Abstract
The objective of this study was to identify Afghan perspectives on the causes of and potential solutions to child and forced marriage in the country. Open-ended interviews (N = 102 interviews) were conducted with religious leaders, police, teachers, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and government officials in Kabul, Jalalabad, and Mazar. Informants reported recognition of the poor social and health consequences of these practices for mothers and infants, citing poverty, tradition, conflict-related insecurity, low status of women, and ignorance of religious and civil laws as causes of these practices. Recommended solutions centered on child marriage prevention; most informants felt little can be done for married girls.
Afghanistan, a country with 15 million women and girls (Central Statistics Office Afghanistan, 2008; United States Central Intelligence Agency, 2008), has experienced high levels of human rights violations in terms of gender-based discrimination and violence against women (Amnesty International, 2005). Such violations were at their height under Taliban rule (1996-2001), which sanctioned policy restrictions on female education and employment and the use of violence to enforce such restrictions. Under Taliban rule, Physicians for Human Rights stated that “trauma and human rights abuses by Taliban officials have had a profound (and detrimental) affect on Afghan women’s health” (Rasekh, Baher, Manos, & Iacopino, 1998, p.455). However, even prior to Taliban rule, under the civil war and during the Soviet invasion, women’s health and well-being were gravely affected (McLachlan, 1993). After the overthrow of Taliban rule and establishment of a democratic government in 2002, Afghanistan undertook a number of initiatives to improve the health and human rights of women, including policy changes and programmatic supports for women and children. (See Figure 1 for the timeline of policy and doctrine changes in Afghanistan to support women and girls, 2001 to present.) Despite these largely legislative advancements, a recent report from Amnesty International (2008) reveals that “Afghan women and girls still face widespread discrimination, . . . domestic violence, abduction and rape by armed individuals, trafficking, forced marriages, including ever younger child marriages, and being traded in settlement of disputes and debts (bad or badal).” The lack of adequate change in the lives of Afghan women and girls over these past 8 years of increased women’s rights efforts in the country indicate the need for further research to understand what maintains women’s vulnerabilities and inequities in Afghanistan and to inform new initiatives.
Timeline of policy and doctrine changes in Afghanistan to support women and girls (2001-present).
Child marriage, defined by the United Nations as marriage prior to age 18 years, is a pervasive human rights violation disproportionately affecting South Asia as a whole (UNICEF, 2009). Afghanistan, a country which maintains age 16 years as its legal age for marriage, has been identified as a nation with very high rates of child marriage linked to poor health outcomes for both Afghan women and children (International Center for Research on Women [ICRW], 2004; UNICEF, 2009; United Nations Development Fund for Women [UNIFEM] Afghanistan, 2008). UNIFEM Afghanistan (2008) reports that 57% of Afghan girls continue to be married prior to the legal age of 16 years, and 60% to 80% of these girls are forced into marriage. No other published data appear to exist on the subject and there is a lack of clarity on how these statistics were obtained, but they appear to be the best indication of child and forced marriage prevalence among girls in Afghanistan.
Socially vulnerable girls within the country appear to be at greatest risk for child marriage. For example, the majority (60%) of women in Kabul women’s prison report marriage prior to age 16 years (UNIFEM Afghanistan, 2008); however, a relatively low proportion of girls in Kabul high schools are married or engaged (1% to 11%), and a very small proportion of Kabul obstetric patients are below age 16 years (<1%; UNIFEM Afghanistan, 2008). Such disparate findings suggest that girls with access to education and health services (i.e., girls more likely to be from urban, more educated and wealthier families) appear less likely to be married at a young age. Such findings are not surprising given that early marriage of girls in Afghanistan can be linked to debt bondage, child trafficking, and slavery, with parents or elders offering children to preserve the financial or physical security of themselves or their family (Revolutionary Association of Women of the Women of Afghanistan, 2009).
Internationally, child marriage is reported to be on the decline (UNICEF, 2007). Nations are prioritizing elimination of the practice based on recognition that it has grave maternal and child health consequences and impedes national development by stunting educational and vocational opportunity for half the population (ICRW, 2004; UNICEF, 2007, 2009). In Afghanistan, these efforts have been more limited, and the country struggles with one of the lowest human development rankings in the world. A climate of rampant gender inequity continues in the country due to ongoing conflict-related insecurity (e.g., women’s mobility is restricted by military presence and conflict) as well as the effects of Taliban policies that prohibited female education and employment (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] Afghanistan, 2007, 2008; UNIFEM Afghanistan, 2008). Subsequent high rates of child marriage (and thus too early fertility), low levels of female education, and inadequate female control over their own health care acquisition, in conjunction with poor access and poor quality health care, have been cited as major reasons for the very high fertility rate and poor maternal and child health in the country (Ahmed, Edward, & Burnham, 2004; Amowitz, Reis, & Iacopino, 2002; Bartlett et al., 2005; Khorrami, Karzai, Macri, Amir, & Laube, 2008; Mashal et al., 2008; van Egmond et al., 2004; Williams & McCarthy, 2005). More than 1 in 10 girls in Afghanistan give birth in adolescence (age 15 to 19 years), and only 10% of Afghans are engaging in any form of contraception (UNDP Afghanistan, 2007). Afghan women have a fertility rate of 7.5 births per mother, and they experience the second highest maternal mortality rate in the world (16 per 1,000 births; UNDP Afghanistan, 2007, 2008; UNIFEM Afghanistan, 2008; United States Central Intelligence Agency, 2008). Similarly, the mortality rate for children below age 5 is the world’s third highest (UNDP Afghanistan, 2007). Such findings are consistent with cross-national data documenting that women married as minors are more likely than those married as adults to report early, frequent, and unplanned pregnancies (typically as a consequence of noncontraceptive use) and to be at increased risk for maternal and infant morbidity and mortality (Amnesty International, 2005; ICRW, 2004; UNIFEM Afghanistan, 2008).
Overall, Afghanistan has seen insufficient improvements in important gender-equity issues such as female child marriage, despite substantial and growing governmental efforts to improve the status of women in the country. Broader efforts via community stakeholders at multiple levels are needed to address forced and child marriage in Afghanistan (Bahgam & Mukhatari, 2004). Such stakeholders likely include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), government structures, police, teachers, and religious leaders as these groups are typically charged with addressing child marriage in Afghanistan or are in an influential position to advise families of girls vulnerable to child marriage. This study assesses the perspectives of these classes of stakeholders on pervasiveness of child marriage, causes and effects of the issue, and possible prevention and intervention efforts to reduce child and forced marriage in Afghanistan. Findings will provide guidance to support development of new programmatic and political approaches to combat this pervasive and perseverant gender-based human rights and public health concern.
Method
From September to December 2007, Medica Mondiale, an international NGO dedicated to supporting women and girls in conflict areas, undertook key informant interviews of individuals associated with more than 60 nongovernmental agencies, government institutions (including district and women’s affairs offices), police departments, schools, and mosques in Kabul, Jalalabad, and Mazar, Afghanistan. These cities are some of the largest in the country. Kabul, the nation’s capital, is the largest and most diverse city in the country, with the greatest access to health care and education. Jalalabad is a major trading center and has a majority Pashtun population. Mazar is a tourist locale known for its Muslim and Hellenic archaeological sites; its population is majority Tajik. As is the case for the country of Afghanistan as a whole, the vast majority in each of these cities is Muslim.
To undertake this study, locally trained research staff identified key informants within sites recommended by women’s NGOs. Key informants were approached, informed of the study, and asked to participate in the confidential in-depth interviews, all of which were conducted in the languages of either Dari or Pashto. Interviews were 90 to 120 min in length and assessed participants’ knowledge and attitudes related to child and forced marriage, their perceptions of the positive and negative effects of child marriage, their organization’s or group’s response to child and forced marriage, and their ideas regarding how to eliminate these practices. Interviewers did not ask about personal experiences with forced or child marriage during these interviews.
Participants provided verbal informed consent immediately prior to the interviews. The majority of the 102 interviews (92%, n = 94) were conducted one-on-one; eight interviews were conducted as group interviews with 2 to 4 participants, resulting in a final sample size of N = 112 interviewees. Confidential data from the interviews were collected via brief notes taken by the interviewers during the interview; these brief notes were then detailed and expanded, professionally translated into English, and typed into a Microsoft Word file for data analysis. Translated typed files were reviewed by the project director for accuracy, quality, and deidentification to maintain quality control. This procedure was approved by the Afghan Ministry of Public Health’s human subjects review board.
Data Analysis
Key informant interviews were analyzed via a grounded theory approach (Glaser, 1995; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Samik-Ibrahim, 2000; Strauss & Corbin, 1997). This approach involves generation of codes (i.e., common themes or perceptions) and linkages across codes to provide insight into key informants’ understanding and perceptions related to forced and child marriage and how it can be reduced/eliminated in Afghanistan. Two research team members independently coded all data using codes identified a priori by investigators and iteratively during coding; any disagreements in coding were resolved by the lead researcher on the study to maintain high intercoder reliability. Coding revealed the following major themes: participants’ knowledge and perspectives related to legal age for marriage in Afghanistan, beliefs regarding the positive and negative effects of marriage before age 16 years, perspectives on why child and forced marriage of girls occurs in Afghanistan, perspectives on what can be done for identified victims of child or forced marriage in Afghanistan, and perspectives on what can be done to eliminate or reduce the practices of child and forced marriage in Afghanistan. Quotes to illustrate these themes are presented, with information on the gender and type of interviewee.
Results
Participant Characteristics
Half of the 102 interviews were administered in Kabul (n = 51), 28% in Jalalabad (n = 29), and 22% in Mazar (n = 22). Interviewees included police (n = 28; 3 women and 25 men), teachers (n = 32; 27 women and 5 men), religious leaders (n = 19; all male and Muslim), NGO staff (n = 21; 19 women and 2 men), and government staff (n = 12; 10 female Ministry or Department of Women’s Affairs staff and 2 male District Staff). Approximately, half of the interviewees were female (n = 59, 53%).
Participants’ Knowledge and PerspectivesRelated to Legal Age for Marriage in Afghanistan
Participants were largely aware of the civilly set legal age for marriage (16 years) or assumed it to be higher than that established by civil law (e.g., 18 or 21 years); most participants felt that 18 years or older should be established as the legal age for marriage in the country. Religious leaders more commonly felt that this higher age for marriage of girls was not in keeping with Islamic law. For example, “Islamic and Sharia law states that a girl should reach puberty before marriage, so 16 years is appropriate provided the girl’s puberty has begun” (male religious leader). Nonetheless, most religious leaders described child marriage (below age 16 years for Afghanistan) and forced marriage as haram (against God) because the Quran requires both adulthood and consent from the bride and groom. Adulthood, however, was not necessarily consistent with the civil law’s age of consent, as noted by a minority of religious leaders. “Quran states that don’t marry your daughter until they become adults . . . there is no age limitation [for marriage] because some girls become adults in 14 years age and some in 12 years age” (male religious leader).
Personal Beliefs Regarding the PositiveEffects of Girl Marriage Before Age 16 Years
Participants largely stated that there are no positive effects of child marriage. When such beliefs were reported, they tended to be those of male religious leaders. Religious leaders reported that such early marriage can protect the girls from illegal behaviors and, thus, can reduce risk for the girl’s family and the community as a whole. As one male religious leader stated, “Girls increase economic status via marriage. If no school [i.e., if they have received no education] and no marry, they may turn to prostitution.”
Although less commonly reported by other respondent groups, among those who did report beliefs that early marriage can have positive effects, similar protective justifications were revealed; for example, “It may have positive effect. She will be protected from deadly sin and delict [i.e., premarital sex and prostitution]” (female NGO staff member). In addition, a few NGO staff, Ministry of Women’s Affairs / Department of Women’s Affairs staff, police, and religious leaders noted that early marriage of girls can benefit development of society and positive behaviors of wives within the family: “She [a girl married before age 16 years] will adopt good behavior” (female DOWA staff member). “In this age, she [a girl married before age 16 years] doesn’t know about everything and can adjust herself well. Also, she can have children younger so she can be happier with her children” (female NGO staff member).
Personal Beliefs Regarding the NegativeEffects of Girl Marriage Before Age 16 Years
All participants reported negative effects of early marriage, and many of these were similar across interviewees. The most commonly reported concerns were related to poor health for mothers and children. Participants cited difficult pregnancy and childbirth, maternal mortality, and infertility due to pregnancy or childbirth complications; for example, “[Too early in life pregnancy results in] sickness during pregnancy and death during delivery” (female teacher).
Infant morbidity and mortality were also cited as major health consequences of early marriage and, subsequently, early pregnancy and childbirth: “[A too young mother] will give birth to a child of low birth weight” (male police).
Negative social consequences to child marriage were also cited, including cessation of the girl’s education and too early loss of parents in their lives: “She will not complete her education” (male religious leader). “Dispossessed of parents’ love, she will experience psychological problems” (female teacher).
Participants also stated that young girls cannot effectively handle the responsibilities of marriage and motherhood, including childcare and domestic chores: “She is immature . . . does not know the rights of her husband and herself, does not take care of her children properly” (male police officers, group interview). Such inadequacies were perceived to create family conflict (domestic violence) and lead to lifetime problems for the girl: “She cannot control her family activities. She feels impotency and cannot take responsibilities of the house. Subsequently it leads to the family conflicts (domestic violence)” (female NGO staff member).
Psychological consequences were also identified as products of both the early marriage and the family conflict which can include domestic violence against the girl. Attempts to escape the situation by running away or via suicide were noted by NGO staff; for instance: “[Family conflict will result in her] psychological problems, escaping from home, self-immolation (suicide by fire)” (female NGO staff). Police additionally identified increased risk for divorce for these girls; for example, “Family problems start and divorce occurs” (male police officers, group interview).
Perspectives on Why Child and ForcedMarriage of Girls Occurs in Afghanistan
Participants reported that child and forced marriage largely occur among the poor, rural, and uneducated, for both economic and stability reasons as well as cultural tradition. Lack of knowledge, illiteracy, and poverty were the most frequently cited reasons for forced and child marriage of girls in Afghanistan, and such concerns were viewed as greater because of the instability in the country: “Poor economy, unawareness of Islamic law, and illiteracy [maintain child marriage in the country]” (male police officer). “Insecurity status, unemployed, have more children, then you give your children early to marriage” (male police officers, group interview). “People are not aware of the Islamic perspective, and thus engage in child and forced marriage though it is against religious law” (male religious leader).
Poverty and insecurity were also linked to increasing drug use and gambling among men; marrying the girls in their family provides resources to pay off gambling or drug debts: “[Child marriage of girls occurs because] gamblers and addicts use it to pay off their debts” (male police officer).
Deeply rooted traditional practices, more common to rural areas, were also noted. These include engagement of very young children and use of “bad” and “badal” (marital exchange between families or communities to address a conflict or concern between these families or communities): “In our culture some girls are engaged at 2 years of age. Then her new family will wait for her for 8 or 9 more years; after that, they compel the family for marriage” (female NGO staff member). “Bad, badal, marriage without consent [maintain the practices of child and forced marriage]” (male religious leader).
When asked who engaged in the practice of child and forced marriage, participants noted that often the poor and the wealthy together reinforce this practice. The poor were ready to relinquish their children for money or reduced expenditure for having the child, rich men were ready to take these girls as brides, and community elders and leaders were ready to support the marriage. A few participants also felt that some religious leaders were culpable in maintaining the practice; for instance: “When they (religious leaders) participate in the wedding party, they should not arrange such marriages, because they know better from the point of view of Islam than anybody else” (female teacher).
Perspectives on What Can Be Done for IdentifiedVictims of Child or Forced Marriage in Afghanistan
In cases where child or forced marriage was planned but had not yet occurred, participants uniformly stated that their first step would be to talk to the family and to stop the marriage. Specifically, interviewees stated that they would inform families that such marriages are against Sharia/Islamic laws, and they would explain the negative consequences of these practices. “We invite their family members and explain the consequences of this type of marriage” (female MOWA staff member). “We explain the Quran and Sharia law in regards to marriageable age” (male religious leader).
For teachers and NGO staff, the discussion can only occur with the girl, unless she allows the participant to speak with her family. This is a major concern because family intervention is needed is such situations. “I can only talk to the girl . . . but I advise her it is not good [to marry early]” (female teacher). “If family disagrees [with me regarding child marriage], then there is no solution” (female teacher).
When the family is involved and cannot be dissuaded from the forced or child marriage of the girl, referrals are made to NGOs, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, tribal elders (Jirga), and the courts. “The traditional Jirga will solve it. [One must] respect culture and traditional values” (female DOWA staff member). “We give them the advice if their problems are too much [in marriage] and the Sharia law was violated; we refer them to the courts” (male religious leader).
In cases where the child or forced marriage has already occurred, interviewees largely stated that they would advise the girl to adapt and adjust to the marriage: “We advise her to adjust to her life because it has already happened” (female teacher). Supporting the marriage after the fact was viewed as a way of protecting the girl, due to cultural mores against divorce in Afghanistan: As they already got married, so this relationship should not be broken because it is a holy and respectful relationship between husband and wife. If it breaks down, then both sides—husband and wife—will lose their value in the society. (female teacher)
Religious leaders did report that they would become involved with the husband and his family to provide support for the wife, helping her adapt to the family and encouraging the husband and his family to support her happiness: “I will tell her . . . try to make your family happy and advise her family to make her happy” (male religious leader).
Participants, across type, did state that they would advise against engaging in these practices in the future, discussing the issue with all families involved, including the girl’s parents and in-laws: “To the [girl’s] family, I would educate them to wait next time until the girl is 18 and to take the advice of the girl on the marriage” (female DOWA staff member). “I will advise her to adjust to her new life . . . and to her (the groom’s) family, don’t repeat this bad action” (male religious leader).
Some participants did recognize risk for ongoing family conflict (and domestic violence) for girls married as minors. In such cases, these participants offered little concrete advice in the form of referrals for assistance, outside of divorce. Some advised participants to “avoid violence,” but no respondents offered specific strategies for avoiding such violence. “We advise them to solve problem between themselves” (male government district staff member). “I will advise her to avoid violence” (female DOWA staff member).
Perspectives on What Can Be Done to Eliminate or Reducethe Practices of Child and Forced Marriage in Afghanistan
In terms of what can be done to prevent child and forced marriage, participants almost uniformly stressed the importance of awareness campaigns, delivered via media, mosques, schools, and community elders; for example, “Use the media, specifically radio and TV, and through mosques and schools. They could have a lobby to prevent these marriages” (male police officer). Teachers in particular stressed the value of educating their students and parent groups to share awareness with the larger community and families: “We have parent committees in our schools. So we can discuss it in these committees and also can discuss these issues with students” (female teachers, group discussion).
NGOs felt that, while religious leaders, teachers and community elders are important for dissemination of awareness programs, training of these groups would be vitally important: “Train religious leaders . . . train students in universities to do awareness” (female NGO staff member). “Conduct awareness workshops and seminars through the Parliamentarians to the mosques, schools and Jirgas” (female NGO staff member).
The need for targeted awareness efforts was recognized; participants perceived that such efforts should vary by region and include both sexes: “The responsible people on this issue should travel to all provinces and collect information regarding the issue. After evaluation, graph the incidence province-wide and district-wide, and then conduct campaigns accordingly” (male police officer).
Particular emphasis on rural populations was recommended: “They should have a meeting with community elders regarding the topic and informing them about the negative side effects. Make a broad awareness program in rural districts” (female NGO staff member). “They should plan for an all rural districts public awareness campaign” (female NGO staff member).
In terms of content that should be provided in the awareness building, participants described the importance of educating the public about Sharia/Islamic laws against the practices of child and forced marriage; religious leaders, in particular, noted the importance of building this awareness through their preaching: “Make people aware of such illegal marriages, because Islam religion has banned this” (male religious leader). “Islamic education to the family and awareness [of the right to marital choice] for the girls” (female DOWA staff member).
Also noted was the importance of increasing awareness regarding the civil laws against the practice: “Give awareness to students regarding the (civil) law . . . through religious leaders, teachers and mass media” (male police officer).
Less often but occasionally mentioned was also building awareness of the negative social and health consequences of early marriage for girls; for example, “Make understanding in the people about negative side effects of these marriages so they will never repeat it” (male police officer).
In addition to awareness building efforts, structural changes to increase and improve the Afghan economy, educational opportunities, and security were also cited as means to reduce men’s and families’ “need” to engage in these practices: “Improve economy of poor people and give education to all people” (male police officers, group interview). “Security organizations should be strengthened” (female teacher). “If there is any opportunity for them to be employed, then this is the issue to save them from poverty” (female NGO staff member).
NGO staff members also noted the importance of female education in reducing the practice; for instance: “There should be a proper atmosphere for them (girls) to study and get degrees” (female NGO staff member). Teachers noted that laws were there but were not being enforced against these practices: “If the laws are applied properly and generally, this can reduce it” (female teacher). Along these lines, participants across type noted the importance of requiring marriage registration to help ensure girls are of legal age for marriage. Religious leaders performing marriages would be instrumental in such a response: “All marriages should be registered. Inform community leaders about illegal marriage” (male and female police officers, group interview). “Mullahs can refuse to do ‘Nikah’ (religious but not legal marriage). Only marry people who register their marriage” (male religious leader).
Discussion
Findings of the current study document a number of important considerations that can support development of stronger initiatives to address child and forced marriage of girls in Afghanistan. First and foremost, study results demonstrate that forced and child marriage is understood and opposed by some members of key segments of the Afghan population—teachers, police, religious leaders, women’s and human rights NGOs, and government officials (including MOWA/DOWA staff), with these members identifying that the practices are both illegal and result in negative social and health consequences for women, girls, and their children. Across type of interviewee, participants clearly and accurately identified poor maternal and child health concerns (e.g., maternal and infant morbidity and mortality, problems or difficulties in childbirth, and infant low birth weight) that may be outcomes of child marriage. In addition, key informants noted the difficulties child wives may have contending with domestic and child-rearing responsibilities and marital relationship issues, which can in turn leave these girls vulnerable to conflict with (e.g., violence from) husbands and in-laws. Several interviewees also noted that such early marriage can stunt girls’ educational and career opportunities as well as their connections with their own families. Societal leaders’ recognition of these concerns provides hope that enforcement of efforts such as legal restrictions against child and forced marriage may be supported by government, community, and organizational leaders. As described here and elsewhere, the mere existence of policies against these practices has not, to date, stemmed the prevalence of child marriage (UNIFEM Afghanistan, 2008).
Of concern, however, is that within this sample of participants willing to be interviewed on these issues by women’s NGO staff, a sample likely biased toward favoring restriction of child and forced marriage of girls, there were some participants who felt that early marriage could be protective and beneficial for girls and that such benefits outweigh the understood risks. These individuals stated that early marriage keeps girls from engaging in illicit practices such as premarital sex and prostitution and thereby protects the girl, her family, and the larger society from potentially disastrous social and legal consequences. Such beliefs were more often noted by religious leaders. Some participants also reported that girls who marry early can better adapt to marriage and a new family, produce more children and, thus, better support a stable society. Overall, these findings speak to the need for greater clarity and awareness of myths and misconceptions that reinforce forced and child marriage in the region, even among those working within or with women’s and human rights NGOs and governmental organizations.
Although some religious leaders reported benefits to marriage of girls at age 16 years or younger, almost all of the key informants, including religious leaders, stated that both forced and child marriage is prohibited by the Quran. However, these are not necessarily conflicting beliefs. Under Afghan civil law, the legal age of marriage for girls is 16 years, but under Sharia law, also recognized by the Afghan government, the legal age of marriage for girls is subsequent to puberty. Hence, marriage at 16 or even younger would be considered legal under Sharia law for many, if they define puberty as menarche (first menstruation). Religious leaders in particular noted that this definition of adulthood by puberty is the law of the Quran. Conflicting civil and religious laws—again, both are recognized by the government of Afghanistan—may be inhibiting implementation of civil law against child marriage in situations where a girl has reached menarche but has not yet reached the age of 16 years. More work is needed to bring together interpretation of Sharia and civil laws to ensure that such conflicts do not facilitate child marriage but rather collectively support the health and well-being of women and girls in the country.
In terms of what participants felt they or their organizations can do in cases of forced or child marriage, responses across types of interviewees were strikingly similar. If a case was identified in which such marriage was imminent but had not yet occurred, participants’ first step was to talk to the family of the girls and educate them on civil and religious law to sway them against the marriage; only if that did not work would efforts be made to bring in the police or courts. However, in cases of forced or child marriage that had already occurred, participants felt they would simply advise the girl to adapt and adjust. The vast majority of participants did not feel that divorce or involvement of the courts offered a reasonable potential resolution for such cases, although many participants stated that they would advise all families involved, including the married couple themselves, not to perpetuate these practices in future. These findings clearly suggest that there is likely little support available for girls forced into marriage or married at a young age in Afghanistan once the marriage has occurred.
Regarding what can be done to address child and forced marriage practices in Afghanistan, participants focused on prevention efforts. Awareness campaigns in schools, mosques, and community venues and via media were most commonly cited, a finding consistent with reported beliefs in this sample that child and forced marriage continue largely due to ignorance of the law or negative effects of the practice. Participants recommended that awareness campaigns focus on the illegality of the practices based on civil and Sharia/Islamic laws as well as the negative health and social consequences of child and forced marriage, targeting those at greatest risk for the practice, particularly rural Afghans. Participants did neither specifically recommend addressing the myths and misconceptions that maintain the practice nor comment on how to address potential conflicts between civil and Sharia law in terms of legal age for marriage; these likely must be addressed by any awareness campaign as well. Notably, although less common, participants highlighted the need for better structural support for women and families in Afghanistan, particularly opportunities for economic stability, education, and security, to reduce men’s and families’ “need” to engage in the practice of forced and child marriage. This is consistent with views that it is these same practices that “compel” families to force marriage of girls for debt repayment, family poverty, and settlement of family or tribal conflicts. Also noted was the recognition that laws exist to prevent child and forced marriage but that there is little or no application of these laws in the country. Requiring legal registration for marriage in Afghanistan was identified as a major step necessary to build application of these laws. Overall, findings document a number of prevention opportunities that should be considered to help alleviate the pervasiveness of child and forced marriage of girls in Afghanistan. Given the substantial changes for the better made since 2001, as outlined in Figure 1, it is not unrealistic to remain optimistic about the status of women and girls in Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, despite our optimism, we recognize that Afghanistan remains in a precarious position, with the Taliban seemingly increasing in strength as we write this article. Furthermore, other South Asian nations, such as India, are similarly maintaining high rates of girl child marriage and doing so in the context of economic growth and stability (Raj, Saggurti, Balaiah, & Silverman, 2009; UNICEF, 2009). A recent publication on child marriage in India documents that 45% of 20- to 24-year-olds were married as minors, and those married as minors were significantly more likely to experience lower reproductive health and greater reproductive health complications (Raj et al., 2009). In the context of the ongoing instability, insecurity, and poverty in Afghanistan, girl children remain highly vulnerable. Nonetheless, this study documents there are places from which to build change in the country, and we must build on that recognition to support the women and girls of Afghanistan.
Limitations
Although the current study offers important insight into forced and child marriage of Afghan girls, it must be considered in light of certain limitations. The sample was recruited via women’s and human rights NGO contacts; thus, these informants may be more likely to understand and oppose these practices than those who may not be available to such NGOs. They are also likely more reflective of urban and more educated populations of Afghans. Furthermore, interviewees knew that this project was being undertaken by an international women’s NGO; hence, responses may have been affected by social desirability (i.e., stating what they believe the interviewer prefers rather than stating their honest opinion). The study was designed to obtain insights on perspectives and social norms related to the topic of forced and child marriage rather than actual practices of forced and child marriage in the region; hence, findings cannot be assumed to reflect actual practices across the country. However, norms offered in the study are consistent with cases of forced and child marriage that have been highlighted in Afghanistan (Bahgam & Mukhatari, 2004) as well as child marriage case study analyses and international reports using data from other countries (ICRW, 2004; Save the Children, 2004; UNICEF, 2009; World Vision, 2008). Finally, the diverse contexts of child marriage, including bad/badal and debt bondage, although mentioned by interviewees, were not fully explored in these interviews. Further research is needed to elucidate the diverse mechanisms through which child marriage occurs and is reinforced.
Conclusion and Implications
Overall, findings from this project demonstrate that the issues of forced and child marriage are recognized and understood as illegal and problematic among key groups that interface with victims of this practice, including MOWA/DOWA, NGOs, teachers, police, and religious leaders. Such perspectives offer an effective foundation to address these issues in the country. However, given the lack of clarity of legal age at marriage among study participants, and the conflicting messages of appropriate age based on civil versus Sharia law, the following additional efforts may further support cessation of these practices.
Public awareness campaigns are needed to build recognition of the laws and effects of child and forced marriage. A first step toward this will require clarity in the law. Interpretations of Sharia law cannot be in direct conflict with civil law if both types of law are going to be in effect in Afghanistan. Elimination of this conflict can be done by increasing recognition that girls’ reproductive anatomy and physiology continue to develop subsequent to menarche (Rockett, Lynch, & Buck, 2004) and that such physical immaturity may allow fertility but compromises the health of these young mothers and their infants (ICRW, 2004; Save the Children, 2004; UNICEF, 2007; World Vision, 2008). Public awareness campaigns focused on these points, as well as on myths and misconceptions regarding positive consequences of child marriage (e.g., elimination of prostitution, girls more adaptive to marriage), are needed across Afghan society, particularly for the most vulnerable populations (e.g., poor and rural communities), and may best be delivered via mass media, community and religious leaders, and teachers. Strong trainings for these groups to deliver such messages will be key to effective implementation of such programs; these trainings would best be conducted by governmental and nongovernmental agencies dedicated to issues of women’s rights and health in Afghanistan.
In addition to awareness building, effective policy implementation is needed to combat these illegal practices. An important means of doing this is via legal marriage registration, which would allow for confirmation that the bride and groom are of legal and marital age. Such an approach necessitates the cooperation of religious leaders and law officials to define the civil law and religious law consistently, as described above, and to intervene if such registration is lacking or if underage brides or grooms are identified. Development and implementation of efforts to support young girls that are already married is sorely needed. Given that current findings lack identification of potential programs for this group, more research on the subject is needed. In the interim period, some potentially useful practice approaches could include policies requiring the physical separation from the husband and reestablishment of residence with the family of origin until the girl reaches legal martial age, as divorce is not an option in this context. In addition, given heighted health risks for adolescent mothers, linkage to health care services trained to work with married girls and their families may be helpful in reducing reproductive risks for this population and may also lead to improved pregnancy and birth outcomes.
While the above programmatic and policy recommendations may contribute to reducing the practices of child and forced marriage of girls in Afghanistan, these traditions are likely to continue unabated until conflict is reduced in the region, economic stability is established, and the status of women and women’s development are improved. Thus, at the larger societal level, there is a need to support a legal national economy and the security of the country while simultaneously improving educational and job opportunities for women (e.g., secure girls’ schools, job quotas for women) in Afghanistan. These sorely needed social changes would likely reduce families’ reliance on girl child marriage as a means of economic and physical survival for themselves and their girls.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the staff of Medica Mondiale, particularly the Medica Mondiale research interviewers in Jalalabad, Mazar, and Kabul. They would also like to thank their interviewees for providing them with their time and insights into issues of child and forced marriage in Afghanistan. They also acknowledge those who assisted with data management and analysis for the project: Dr. Khelda Jabar, Dr. Anu Garg, and Ms. Gazal Humkar. In addition, they thank Dr. Elizabeth Reed for her review and feedback on this article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The authors thank their funders, including the German Embassy, for their funding of this important work.