Power Relations and Reciprocity

Abstract

In this article we suggest a theoretical framework of knowledge construction by employing the concept of dialectics to power relationships between researcher and participants. Power distribution in research is perceived as dichotomous and asymmetrical in favor of the researcher, creating unequal power relations that make exploitation possible. Acknowledging such exploitation has led to a critical stance and attempts to bridge gaps through egalitarianism and empowerment of participants. Some scholars have focused on shifting expert knowledge differentials between researcher and participants throughout the research project. Others have evaluated such gaps as a source of knowledge construction. In the present work we applied a dialectical approach to understanding research relationships, suggesting reciprocity as their defining attribute, regardless of symmetry or asymmetry and as a source of knowledge construction. In this article we recommend avoiding a taken-for-granted attitude, because we see it as a direct obstacle to the construction of knowledge.

Keywords

epistemology ethics / moral perspectives knowledge construction power / empowerment relationships research

How do dialectics, reciprocity in research relationships, and knowledge construction interrelate? In this article we suggest a theoretical framework of knowledge construction, employing the concept of dialectics to power differentials and to the power relationship between researcher and participants. Traditionally, scholars had assumed asymmetry between the research parties (Karnieli-Miller, Strier, & Pessach, 2009; Reason, 1994). From this perspective, power distribution is perceived as dichotomous and asymmetrical in favor of the researcher, creating unequal relations that make exploitation possible. A critical position has thus developed, as have attempts to bridge the resulting gaps through an egalitarian outlook and empowerment of participants. Other scholars have evaluated the gaps between researcher and participants as a source of knowledge construction. In this article, we apply a dialectical approach to the understanding of research relationships, suggesting reciprocity as their defining attribute, regardless of their symmetry or asymmetry, and as a source of knowledge construction in qualitative research

Power Differentials Between Researcher and Participants

Traditionally, power had been defined as the ability to manipulate others’ thoughts or actions (Kelly, Burton, & Regan, 1994; Millen, 1997). Scholars in various theoretical traditions of qualitative research have addressed issues of power relations. Common to all those traditions is the notion that such relationships are primarily dichotomous, asymmetrical, and present the researcher in unequal power relations with the participant (Kvale, 2003; Limerick, Burgess-Limerick, & Grace, 1996). There are two main perspectives with regard to power differentials between researcher and participants (Enosh, Ben-Ari, & Buchbinder, 2008). The first views research relations as a symmetrical relationship between research parties (Mishler, 1986; Rubin & Rubin, 2005). The second maintains that research relations, in fact, reflect an asymmetrical relationship, emphasizing inequality as a defining attribute of the exchange (Denzin, 2001; Goffman, 1959; Hochschild, 1983). The first approach might be perceived as attempting to achieve a utopist state of relationships, whereas the second one describes the actual reality of research relationships.

Traditionally, the conduct of research assumed asymmetry between the research parties. As Reason eloquently put it, “In traditional research, the roles of researcher and subject are mutually exclusive: the researcher alone contributes the thinking that goes into the project, and the subjects contribute the action or contents to be studied” (1994, p. 42). Participants were considered mainly as providers of information; a means to the end of knowledge acquisition initiated by the researcher. Indeed, popular wisdom maintains that as the persons asking the questions, researchers might be seen to be in a more powerful position. Later, mainly for ethical considerations, the quest for symmetry was a reaction to the initial asymmetric and exploitative nature of research relationships. The initiative came from concerned scholars who sought to ameliorate historical wrongs (e.g., Edwards & Mautner, 2004; Manderson, Bennett, & Andajani-Sutjahjo, 2006; Oakley, 1981) that made power distribution in research dichotomous and asymmetrical in favor of the researcher, creating the possibility of exploitation (Karnieli-Miller et al., 2009; Limerick et al., 1996).

Scholars either took the critical position, emphasizing power gaps or trying to bridge them through egalitarianism and empowerment of participants, or they evaluated gaps between researcher and participants as a source of knowledge construction (Ben-Ari & Enosh, 2011; Enosh & Ben-Ari, 2010). Scholars of different traditions taking the critical position, especially those advocating feminist approaches and participatory action research (PAR), have attempted to empower specific disadvantaged populations by creating research relations based on egalitarian partnership (e.g., Brayton, 1997; Maguire, 1987; Treleaven, 1994). In a keynote conference speech, Kvale (2003) used the metaphor of the “gentle and enticing wolf” in Little Red Riding Hood (Grimm & Grimm, 2004) to warn participants against ill-intentioned researchers, and researchers not to abuse their power over participants.

As Enosh and Buchbinder (2005) noted, however, when considering the original story (Grimm & Grimm, 2004) as a metaphor of the research endeavor, the respondent in the fairytale was the wolf, whereas Little Red Riding Hood was the interviewer (researcher). The interview ended when the respondent (wolf) devoured the researcher (Red Riding Hood). The main theme of this fairytale is that control over knowledge shifts foci of power between researcher and participant in unexpected ways that turn and twist the plot, possibly leading to a view relating power differentials to the control of knowledge. Therefore, we argue that power is constructed discursively, whereby each participant attempts to steer the interview but is simultaneously steered by the other. Given that the major goal of the research endeavor is the production of knowledge, power relations in qualitative research might be conceived as the power to impact the process and outcomes of knowledge construction (Enosh & Buchbinder).

Knowledge-related power differentials arise at different stages of the research process. In data gathering, the participant holds the knowledge of his or her experiences while the researcher, holding the knowledge of the conduct of research, sets the agenda. That the participants may withdraw at any time from the interview with no further obligations also challenges preliminary conceptions of power differentials between researcher and participant (King & Horrocks, 2010). We claim that the mere fact that participants have access to and control the experiential knowledge shapes and defines the nature of their relationships whether they are aware of it or not. They may refuse to participate, negotiate the level of their participation, and/or negotiate the emerging meanings of discourse developing through the data collection process, be it interview or observation.

Furthermore, throughout data gathering or interviewing, the question arises as to who produces the knowledge. Thus, in the course of interviewing there is collaborative production as well as negotiation over facts, myths, labeling, and interpretations. At the data analysis stage, the question is who interprets the results and according to what criteria (Enosh & Ben-Ari, 2010; Enosh et al., 2008). In the next stage the concern is who disseminates the knowledge produced; in other words, who is responsible for its implications and its implementation? We claim that a useful way to bridge the differences, apparent contradictions, and contrasting approaches to power relations in conducting research would be to employ a dialectical approach. To that end we need first to understand what a dialectical approach means.

Dialectics

There are three fundamental assumptions in current mainstream conceptions of dialectical thinking: First, a contradiction is a temporary state that will be replaced by an integrated or synthesized thought. Second, the progress of thinking is linear, logical, and moves in one direction from contradiction to synthesis. Third, integration or synthesis is at a higher level of cognitive functioning, and is usually considered a more sophisticated, creative, and advanced mode of thought (Baltes & Staudinger, 1993; Basseches, 2005; Benack, Basseches, & Swan, 1989; Friberg, & Öhlén, 2010; Manzo, 1992).

Dialectics can be defined in both the ontological and the epistemological realms. It is a fundamental aspect of the nature of reality (ontology), but also refers to our understanding of how we come to know or perceive the world, which is epistemology (Basseches, 2005; Ben-Ari, 2012; Ben-Ari & Enosh, 2011; Friberg & Öhlén, 2010). At the ontological level, we define reality as dialectical inasmuch as it comprises ongoing processes of change, assuming that oppositional forces form the basis of all phenomena and that change is constant and ongoing. These assumptions converge into the understanding that contradictions drive change. They create the constant tension between unified oppositions, forces, or themes that negate or oppose one another, yet are simultaneously interdependent.

Change can be understood to occur at two levels, referred to as first-order and second-order change (Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974), relating respectively to change bounded by the rules of the system or changes in the rules of the system (Watzlawick et al., 1974). Basseches (2005), who contributed extensively to the development of modern age dialectics, defined dialectics as a second-order change. He defined dialectics as “movement through forms,” which reflected his understanding of second-order change in contrast to “movement within forms” (p.50), akin to first-order change.

In the epistemological realm, dialectical thinking is a mental process compromising or synthesizing facts, views, and goals of opposing stances. As such, it attempts to adapt understanding to the ontological processes of change (Basseches, 2005; Friberg & Öhlén, 2010). In our view, however, first- and second-order epistemological dialectics can exist independently of ontological dialectics. It is the ability to view issues from multiple perspectives and to arrive at the most economical and reasonable reconciliation of seemingly contradictory information. As such, it is a form of analytical reasoning that produces knowledge as long as there are questions, conflicts, and apparent contradictions. In this context, first-order change is the tacit reinforcement of the present understanding that includes changes consistent with existing schemata. Second-order change is the conscious modification of the organizing frameworks (schemata) in a particular direction (Bartunek & Moch, 1987). That is, first-order change helps maintain existing understandings whereas second-order change aims at replacing them.

Thus, in a dialectical approach, a second-order change synthesizes two opposing stances into a higher level of conceptual analysis. The synthesis itself becomes a new thesis, which in turn is negated by a new antithesis producing a new synthesis, in an endless process of knowledge production (Ben-Ari & Enosh, 2011; Enosh & Ben-Ari, 2010). We now move to examine how the dialectics concept can facilitate understanding of research relationships, emphasizing gaps and power differentials between research parties.

Power Differentials: Ontological, Epistemological, and Ethical Considerations

From an ontological perspective, mainstream conceptions of research relationships can be understood as derived from differences or similarities between researcher and participant (e.g., Aléx & Hammarström, 2007; Enosh & Ben-Ari, 2010; Karnieli-Miller et al., 2009; Vitos, 2008). These could be either changing (dynamic; Aléx & Hammarström) or unchanging (static; Ribens, 1989; Vitos). In the static view of power differentials the researcher is traditionally presented as holding power over the participant (Kvale, 2003). By contrast, the dynamic view of power relations between the researcher and participants indicates that first-order changes might occur throughout or even within different stages of the research process. Such a view might refer either to changes throughout the research process or to micro changes occurring within a given stage. Aléx and Hammarström, for example, described ups and downs in social status within the interview process.

As noted before, others have described the changing roles of researcher and participants vis-à-vis the control of knowledge, with their attendant major epistemological implications. At each stage of knowledge production, control over the inputs and outputs shift between the parties. The final constructed products of knowledge are created from those same inputs and outputs of the ongoing process between researcher and participants. Each stage might become a source of new knowledge or hinder its construction through processes of resistance, conflict, or power struggles between researcher and participants (Ben-Ari & Enosh, 2011; Enosh, 2008; Enosh & Ben-Ari, 2010). For new knowledge to emerge, one should cultivate inquisitiveness and intellectual curiosity, and avoid taking matters for granted (Enosh et al., 2008).

At the data collection phase, the participants hold access to their experiences, beliefs, and attitudes, and consequently have expert knowledge and are perceived accordingly. The researcher holds the knowledge of ways to conduct the research. In the data analysis stage, the researcher controls the knowledge of how to analyze the information gained, and can choose to involve the participants in the process or not. In the dissemination stage, the researcher interprets the data and controls the knowledge as well as access to venues of knowledge distribution (scientific reports and journals, book chapters, and books).

Ontologically, one cannot ignore the inherent power differentials in most research relationships. Epistemologically, the nature of research relations might be used as a source of the knowledge produced and affect the process of knowledge construction. At the same time, the ethical stances and epistemological considerations of the scholars involved influence the range of meanings attached to such differentials, and the ways proposed to cope with them are also influenced by the ethical stances and epistemological considerations of these same scholars (Ben-Ari & Enosh, 2011; Enosh & Ben-Ari, 2010). From an ethical standpoint, advocates of egalitarianism as an ultimate goal (e.g., Karnieli-Miller et al., 2009; Kvale, 1996, 2003; Oakley, 1981; Strier, 2006) aspire to alleviate the problem by reducing the power gaps between researcher and participants. Other scholars, for pragmatic reasons of knowledge acquisition, have tried to overcome participants’ resistance by minimizing social gaps between them and the researcher (Cannell & Kahn, 1968; Oakley). In a classic paper, Cannell and Kahn argued that “it may be best to minimize the social distance between interviewer and interviewee so that the interviewer is seen as within range of communication of the respondent” (p. 585).

From an ethical position, a question to be asked in this context is whether those power differences are harmful to the participants and to knowledge production. That there are power differentials between researcher and participants is an ontological fact. Seeing it as a disadvantage or an advantage is an ethical matter. So far, we have focused on views critical of the disadvantages and drawbacks that derive from it, and thus recommended reducing the gap on the ontological level. In this approach it is assumed inherently or explicitly that equality (egalitarianism) is an ethical meta goal to be pursued at all contexts.

With that, other scholars, taking a different ethical and epistemological approach, have emphasized advantages of the gap. From their perspective, a social gap between researcher and participant could enrich the interview situation as far as knowledge construction is concerned. Enosh et al. (2008) have argued that when researcher and participant come from the same social background, they tend to trivialize the phenomena studied and the need to explore them. In the same vein, overempathizing and too much social and/or experiential closeness to the participants reduce the researcher’s genuine curiosity as well as the ability to reflect on the information and the life situation of the participants, taking for granted what otherwise could have produced a “sense of differentness” (Ben-Ari & Enosh, 2011; Miller, 1969; Ribens, 1989). As a result, power differentials are shaped by the interview situation in a way that what has been said and how it has been said becomes a new source of knowledge (Ribens; Vitos, 2008). Within this framework, we echo Riben’s question:

How desirable is it, then, that we are socially close to the people we are interviewing? . . . What we need, perhaps, is sensitivity to the ways in which particular social characteristics will affect our research relationships. How this affects the balance of power in the interview may be very significant for the talk that ensues. (1989, p. 581)

The idea of power differentials and power relations, and attempts to change this balance of power by trying to create an egalitarian research system, can be viewed as first-order change attempts. Equality between research parties is unrealistic because each plays an entirely different role. By emphasizing differences and similarities between them, mainstream views of research relationships are still restricted to focusing on their respective roles. Accordingly, common conceptions of the research relationship as symmetric or asymmetric tend to be maintained through such views, creating interminable futile attempts to achieve symmetry where it does not and cannot exist.

Acknowledging and appreciating the differentness between research partners and its contribution to knowledge production, we claim that every project can be perceived as an arena that reflects power differentials between researcher and participants. These could prove detrimental to knowledge construction by undermining the interview partners’ motivation to explore the issues at hand in depth, but could also motivate the exploring of differences and thus become a source of new knowledge. Interactions within the research process are essentially ongoing occurrences of potential misunderstandings. Hence we should perceive research not necessarily as shared and agreed-upon meaning-making endeavors, but rather as ambiguously complex processes with multiple levels of “differences interrupting differences” (Scheurich, 1995, p. 243).

We claim also that these “interrupting differences” are the hallmark of qualitative research and can serve as a vessel of knowledge production. In sum, each exchange becomes an arena in which researcher and participants negotiate the meaning and the implications of the phenomena as studied and understood. We suggest that analysis can be organized by a continuum of agreement and disagreement between researcher and participants regarding their perceptions of reality, reflecting power imbalances in their relationships (Enosh et al., 2008). We argue, too, that the idea of a neutral researcher, or even the bracketing of his or her beliefs, is doomed to fail. Instead, noting, emphasizing, analyzing, and using imbalances and differences between research parties might prove to be the cornerstone for building the substance and process of knowledge construction.

Focusing on interaction between researcher and participants would allow for schemata change. The transition from viewing research relations in terms of the parties’ roles to understanding the nature of research relationships gives rise to a second-order change in understanding them. Rather than restricting ourselves to either symmetrical or asymmetrical relationships, understanding these relations as reciprocal fosters a synthesis between the two previously opposing views. Using a dialectical reasoning mode, we switch from an either/or perspective to a both/and perspective (Basseches, 2005).

The Reciprocity Norm: A Defining Attribute of the Research Relationship

Before showing how reciprocity relates to our view of the research relationship, a short theoretical presentation of the construct is in order. Reciprocity (2009) can be understood as a relation of mutual dependence, action, or influence; a mutual or cooperative interchange of favors or privileges, especially the exchange of rights or privileges. In his classic paper, Gouldner (1960) distinguished between three meanings of reciprocity: first, as a pattern of mutually contingent exchanges of gratification; second, as the existential or folk belief in reciprocity; and third, as the generalized moral norm. Based on this conceptualization, Uehara (1995) suggested two basic connotations for the reciprocity concept: a pattern of social exchange of goods and services and the moral belief in the generalized obligatory norm. Within this context, three alternative explanations are suggested, implying three different moral meanings of reciprocity. One is the egoistic approach, encouraging reciprocity as a way to increase one’s benefits over time (Blau, 1964; Etzioni, 1988).

Adhering to the egoistic approach implies that it is reasonable to realize the opportunity to overbenefit from an exchange. Equity is the pivotal attribute in the second approach (McClintock, Kramer, & Keil, 1984; Prinse, Buunk, & van Yperen, 1993; Walster, Walster, & Berschied, 1978), positing equality of exchange as the rule. That is when individuals adhering to the equity meaning of reciprocity are forced to choose between overbenefiting and underbenefiting from an exchange; they would prefer to overbenefit. The third is the reciprocal approach (Morris & Rosen, 1973; O’Connell, 1984; Uehara, 1990, 1995), implying that reciprocity, the ability to repay in kind, is of foremost importance, and if forced to choose, individuals would prefer to underbenefit rather than to feel indebted.

We assert that reciprocity stems from the common interest of both research parties to understand in depth the phenomenon in question. We understand reciprocity as a process whereby each research party believes that he or she contributes not necessarily to the other party, but to a matter of common interest, an issue of concern, a social phenomenon, or a personal matter. From the researchers’ perspective, this is manifest in their interest in understanding the participants, learning about their worldviews and developing and constructing new knowledge.

When we consider participants’ perspectives, the interest might be in egoistic as well as reciprocal benefits such as sharing experiences with an empathic listener (Buckle, Dwyer, & Jackson, 2010; Campbell, Adams, Wasco, Ahrens, & Sefl, 2010; McCoyd & Shdaimah, 2007), feeling justified and vindicated through knowing that others share the same condition (Harper & Cole, 2012), voicing one’s marginalized and stigmatized condition and discourse (McCoyd & Shdaimah), the opportunity to reflect on and derive meaning from one’s experience (Dyregrov et al., 2011), or helping others in the same situation or condition (Iversen, 2012)—just a few of the reasons participants reported as motives for participating in qualitative research. Mutual interest, then, is the basis for understanding the inherent reciprocal nature of the exchange in research relations.

Therefore, rather than focusing on the relationships between researcher and participants, we focus on the relations between each party and the subject under study. This understanding creates a situation of similarity between the partners despite actual power differentials. From a different perspective, it is a second-order change because it involves not only relationships between human beings, but relationships between them and the subject of common interest.

The extensive literature on reciprocity in experimental and qualitative research demonstrates that overall, most participants in reciprocity studies preferred reciprocal interactions or avoided interactions in which they overbenefited. Furthermore, in contrast to Gouldner’s (1960) assumption emphasizing immediate exchange, Ekeh (1974) argued that reciprocity need not be realized here and now. There might be time lags between giving and receiving, and they might include the possibility of indirect reciprocity (Uehara, 1995), as many ethnographic studies have demonstrated (Schreiber & Glideweel, 1978; Wentowski, 1981). Applying the reciprocity concept to contexts of power differences between actors in the exchange, Gouldner stated,

Egotistic motivations may seek to get benefits without returning them . . . the situation is then ripe for the breakdown of reciprocity and for the development of . . . exploitation. The norm . . . safeguards powerful people against temptations of their own status; it motivates and regulates reciprocity as an exchange pattern, serving to inhibit the emergence of exploitative relations. (1960, p. 174)

This claim could be overly optimistic, given the abundance of exploitative situations in our world. However, we can certainly claim that the reciprocity norm has lessened the abuse of power even if not totally preventing it. Indeed, regarding our issues, the history of research ethics is rich in examples of power exploited by researchers (e.g., Guillemin, & Gillam, 2004; Seto, 2001), persons not motivated by this norm but probably by the egoistic moral code. By contrast, the movement that stresses egalitarianism in research relations (e.g., Baum, MacDougall, & Smith, 2006; Karnieli-Miler et al., 2009; Kvale, 2003) emphasizes the equity principle, attempting to achieve egalitarianism and direct reciprocal exchange between researchers and those they research. As Uehara pointed out, not having had an opportunity to reciprocate directly or indirectly, recipients reported “feelings of discomfort, guilt, inadequacy and even resentment” (1995, p. 490).

Possibly scholars and researchers who emphasize equity are driven by feelings of guilt and discomfort in overbenefiting from the exchange, and by collective guilt over abuses of power by other researchers. Since such attempts to achieve a form of direct reciprocity and egalitarianism have been largely futile, we suggest perceiving relations between researcher and participants as based on indirect reciprocity, in which each party brings different forms of expert knowledge to the exchange. Reciprocity allows for asymmetrical relations, be they static or dynamic, while enabling each research party to gain from them. Power differentials are acknowledged and exchanges between the parties promoted. Each recognizes his or her contribution to the research process, as well as that of the other.

Producing knowledge can be perceived as a joint venture of researcher and participant, so that reciprocity can be thought of as a defining attribute of the research relationship. The researchers benefit directly from the exchange, whereas the participants probably benefit directly and/or indirectly in the long run, rather than directly and immediately. Thus, reciprocity might be affected indirectly by using the constructed knowledge later to help those participants or others in similar situations. Characterizing the research relationships as reciprocal, we inevitably consider the need for mutual recognition and respect, knowing that advancing the topic in question is contingent upon the contribution of each party. That is, understanding the reciprocal nature of research relations entails mutual respect.

From a Dyadic to a Triadic System of Relations

In this article we introduced the notion of reciprocity that enabled us to consider the triadic system of research relations involving researcher, participants, and the phenomenon of interest. This gives rise to the move from a traditional dyadic view to a triadic system. Such a system generates a multisystemic structure of interactions among researcher, participants, and phenomena, and is in turn impacted by the relationships each has with the other two. We believe that each of the three systems of exchange between each dyad influences and is influenced by the third element in the triangle, and can serve as a source of new knowledge.

How do dialectics, reciprocity, and knowledge construction interrelate? Change is the pivotal concept in this triadic conceptualization, because it links all three. Dialectical developments occur through change—the driving force in conflicts—and between opposites. Constantly looking for oppositions, power differentials, and conflicts among researcher, participants, and phenomena protects us from taking anything for granted, enhancing the search for new knowledge as a resolution or synthesis of oppositions. As researchers, we should take nothing for granted and always challenge fixed categories, the rigid “shoulds,” and the congealed knowledge that stops us from seeing the world. Our beliefs are the greatest obstacles to clear perceptions and the generation of fresh knowledge.

Footnotes

Authors’ Note

Both authors have contributed equally to the article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Bios

Adital Ben-Ari, PhD, is a professor at the School of Social Work, Faculty of Welfare and Health Sciences, University of Haifa, in Haifa, Israel.

Guy Enosh, PhD, is senior lecturer at the School of Social Work, and chair of the Committee for Ethical Research on Human Beings, Faculty of Welfare and Health Sciences, University of Haifa, in Haifa, Israel.

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