The broad scope of enactivism

Villalobos and Razeto-Barry (2019) suggest a reformulation of autopoietic theory that makes “explicit reference to the bodily dimensions of living beings” such that “every living being is an autopoietic body” (p. 8). This reformulation, they hold, is more in line with the original conception of the autopoietic theory. On their view, extended enactivist interpretations, which suggest autopoietic unities extend beyond the physical boundary of the organism, fail to adequately address this feature of the autopoietic theory. We think that autopoiesis, even with Villalobos and Razeto-Barry’s reformulation, is not enough on its own to provide a theory of living beings. This is why an extended, enactive conceptualization of living systems is required.

Twenty-first century developments in enactivist theory suggest that autopoiesis should be supplanted by autonomy and adaptivity in specifying the nature of living things. The concept of autonomy is a more general notion of autopoiesis and refers to the organizational closure of certain systems, including living systems (Di Paolo, 2005; Froese & Di Paolo, 2011). Adaptivity entails that living systems are robust—they have the capacity to withstand perturbations and undergo regulatory activities accordingly (Di Paolo, 2005; Froese & Di Paolo, 2011). These two features are central to a conceptualization of living systems, but they are not explicit in the original conception of the autopoietic theory. This is the work that the extended enactivist view attempts to do: it attempts to provide a richer account of what qualifies as a living being, rather than merely specifying a certain type of operational characterization of systems.

The work that Villalobos and Razeto-Barry attempt with their modification of autopoietic theory has already been done, by the incorporation of the concepts of autonomy and adaptivity (and perhaps sense-making as well) into extended enactivism. A theory referencing both autonomy and adaptivity, rather than only referencing autopoietic theory, ought to be what we talk about when we talk about what it means to be a living system and whether that implies that a living system is necessarily a living body. Because autonomy entails operational closure, it is possible to identify the relevant spatial boundaries for a living system, while maintaining that living systems are not solely constituted by living bodies. Adaptivity builds in the regulatory feature of living systems and further helps to identify what qualifies as a living body by specifying capacities for internal regulation in the face of perturbations.

We are well aware that Villalobos, at least, will reject these suggestions (Villalobos, 2013; Villalobos & Ward, 2015). But the inclusion of autonomy and adaptivity in enactive theory already does the work that Villalobos and Razeto-Barry propose with their modification of autopoiesis, and in doing so imply that living systems are not confined to living bodies. We take this to be genuine progress.

The inclusion of autonomy and adaptivity enables the extension of enactivist theory to social cognition. Work on participatory sense-making (e.g. De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007), inter-enactive agency (e.g. Torrance & Froese, 2011), and languaging (e.g. Di Paolo, De Jaegher, & Cuffari, 2018) illustrate this. The move into the social realm has been among the most active research areas in enactivism for a decade now. It would not be possible if enactive theory only applied to individual living bodies. Moreover, these recent innovations put the extended enactive approach very close to Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/2012) phenomenological views, which emphasize the malleability of the lived body and the constant renegotiation of the fuzzy boundaries between self and other, and between self and world. This progress is unattainable in Villalobos and Razeto-Barry’s version of enactivism.