Abstract
Improving low-performing/failing schools in the United States, especially in urban areas, has been a focal point of policymakers since the 1960s. Turning around low-performing schools gained increased attention after Congress passed No Child Left Behind and Race to the Top in the 2000s. In 2009, President Barack Obama and his Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, championed improving failing schools with a $3.5 billion investment in School Improvement Grants (SIG program) to decrease dropout rates, increase college readiness among high school graduates, and improve their potential for postsecondary success. Our qualitative case study examined the turnaround leadership actions of an urban superintendent in New Jersey and a high school principal in Michigan. Our case studies identified specific turnaround leadership actions that practitioners could replicate in their urban school district or school. Finally, we conclude with several vexing policy implications regarding the future direction of improving or turning around failing schools, especially in urban areas.
Keywords
Introduction
Improving student outcomes in schools with low academic achievement has vexed educational leaders and policymakers for generations. The federal government’s desire to improve student achievement in the nation’s lowest-performing schools has its earliest policy origins in the 1960s in President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society vision, and the “War on Poverty” was a key component of the vision. As a result, President Johnson signed legislation that provided historic investments in rural and urban schools where poverty rates were high, commonly referred to as Title I, which was a part of the Elementary and Secondary School Act of 1965 (Addonizio & Kearney, 2012; Brown & Brown, 2021; Noguera, 2003; Tyack, 1974; Tyack & Cuban, 1995). In the 1980s, a renewed focus shifted to improving the lowest-performing schools in the nation after the publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983 by the National Commission on Excellence in Education with mandates for curriculum and accountability for student learning via standardized tests to improve the dropout rates as these factors were negatively impacting the competitiveness of the American economy (Addonizio & Kearney, 2012; Bryk et al., 2010; National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983; Tyack & Cuban, 1995), especially in urban areas (Black et al., 2023; Payne, 2008).
The post-A Nation at Risk era was also defined by dismal statistics, such as high dropout rates and unacceptable ACT and SAT scores in urban schools (Addonizio & Kearney, 2012; Mirel, 1999; Royal & Cothorne, 2021; Tyack & Cuban, 1995; Wong et al., 2007), and violence in urban schools (Noguera, 2003), such as in the Detroit Public Schools (Kresnak, 1988; Mirel, 1999) and the Paterson City Schools (Kozol, 1991; Twain & Avildsen, 1989). In the 1990s, some large urban school districts believed district leadership was the problem, and urban governance reforms, such as mayoral control or state takeovers, would be the silver bullet for the issues challenging urban schools (Addonizio & Kearney, 2012; Black et al., 2023; Reville, 2007; Viteritti, 2009; Wong et al., 2007). In 2001, a tremendous shift in education policy occurred regarding the unfavorable perception of low-performing schools, especially urban schools, with the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (Ravitch, 2010). The low-performing schools across the United States provided one of two accountability labels (Darling-Hammond, 2004; Ravitch, 2010), which were failing or non-failing, with a disproportionate number of failing schools located in urban areas with high rates of poverty and students of color attending these schools (Payne, 1984, 2008; Ravitch, 2010; Royal & Cothorne, 2021).
In February 2009, the United States Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 in response to the Great Recession of 2007 to stimulate the American economy, which included $100 billion to secure education sector jobs and $3.5 billion for School Improvement Grants (SIG) program, and four prescribed turnaround models from the United States Department of Education (transformation, turnaround, closure, and restart) (Dee, 2012; Dragoset et al., 2017). Then-United States Secretary of Education Arne Duncan also stated in 2009 that: “We could really move the needle, lift the bottom, and change the lives of tens of millions of underserved children” (Brown, 2017). The SIG program under the Obama administration had reformers on both sides of the political spectrum wondering if the administration’s approach to turning around failing schools by utilizing the SIG program was the right policy vehicle. Stuit (2010) found school turnarounds to be unsuccessful because only 26 schools (1.2%) of the 2,025 low-performing schools (traditional and charter) in 10 states demonstrated academic improvement from 2003-04 to 2008-09. Thus, Stuit (2010) questioned: “Whether Secretary Duncan’s emphasis on this reform strategy [SIG program] is warranted, whether the billions of federal dollars being channeled into weak schools may be largely wasted” (Stuit, 2010, p. 4). On January 19, 2017, in a provocatively titled Washington Post article, “Obama Administration spent billions to fix failing schools, and it didn’t work”, Emma Brown stated that failing schools in the SIG program did not fare any better than failing schools without the additional funding when examining standardized test scores, graduation rates, and college enrollment. This influential article contributed significantly to a widespread narrative that the SIG turnaround models were ineffective, overshadowing the broader body of scholarly research that identified multiple benefits and positive outcomes of the SIG interventions.
The SIG program during the Obama Administration had four turnaround models: transformation (all staff is retained except for the principal), turnaround (replacing the principal, replacing 50% of the staff, and implementing a new instructional program), restart (the school is converted to a charter school), and closure (the school is closed and students are sent to the higher performing school) (Branch et al., 2013; Dee, 2012; Dragoset et al., 2017; Noguera & Syeed, 2020; Peck & Reitzug, 2014; United States Department of Education Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, 2014; Woulfin & Weiner, 2019). The replacement of principals was the administration’s preferred turnaround model (Peck & Reitzug, 2014; United States Department of Education Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, 2014). The school closure model is noteworthy as nearly two decades of evidence revealed that it did not yield widespread improvements or improved outcomes for Black and Brown students attending failing schools in urban areas nationwide disproportionately impacted by school closures (Noguera & Syeed, 2020; Royal & Cothorne, 2021). According to Royal and Cothorne (2021), school closures affect urban communities on a macro level by the following: “(1) Weaken property values, (2) Disrupt communities and families, (3) Do not yield improvements for students from closed schools, (4) Create neighborhood blight, causing more harm than before this approach was attempted as a remedy” (Royal & Cothorne, 2021, p. 486).
Relevant Scholarly Literature
This paper’s term “turnaround” is derived from using qualitative metrics to define student education success. More specifically, “turnaround” is needed and defined as most students not scoring above 20% on standardized assessments measuring grade-level proficiency for two or more years (Herman et al., 2008). An exploratory study conducted by Peck and Reitzug (2014) presents several paradoxes regarding turnaround leadership, and two of their findings are the pronounced gaps in turnaround leadership literature that our case study intends to contribute to the literature by addressing two of the paradoxes of the Peck and Reitzug’s (2014) exploratory study. More specifically, Peck and Reitzug (2014) stated in their second paradox of turnaround leadership: “There is no evidence of widespread success of turnaround schooling (indeed, emerging evidence indicates extremely limited success at best), yet it receives high priority in federal education policy.” To that end, Duke (2015) developed a leadership framework with several “first-order strategies” essential for turning around low-performing schools. These first-order strategies are the following: curriculum alignment, instructional focus, PLCs, scheduling, professional development, building capacity, addressing student behaviors, and family engagement (Duke, 2015). Thus, our case study will provide insight into the gaps in turnaround leadership literature due to Peck and Reitzug’s (2014) exploratory study and assess Duke’s (2015) first-order turnaround strategies in our case studies.
Failing Schools
What is a failing school? According to Leithwood et al. (2010), failing schools share specific leadership and philosophical characteristics, which include the following: poor teaching condoned, weak leadership tolerated, lack of vision, poor communication, inattention to education, lack of school-wide goals, and low expectations of students is the dominant perception of staff members. Hitt and Meyers (2018) assert, “While there is no panacea for failing schools, it makes sense that leadership, at the school and district level, is implicated in the rehabilitation of a school, as most of the factors that contribute to low performance (for example, teacher quality, teacher development, teacher recruitment, and school safety) are under the formal authority of a principal and, indirectly, the district” (Hitt & Meyers, 2018, p. 6). In urban school districts with poor-performing schools, campuses typically suffer from weak practices, weak programming, and structural inequities, which often fail to meet the needs of underserved urban students (Milner & Lomotey, 2021; Payne, 2008). Payne (2008) found that failing schools tended to have “weak pre-professional training for new teachers, staff members who were skeptical of students’ learning capacity, inadequate instructional supervision by building administrators, and fragmented professional development” (Payne, 2008, p. 81). Payne (2008) also noted that failing urban schools are disproportionately led by principals with weak skills and staffed by teachers with fixed mindsets. Lastly, failing urban schools are typically staffed by demoralized individuals (Noguera, 2003; Payne, 2008), and the morale of the staff at failing schools significantly impacts its capacity to turn around and change over time (Noguera, 2003).
The problems of failing urban schools are only symptoms of more ingrained structural issues within urban school districts (Bryk et al., 2010). A longitudinal case study of Chicago Public Schools found that the bottom third of the schools in the district were mainly the result of poor internal school culture as they were “plagued by serious conflict, and meaningful improvements were unlikely to emerge until this fighting ended” (Bryk et al., 2010, p. 17). Fundamentally changing how failing schools operate and building a commitment among staff to educate urban students equitably are essential strategies for increasing student achievement (Bryk et al., 2010; Herman et al., 2008; Leithwood et al., 2008). Despite the grim outlook for urban schools and the students who attend them, turnaround leadership practices provide hope that positive student outcomes can be achieved in schools once labeled as failing. In summary, turnaround leaders understand, when necessary, what to stop doing and what things to do differently.
Turnaround Principal Leadership
The literature on principal turnaround leadership, in particular, further expands our understanding of these leaders’ multifaceted approaches to transforming their schools via academic leadership, climate and culture leadership, community leadership, instructional leadership, and organizational leadership.
Academic Leadership
In turnaround situations, turnaround principals must know academic standards in reading and math and create a culture where academics and student achievement are priorities (Edmonds, 1979; Hill et al., 2022; Leithwood & Strauss, 2009), literacy is a priority and frequently monitored (Edmonds, 1979; Kowal et al., 2009; Meyers & Hambrick Hitt, 2017; Salmonowicz, 2009), and the development and implementation of systematic academic reforms will address many academic challenges and barriers to student achievement (Kowal et al., 2009).
Climate and Culture Leadership
In turnaround situations, turnaround principals must establish conditions within the school where the climate and culture are conducive for student learning to improve (Bryk et al., 2010; Edmonds, 1979; Leithwood et al., 2008, 2010; Leithwood & Strauss, 2009; Meyers & Hambrick Hitt, 2017; Payne, 1984), seek buy-in and collaborate with staff members and the community on major decisions (Hill et al., 2022; Leithwood et al., 2008; Meyers & Hambrick Hitt, 2017; Payzant & Horan, 2007; Salmonowicz, 2009), accountability exists for both students and staff members in the classroom (Edmonds, 1979; Fullan, 2005; Fullan & Quinn, 2016; Hill et al., 2022; Hitt et al., 2018; Leithwood et al., 2008, 2010; Leithwood & Strauss, 2009; Meyers & Hambrick Hitt, 2017), decisions are transparent (Hitt et al., 2018; Leithwood et al., 2008, 2010), and create a culture of positive change (Green, 2015).
Community Leadership
In turnaround situations, turnaround principals must collaborate with their community, including the development of partnerships to assist students in areas where the school is unable to due to fiscal or human resource limitations (Fullan, 2005; Green, 2015; Hill et al., 2022; Kowal et al., 2009; Meyers & Hambrick Hitt, 2017; Payzant & Horan, 2007; Reynolds & Howard, 2013).
Instructional Leadership
In turnaround situations, turnaround principals focus on improving instructional quality with a shared vision for instructional excellence (Edmonds, 1979; Fullan, 2005; Herman et al., 2008; Kowal et al., 2009; Leithwood et al., 2010; Meyers & Hambrick Hitt, 2017; Payne, 1984; Payzant & Horan, 2007; Woulfin & Weiner, 2019), instructional coaching and professional learning opportunities are provided for support (Fullan, 2005; Herman et al., 2008; Hill et al., 2022; Kowal et al., 2009; Leithwood et al., 2010; Payne, 1984; Payzant & Horan, 2007; Woulfin & Weiner, 2019), teachers are given individual development plans to build their capacity (Davis et al., 2005; Fullan, 2005; Hill et al., 2022; Kowal et al., 2009; Leithwood & Strauss, 2009; Meyers & Hambrick Hitt, 2017), and there are collaborative professional learning opportunities for all staff members based upon qualitative and quantitative metrics collected and analyzed (Herman et al., 2008; Leithwood et al., 2010; Payzant & Horan, 2007; Salmonowicz, 2009). Lastly, key performance indicators (KPIs) for success are developed and shared with instructional staff members, and they celebrate the “quick wins” with staff and students as they make ongoing progress in the areas of the KPIs (Herman et al., 2008; Lutterloh et al., 2016).
Organizational Leadership
In turnaround situations, turnaround principals establish a vision of success with measurable and attainable goals (Davis et al., 2005; Herman et al., 2008; Kowal et al., 2009; Meyers & Hambrick Hitt, 2017; Leithwood & Strauss, 2009; Payzant, 2010; Payzant & Horan, 2007; Salmonowicz, 2009), a strategic plan is developed (Hitt et al., 2018; Payzant & Horan, 2007), and student achievement data is analyzed (Hitt et al., 2018; Leithwood et al., 2010; Meyers & Hambrick Hitt, 2017; Payzant, 2010; Payzant & Horan, 2007). Payne (2008) asserts how analyzing data impacts teaching practices and turns around schools, “in the gap-closing schools, teaching was much more diagnostic, with teachers constantly assessing students and adjusting their instruction accordingly” (Payne, 2008, p. 95).
Turnaround District Leadership
A district strategic plan with a compelling vision is essential to successfully turn around a failing school district (Fullan, 2005; Kowal et al., 2009; Payzant, 2010; Payzant & Horan, 2007; Reville, 2007; Wong et al., 2007). New leadership in turnaround schools establishes cultures of accountability but also supports while building the capacity of educators in the schools, which is critical for success facilitated by district leaders as a part of the broader vision for the school district (Duke, 2015; Fullan, 2005; Kowal et al., 2009). To ensure stability in low-performing schools, turnaround district leaders develop turnaround principal pipelines (Kowal et al., 2009), and district leaders are responsible for finding the “right” principals to lead their turnaround efforts (Fullan, 2005; Payzant, 2010; Payzant & Horan, 2007). District turnaround leaders are responsible for developing the capacity of their principals in areas such as data-driven instruction and data analysis before replacing ineffective principals (Duke, 2015).
Turnaround principals placed at failing schools by district leaders must be instructional leaders and intentionally improve the instructional quality within the failing schools (Bryk et al., 2010; Fullan, 2005; Payzant, 2010; Payzant & Horan, 2007). District leaders focused on turning around a failing district were committed to building the capacity of adults as a part of the broader vision, which included relevant professional development aligned with the needs of students and changing the adult culture to one where there is a willingness to get better in the service of children (Fullan, 2005; Noguera & Syeed, 2020). A desire to get better in the service of children includes a systemic approach facilitated by district leaders to improve the quality of instruction in the classrooms of failing schools (Bryk et al., 2010; Fullan, 2005; Noguera & Syeed, 2020) and a willingness from district leaders to engage the community and take feedback on what progress is, including feedback from their principals (Fullan, 2005; Kowal et al., 2009; Payzant & Horan, 2007). According to Duke (2015), district leaders can lead the turnaround process if two essential elements occur: “(1) developing a clear understanding of the priorities, and (2) securing broad-based commitment to those priorities” (Duke, 2015, p. 200).
Impact of the SIG Program
As mentioned above, President Obama championed the School Improvement Grants (SIG) program in 2009 to turn around some of the lowest-performing schools in the United States (Brown, 2017; Dragoset et al., 2017). An unintended consequence of the SIG program was its exclusiveness to participate in the program. For example, in Cohort 2 (2012), a total of 12,445 low-performing schools in 41 states and the District of Columbia were eligible for the SIG program (Hurlburt et al., 2012); however, only 471 schools (3.7%) participated in the SIG program (United States Department of Education Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, 2014). In Michigan, a total of 228 low-performing schools were eligible for the SIG program for Cohort 2 (Hurlburt et al., 2012), and 24 schools (10.5%) participated in the SIG program after MDE officials made their selections (Michigan Department of Education, 2014). In New Jersey, a total of 206 low-performing schools were eligible for the SIG program for Cohort 2 (Hurlburt et al., 2012), and nine schools (4.3%) participated in the SIG program after NJDOE officials made their selections (New Jersey Department of Education, 2012).
Despite the initial $3.5 billion investment into the SIG program, it yielded mixed results. Regarding the effectiveness of the turnaround models, in a sample of 270 SIG schools, Dragoset et al. (2017) found “no evidence that SIG-funded models substantially increased the use of SIG-promoted practices” (p. 84). Their analysis highlighted that within grades 2–5, no intervention model demonstrated clear superiority. However, in grades 6–12, schools implementing the turnaround model exhibited significantly more mathematics improvements than those applying the transformation model (Dragoset et al., 2017). Supporting these findings, a longitudinal study by Strunk et al. (2016) in the Los Angeles Unified School District revealed noteworthy improvements in schools undergoing extensive restructuring and restarts.
Regarding the effectiveness of the SIG program in improving student achievement, Dragoset et al. (2017) found “no significant impacts of SIG-funded models overall on math or reading test scores, high school graduation, or college enrollment” (p. 83). Conversely, additional research has documented notable positive outcomes from SIG interventions. Dee (2012), utilizing a regression-discontinuity design, identified statistically significant improvements in academic performance attributable to SIG funding in California schools. Similarly, Player and Katz (2016), examining school turnarounds in Ohio, demonstrated that SIG-funded schools adopting the University of Virginia’s turnaround principles, characterized by effective school leadership, school and district ownership, and data-driven management, experienced substantially more significant gains in standardized assessments compared to SIG-funded schools that did not employ this specific framework. A meta-analysis conducted by Redding and Nguyen (2020), encompassing 35 studies of school turnaround models, identified significant improvements in standardized assessments in English Language Arts (ELA) and mathematics, graduation rates, and attendance among schools adopting transformation, turnaround, and restart models. Sun et al. (2017, 2021) further substantiated these findings, indicating that SIG interventions produced sustained academic achievements, with marked gains particularly evident in mathematics by the third year of implementation in the school districts they studied. These studies also observed reduced student unexcused absences, enhanced school desirability as indicated by increased family enrollment preferences, and improved teacher retention through targeted professional development and support systems (Sun et al., 2017, 2021). Importantly, schools utilizing the turnaround model characterized by intensive staff restructuring demonstrated more substantial and sustained improvements than those employing the transformation model (Sun et al., 2021). These results underscore the efficacy of comprehensive capacity-building interventions provided through SIG funding, especially in improving academic outcomes and school environments for historically underserved student populations (Sun et al., 2021).
Research Questions
Our case studies examined the turnaround leadership of two urban school leaders: a district superintendent in New Jersey and a high school principal in Michigan. Our case studies will analyze the leadership actions undertaken for district and school-level turnarounds. More specifically, we addressed the following research questions: (1) What were the new superintendent’s turnaround leadership strategies during his Asbury Park Schools tenure? (2) What were the new principal’s turnaround leadership strategies during his Battle Creek Central High School tenure? (3) What perceived impact did the SIG program have in Asbury Park Schools or at Battle Creek Central High School?
Methods
This section will discuss the methods used to conduct our case studies, such as site selection criteria and data collection, including a brief description of the interview participants, trustworthiness, and data analysis. Our qualitative case study draws on 19 semi-structured interviews, and the interview data develops themes for analysis (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2009). This study aims to understand the phenomenon of turnaround leadership and the leadership actions undertaken by an urban superintendent and high school principal.
Case Study Sites and Context
We selected the case study sites based on the following criteria: (1) A state department of education labeled Asbury Park Schools and Battle Creek Central High School as failing schools, persistently low-achieving, or in the bottom five percent of schools in their state. (2) There was a high-profile change in leadership by hiring a candidate from outside the organization. (3) Asbury Park Schools and Battle Creek Central High School are located in areas with “urban characteristics”, such as most students receiving free and reduced lunch. (4) Both case study sites educate significant majority-minority student demographics. (5) Asbury Park Schools was selected specifically because of the failing narrative of the school district and the controversy surrounding the superintendent search. (6) Battle Creek Central was specifically selected because of the failing narrative of the high school and the community’s desire for it to restore its former glory as The Pride of the State.
Site Selection Characteristics
Data Collection
Asbury Park Schools Case Study Site Participants
Battle Creek Central High School Case Study Site Participants
Interview Questions
Data Analysis
There were keywords from the interview transcripts that were identified and used to create themes from the interview data, which described the leadership actions or strategies undertaken by both turnaround leaders (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2009; Lofland & Lofland, 1995); for example, keywords identified included ILTs, PLCs, Instructional Coaches, PBIS, ninth Grade Academy, etc. Next, the keywords were coded from the interviews into prominent themes developed from the interview data utilizing a grounded theory approach (Gall et al., 2003).
Trustworthiness
Our case study established trustworthiness with standardized open-ended interview instrumentation during the semi-structured interviews (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2009). The interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed, vetted (i.e., member-checked) for accuracy by each interviewee, and then resubmitted to the authors electronically for inclusion in this study. Our process decreased possible biases and established credibility in the data collection and analysis.
Findings
The findings for our case study are organized by the location of the case study and the pertinent research questions. The discussion section will discuss the collective results and themes from the findings section related to turnaround leadership. In the first case study, we will present our findings from the Asbury Park School’s case study of district turnaround leadership. In the second case study, we will present our findings from the Battle Creek Central High School case study of school turnaround leadership.
Asbury Park Schools Case Study Findings
The Asbury Park School’s turnaround began by communicating the belief that all Asbury Park School students can succeed, which the district’s strategic plan title emphasizes: Hard Hat Nation: Building a Brighter Future. When the new superintendent took over Asbury Park Schools, he took over an unsuccessful school district in terms of educating children, evident in the district’s 49% graduation rate, making improving the graduation rate one of the superintendent’s key priorities to turnaround the school district when he began his tenure, but more importantly, to produce high school graduates that were college and career-ready upon graduation. The findings of the Asbury Park School’s case study are organized under each research question below from the participants in the case study.
Research Question 1: What Were the New Superintendent’s Turnaround Leadership Strategies During His Asbury Park Schools Tenure?
Changing District Culture
The new superintendent’s vision for student success promoted a turnaround mindset, making this a practical, effective way to express expected changes in the culture. For example, when the new superintendent began his tenure, he carried a white hard hat with him, which sent a visual message to students and the community that the district was under reconstruction and that district leadership was committed to rebuilding the struggling school district. Thus, the new superintendent and his team focused on changing the culture and communicating the school district’s shifting narrative. Mark points out how leadership stayed committed to student engagement, operating on the belief that, “Climate trumps strategy, so the focus over the last few years continues to emphasize building relationships with our students to understand them better and for them to understand us better.” Kathy reiterated this point of how changing district culture was an essential step in the district’s turnaround: The result of [both] students and instructional staff feeling valued and relevant… students understand that they now had an administrative team that supported them, and we were willing to hear them… much of the reason misbehaviors decreased can be attributed to the building of relationships and giving our students a voice.
A pillar of the superintendent’s vision for changing the district’s culture was restoring confidence in staff and students, a sense that they can achieve it if they believe it. Amanda’s observations demonstrate how the superintendent changed the district’s culture, “He acknowledges staff and students for a job well done and is always visible in our schools watching the progress of what we are doing.” Such positive impacts on culture and climate are significant, especially for people whose experience in schools was pessimistic before the district turnaround initiative. The burdens of turnaround schools are often a complex set of negative perceptions. As these perceptions become entrenched, they impact how the community, families, staff, and students see the school and themselves. The weight of these perceptions lowers expectations and creates a set of self-defeating prophecies that highlight failure, downplay successes, generate diminishing returns, and decrease engagement. A vital part of any turnaround effort is confronting and changing this narrative. John stated, “You must build staff morale within the buildings to improve student achievement.” Relationship and staff morale work allowed capacity building among staff to increase organically within school communities. Hence, while the district had high expectations for students and staff, all received the support necessary to meet those expectations. According to Lauren, changing the district’s culture was intentional: Developing cultural expectations to meet the total needs of each student is an emphasis in the Asbury Park School District’s mission for both instructional staff and students. This initiative continues to play a significant role in decreasing student behaviors throughout the past years. Including programs that target the management, self-efficacy, and regulation of feelings has provided students from preschool to twelfth grade the opportunities and exposure to take ownership of their internal emotions before they act through behaviors. Because of this, the overall climate for the school buildings and district has been enhanced by positive and purposeful reactionary approaches that have replaced the previously historic misbehaviors.
Strategic District Improvement Plan
The framework for changing the district’s academic culture consisted of a three-step cyclical improvement model: Assess, Create, Execute (ACE). Assess describes the process of collecting and evaluating data to gain understanding. Create is developing an action plan to establish a vision, mission, values, and goals. Execute is the implementation of strategic objectives and includes the deployment processes. The district’s strategic improvement plan focused on three key areas: (1) Organizational development; (2) Capacity development; and (3) Digital leadership and the expected outcomes for the district were to retool, rebuild, and restore Asbury Park Schools.
Capacity Development
The capacity development practice for instructional change began with the new superintendent’s four visits to every Asbury Park classroom within the first 3 months of school. These visits allowed the superintendent to develop an instructional framework to improve the quality of instruction in Asbury Park School’s classrooms. Capacity development efforts in Asbury Park Schools began with the Asbury Park Schools teachers, which allowed them to focus on improving their classroom instructional practice, and principals focused on creating the conditions and climates conducive to positive human interactions and relationships, thereby increasing productivity and student achievement. The vision-aligned collaboration was a staple of capacity development in Asbury Park Schools. Shared leadership structures such as Instructional Leadership Teams (ILTs) supported this empowerment. Mark elaborated: “We have become a district where there is shared leadership where principals have been allowed to make instructional and leadership decisions in their schools.” School goals provided the foundation for decision-making and were instrumental in school-level success. Mark and Amanda’s observations provide a detailed picture of the capacity development in Asbury Park Schools at all three levels in the district, “teacher leadership, school leadership, and district leadership.” Lauren explained what capacity development looked like in Asbury Park Schools: Teacher-led leadership teams and administration-teacher collaboration, in addition to a partnership with the International Center for Leadership in Education (ICLE), where a blueprint was created, and the superintendent and director of curriculum empowered school-based Instructional Leadership Teams (ILTs) to work together to build leadership, map out a rigorous curriculum, create a more engaging learning environment for our children, and established reading interventions for all of our students reading below grade level.
Capacity development in Asbury Park Schools was supported district-wide when Instructional Leadership Teams (ILTs) were developed in every school. The work of the ILTs was to build the capacity of everyone who touched classroom instruction. Thea described capacity development among school leaders and teachers and why the ILTs were important: In our district, we no longer believe that one administrator can serve as the instructional leader for an entire school without the substantial participation of other educators. Developing the leadership capacity of the school community is an essential aspect of the Instructional Leadership Team.
Amanda described the capacity development as a system aligned with other systems in Strawberry School: Instructional Leadership Teams (ILTs) meet to focus on their strategic plan and create goals for the upcoming school year with central administration and ICLE support. The plan is created during the summer months and modified when needed based on data and feedback from the school community. One of the goals of the strategic plan was to focus on building strong and consistent leadership. [My school’s leadership team has] been trained and continues to be trained to ensure our schools are creating a learning culture.
In Asbury Park Schools, district leadership believed developing the capacity of all staff members that touched classroom instruction would yield positive results for students on standardized tests and turn around the district’s academic culture.
Community Partnerships
Efforts to change the narrative in Asbury Park Schools resulted in partnerships with numerous entities, including Brookdale Community College and the Jules L. Plangere Jr. Family Foundation. These partnerships created the Asbury Park College Promise, which pays up to 50% of college costs for qualifying Asbury Park School students. This community partnership was developed and enacted by the new superintendent after his tenure began, and it served as the tangible connection between the vision to make kids college and career-ready.
Positive Behavior Support
As people internalized the vision of Hard Hat Nation, a growth mindset developed among adults in the district that naturally focused on constructive efforts like implementing positive behavior supports for students, which included a significant amount of time spent meeting with students to set expectations and emphasize the importance of their education. John stated, “… consequences kept kids in school… When you put in good leadership within the buildings, it creates a better learning atmosphere.” Programs promoting positive social and emotional interactions between students and staff produced results, and the staff was willing to trust the new superintendent’s vision for change. Compared to 2014–2015, the 2016–2017 school year showed that 87% of secondary students anonymously reported in surveys that staff respected the students, an 8.8% increase. In addition, 88% of teachers agreed, “I know what my students are passionate about,” an 8.6% increase (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). As a result, Thea stated: “[student] misbehaviors decreased due to Positive Behavioral Supports in Schools (PBSIS) programs, systematic classroom-based relationship strategies, and Restorative Practice initiatives that have been implemented throughout the district.”
Intervention Classes
The new superintendent used student achievement data to determine how to meet the learning needs of the students he was now responsible for educating. A part of the turnaround in Asbury Park Schools was knowing where students had learning deficits and placing them in structured intervention classes to address their deficits, especially in reading. Mark stated that: Intervention classes were a critical driver of the improved results in Asbury Park Schools. Underscoring the same idea, the students of Asbury Park have [now] been immersed in a climate working to celebrate successes, understand struggles, evaluate and apply solutions to solve problems, and teach to the whole child. Through this paradigm, student achievement has been on the rise and is, in fact, disrupting the status quo.
Thea concludes, “Student achievement has increased due to the consistency of the intervention programs adopted by the district for grades K through 12, and the retooling for instructional improvement included increasing student engagement by helping address areas of deficit.”
Digital Leadership
Engaging with the entire school community through digital leadership leads people to invest in a shared vision and helps counter negative perceptions around failing schools; consistent, positive communication can debunk falsehoods, celebrate student and adult successes, increase community interactions, and foster productive partnerships. Under the new superintendent’s leadership, Asbury Park Schools focused on using the latest technologies, like social media, to increase engagement with parents and the greater community by communicating essential information and celebrating the successes within Asbury Park Schools. By digitally sharing the work done in Asbury Park Schools, the superintendent provided staff and students with the tools, knowledge, confidence, and interpersonal skills to build a brighter future for themselves through increased levels of engagement. Asbury Park Schools conveyed a hopeful message to internal and external constituents during this period and coupled with students’ results, Asbury Park Schools’ message was very compelling. Amanda described the district’s digital engagement efforts in detail: Another focus was to change the negative climate in the schools and the negative perception of the district within our community and in an East Coach state. [The superintendent and his team] changed the climate of the district by promoting all of the positive initiatives going on in the schools and district… by using Twitter and other social media outlets, people from all over the educational map have been able to see the progressive edge our district has taken and how we are moving our students in an educational direction that will prepare them for the jobs of the future.
Asbury Park Schools Case Study Summary
Asbury Park Schools Turnaround Summary
Battle Creek Central High School Case Study Findings
In 2011, Battle Creek Central High School was on Michigan’s list of Persistently Low-Achieving Schools, meaning the campus consistently ranked in the bottom 5% for student academic performance on standardized tests, and the new principal implemented a transformation plan for the school. Essential to the new principal’s focus was developing systems in the school to address common pain points over the previous school years. The findings of the Battle Creek Central High School case study are organized under each research question below from the participants in the case study.
Research Question 2: What Were the New Principal’s Turnaround Leadership Strategies During His Battle Creek Central High School Tenure?
Response-to-Intervention
A critical reform in positively changing the school’s culture was implementing Response-to-Intervention (RtI) models designed to meet students’ social, emotional, and academic needs, including developing a college-going culture. The RtI models at Battle Creek Central High School represented a significant departure from usual district practices. They required changing how the school deployed its resources to support students behaviorally and academically. Bernard stated the following about behavioral RtI: “The goal of the RtI was simple. We [teachers and administrators] taught our students how to make better choices by focusing support on their social and emotional needs.” Michael shared his perspective regarding leadership actions taken by the new principal as he was the head of security during the previous principal’s tenure and the new principal’s tenure: I think during that time, students felt that the administration cared about the students’ success, not just during their time there but also in their future. Before that era, we had big-time drug problems and gang activity. And I think incentive programs created by administrators in the building were paramount because they recognized students and staff for exceptional performance. Rather than just looking for the negative, the focus was also placed on positive things that were going on in the building.
The data reflected a cultural change due to the RtI initiative with fewer kids skipping class or getting into fights, the school experienced academic gains, and the Class of 2013 was breaking college applications and enrollment records. A Battle Creek Central student, Madeline, described her feelings this way: “There were higher expectations [for students]. I believe that my peers could meet high (but reasonable) expectations when they were clear and consistent. We knew what would be tolerated and what wouldn’t be.” And Bernard stated the following regarding Academic RtI: We wanted to identify students who were in danger of failing a course and intervening before they were overwhelmed with the content and quit on the class, leading to behavior problems. We also told our students that the adults in the building would not allow them to fail; we waged guerrilla warfare on ‘silent Fs’ [students who were not disruptive and sat in class quietly and were seemingly okay with earning Fs]. We identified those students and gave them the academic support they needed to succeed and re-engage them in the classroom community.
The data reflected an upward trend at the high school, which was noticeable to the students attending the school. RtI positively affected students and strongly influenced the positive culture change for the adults, students, and the entire community. Danielle was a student and said the following regarding the transformation she witnessed while at Battle Creek Central: The rallying of the Battle Creek community and school leadership around creating a college-going culture was invaluable to creating a positive change at Battle Creek Central High School. The implementation of ACT prep courses was a fantastic step forward… Additionally, I believe empowering teachers to take an active role in shaping the culture of the school and working as a team with the administration was vital to the positive change. In my opinion, attention absolutely must be paid to creating the relationship between the administration, teachers, students, and parents. Battle Creek Central teachers have always been invested in the lives and achievements of their students, but I think the most important change was having the administration become aware of and championing that relationship!
PLCs
Fundamental to creating a system for the continuous improvement of instruction at Battle Creek Central High School was the integration of Professional Learning Communities (PLCs) into the master schedule. As a result, teachers in similar subjects and grade levels received 235 min of dedicated collaboration time every 2 weeks in addition to their contractual planning time. PLCs were designed and structured according to best practices, used dedicated instructional coaches to provide support, and generated a forum in which teachers discussed data, planned instruction, formulated assessments, and created interventions that met the needs of their students. LuAnne stated the impact of the PLCs as a veteran teacher: “We spent tons of time looking at the data. I don’t think we had ever done that as a whole… I think it helped teachers see what standards they needed to work on… administration also did a great job giving feedback to teachers… that was very specific. Joey also shared his insights on PLCs at Battle Creek Central High School as a new teacher in the building: I came into the school during the second year, and what stood out to me the most was the focus on academic learning standards. There was a focus on 1.) What specific content knowledge or skills were taught, and 2.) How would content knowledge and skills be assessed? This work was done in PLCs with instructional coaches, and we always knew what we needed to accomplish and by when we needed it.
The initiative for teachers allowed teachers to be more intentional about academics and supporting the needs of students. When students were unsuccessful, the PLCs served as a safe space to discuss with colleagues what the root causes could have been and strategies from them, the instructional coach, or the administrator to move more students into the proficiency range. Bernard described the effect of PLCs: We had teacher leaders and instructional coaches who had built trust with their colleagues. With their confidence and consistent meetings with the building principal, who facilitated learning with the instructional coaches and his leadership team, the instructional coaches were the key facilitators of the strategic turnaround plan. Their belief in the PLC system helped all implement it on a faster timeline. With the instructional coaches supporting teachers and administrators providing accountability, both teams worked closely together to develop consistent instruction in the four core subject areas.
Master Schedule With Tier 2 and Tier 3 Interventions
Students who experienced substantial difficulties in mathematics or English Language Arts took advantage of flexible scheduling to take new, credit-generating Core Area Enrichment (CAE) courses. Appropriately certified teachers staffed these classrooms, which had three purposes: to provide remediation for skill deficiencies, to reteach vital concepts when necessary, and to pre-teach content for the next day. In this way, students received classroom-based remediation and enrichment in addition to regular math or ELA classes, which provided “catch-up” growth while ensuring “keep-up” growth. Essentially, Tier 2 and Tier 3 interventions were embedded into the master schedule to meet students where they were but to route them to an adult for the individual support they needed to be successful.
Instructional Coaches
Instructional coaching was critical to the success of PLCs and improved teacher practices. Instructional coaches supported teachers in planning from standards, reviewing assessment data, discussing reteaching strategies, and developing Tier 2 interventions. They also modeled, observed, and provided classroom feedback purposefully and collegially rather than evaluatively. LuAnne provided her perspective on the impact of instructional coaching at Battle Creek Central High School, stating: I think our instructional coaches finally had enough training and experience to really help us plan engaging lessons. We started looking at and dissecting our data and using data to plan enrichment and remediation. Administration’s expectations also became more rigorous, and... administrators held teachers accountable for student engagement for ALL students.
These findings suggest that the systems developed around RtI, PLCs, master scheduling with intentionality to support the learning needs of students, and instructional coaching led to deep collaboration and strategic support of the students attending Battle Creek Central High School, which were significant in the turnaround of the school.
Battle Creek Central High School Case Study Summary
Battle Creek Central High School Turnaround Summary
Research Question 3: What Perceived Impact did the SIG Program Have in the Asbury Park Schools or at Battle Creek Central High School?
Asbury Park Schools
The superintendent elected not to pursue SIG program funding due to two primary considerations: (1) The low probability of selection, as evidenced by only 4.3% of eligible low-performing New Jersey schools participating in Cohort 2, and (2) A preference for individualized, data-driven school reforms incompatible with the standardized turnaround models mandated by the United States Department of Education. While equitable school funding is critical to turnaround success, the Asbury Park Schools case study found that the turnaround practices in the Asbury Park Schools did not rely on additional funding for their success.
Battle Creek Central High School
The principal was unable to pursue SIG program funding for two primary reasons: (1) The Michigan Department of Education had already allocated all its available SIG funds before the designation of Battle Creek Central High School as a persistently low-achieving school (PLAS), and (2) The state had adopted the federally mandated turnaround models for all PLAS schools regardless of their SIG funding status, and the principal leveraged elements of the transformation model, in addition to traditional state funding sources, such as general funds and 31a funds designated for at-risk populations, and innovative utilization of existing federal Title I funds to implement various aspects of the transformation initiatives.
Participants in the study indicated that a different external non-profit organization, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, was instrumental in the high school’s turnaround. The Kellogg Foundation funded a reform at Battle Creek Central High School, where a ninth Grade Academy was created to function as a school within a school. This initiative relied heavily on research from Johns Hopkins University identifying factors leading urban students to drop out of high school (Balfanz & Legters, 2004). The ninth Grade Academy had a principal, counselor, attendance agent, interventionist, and floor within the high school. The foundation’s influence and funding supported the school’s transformation.
Joey added: “In the Freshman Academy, there was always a laser-like focus on improving the behavior and attendance of our students and providing coursework support via data conversations in our PLCs and in our team meetings.” The ninth Grade Academy team improved outcomes for freshman cohorts by intensely focusing on key metrics, including attendance, behavior, course performance, and connections to the school. The ninth Grade Academy team celebrated achievements around these metrics quarterly, recognizing students who met or exceeded targets. Anita assessed the ninth Grade Academy’s role in turning around Battle Creek Central High School: The 9th Grade Academy’s programmatic focus was on establishing a Multi-Tiered System of Support (MTSS) in academics, attendance, and behavior, which was patterned after the middle school teaming process in that teachers were organized in interdisciplinary intervention teams to support student success. Before the 9th Grade Academy, only 62% of 9th grade students were advancing to the 10th grade. After the first year of implementation, 82% of 9th Grade Academy students advanced to the 10th grade. At the same time, the school also saw dramatic declines in social and behavioral issues.
Discussion
This section discusses the findings of our case studies, and it synthesizes the strategic leadership actions undertaken in Asbury Park Schools by the new superintendent and Battle Creek Central High School by the new principal. In Asbury Park Schools, the new superintendent had a philosophical approach, stating that the people in the organization were the most critical factor in the turnaround. In contrast, the new principal at Battle Creek Central had the philosophical approach that robust systems led to improved performance. Despite these two varying philosophical approaches, the turnarounds had the same positive results.
The “first-order strategies” developed by Duke (2015) provided us with a theoretical framework. The first-order strategies included curriculum alignment, instructional focus, PLCs, scheduling, professional development, building capacity, addressing student behaviors, and family engagement (Duke, 2015). The findings of our case studies supported several of Duke’s first-order strategies. Still, the findings also revealed other strategies used for the turnarounds in Asbury Park Schools and Battle Creek Central High School based on the longitudinal data from both case study sites. From a quantitative perspective, there was an abrupt about-face in trend data (e.g., graduation rate, dropout rate, standardized testing scores, course failure rate, and student discipline referrals). From a qualitative perspective, there was a distinct change in the overall climate and culture (i.e., general feeling) at both sites where failure and the status quo were no longer acceptable, thus changing the narrative in the communities about both educational institutions. The section below summarizes the results of our case studies and the leadership actions undertaken by turnaround leaders at both sites.
The SIG Program
The turnarounds in Asbury Park School and Battle Creek Central High School occurred despite not participating in the United States Department of Education’s SIG program, where they would have received additional funding to support their turnaround efforts. Moreover, turnaround models suggested by the United States Department of Education did not significantly impact the initiatives or success of the turnarounds at either site.
First-Order Strategy Theoretical Framework
Addressing Student Behaviors
Students also received strategic social and emotional support (i.e., positive behavior support) during the school day, and as a result, violence in the schools significantly decreased. Moreover, and of significance to these two urban areas, out-of-school suspensions decreased, which means there was a disruption in the school-to-prison pipeline as out-of-school suspensions and expulsions decreased the likelihood of these urban students coming in contact with the juvenile justice system (Noguera, 2013; United States Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, 2014). The development and implementation of tiered support systems in academics, attendance, and behavior provided the support students needed to remain engaged and meet the expectations at both sites.
Instructional Focus
There was a concerted effort to improve the quality of classroom instruction in Asbury Park Schools and Battle Creek Central High School with a focus on defining quality instruction, instructional coaching, observation, feedback cycles, and using interim assessment data to address the gaps in student learning and mastery of grade-level content.
PLCs & Building Capacity
In Asbury Park, ILTs were preferred to develop the capacity of all adults who touched instruction, while Battle Creek Central High School preferred to leverage PLCs and Instructional Coaches. The ILTs in Asbury Park Schools held educators accountable for providing guidance and support to improve classroom instruction to meet the district’s expectations. Conversely, Battle Creek Central High School PLCs went deeper into planning and discussing curricular matters, and colleagues held each other accountable.
Scheduling
Master schedules were leveraged as school improvement mechanisms to support the students who were struggling and behind academically. Students received strategic academic support during the school day to address their learning deficits and to increase engagement to prevent them from dropping out of high school.
Contributions to Turnaround Literature
Asbury Park Schools
The results of our case studies differed from the theoretical framework of first-order strategies developed by Duke (2015), which uncovered some unexpected findings and contributions to turnaround literature. In Asbury Park Schools, the new superintendent engaged the community to change the narrative of the school district by sharing success stories via social media. The digital leadership from the superintendent provided a counter-narrative to the previously held history of Asbury Park Schools. Additionally, it allowed the narrative of Asbury Park Schools to meet the community where they were instead of visiting the school to see it firsthand. The district’s strategic plan was also a catalyst for turnaround success because it was data-driven and aligned the resources (i.e., human and fiscal resources) with strategies to improve student learning at scale in Asbury Park. Lastly, the strategic development of community partnerships helped to educate the whole child. Still, it also provided Asbury Park students with tangible postsecondary opportunities to continue their education or find careers in demand.
Battle Creek Central High School
The results of our case studies differed from the theoretical framework of first-order strategies developed by Duke (2015), which uncovered some unexpected findings and contributions to turnaround literature. At Battle Creek Central High School, interview participants hailed the reorganization of the school and support from the W.K. Kellogg Foundation funding a ninth Grade Academy as a solid organizational first step to assist the principal’s turnaround of the school. The ninth Grade Academy provided a solid freshman year for students focused on attendance, behavior, course performance (credits), and connections to the school, ultimately improving outcomes for those students when they graduated four years later. The development of the RtI system to identify students struggling with academic achievement, behavior, and attendance was critical to the turnaround at Battle Creek Central as it caught students before they slipped through the cracks and provided them with interventions during the school day.
Summary
The findings in our case studies provide some promise for the field and the direction of education policy in this area for several reasons. First, our case studies identify concrete leadership actions and specific strategies to turn around previously failing schools, which extend beyond Duke’s (2015) first-order strategies, and address the second paradox of Peck and Reitzug (2014) by providing two successful sites for turnarounds despite not being recipients of the SIG program funding. Second, it counterpoints the common belief that only the principal is central to turnaround efforts and highlights how all educators must play a role in the turnaround. Third, our case studies identified the importance of the people in the organization and robust systems as additional must-haves for turnarounds. Fourth, the strategic use of existing financial resources can support turnaround efforts. Finally, our case studies’ findings revealed how visionary leadership resulted in turnaround success at two urban sites, which was still possible without an infusion of federal funds from the SIG program. Sustainability is still questioned but will be discussed in the implications section.
Implications
The implications for policymakers who continue efforts to turn around failing schools should address these overarching questions: (1) Why is failure, especially in most urban areas, replicated with subsequent superintendents, principals, teachers, parents, and students? (2) How might intergenerational urban school failure be interrupted by a combination of social policies and proven educational strategies emphasizing changes in vision internalization, systems alignment, and student-focused practices?
Considering the implications of our case studies on current education policies, we reflected on Noguera and Syeed’s (2020) argument that politics rather than research and evidence would likely determine the next steps for failing schools (e.g., SIG program), especially in urban areas as they highlighted all of the factors preventing students from being successful academically with the majority of the factors outside of the school’s locus of control, and Payne (2008) asserted that “institutional failure can create a social environment that encourages yet more failure, one downward spiral generating another” (p. 45). Unfortunately, the SIG program was not a “silver bullet” for education reform, especially regarding its ability to turn around low-performing schools. The mixed results of the SIG program indicate that turning around failing schools is more complex than initially believed, as additional funding cannot solely address or solve how the influences of peers, family life inside homes, environmental neighborhood issues, and poverty all intersect to impact student achievement.
Suppose policymakers are serious about improving failing schools. In that case, serious consideration should be made to understand how environmental issues outside of schools significantly impact schools, causing them to become failing schools. Noguera (2003) argued that the only significant progress in closing the achievement gap occurred during The Great Society initiative as a part of President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty during the 1960s. Two central pillars of The Great Society were cities and classrooms. President Johnson declared during his speech at The University of Michigan’s commencement in May 1964 that “poverty must not be a bar to learning, and learning must offer an escape from poverty” (LBJ Presidential Library, 2012). President Johnson further asserted the negative impact that American society (i.e., systemic and institutional racism) had on Black families during his speech at Howard University’s commencement in June 1965 (LBJ Presidential Library, 2013): The family is the cornerstone of our society. More than any other force, it shapes the attitude, the hopes, the ambitions, and values of the child. And when the family collapses, it is the children that are usually damaged. When it happens on a massive scale, the entire community itself is crippled. So, unless we work to strengthen the family to create conditions under which most parents will stay together, all the rest: schools, and playgrounds, and public assistance, and private concern will never be enough to cut completely the circle of despair and deprivation.
Therefore, until policymakers champion initiatives designed to impact the communities of failing schools to address the needs of the whole child and the macro-level environmental issues in the communities of failing schools that negatively affect student learning, this conversation about how to fix failing schools, especially in urban areas will continue for our posterity to attempt to resolve. Thus, most district and school turnarounds will be short-lived without substantive urban and poverty elimination initiatives to accompany them.
Our case studies of Asbury Park Schools and Battle Creek Central High School found that turnarounds are possible due to strategic leadership actions and reforms. Superintendents must change the district’s narrative by implementing a data-driven strategic improvement plan from student achievement data that addresses and supports students’ social and academic needs. Still, superintendents cannot forget about the professional educators serving and increasing their capacity to meet and support the needs of their students. It is also imperative to tell your story through digital leadership to inspire students and educators about the progress made. Principals must design systems to improve students’ academic and social outcomes, making it impossible for them to fall between the cracks per se. Implications for education policies include revised policies for SIG program turnaround models, which could consist of our findings to make turnarounds doable at both the district and school levels, regardless of whether additional funding exists. Still, the game-changer for failing schools would be policies seeking to transform life in urban and rural areas where poverty, despair, and deprivation are prevalent, and hope and opportunities remain elusive.
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.