Abstract
Qualitative methodologies assert certainty in the research process, creating a problem for Indigenous scholars who are tasked with surfacing ontologies that have been subjugated by Western thought. Indigenous methodologies have augmented standardised methodologies to investigate legitimate problems in the wake of colonisation. But how does one address the problem of an intangible yet affected reality, known only to Indigenous peoples? In this article, I present my disposition against methodology, arguing that methodology embodies certainty that may undermine Māori ontology and contribute to a phenomenon called fragmentation. A “Māori speculative philosophy” counters methodological certainty by surfacing metaphysical questions and asserting Māori being.
Introducing the Problems of Methodology and Fragmentation
Many Māori and Indigenous scholars are experienced in the assessment of problematic research and the development of more suitable approaches to inquiry. These appraisals are due to the lived reality of Indigenous peoples that are shaped by colonisation, which is derived from a hegemonic Eurocentric philosophy. I refer to this intellectual genealogy as “Western thought”. In the wake of colonisation, an empirical certainty based on Western thought has taken hold. This certainty has ontological implications for Indigenous peoples. Although adaptations and well-meaning principles have been devised to mitigate Indigenous concerns, there remains a fundamental disjuncture in the ontological premise of inquiry. Indigenous researchers are drawn to qualitative methodologies because of their ability to express Indigenous knowledge systems in the context of colonisation. However, in the adoption of these methodologies there is a risk that the fullness of Indigenous life might become stifled by a faithfulness to measurable certainty.
In this article, I address these concerns from the position of a problem that seems unidentifiable in qualitative methodologies. The problem is called “fragmentation.” It refers to a metaphysical displacement and imposition of Western thought on Māori being. 1 Fragmentation threatens Indigenous ontologies. Māori are the Indigenous peoples of Aotearoa (New Zealand) who, like Australia, Canada and United States, are subject to setter colonialism (Wolfe, 2006). Ontology is a premise to any research activity, but qualitative research relies on epistemology, thus ignoring its underlying metaphysics (Hein, 2025). Data-driven methodologies establish an uncanny certainty and desire to know things in tangible ways only. Epistemology is focused on knowledge, which brings about a tension for the intangible aspects of the world that make up Indigenous realities. Useful here is post-qualitative inquiry which critiques qualitative processes by engaging in ontological questions (St. Pierre, 2019; 2021b). Taking interest in the post-qualitative ethos, I seek Māori-specific tools that can prioritise the Māori experience and counter-colonial thought like fragmentation.
Fragmentation causes a methodological tension for Indigenous peoples because the holistic understanding of the world is counterintuitive to the compartmentalised one devised in Western thought. The separation of things in the world can be understood as the Cartesian mind–body problem and the philosophical hangover caused by the Enlightenment. Mika (2017) discusses this in what is termed the metaphysics of presence (a dominant hegemony); Southey (2020) describes an inherited metaphysics that requires an Indigenous critique. Fragmentation imposes the idealistic and hierarchical categories of Western thought on to Māori being (Palmer, 2025). The influence of Western thought in methodology can be seen in its empirical preferences, in which a desire to know things in their tangible entirety conflicts with the holistic Māori philosophy.
The holistic philosophy that underpins Māori ontology can be recognised in the notion of whakapapa. Whakapapa is a Māori concept integral to life that refers to the genealogical layering of things in the world (Marsden, 2003; Mika, 2017; Roberts et al., 1995). Māori understand the metaphysical entities they whakapapa with, as an ongoing relationship with ancestors. Commonly recognised in Māori culture are Papatūānuku (the Earth) and Ranginui (the sky). Together, they spawned deities that represent important domains of life in the Māori world, for example, Tangaroa and Hinemoana (sea and aquatic life), Tāne Mahuta (forest and living creatures), and Tāwhirimātea (the wind and atmosphere) (see Mead, 2003; Roberts et al., 1995). Māori are in direct lineage with these entities, which extend to the pre-origins of human life, for example, te kore (nothingness) and te pō (darkness) (see Marsden, 2003). In short, whakapapa relates to almost everything, for instance, “emotion, feeling, cognition, even physical attribute—is dependent on the interplay of whakapapa with the natural world” (Mika, 2012, p. 1086). Whakapapa is important because it establishes the ontological premise from which an inquiry can proceed on Māori terms.
Western thought may understand whakapapa as inanimate and animate, non-human and more-than-human. The “ontological turn” in the humanities and social sciences aims to take seriously the inanimate and more-than-human relationship in the development of posthumanism and new materialism (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012; St. Pierre, 2016). However, Indigenous scholars are critical of these theories for their potential to further compartmentalise the world and displace Indigenous ontologies (Hokowhitu, 2020; Palmer, 2025; Todd, 2016). The Māori holistic philosophy is imbued with both intangible and tangible things; things are not divided in Māori thought (Mika, 2017). Indigenous peoples will recognise this in concepts of belonging, place and spiritual engagements, things that are unknowable to Western thought.
Fragmentation alerts to the potential influence of Western thought on the things that make up Māori being. In researching a metaphysical problem, the Māori scholar is faced with great difficulty in substantiating an ontological problem that Western thought will find worth investigating. St. Pierre (2021a) explains this as the “dogmatic image” of conventional methodologies that are embraced by the natural and social sciences. Theorised by Deleuze (1968/1994), the dogmatic image of thought refers to the incessant hegemony of an idea that is uncritically accepted by the masses. Methodologically, this represents the standardised qualitative approaches of interviews, data collection, analysis and reporting styles. These widely accepted terms of research, if adopted uncritically, in a repetitive stasis, may enhance the displacement of Māori being that fragmentation causes. Methodology, in its desire to procure empirical evidence, exhibits this same dogmatic image in how it has been sublimely ratified by the social sciences (St. Pierre et al., 2016). The inability of qualitative methodologies to investigate fragmentation highlights the same prevailing dogma.
The Māori response to fragmentation requires a sustained engagement with metaphysics, but the application of standardised qualitative tools fall short of what is required to answer such questions. Although there are some Indigenous research approaches that aim to recentre the marginalised perspective, these allow for qualitative methodologies to undermine Indigenous metaphysics. The implied certainty and the assertion of knowing things in their fullness are incommensurable with the things unknowable in a Māori metaphysics (Mika, 2015, 2021b). Responding to fragmentation will thus require a stance against methodology to accept the possibility of not knowing things, which will more accurately represent the Māori holistic worldview. Relatedly, Feyerabend’s (1975/2010) Against Method criticised science for its archaic and self-assured orthodoxy. However, I take this stance against methodology in response to fragmentation, which I theorise from a Māori perspective in my doctoral thesis. I focus on Māori because I am Māori and work in Māori Studies departments. 2 Alongside that, a Māori theory of fragmentation will likely be of use to other Indigenous groups. Fragmentation is an underlying force in colonisation, compromising Indigenous ontologies by creating a “knowledge seeking” pursuit that is built upon binaries (Mika, 2021a, p. 5). A Māori response is required to reaffirm Māori being, yet the problematics of methodology can apply broadly to all researchers, including non-Indigenous.
I argue against the certainty imposed by methodology’s desire to know, in favour of a Māori speculative philosophy. Adopting a Māori speculative philosophy grants the Indigenous scholar an uncertainty that opposes empiricism to account for an ontological relationality to the world. Importantly, a Māori holistic philosophy does not claim to fully know things, especially primordial entities. In this way, a Māori speculative philosophy “takes for granted” the holistic philosophies of Indigenous peoples and actively dispels the rigidity of epistemological certainty found in data-driven procedural studies. I problematise these implications of research to make way for a Māori speculative philosophy so that metaphysical issues like fragmentation can be addressed by Māori scholars.
This article addresses the fragmentating practices that underpin qualitative methodologies. It also raises concern for Māori and Indigenous scholars who may rely on qualitative procedures themselves. Researchers who are trained in qualitative methodologies often go on to reproduce the same practices (St. Pierre, 2019), yet social research often fails to articulate the ontological problems facing Indigenous peoples. I advocate for a potential antidote to these conditions by examining the contradictions qualitative methodologies pose for Māori being. One solution, I argue, will be to embrace the intangible questions and to contribute to the growing body of Māori speculative philosophy. Going against methodology’s conventions, for Indigenous scholars, is a counter-colonial research agenda that aligns with decolonial movements.
Having established a philosophical problem in the use of qualitative methodologies for Māori researchers responding to metaphysical concerns like fragmentation, the structure of this article will be as follows. First, I will provide the example of mātauranga Māori (Māori knowledge) to illustrate how Western thought struggles with the holistic Māori perspective. I then move to problematise the reliance on qualitative methodologies and its relationship to kaupapa Māori theory. Advocating for a Māori speculative philosophy, I draw attention to other recent Māori scholars that have disrupted the fixation on knowing methodologies. I end by endorsing a cautionary engagement with post-structuralism, specifically Deleuzian thought, and the wider scholarly landscape of marginalised perspectives. These tools can help to unsettle methodological convention and address the intangible concerns of Māori and Indigenous peoples.
The Limits of Qualitative Research and the Problem for Kaupapa Māori
Māori and Indigenous researchers are in a delicate position in the academy. We are subject to its colonial legacy and division of knowledge from which we must find a way forward to answer difficult questions in a meaningful manner. The exposure to fragmentation can reveal itself in a “methodological discomfort” that Indigenous scholars may have observed. In my experience, Māori Studies departments are led by Māori researchers who take interest in Māori-related topics. Unique to Māori and Indigenous studies is the entangled relationship to the topics researched, which have potential to resurface colonial trauma (Te Huia, 2022). It is worth recalling Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s (1999/2012) famous words, “[t]he word itself, ‘research’, is probably one of the dirtiest words in the indigenous world’s vocabulary” (p. 1). The relationship to research is thus a lived reality that may exceed the conventional research dynamic in other disciplines. Accordingly, Māori and Indigenous scholars are concerned with the ethical procedures of research (Battiste, 2007; Cram & Adcock, 2022; Grande, 2004; Innes, 2004; Wilson, 2001). Although Indigenous scholarship has developed a suite of methodological tools, the empirical certainty that it has come to rely upon, further exposes metaphysical entities to fragmentation.
Māori scholars experience the “trap” of Western methodology (Mika & Stewart, 2016). Research projects that employ qualitative methodologies require the researcher to formulate a research question that demands a means of data collection, usually with human participants. Interview questions tend to focus on tangible socio-political matters that steer analysis towards epistemological factors. The research question is thus formulated with a data-collecting purpose for it to stand. Thematic analysis of interviews is intended to answer the research question resembling a closed-ended process. The shape of the qualitative research process is centred on a desire to know that is designed to create certainty to justify methodological procedures. I call this the “problem-solution pathway.” The closed-loop formula inhibits discussion of the metaphysical register. The methodological discomfort I raise here should concern Indigenous scholars because fragmentation is “the fundamental mode of colonisation” (Mika, 2021b, p. 50).
Kaupapa Māori has origins in critical theory but is today commonly reduced to Kaupapa Māori methodologies. The development of kaupapa Māori theory confronts the colonial logic of conventional research that failed to understand cultural specifics and often reproduced racial bias (L. T. Smith, 1999/2012). Kaupapa Māori was borne out of a movement towards Māori independence and cultural renaissance; critical theory underpins a Māori-specific approach to qualitative methodologies that critiques systems of power and colonisation (G. Smith, 2003). The blend of qualitative research techniques and culturally appropriate framings extends kaupapa Māori principles for application to other fields. Kaupapa Māori mandates ethical procedures for the benefits of participants and the intention for Māori to benefit from the research (L. T. Smith, 1999/2012). The adoption of qualitative reflexivity and positionality are key to its methodological development (Cram, 2001). While there are many principles and augmentations to kaupapa Māori methodologies, perhaps most poignant is the intention of research by Māori, for Māori (L. T. Smith, 1999/2012). The methodological approach draws attention to decolonial research processes, yet it relies on a set of (qualitative) techniques that can lead to a Western treatment of knowledge.
The epistemological certainty of qualitative methodologies dominates kaupapa Māori methodology today. Cram and Adcock (2022) state that kaupapa Māori methodologies centre Māori ways of knowing and being and are thus ontologically concerned. However, when implementing an epistemological basis, as in qualitative kaupapa Māori research, the ontological possibilities are rescinded by the epistemological findings. The risk inherent in qualitative methodologies is the same proclamation that things in the world are knowable as in the rationalism of Western science. These issues echo the warning that kaupapa Māori risks domestication, potentially weakening its transformative intentions (G. Smith et al., 2012). Indeed, the notion of methodology implies a controlled process and criteria like Western science. Māori scholarship and kaupapa Māori theory are not limited to data, although it can become difficult to reconcile when they are framed as methodology (Somerville, 2011). The wide application for kaupapa Māori theory remains possible if removed from the burden of qualitative data.
It is not my intention to evaluate every example of kaupapa Māori methodologies, but it should be acknowledged that its principles continue to evolve in data-driven studies. I do not dismiss kaupapa Māori for qualitative purposes; I am against methodological rigidity that subjugates ontological inquiry. Rather, I am focused on problematising the narrow epistemological certainty that qualitative methodologies bear upon kaupapa Māori research. Research methodologies tend to seek out certainty. Methodology reinforces empiricism and rationalism, “capturing the world in language” (St. Pierre, 2021a, p. 483). Qualitative and quantitative methods are prime examples, but kaupapa Māori methodologies are no different because it relies on the “hardening” of knowledge (Mika & Stewart, 2016). In that act of knowing something in the world to its fullest, the Indigenous world becomes compartmentalised and fragmented. There is a need to reacquaint Māori thought with its ontological origins, which can still make use of kaupapa Māori developments (Nepe, 1991, as cited in Green, 2018). The problem of fragmentation escalates these matters, requiring a Māori speculative response that can adequately centre holism without the burden of certainty.
St. Pierre (2019) alerts scholars to the same hardening of knowledge in the social sciences by way of assumptions and replication – both of which methodology depends upon. In this light, “[i]t could be argued that research is merely a pre-ordained outcome of a particular gesture to the world, and so it seems to be solely a human-constructed thing” (Mika & Stewart, 2016, p. 140). Nordstrom (2018) makes the point that qualitative methodologies narrowly depend on human participants. The methodological withdrawal from holism desensitises the self from the world; it preforms compartmentalisation just as Cartesian dualism has done. Environmental degradation, as a primary concern for Indigenous communities, reflects this contradiction (Whyte, 2018; Wildcat, 2001). The holistic Māori view would thus understand research methodologies that inscribe certainty to be a fragmenting exercise.
The practice of organising interview data could be read along the same lines as Western thought’s desire to compartmentalise aspects of the world. As Southey (2020) argues, “[t]he data driven analytic style . . . is tied to a strict expectation that responses from participants will be ordered and grouped into themes that identify the (apparent) significant points related to an area of inquiry” (p. 52). Qualitative practices are focused on hierarchical knowledge and the problem–solution pathway. Accordingly, research quality can become compromised when funded by organisational bodies who may have an underlying mission or agenda (Green, 2018). Adopting a set of ethical methodological procedures can still be undermined by the shape of research questions and intent because the research process is controlled by a set of criteria. Methodology fails to admit its partiality in findings due to the limitation of empiricism, whereas going against methodology concedes to the impossibility of fully knowing things.
Alternative approaches to qualitative methodologies take a stance against the very notion of methodology. Qualitative methodologies are underpinned by Western science. The set criteria, development of frameworks, instruments and models, all mimic the expertise of hardened knowledge. St. Pierre (2018) argues that there is an incommensurability between epistemologies and ontologies when deploying qualitative methodologies and post-structuralist theory. Southey (2020) developed “non-method” to refuse the standard qualitative thematic treatment of participant whakaaro (Māori thought) by reinterpreting utterances in interviews. St. Pierre et al. (2016) also negate qualitative methodologies, arguing for questions of being to be foregrounded. These ideas encourage a metaphysical inquiry to address the problem of fragmentation.
It is worth remembering that qualitative methodologies were, in their early development, new and treated cautiously by the established methodologies of the time (St. Pierre, 2021b, 2024). Over time it formalised as a methodology and thus brought about a set of conventions to approach a problem. In cementing methodology, the problem–solution pathway becomes prescribed as convention. The same tension can be found in scholarly disciplines that become canonised by self-serving traditions. To maintain a critical edge in thinking, methodological norms will occasionally need critique. Here, I reiterate the importance of kaupapa Māori, but I also underline the risk in it becoming a convention, and with that, possessing Western thought’s desire to know.
Mātauranga Māori and Western Science
Turning to the example of mātauranga (Māori knowledge) and its relationship with Western science, I argue that the desire to know exerts itself in methodology. Briefly, mātauranga Māori refers to Māori knowledge that is both “traditional” and contemporary (Mead, 2003; Royal, 2012). Consequently, mātauranga has a range of interpretations in research methodologies; it can appear in interviews as contemporary information (Palmer et al., 2021) or as oral histories in whakataukī (Māori proverbs) (Mercier et al., 2022). The example of mātauranga surfaces the methodological discomfort Indigenous researchers can sometimes face when forced into the conventions of Western thought.
Engagement between Mātauranga Māori and Western science has gained momentum in recent years. The interest in Indigenous knowledge has given rise to the provision of mātauranga in government policy, innovation and research (Royal, 2012; Rauika Māngai, 2020). These conditions have led to numerous research projects that adopt both mātauranga and Western science (Mercier, 2018). However, the broad range of knowledge – both traditional and contemporary – is a difficult terrain for Western thought’s desire to know. Such methodological developments within the context of settler colonialism have also led to criticism and political debate. Complicating research, for Māori, is the intertwined and collective response to colonisation (H. M. Barnes, 2022). The broadening engagement with mātauranga highlights another way that methodological certainty asserts itself in the research process, appearing both scientific and qualitative.
The involvement with Western science has reiterated an ontological disparity with a Māori holistic philosophy. The assumption that all things in the world must be knowable in their entirety to become “truth” is problematic for Māori thought (Mika & Stewart, 2016). Western science is a positivist tradition that seeks to prove tangible truths (L. T. Smith, 1999/2012). Tau (2001) warns of epistemological orthodoxy, calling it “the death of knowledge” (p. 139). The methodological requirements for empirical tangibility are precarious for Māori because of the inherent interconnectedness of things in the world (Mika, 2017). Western science is thus prone to misconstruing mātauranga, demanding evidence-based outcomes. There is a need to see it to believe it. However, these priorities can become mired if mātauranga is directly translated and equated with Western science because it reduces the capacity of Māori being (Mika, 2012). The rationalist precision imparts a Western definition of mātauranga. While the two may collaborate, equating mātauranga to the sameness of science diminishes its metaphysical capacities.
Somewhat illogically, it is often the Western science parameters that validate mātauranga, undermining the full potential of Māori being. The recognition of medicinal properties in rongoā (Māori medicines) highlights Western thought’s desire to know things in their tangible form. Māori, for example, utilised the native mānuka shrub for medicinal properties. These “claims” were regarded with mysticism by Western science until it was proven to have anti-microbial properties (Carter et al., 2016). Western science demanded quantifiable empirical evidence before accepting the Māori uses of mānuka. Upon validation, the economic potential of naturally occurring anti-microbial properties was realised, leading to the intensification of apiculture and a high-value export market (Essien et al., 2019). The global interest in taonga (culturally treasured) species like mānuka is emblematic of the exploitative risk associated with the verification of mātauranga by Western thought.
The growth of collaborative research that infuses mātauranga with scientific protocols has led to the new methodologies. Moko-Painting et al. (2023) argue for a kaupapa Māori informed science called pūtaiao (science), which emphasises a decolonial science that is underpinned by kaupapa Māori theory. However, in their augmentation of Georgina Stewart’s (2007) thesis, there is a potential divergence in how a pūtaiao methodology might assert Māori knowledge as science. Concerning this, is the constant frame of reference that Māori must submit themselves to when engaging with the methodological certainty of Western thought. The issue insists upon science for validation, which is premised on the trajectory of Western traditions and histories. The suggestion that Western science can fully accommodate the complexities of mātauranga Māori (Māori knowledge) is paradoxical. Cooper (2012) restates this concern for a so-called “legitimate knowledge” and the potential to mire things Māori. These problems highlight the adhesiveness of Western thought and its ability to displace Indigenous ontologies. The omission of metaphysical considerations by empirically based methodologies limits the understanding of “what else” might be impacting Indigenous life. This paradox reappears in the social scientific methodologies that strive to prove “true knowledge” in quantifiable ways.
The debate regarding mātauranga Māori and its equation to Western science is ongoing in both Māori and whitestream scholarship. Recently, mātauranga has been co-opted for the political gains of right-wing groups, marring any dignified and philosophical discussion. As Stewart (2019) points out, the binary question “is mātauranga science?” fails to acknowledge the political motivations behind such debates. Science is a dogmatic image in today’s research landscape, forming an economic basis to many institutions. Scientism follows the developments of the Enlightenment and is symbolic of colonial thought (which gave reason and logic to the pillaging of Indigenous lands) (L. T. Smith, 1999/2012). Perhaps more productive will be to question the “myth-truths” of settler-colonial migrants who perpetuate falsehoods and ignorance in their cultural negligence (Stewart, 2023). In this regard, methodological criteria harden knowledge into a definition that is underpinned by Western science yet fails to understand its own partiality.
The uptick in Māori collaborations with Western science coincides with the growing methodological discomfort that I identified in the concern for intangible entities. Due to epistemology’s inability to bring focus to ontological problems, methodology is prone to fragmentation. “Māori understand knowledge to be a mode of belonging to the world rather than a tool for controlling it” (Mika, 2021, p. 53). If mātauranga becomes the same as Western forms of knowledge, it risks “bring[ing] things in the world into order in exactly the same way” (Mika, 2012, p. 1089). Incorporating mātauranga into rigid methodologies symbolises the domestication of Indigenous thought by Western science. It is possible that mātauranga can be a philosophical tool in its own right (Mika et al., 2022; Royal, 2012), yet the prevailing use of it appears to reinforce the methodologies that limit its philosophical potential.
Towards a Māori Speculative Philosophy
The development of alternative research practices reinforces a new pathway to explore my concerns for the metaphysical disturbances of fragmentation. The dogmatic image of thought that appears in qualitative methodologies demands an ontological response (Jackson, 2017; St. Pierre, 2016), but avoiding the same colonising tendencies requires the centring of Māori being. Indigenous philosophies often find themselves responding to the hegemonic formalisation of philosophy in the analytic and continental academic traditions (Gordon, 2019). In this sense, a speculative approach is, quite possibly, the only tool left in the arsenal of Māori and Indigenous studies that has the opportunity to grapple with fragmentation. Accordingly, unless otherwise stated, my use of the term “speculative” in this article tends to the Māori philosophical approximation over any continental tradition. This approach is required to address Māori ontological concerns due to fragmentation.
The speculative is a call to shift into a metaphysical mode of questioning that permits an inquiry to fragmentation. “Speculative thinking is a type that is not so intent on finding a solid foundation of truth. It is more of an imaginative enterprise than an epistemically certain one” (Mika, 2017, p. 140). It thus provides an ample response to the concreteness of knowledge demanded in qualitative methodologies. Speculation grants an ontological inquiry the chance to think on primordial matters that epistemology cannot (Mika, 2017). Doctoral students, for example, are paradoxically restricted to a methodological process in their research proposals that predetermines the scope of work before any research can proceed. Issues like fragmentation coalesce on Māori being in ways that standardised methodologies cannot grasp. Speculation on intangible things, if taken seriously, can platform Indigenous interests without the burden of empiricism.
The call for Māori speculative philosophy takes shape, coincidently, alongside the developments of a contemporary speculative philosophy. The Māori interests here should not be confused with the “speculative turn” which extends the continental philosophy tradition. Speculation in the continental sense refers to a renewed interest in post-Kantian relationality to objects (Harman, 2018). These continental arguments differ from Māori interests because the intellectual concerns remain tethered to the global North and the tradition of Western thought.
Speculative philosophy today is concerned with realism and materials, so that “. . . the nature of reality independently of thought and of humanity more generally” can be engaged (Bryant et al., 2011, p. 3). Shaviro (2014) notes that speculative realism theorises an independency of being in objects. Meillassoux (2008) disputes the dominant philosophy of “correlationism,” arguing that things in the universe are contingent. The “speculative turn” moves away from the “linguistic turn” while acknowledging the advances in continental thought as they appear to the Anglosphere in Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze (Bryant et al., 2011). While “speculation” emerges in contemporary philosophy, it is not the same speculation that is drawn upon in a Māori speculative philosophy. Differentiating between Māori thought and the continental tradition are the ontological assumptions of each philosophy. Māori philosophy has a primordial premise that is unrecognised in the global North tradition of speculation. However, between these distinct collectives is the growing appetite for speculation in the broader scholarship, undermining the certainty that has reigned since the Enlightenment.
Māori ideas are innately connected to intangible and unknowable things, making speculation a fitting tool for research activity. Green (2018) argues that “speculation, in the sense of contemplating the intangible aspects of Māori knowledges, is a theoretical approach that fits with ‘taonga tuku iho’” (p. 235). Taonga tuku iho refers to ancient cultural knowledge and concepts that are orally transmitted (Mead, 2003). It appears in the foundations to kaupapa Māori theory and the Treaty of Waitangi 3 (G. Smith, 1997). In its broader definition, taonga includes both tangible and intangible things (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011). Green (2018) makes this explicit, arguing that taonga tuku iho includes the ontological concepts that might be theorised in Māori being.
The contempt for empirical knowledge is not limited to Māori speculative philosophy but is shared with post-qualitative inquiry. A speculative Māori philosophy can break away from the conventions of social research to address metaphysical questions in the interest of Māori (Mika & Southey, 2018). The entrenched attitude towards knowing things in their fullness is indicative of fragmentation. St. Pierre (2019) concurs that research should engage with the ontological questions that qualitative methodology fails to inspire. If qualitative methodology conventions are woefully accepted, then the metaphysical problem of fragmentation will remain unquestionable and unanswerable.
Kim Southey (2020) developed a Māori speculative philosophy alongside the concept of whaiwhakaaro to examine the tension of Western mental health and Māori understandings of well-being. Whaiwhakaaro “concerns the active event of co-creation, or an expression of conversations with the world and the influence of those things that both manifest in conscious thought and influence the self in embodied, unthinkable ways” (Southey, 2020, p. 49). Whaiwhakaaro proposes an unconventional interpretation of interviews that allows for the recognition of the Māori world that might otherwise be reduced in conventional qualitative practices. These approaches to speculation highlight the uncertainty that researchers must accept, rather than temper with colonial logic.
Māori ontological interests like whakapapa underpin a speculative approach in Māori research (Mika & Southey, 2018). This is because a speculative Māori philosophy thinks on a primordial premise that counters colonial thought. Furthermore, a Māori understanding of the world cannot be known in its entirety (Mika, 2017), thereby presenting a problem to the rigour of methodological traditions. Perhaps more productive for the Māori researcher will be to focus on the intangible things that are amiss in methodological conventions. Sitting with uncertainty, or mystery, as Mika (2012, 2021b) argues, is a fundamental tool for the Māori philosopher. Mystery is “the hiddenness and presence of an entity, the relationship of the entity to the self beyond the cognitive, the entity’s participation in Being” (Mika, 2015, p. 1140).
In theorising metaphysical issues facing Māori, I do not “think” in isolation. I am influenced by primordial origins that are partly known through Māori concepts like whakapapa. However, even the most inherent Māori ideas require a reflexibility and openness to their unsettling due to the potential disruption of Western thought. I am in no position to say, “do this” to achieve an “outcome.” Rather, I can speculate based upon an activation of thought regarding primordial understandings of a holistic Māori philosophy. There is, for the Māori scholar, “a subsequent and wild freedom of thought” (Mika, 2015, p. 1140) to be found in a Māori speculative philosophy. Methodological conventions hinder this freedom in the same way it renders the intangible as knowable.
Māori speculative philosophy must avoid becoming “methodology.” Becoming certain of its procedures would defeat its purpose of uncertainty. Mika (2017) and Green (2018) resist the notion of methodology for its cementation of ideas may limit the true intention of speculation. Similarly, Kim Southey (2020) observed how methodology cements the possibilities of inquiry, opting in protest, for the notion of a “non-method,” highlighting the need to break away from the problem–solution pathway. Mika and Southey (2018) proclaim the Māori “creative speculative” research can help to unshackle the conventions of qualitative methodology, allowing for the possibility of metaphysical details to surface. A speculative Māori metaphysics resists methodological determinacy by working against the desire for certainty (Green, 2018; Mika, 2017; Southey, 2020). The desire to know and the problem–solution pathway are thus avoidable when prioritising a metaphysical line of inquiry like a Māori speculative philosophy.
Engaging With Marginalised Scholarship and Post-Structuralism
A speculative Māori philosophy can benefit from the wider critique of metaphysics among allies and even European thinkers. Indigenous scholars that engage with Eurocentric ideas might be critiqued for perpetuating colonial thought (Ahenakew, 2016). The engagement with Western thought is thus another hurdle in scholarly inquiry that Indigenous research confronts. Marginalised scholars are familiar with colonisation’s exploits and have accordingly explored hybrid ontological schemas (Ahenakew, 2016) and epistemological pluralism (Andreotti et al., 2011). Furthermore, the subversion of continental philosophy, in the interests of Indigenous peoples, holds potential for ontological arguments that can counter-colonial thought (Mika, 2015, 2017). Complimenting these thought experiments is the shared marginalised experience that can be recognised in scholarship from Black, queer, trans, and people of colour.
A Māori speculative philosophy draws on the work of anti-, counter-, and decolonial thought of marginalised scholars. The use of scholarly minorities might insinuate a form of “method” to some. However, there is no prescriptive syllabus or geographical boundary that qualifies the inclusion or exclusion of such theories. Rather, it is the concurrences between marginalised scholars, Black, Indigenous, queer, trans, and people of colour, in the matter of understanding Western thought today that I acknowledge. Indigenous scholarship, for example, benefits from the decolonial work of Frantz Fanon (Barber, 2021; Cooper, 2022; Coulthard, 2014), highlighting potential synergies and learnings in Black philosophy. Marginalised scholars must continue to engage with one another in the critique of Western thought.
Perhaps, less obvious, are the connections to European scholarship. Drawing on Western critiques of Western problems can assist a Māori speculative philosophy. There are several modes of alignment here. First, marginalised scholarship is indicative of the dominant Eurocentrism that steers settler-colonial states. For this reason, the critique of colonisation and its connectives is an endless task. White scholars who share interest in understanding their intellectual assertion on the world, therefore, offer additional resources to theorising metaphysical problems like fragmentation. Second, the disruption to Western categories by post-structuralism can be leveraged in the interest of the anti-, counter-, and decolonial literature. Like post-qualitative inquiry, I share an interest in Deleuze and Guattari for their potential to disrupt the dogmatic image of thought.
In What Is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) encourage the creation of concepts to help re-orientate thought. To gain perspective from all sides of an issue should be at the core of Indigenous scholarship. This is why it is still important for the socio-political critique that may draw upon empirical modes of research; however, these cannot be our only tools. For this same reason, I am drawn to an ontological inquiry that engages with post-structuralist theorists (St. Pierre, 2018). While keeping in mind that a Māori response to fragmentation will need to centre Māori being, the creative arguments of Deleuze and Guattari have some emancipatory qualities that unsettle Western conventions. For some, this will prove productive, while others may find better use in different allies. In this way, “[e]very situation is unique and requires a specially tailored repertory of concepts” (Massumi, 1992, p. 24).
The importance of the philosophical “concept” is outlined by Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) as the creation of concepts in response to a problem. While this might seem straightforward, Deleuze and Guattari outline the power of a philosophical concept in its dissimilarity from science and the arts. They argue that concepts are for philosophy, whereas science can make claims via propositions, and the arts can stimulate responses like affects Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994). Science and art are set with different capacities than the philosophical concept, corresponding to the potential problems that emerge when methodologies become “scientific” procedures or when mātauranga Māori becomes equated with science. Their advocation for the concept has potential to assist a Māori speculative philosophical response to the problem of fragmentation.
The “concept,” for Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994), is deeply intwined with their own ontological commitments. These are referred to throughout their oeuvre, but they also evolve and change names over time. Readers of their work will note the development of, and interchangeability, in ontological concepts like the plane of immanence and becoming (Massumi, 1992). An earlier connective here is Deleuze’s (1968/1994) development of the philosophy of difference to unsettle the categorical issues in the history of philosophy. Becoming, similarly, works to suggest that things are constantly in a process of taking place (Colebrook, 2002). These philosophical concepts are disruptive to the Western philosophical tradition that establishes the problem of fragmentation, providing support for the speculation of otherwise.
Importantly, the adoption of post-structuralism requires an attention to detail when used for Indigenous scholarship. There is potential for post-structuralism to unknowingly reassert colonial interests, suggesting that a focus on decolonial scholars is more productive (Mignolo, 2007). Accordingly, a cautionary approach to Deleuze and Guattari is required. My employment of their philosophy intends to benefit a Māori speculative philosophy by leveraging their critique of Western thought – the very thing imposed upon Māori being. It does not intend to recreate a Deleuzian philosophy; rather, it draws on their ability to pry open dominant thought and speculate new routes forward.
The allyship of Deleuze and Guattari has been critiqued in the margins of scholarship. Wuthnow (2002) argues that “Deleuzian thinking, both in its original renditions and subsequent deployments, strongly lends itself to the perpetuation of colonizing discourses in ways that work to undermine the possibility of effective indigenous politics” (p. 185). They also suggest caution in the secondary literature, arguing that postcolonial Deleuzian scholars like Rosie Braidotti and Paul Patton may perpetuate underlying colonising discourses in Deleuzian thought. Therefore, the critical assessment of Deleuzian–Guattarian concepts by Indigenous scholars will benefit future Indigenous philosophy. Despite Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual disruption to the Western philosophic tradition, they still produce Western though in their concepts. To suggest otherwise would mean to overlook their undulating colonial background as non-Indigenous White men who are alien to Māori realities. Regardless, ignorance of their ideas will not benefit Māori interests.
Unangaxˆ scholar Eve Tuck’s (2010) Breaking up with Deleuze signals the contentiousness in working with Deleuze in a decolonial context. Tuck expresses an affinity in reading Deleuze, and his collaborations with Guattari; however, as her de-colonial scholarship developed, she describes “falling out” with Deleuze. Tuck (2010) identifies some problems with Deleuzian desire and the limit of hopefulness. Deleuzian desire is a core aspect of the philosophical machinery developed in Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972/2023) which critiqued psychoanalysis and its conception of desire. Tuck (2010) highlights Deleuze’s admittance to desire’s significance and meaninglessness as counterproductive to Indigenous agency and self-determination. Tuck (2010) draws attention to Sandy Grande’s (2004) critique of philosophies of fluidity (which could be coded as Deleuzian becoming), which risk further disempowerment if articulated in White scholarship. Tuck cements her critique in a departure from Deleuze and Guattari. These critiques are not lost on the risk of employing the thought of poststructuralists.
Mitigating the “problematics” in continental philosophy is the potential subversion of them. Mika (2014) observes the potential for subverting ideas found in continental philosophy, for the benefit of an Indigenous application. For example, Mika (2022) demonstrated an imagined Māori philosophical dialogue from German romantic poet Novalis. These affairs with European thought are at times cathartic for the Indigenous scholar because they articulate attributes of Western thought and allow for a Māori response (Mika, 2014). Pointedly, there are still things to learn from European thinkers that may assist the Indigenous scholar in diverting the course of fragmentation, but these must give platform to the ontological interests of Māori being.
Engaging cautiously with post-structuralism, in tandem with marginalised philosophies, has potential to generate new theoretical directions for Indigenous scholarship. In harnessing the generative philosophy that is open to diverse connections (von Schantz and Frichot, 2025), Deleuzian–Guattarian concepts will find application outside books to avoid becoming a set of devised rules (Deleuze, 1990/1995, as cited in Kedem (2024)). The “people to come” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, 1994) are thus poised to elucidate a refreshed impression of Western thought in the interests of reasserting their own ontologies. Challenging colonialism and the overlooked metaphysical subjugation of Indigenous peoples will require a range of tools. Significantly, the critique of qualitative methodologies is overdue for Māori and Indigenous scholars.
Conclusion
A Māori speculative philosophy is needed to address the questions qualitative methodology cannot ask. Aligning with post-qualitative inquiry, the call to critique methodological certainty and the need for unconstrained thinking are overdue. These issues are outlined in the problem of fragmentation and the desire to know. Interrogating the problematics of certainty in qualitative methodologies highlights the need to think outside the dogmatic image of thought. Qualitative methodologies suggest a problem–solution pathway that resembles the empirical desire to know things in their entirety. Māori holism and qualitative methodologies are thus incommensurable due to the ontological commitments in Western thought. In turn, kaupapa Māori methodologies that employ qualitative methods risk defining Māori concepts within the conceptual confines of Western thought. The complexity of engaging with mātauranga Māori highlighted these disparities between conventional methodologies and the metaphysical realities that underpin Māori being. Subsequently, the Māori response to metaphysical disturbances like fragmentation requires a Māori speculative philosophy to think “outside” of the established conventions and allow for its own philosophical terrain to take shape. I suggest a cautious and critical engagement with post-structuralist theorists like Deleuze and Guattari may help to pry open Western thought and spur new directions in Indigenous philosophy. Furthermore, sustaining a wide engagement with marginalised scholars will help to counter Western thought and support the work required to understand the problem of fragmentation. Turning against methodology gives potential to Māori being in scholarly research.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Carl Mika, Shaun Ogilvie and Kirsty Dunn for their supervision while researching the problem of fragmentation. The author also thanks the anonymous peer reviewers and the Editor for their time spent reviewing this article.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The author declares scholarship funding that supported the research of this topic. Thank you Ngā Pae o te Māramatanga and the University of Canterbury.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.