Abstract
Human rights are not limitless. Rather, they are in constant competition with one another, and other considerations, as various situations requiring different prioritizations. Limor Yehuda's thought-provoking book Collective Equality: Human Rights and Democracy in Ethno-National Conflicts contemplates the proper balance between traditional human rights and related concerns in the limited context of ethno-national conflicts. Per Yehuda, “ethno-national conflicts are struggles over domination—over who controls the nation-state, or, more broadly, who will be superior and dominate the other.” When an ethnic group is discriminated against and/or marginalized, whether politically and economically, there is a greater likelihood for violence. In such circumstances, the balance between various human rights might well be, and should be, different than what is favored in a peaceful democratic state.
While the European Court of Human Rights has struck down power-sharing arrangements that appear to violate the right to non-discrimination in the selection of various political positions, Yehuda recognizes the limitations of other alternatives, such as partitioning and internal self-determination (requiring enforcement of human rights obligations by a majority predisposed to conflict with minorities within the state). Instead, she proposes a theory of collective equality to justify power-sharing governmental systems—where major social groups have designated places in the state's political structures—despite arguably negative effects on certain traditionally held rights.
So, what is collective equality? Unsurprisingly, given Yehuda's definition of ethno-national conflict, it focuses on addressing the central issues defining such situations—discrimination, marginalization, and shared economic and political resources. Among other factors, it requires (1) recognition of competing ethno-national groups as sharing equally viable claims to self-determination, a status which should be formally recognized by both internal and external parties; (2) a concept of justice requiring all groups to cooperate on matters of social concern; (3) mutual respect between conflicting groups, including a concept of patriotism which demands due respect to opponent groups; (4) a focus on “institutionalization of equal and interdependent relations among the groups”; and (5) reconstruction of social and political relations between the groups, including commitment to equality in negotiations, distribution of public goods, political representation, linguistic and cultural recognition, and dual national aspirations.
From a traditional human rights perspective, Yehuda's approach might appear controversial, as it requires, at least to some degree, the limits of a majority vote (and thus an individual vote) for a particular candidate of choice. However, we have long recognized the danger of the tyranny of the majority; thus, most democracies articulate certain fundamental rights that are strongly protected even from the majority. A quick review of fundamental texts reveals that the right to nondiscrimination, most notably in areas of ethno-national conflict, is in competition with other basic rights. For instance, both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 3) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 9) recognize security as a fundamental right. If security is to be a priority of a population, there is seemingly no inherent reason why nondiscrimination should be dominant to the extent it poses a severe detriment to security.
Yehuda suggests that “decisions made by human rights bodies are built on an individualistic conception of justice and a narrow understanding of legitimate political [systems].” Clearly, justice is an inherently vague term, always subject to debate as to its contents, and, even then, requiring the consideration of a number of disputed factors to determine if such requirements have been met. Thus, justice advocates may focus on liberal democracy, human rights, minority rights, or various aspects of international law—none of which are precisely aligned and, again, are often in competition with one another. As a result, external institutions may view power-sharing and human rights as competing interests, failing to recognize what justice might actually mean to those involved in ethno-national conflict. In such scenarios, Yehuda contends that “considerations of justice support recognizing national groups (minorities and majorities) as primary and legitimate political actors that are substantially equal.” This is where collective equality comes into play. A focus on nondomination of one group over the other(s) and the interdependence of the various groups is key. This requires political, social, and economic equality among groups, including recognition that each groups’ culture and aspirations are meaningful. Similarly, collective equality should be considered a core principle of peacebuilding—an understanding that working together, in the peace process and more generally throughout society, is more beneficial than expended resources on conflict correlate to a successful peace process.
Of course, power-sharing governments are not perfect. Collective equality is not a one-size-fits-all answer. Lebanon, from its formation in the early 18th century, has an evolving history of sectarian power-sharing. The result, while not terminally unsuccessful, has resulted in a country with a relatively weak government, often unable to make rapid changes and subject to significant outside influence. It has also been plagued with numerous assassinations of leadership as a means of regime change.
Nonetheless, there is simply no reason that collective equality should simply be disregarded based on perceived conflicts with other established rights. Yehuda, who teaches at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, notes that the Israel–Palestine conflict is in critical need of a paradigm shift, from separation of populations as a guiding principle to “fair cooperation between the two peoples, the two states and their citizenry.” As advanced by Yehuda, this can be done (or at least attempted) by “promoting equality between ethno-national groups as a core rationale underlying more just peace processes.” Collective equality is justified as it is more likely to advance successful peace processes, and it can provide a better understanding of the right to self-determination, while making international law more capable of regulating ethno-national peace-making. Thus, Yehuda concludes, that collective equality should remain a viable tool in the quest for peace in regions of severe ethno-national conflicts.
Collective Equality is not a quick read, nor should it be. But for those involved or interested in transitional justice and peace building, it is time well spent. The search for additional means of such conflict resolution is undoubtedly worth the effort.
