2008; Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2015). It’s also been applied to various Jewish sects, especially within Orthodox Judaism (Berman, 2000; Carvalho et al., 2017; Carvalho and Koyama, 2016).

The model postulates that a religious club’s ability to attract or retain members is limited. Individuals with higher earning potential might opt out of the club, forgoing its benefits (Berman, 2000). Some contend that earning potential relates to wage levels (Carvalho and Koyama, 2016). Berman (2000), for example, theorized that the rising demands for religious activities among Israeli ultra-Orthodox communities and their increasing avoidance of secular society stem from efforts to safeguard the community against rising real incomes. However, others associate earning potential with labor productivity, implicitly associated with personal capabilities. As Carvalho et al. (2017) noted, labor productivity is related to educational attainment. They demonstrated that curbing a club member’s education is logical when educational returns are minimal. They used the religious club model to show that the enlightenment and emancipation movements in the 19th century led some Jewish streams, especially in Eastern Europe, to, consciously, increase the sacrifice required from community members, to segregate and reduce the scope of secular education, and even to avoid secularism altogether.

Wang (2020) also found that imposing restrictions on children’s education in the Amish community was used to screen out high achievers and thus maintaining a cohort with relatively lower labor productivity. Intriguingly, like the Israeli ultra-Orthodox society, Amish children's education restrictions were facilitated by state support, which allowed the Amish to cultivate their segregated way of life and preserve their religious customs, exclude people with low religious participation, and even boosting their numbers through increased birth rates. ²

This study demonstrates the tension that exists in ultra-Orthodox society between individuals’ need to earn a living and their desire to belong to a supportive social club, in the spirit of the religious club model. That is, (personal) labor force considerations are mitigated by the community’s influence, as demonstrated by the Israeli ultra-Orthodox case. An Avrekh, which is an Israeli ultra-Orthodox man studying in the Yeshiva (i.e., member of the high-quality religious club), derives benefit from funded tuitions (state and Yeshiva) and other state funded financial support as well as from his religious activities, such as prayers and religious studies. This individual also enjoys external advantages in a variety of areas, merely by being a member of the high-quality religious club. These “external” benefits include, among other things, interest-free loans, free mortgage guarantees, assistance in finding a quality match, admission to prestigious educational institutions, priority entitlement in admitting his children to prestigious educational institutions and more. However, all these desirable benefits can be limited to club members, that are required to signal that they are behaving according to accepted norms of behavior. In the case of the Israeli ultra-Orthodox men, these signals include the amount of time devoted to religious activities, such as Torah studies, refraining from using the Internet, and reading secular newspapers (Perelman et al., 2019). Failing to properly signal may lead to the individual’s expulsion from the Yeshiva (i.e., banishment from the high-quality religious club), deny him of the benefits and, in addition, may incur other costs, such as social sanctions on him and his family. In this sense, signaling is an expression of club members’ voluntary sacrifice for being a member of the club.

The sample

Data from the Central Bureau of Statistics (2019) indicates that ultra-Orthodox men of working age predominantly fall into two groups: those who commit fully to religious studies, known as “Avrekh” (Avrekhim in plural), and those who participate actively in the labor market. For our study’s design, we selected a sibling sample - specifically brothers - to represent the ultra-Orthodox male population in relation to labor market participation. It is crucial to note that our focus is not on sociological aspects like family dynamics, peer influence, or status. Therefore, there was not a requirement for direct sibling supervision or pairing. Instead, our classification, detailed later, aims to typify participants not by their occupational choices but by the extent of their voluntary sacrifice within the ultra-Orthodox context.

The study population was sampled during 2019–2020 from among Haredi men. Recruitment was facilitated by ultra-Orthodox undergraduate students from the University of Haifa. Recruiters were diverse, spanning different ages, income levels, areas of residence, and affiliations with specific ultra-Orthodox streams. Each student was tasked with recruiting sets of male siblings from the same family for the study. Out of 389 completed questionnaires, 82 were screened out as they were not identified as ultra-Orthodox, and 57 had incomplete data, resulting in a total of 256 valid records.

Characterizing the ultra-Orthodox religious club

As posited by Perelman et al. (2019), within the ultra-Orthodox community, the exemplary man is seen as a religious scholar fully committed to Torah study. Consequently, ultra-Orthodox men are anticipated to dedicate considerable time to religious studies, both as an affirmation of their dedication to this ideal and as a signal to their membership within the religious community. In addition to spending time on religious studies, other behaviors signal an ultra-Orthodox man’s commitment to the religious club. These behaviors indicate a deliberate distancing from secular influences, such as refraining from reading the secular press and using the internet for non-livelihood purposes. Thus, religious club membership is not merely a one-off formality determined by a single criterion. Instead, it is an implicit amalgamation of factors that encompass the time dedicated to Torah study, abstention from secular activities, and adherence to religious norms. While this membership criteria might seem ambiguous, it facilitates varying degrees of commitment within the religious community.

The ambiguity of club membership criteria and the heterogeneity of commitment to religious and social norms offer valuable insights into the club’s dynamics. Building on Berman’s (2000) definition, which centers around non-participation in the labor market and indirectly implies significant sacrifices for club benefits, the club, in our view, faces inherent limitations in monitoring and enforcing its norms. This results in a spectrum of adherence levels among both members and non-members, with some Avrekhim not fully upholding the club’s dictates and becoming “free riders,” while some non-members stringently follow the norms in their aspiration to become members (“wannabes”).

Employing the K-means clustering method, we were able to unveil the intricate signaling patterns within the ultra-Orthodox community. This approach enabled us to identify distinct subgroups, offering a deeper understanding of the club’s dynamics, particularly the discrepancies between formal membership criteria (employment status) and actual adherence to religious norms (voluntary sacrifice).

The results of the K-means clustering analysis pointed towards two distinguishable “types” (elaborated in Table 1). The first “type” portrays club members as ultra-Orthodox who allocate more hours daily to Torah study and exhibit a pronounced inclination to avoid internet browsing and secular newspapers. This “type” can be described as exhibiting a “high level of voluntary sacrifice”. Correspondingly, the second “type” is characterized by a “low level of voluntary sacrifice”.

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Table 1.

K-Means clustering analysis estimation of club membership – High and Low voluntary sacrifice levels of ultra-Orthodox Jewish men.

		Voluntary sacrifice level
		Low	High	Sig
	N	107	149
Signaling about adherence to an ultra-Orthodox lifestyle	Daily hours of Torah study (average)	1.6	7.5	t = 44.4***
	Surfing the Internet for non-livelihood purposes	77%	28%	χ2 = 60.2***
	Reading articles in secular newspapers	31%	10%	χ2 = 17.6***
Additional background characteristics	Avrekhim	7%	93%	χ2 = 184.2***
	Age	30.1	29.7	t = .643

This classification documents several interesting phenomena. At first, it is interesting to note that membership in the religious social club is implicit and vague in a way that allows “flexibility” in weighing accepted norms of behavior. That is, although ultra-Orthodox men characterized by a high level of voluntary sacrifice (i.e., club members) devote more time to Torah studies (7.5 hours per day), a significant proportion of them surf the Internet and/or read secular newspapers (28% and 10%, respectively). Similarly, although ultra-Orthodox men characterized by a low level of voluntary sacrifice devote less time to Torah studies (1.6 hours per day), many of them do not surf the Internet and/or avoid reading secular newspapers (23% and 69%, respectively).

The classification also discerns “free riders.” Our analysis reveals that 7% of those with a low voluntary sacrifice level are Avrekhim. Such individuals ostensibly associate with the social club but do not genuinely embody the typical voluntary sacrifice expected of this group. It’s conceivable that they might not sustain their Yeshiva association for an extended period voluntarily. Conversely, roughly 7% of those with a high voluntary sacrifice level aren’t Avrekhim (i.e., ultra-Orthodox men in the labor market). These individuals (“wannabes”), while not official club members, aspire to join and demonstrate this intent by embracing and signaling the ultra-Orthodox lifestyle, hoping to enjoy the club’s privileges.

Variables

As stated, one of the objectives of the present study is to demonstrate the tension between the level of voluntary sacrifice required of the religious club members and their earning potential. According to one interpretation (Hemi, 2019; Nevo et al., 2004), earning potential is an expression of individuals’ abilities and skills. Highly capable individuals will most likely receive higher compensation in the labor market. Abilities, in this sense, may express individuals’ cognitive capacity to solve problems, as well as their interpersonal and intrapersonal “softer” skills in the context of coping with challenges in everyday life. Others, for instance Perelman et al. (2019), interpret earning potential as an expression of individuals’ subjective wage expectations, whether related to abilities or not.

To this end, we’ll evaluate three measures of individuals’ earning potential aligned with these interpretations:

1. Earning Potential Based on Subjective Wage Expectations: Following Perelman et al. (2019), we estimated this by asking respondents to estimate the wages of non-academic ultra-Orthodox men. We used the logarithm of these estimates for our analysis. Our research model predicts that wage expectations are higher among individuals with lower levels of voluntary sacrifice.

Further, we probed into the concerns of ultra-Orthodox men about the potential ramifications of diverging from their religious lifestyle. Foremost among these concerns was the fear of being perceived as ‘lesser quality’ suitors, potentially discouraging high-quality women from considering them as marital partners. Other apprehensions included the risk of their children experiencing reduced social engagements and facing barriers when enrolling in educational institutions. We gauged the concerns of ultra-Orthodox men regarding the social fines tied to deviating from their religious lifestyle, using 5 statements on a 4-item answer scale (Appendix 2). Our measure of perceived personal and social fines was computed as a standardized mean of the responses (α = 0.807). Such social sanctions function as mechanisms for a central planner to ensure commitment intensity within the group and to manage its membership. Thus, our hypothesis posits that ultra-Orthodox men exhibiting a lower level of ‘voluntary sacrifice’ likely view these social fines with less gravity.

Earning potential and social fines substitution

We conducted a simulation to assess the interplay between earning potential (i.e., wage expectations) and perceptions of personal and social fines, in relation to the likelihood of belonging to either group.

As depicted in Table 2, of the participants, 139 (58.2%) are Avrekhim, signaling a high level of voluntary sacrifice. In contrast, 99 participants (41.8%) are ultra-Orthodox men in the labor force, signaling a lower level of voluntary sacrifice. Based on this distribution and the outcomes of our Logit regression model, we can calculate the earning potential corresponding to each degree of personal and social fines perception. For simplicity, our calculation accounted for median values of 0 for coping with challenges in everyday ultra-Orthodox life and 17 for cognitive skills test results. Given our aim to assess whether financial incentives could improve labor force participation of ultra-Orthodox men, we can also simulate an alternative scenario where ultra-Orthodox labor force participation is 10% higher, representing 52.4% of all ultra-Orthodox men. The outcomes of both simulations, along with the differences in wage expectations, are visualized in the subsequent figure (Figure 1).

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Figure 1.

The salary increase required to reduce the group of ultra-Orthodox Avrekhim with a high level of voluntary sacrifice by 10% (for median values of life coping abilities level and cognitive skills).

The simulations revealed that when perceived fines are extremely low, a NIS 914 incentive might reduce high-sacrifice Avrekhim population by 10%. However, with extremely high perceived fines, a NIS 3819 incentive would be necessary for a similar outcome.

From Yeshiva to workforce: Evaluating the financial impetus for ultra-Orthodox men

We utilized our simulation data to quantify the cost of a government program designed to reduce the number of Avrekhim. For reasons of convenience, we determine the goal of the program arbitrarily to a reduction of 10%. Also, for simplicity, the analysis ignores natural growth and development trends of the ultra-orthodox community. Currently, with an estimated Avrekhim population of 100,000 in Israel, the objective would be to transition 10,000 Avrekhim into the labor market. To achieve this, the government should consider financially incentivizing the Avrekhim, aiming to increase an average individual’s likelihood of transitioning by 10%. This proposed policy outlines a year-long initiative in which the government offers a monthly stipend for a span of 3 years to any Avrekh leaving the Yeshiva to join the labor force, under the condition they commit to at least 3 years6 in the labor sector (it is important to note that existing incentives are not addressed in this proposal). Considering the median levels of perceived fines and other individual attributes, our simulation indicates a required monthly subsidy of NIS 1876, which equates to NIS 22,510 annually.

The above calculation assumes that granting such a subsidy is unlikely to affect the Haredi social identity of the average individual. Berman (2000) argues that providing a subsidy to Avrekhim who remain to study in Yeshiva distorts the labor supply in Haredi society, since such a subsidy increases the benefit of belonging to the ultra-Orthodox religious club. Accordingly, an ultra-Orthodox individual who wishes to remain in the religious social club and enjoy its’ benefits must increase his signaling (i.e., voluntary sacrifice) and indicate his commitment to the community. Such a signal may be in the form of increasing his Haredi social identity (which consists, among other things, of devoting a lot of time each day to religious studies, avoiding surfing the Internet, etc.) According to the same logic, providing a subsidy to Haredi men entering the labor market is likely to achieve the opposite result, that is, to reduce the Haredi social identity of the average individual. Therefore, it can be assumed that the plan proposed above will increase the rate of Avrekhim entering the labor market even beyond 10% per year (beyond the growth rate expected under the proposed plan). Alternatively, the growth target can be achieved through a smaller annual subsidy.

The program’s influence on Avrekhim labor market participation, the magnitude of the incentive grants distributed, and the projected economic benefit for Israel as these Avrekhim integrate into the workforce are detailed in below Table 5.

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Table 5.

The effect of a government program on Avrekhim joining the labor market, the scope of incentive grants paid as part of the program, and the discounted benefit to the Israeli economy when Avrekhim enter the labor market.

Year	Number of Avrekhim entering the labor market for the first time due to the government program	Total number of Avrekhim eligible for a work incentive grant under the program	Cost	The discounted benefit for each program year a
			(Million NIS)
1	10,000	10,000	225	15,000
2	—	10,000	225	—
3	—	10,000	225	—
	Total after discount		631	14,493
	Net profit (million NIS)			13,862

The underlying assumption in our calculation is that, upon the program’s launch, 10,000 Avrekhim will enter the labor market. Consequently, each of these Avrekhim would be eligible for an incentive during their first 3 years in the employment market. The yearly subsidy amount can be determined by multiplying the number of eligible individuals by the annual subsidy, which stands at NIS 22,510 annually. The table above details our analysis results, indicating that the total discounted cost for the program in its inaugural year is projected to be NIS 631 million, based on a capitalization rate of 3.5%. This capitalization rate is used to evaluate the cost of the program and it is consistent with the discount rate used by Cave and Aboody (2011) to calculate the expected contribution of an ultra-Orthodox man joining the labor market.

As Cave and Aboody (2011) have previously noted, the Israeli economy gains a net profit of NIS 46,275 for every Avrekh who enters the labor market in his initial year of employment. Spread across 30 working years, this translates to a cumulative economic benefit of roughly NIS 1.5 million (considering a capitalization rate of 3.5%). Thus, the total discounted present value of all the Avrekhim joining the labor force due to the program is approximated at NIS 14,493 million, using the same capitalization rate. When the subsidy cost is subtracted, the program’s anticipated discounted profit for the economy stands at an impressive NIS 13.86 billion.

Limitations

One cannot overlook the intricacies of causality when analyzing career choices. There’s a tangible possibility that deciding to venture into the labor market might reshape workers’ expectations concerning potential earnings, particularly for ultra-Orthodox men lacking academic qualifications. This potential shift also applies to their perceptions of personal and societal fines. Given the current research design doesn’t comprehensively address these dynamics, conclusions regarding ultra-Orthodox men’s likelihood of labor market entry should be approached with caution.

This study frames its analysis around the religious club model (Berman, 2000), positing that individuals within religious “extreme” groups also make labor market choices based on cost-benefit considerations. Nonetheless, while this economic perspective forms the core of our analysis, the study acknowledges, yet does not empirically explore, the significant role of longer-term sociocultural influences on these decisions. Such influences, as indicated by works like Perelman et al. (2019), merit recognition even if they fall outside the direct empirical scope of this research.

Finaly, employing closed questionnaires, particularly those probing into respondents’ past experiences, may inadvertently introduce biases. Respondents’ recollections are susceptible to memory distortions, post-hoc rationalizations, selective recall, among other issues. It's crucial for interpretations of the data to consider these potential biases in understanding the reported behaviors and attitudes.