Protesters as “Passionate Economists”

Protesters as Individual “Economists”

Protesters as Passionate Group Members

Toward an Integrative Theoretical Model

At present, the literature on collective action offers several potentially important explanations that come out of two contrasting traditions. The “individual economists” approach focuses on belief in group efficacy and the presence of other instrumental resources (such as the presence of others willing to take action) that better enable effective collective action. The “passionate group members” approach focuses on group identity, subjective perceptions of injustice (unfairness, illegitimacy), and feelings of group deprivation. To examine empirically why protesters, such as those in Egypt’s Tahrir Square, undertake collective action, researchers can assess several of the prevailing explanations and compare their predictive power (e.g., Mummendey et al., 1999; Simon et al., 1998). Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al.’s (2008) meta-analysis showed, for example, that group identity, feelings about group injustice, and group efficacy beliefs each had independent, medium-sized effects on collective action intentions and behavior. Stürmer and Simon’s (2004) review showed politicized group identity and a wider range of cost–benefit calculations to each predict collective action.

However, previous efforts provide empirical models that integrate several constructs into one predictive model. As such, previous integrative models of collective action do not provide an overarching or unifying conceptual framework that integrates explanations of collective action into a single theoretical model. We believe that conceptualizing collective action as a form of approach coping with collective disadvantage enables a theoretical model that can integrate the major explanations of collective action by viewing individuals as “passionate economists”. In addition, the coping approach views collective action and its explanations as dynamically related—undertaking collective action can feed back to affect its explanations. Thus, a coping approach allows us to offer a theoretical model of collective action that, for instance, views group identity, group-based anger, and group efficacy as both causes and consequences of collective action.

Primary Appraisal: Self-Relevance

Primary appraisal is focused on interpreting whether an event is sufficiently self-relevant to initiate coping effort. Only events that are sufficiently important to one’s self-concept, or to one’s goals, require coping effort. According to Lazarus (1991), there are three interrelated facets of primary appraisal: ego involvement, goal relevance, and goal congruence. Thus, in primary appraisal one can interpret an event as relevant to a particular aspect of one’s ego (e.g., the personal vs. the social self, one’s morality, one’s competence) and as relevant to a particular goal (e.g., to meet one’s moral ideals, to be kind to others, to be esteemed and respected). The event with which one must cope is appraised as either congruent or incongruent with the particular goal. Although Lazarus’s model has mostly been used to examine the appraisal of individual self-relevance (e.g., health), it applies equally well to the self-relevance of group phenomena such as collective disadvantage (Iyer & Leach, 2008).

In the context of collective disadvantage, individuals’ group identity must be(come) relevant to initiate coping efforts (see Figure 1, top). This is because collective disadvantage needs to be(come) self-relevant in this case. When put in the terms of the social identity tradition, the notion of primary appraisal states that individuals must self-categorize as members of a disadvantaged group to enable a collective response (see Ellemers, 1993; Turner et al., 1987). Individuals can self-categorize as a group member because the collective nature of the event makes their social identity salient (e.g., I am being discriminated against, like other women, because I am a woman). Or, those who highly identify with their group can self-categorize as a group member because they come to the event with their group identity chronically salient (e.g., Leach et al., 2008; for discussions, see Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). Thus, acute self-categorization as a group member or chronic group identification both make it more likely that individuals’ group identity becomes salient when faced with collective disadvantage (for a discussion, see Iyer & Leach, 2008). The salience of group identity in response to collective disadvantage is what makes collective disadvantage relevant to the group-level self (e.g., Veenstra & Haslam, 2000). To illustrate, in Van Zomeren et al. (2004, Study 1) students from one university read that they were disadvantaged by their university in one condition, whereas in the other condition they read that students from another university were disadvantaged by that university. In line with our reasoning, results showed that in-group disadvantage made the in-group more salient to participants than did out-group disadvantage.

Note, however, that the dynamic dual pathway model does not presume that all participants engage in collective action because collective disadvantage is seen as relevant to their group-level self. As can be seen in Figure 1 (top), when personal identity is salient (or when individuals identify only weakly with the group), the decision to engage in collective action is presumed to be based on an individual cost–benefit calculus regarding collective disadvantage and collective action against it. In this sense, the individualist and rationalist explanation of collective action as assumed by classic resource mobilization theory is not incorrect. It applies best to those who appraise collective disadvantage as most relevant to their individual, rather than their group, self. Such individuals should most support collective action when it offers individual benefit with little individual cost (for a review, see Klandermans, 1997). This individual-level coping resembles Olson’s (1968) analysis of collective action in which individuals are looking for a free ride by offering low-cost support (e.g., signing an online petition) to those who engage in collective action on behalf of the group as a whole.

Secondary Appraisal: Blame for Unfairness

According to Lazarus (1991), the secondary appraisal of blame for unfairness is an important antecedent of approach coping. Approach motivation needs to be oriented toward an agent (i.e., the self, the other, the institution), and hence one must judge who is to blame for unfairness. In addition to identifying an agent, the appraisal of blame for unfairness involves a judgment of whether the agent’s action is unfair, illegitimate, immoral or otherwise unacceptable. Blaming an external agent for an injustice has long been considered a fundamental basis of anger (for reviews, see Averill, 1982; Frijda, 1986; Scherer et al., 2001). This is why Lazarus (1991, chap. 6) conceptualized anger as a response to a “demeaning offense against me and mine” (p. 222) that is relevant to one’s esteem. Lazarus viewed anger as strongly linked to the “action tendency” of an “attack on the agent held to be blameworthy for the offense.” Thus, attack is a form of approach coping based in a particular pattern of appraisal tied to the specific emotion of anger. Indeed, recent research confirms anger as a potent basis of approach-oriented motivation and action (for a review, see Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). However, when group members fail to blame an external agent for unfair collective disadvantage, they are likely to feel less agitated negative emotions than anger, such as dissatisfaction or sadness (Walker & Smith, 2002). Obviously, these less action-oriented emotions provide little basis for collective action. ⁵

In the context of collective disadvantage, individuals may make the primary appraisal that their disadvantage is collective and thus relevant to their group-level self. As such, they may make the secondary appraisal that their collective disadvantage is an unfair event for which an external agent is to blame (e.g., a dominant out-group, the government). This pattern of appraisal should make the emotion of anger likely and thus facilitate approach coping efforts that motivate collective action against the external agent. Lazarus (1991) refers to this particular coping effort as emotion-focused because an emotional experience is at its heart and it is emotion that motivates the coping effort (also see Austenfeld & Stanton, 2004; Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). Although many seem to believe that Lazarus viewed emotion-focused coping as an avoidant (e.g., denial, distraction, suppression) and thus maladaptive coping effort, emotion-focused coping can be either approach or avoidance oriented (see Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Lazarus, 2001). ⁶ Because anger toward an external agent is one of the more approach- and action-oriented emotions, anger about injustice is one of the more obvious types of emotion-focused approach coping.

Although Lazarus (1991) focused on anger as a form of emotion-focused coping with individual demands, his conceptualization of anger as an “offense against me and mine” allows for group-based anger about collective disadvantage and other collective circumstances. Indeed, recent theory and research combines appraisal theories like Lazarus’s with the social identity perspective to specify how individuals feel emotion about their group and its relation with other groups (E. R. Smith, 1993; for reviews, see Iyer & Leach, 2008; Leach et al., 2002). Consistent with the approach orientation of anger in general, group-based anger about collective injustice tends to be a medium-sized predictor of approach-oriented motivation (e.g., Leach et al., 2006, 2007; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; for a review, see Iyer & Leach, 2008).

As shown in Figure 1 (middle left), our dynamic dual pathway model therefore proposes that the appraisal of external blame for the unfairness of collective disadvantage is an important antecedent of emotion-focused approach coping. Blaming an external agent for unfair treatment is a basis for anger at this agent. This anger can be validated and reinforced by emotional social support—sharing one’s appraisal of blame and one’s feeling of anger with like-minded others (e.g., Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, Bruder, & Shepherd, in press; Peters & Kashima, 2007; Van Zomeren et al., 2004; also see Mackie et al., 2000). Emotional social support is a coping resource that is best provided by a group who shares one’s circumstances (Haslam & Reicher, 2006; Klandermans, 1997). Given that it is a group-based emotion, anger at collective disadvantage can be viewed as a state of action readiness that prepares the individual for adaptive action on behalf of the group. This is why our model proposes that appraising external blame for the unfairness of collective disadvantage leads to collective action through group-based anger.

Secondary Appraisal: Coping Potential

Secondary appraisal also involves a judgment of one’s potential to cope effectively with a demand. High coping potential results from a calculus whereby one’s (psychological, social, and material) resources are thought to outweigh the demands placed on one. High coping potential also suggests the power to alter the event through action. Thus, high coping potential is an important antecedent of problem-focused approach coping (Lazarus, 1991). As can be seen in Figure 1 (middle, right), our model proposes that appraising coping potential as high leads to collective action through group efficacy beliefs. This coping effort aims at directly altering the precipitating event of collective disadvantage.

Coping potential refers to the individual’s appraisal of the resources that can be marshaled. As it is a group-based action, collective action requires individuals to focus on their group-based resources (also see Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Our model focuses on the important group-based resources provided by appraisals of instrumental social support (also known as action support; see Figure 1, middle right). Instrumental social support provides the resource of others who are willing to take direct action to alter the group’s collective disadvantage. Thus, instrumental social support increases the more material resource of group efficacy. Indeed, others’ willingness to engage in collective action suggests stronger mobilization resources that increase individuals’ belief in group efficacy (Klandermans, 1997). Individuals who perceive themselves as having greater instrumental social support should thus have a greater sense that the group has the efficacy to take direct action to alter its circumstances. A greater belief in the group’s efficacy should in turn lead to a stronger willingness to undertake collective action. Group efficacy represents problem-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage because it mobilizes individuals for the direct purpose of changing their circumstances.

At this point, it should be clear that the differentiation between emotion- and problem-focused approach coping does not indicate an “emotional” versus a “cognitive” pathway to action. Both coping efforts are based in cognitive appraisal. Group-based anger is based in the secondary appraisal of external blame for unfairness, whereas group efficacy is based in the secondary appraisal of coping potential. In fact, Lazarus’s (1991) theory is devoid of a dualism between cognition and emotion, and so is ours. This is why we view individuals as “passionate economists,” whose decision to act is based in two distinct motivational pathways. Thus, the emotion-focused and problem-focused pathways of coping are complementary rather than competing. Indeed, Lazarus (2001) warned against viewing emotion- and problem-focused coping as opposed processes or as competing explanations of action: “The distinction, which has been widely drawn on in coping measurement and research, leads to their treatment as distinctive and competing coping action types, which is a too literal and misleading conception of the way coping works” (p. 49). Indeed, both pathways are equally cognitive, “rational,” and potentially adaptive.

Cognitive Reappraisal: The Key to a Dynamic Model

One clear advantage of a coping perspective is that it enables us to view collective action as a dynamic process by specifying both causal antecedents and consequences of collective action (see Figure 1). Our dynamic dual pathway model assumes not only that appraisal feeds into coping but also that coping feeds back into reappraisal (Lazarus, 1991, 2001). This makes the model dynamic because, in line with Lazarus (1991), coping is treated as a continuous process of appraisal and reappraisal. The notion of reappraisal is important because it suggests feedback loops through which coping informs future appraisal and coping effort such as to optimize effective coping. Individuals thus continue coping as long as it is appraised as necessary (Lazarus, 1991). More concretely, our model specifies how approach coping efforts and outcomes affect primary and secondary appraisals of collective disadvantage subsequent to initial coping efforts (see Figure 1). For instance, coping efforts can lead to undertaking collective action, which in turn increases the primary appraisal of self-relevance (i.e., an increased sense of group identification, or social identity salience). The dynamic dual pathway model is the first model of collective action that makes such specific feedback loops explicit and testable. This is important for theory and research on collective action because surprisingly little is known about the psychological consequences of undertaking collective action (and how this feeds back into later behavior). This has led to calls to view the psychology of collective action as a more dynamic process (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2009; Reicher, 1996). The dynamic dual pathway model is in a unique position to answer these calls through the unifying notion of coping because coping involves a dynamic process of cognitive appraisal and reappraisal.

Predictions of the Dynamic Dual Pathway Model

The dynamic dual pathway model views group-based anger as key to emotion-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage and group efficacy beliefs as key to problem-focused approach coping. The model uniquely specifies which psychological variables stimulate or impede emotion- and problem-focused approach coping. Specifically, variables that indicate coping potential, and thus stronger group efficacy beliefs (e.g., instrumental social support) stimulate problem-focused approach coping, whereas variables that indicate stronger blame for unfairness and thus group-based anger (e.g., unfairness and emotional social support) stimulate emotion-focused approach coping. Group-based anger and group efficacy each have complementary effects on collective action because they are not mutually exclusive.

The model further specifies how social identity relates to emotion- and problem-focused approach coping. On one hand, group identification and social identity salience increase the appraised unfairness of collective disadvantage and the attribution of external blame, and hence the experience of group-based anger. The dynamic dual pathway model thus predicts that the relevance of group identity facilitates emotion-focused approach coping. However, lower identifiers do not necessarily appraise collective disadvantage as irrelevant to the self—after all, collective disadvantage might still harm their personal goals and outcomes (for reviews, see Ellemers et al., 1999, 2002; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000). Lower identifiers are only likely to act on behalf of the group when they believe that personal goals are likely to be achieved through group action (e.g., Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002). Lower identifiers should therefore rely on their group efficacy beliefs to calculate whether undertaking collective action is worth the effort (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995). The dynamic dual pathway model thus predicts, different from the SIMCA, that the relevance of group identity moderates problem-focused approach coping: Individuals’ group efficacy beliefs become more predictive of their willingness to undertake collective action when their group identity is less relevant to them.

Finally, our model offers specific predictions regarding crucial feedback loops from coping to cognitive reappraisal. For instance, it predicts that stronger approach coping, as indicated by stronger collective action tendencies or actual collective action, can increase the primary appraisal of self-relevance. We thus predict that group efficacy beliefs increase group identification through the experience of “putting one’s identity into action” with collective action. This is consistent with more general evidence that individuals’ belief that social change is possible increases their group identification (e.g., Doosje et al., 2002; Mummendey et al., 1999; for a review, see Ellemers, 1993). Moreover, it fits with evidence that group efficacy and attendant collective action tendencies can redefine individuals’ group identity in terms of the collective action for which group members are prepared (Drury & Reicher, 2009). As such, a shared tendency for collective action can serve as a concrete means by which the value of the group is affirmed and strengthened in individuals (Drury & Reicher, 2005). This all implies that a stronger belief that social change is feasible mobilizes individuals for collective action and increases the group-level self-relevance of collective disadvantage. Therefore, greater problem-focused approach coping should lead to the greater self-relevance of collective disadvantage (e.g., higher group identification). This constitutes a feedback loop whereby problem-focused approach coping feeds back into a key aspect of primary appraisal.

In a second crucial feedback loop, our model predicts that undertaking collective action can increase the secondary appraisals of coping potential. In other words, undertaking collective action can empower individuals by increasing their coping potential. This is consistent with qualitative field research by Drury and Reicher (2005). They found that undertaking collective action can result in the positive experience that one is challenging the status quo as an active agent of social change (i.e., empowerment). This is as an excellent indicator of coping potential because it implies confidence in achieving group goals despite potential short-term failure (Drury & Reicher, 2005). Moreover, we predict that undertaking collective action can increase individuals’ appraisal of blame and/or unfairness and thus increase their experience of group-based anger. In fact, Drury and Reicher (2009) suggest that taking collective action can increase perceptions of unfairness as part of feeling empowered. Thus, we predict feedback loops whereby undertaking collective action increases the secondary appraisals of coping potential and external blame for unfairness.

These predictions differ in scope and precision from those by previous integrative work. No other integrative model (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2009; Mummendey et al., 1999; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Van Zomeren et al., 2004; Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 2008) offers specific causal predictions about both the antecedents and consequences of collective action. It is our use of Lazarus’s (1991) dynamic theory of coping as an integrative theoretical framework that enables us to offer a dynamic theory of collective action as approach coping with collective disadvantage. This dynamic approach enables us to depart from the assumptions of simple cause-and-effect empirical models that view collective action as the product of one or more, sometimes competing, explanations. For example, our dynamic model allows us to depart from the widely held view that group identity is only a causal antecedent of collective action (e.g., Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 2008). Consistent with an emerging view that group identity can be both a cause and a consequence of social action (e.g., Doosje et al., 2002; Leach, Rodriguez Mosquera, Vliek, & Hirt, 2008), we conceptualize group identity as dynamically interrelated with collective action. Group identity is a primary appraisal that feeds the coping efforts behind collective action, and collective action can promote stronger group identity by suggesting the group’s power and value to its members. Of course, collective action that is ineffective or invites brutal retaliation may also feed back to undermine group identity by suggesting the group’s disempowerment and its danger to members. The important advantage of a dynamic coping model of collective action is that group members are understood to be active co-constructors of their psychological and social reality who engage in coping efforts aimed at successfully negotiating the person–environment relationship. As such, our model aims to better theorize collective action to better represent its complex nature and thus to better enable its empirical examination.

Evidence From Our Research Program

We first turn to the empirical evidence for the dynamic dual pathway model generated by our research program of experimental and field studies. The typical paradigm in our first set of studies (Van Zomeren et al., 2004) was that we confronted our participants with a real-life example of collective disadvantage, manipulated their appraisal of the situation, and measured their appraisal and coping responses through self-report. In three experiments, we led Dutch university students to believe that the actions of a powerful authority (e.g., the national government or their university) led to students’ collective disadvantage. For instance, we used the issues of increased tuition fees or alleged increase in first-year students’ obligatory research participation as a self-relevant collective disadvantage that placed serious demands on the Dutch college students who were our participants (for a discussion, see Leach, 2010).

In all three studies, we tested whether group-based anger and group efficacy uniquely predicted collective action tendencies and whether specific appraisals of the situation predicted group-based anger and/or group efficacy. Manipulations of appraised unfairness were designed to affect the secondary appraisal of external blame for unfairness, whereas manipulations of appraised emotional and instrumental types of social support were designed to affect the secondary appraisal of coping potential. Emotional social support (termed opinion support in these studies) was operationalized as the expectation that fellow group members share one’s opinion that collective disadvantage is unfair. Instrumental social support (termed action support in these studies) was operationalized as the expectation that fellow group members are willing to do something against collective disadvantage.

The dynamic dual pathway model predicts that stronger appraisal of procedural unfairness increases group-based anger but not necessarily group efficacy. Stronger emotional social support also increases group-based anger because it socially validates the appraisal of unfair collective disadvantage and thus makes the experience of unfairness more group based. However, stronger emotional social support does not necessarily imply group member’s willingness to act. Hence emotional social support predicts group-based anger but not necessarily group efficacy. In line with the idea that collective action is more likely when individuals “put their money where their mouth is,” we expected instrumental social support to increase group efficacy because stronger action readiness among the disadvantaged group indicates that the group will be more efficacious.

Figure 2 shows the pooled results from the three experiments that we obtained by meta-analyzing the correlation matrices. ⁷ Results support the unique predictive power of group-based anger and group efficacy and their hypothesized antecedents. Group-based anger and group efficacy both uniquely predicted collective action tendencies across the three experiments, and the association between group-based anger and group efficacy was so small that it could be dropped from the model. These findings corroborate our view of the emotion-focused and problem-focused ways of coping with collective disadvantage as distinct. In further support of the distinct pathways to collective action, appraisals of procedural unfairness and emotional social support increased group-based anger, but not group efficacy. In contrast, instrumental social support increased group efficacy beliefs much more than group-based anger. These results support the notion of distinct emotion-focused and problem-focused approach coping efforts that motivate collective action on the basis of different group-based appraisals of the situation.

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Figure 2.

Partial test of the dynamic dual pathway model of coping with collective disadvantage

We note that our manipulations of appraised unfairness and social support enabled important evidence for the causal arrows between these appraisals and the other variables in the model. To further test the model’s internal validity, using the same paradigm, Van Zomeren, Leach, and Spears (2010) directly manipulated individuals’ group efficacy beliefs and measured their collective action tendencies. We manipulated students’ group efficacy beliefs by having an expert state that collective action would or would not achieve the group’s goals. In line with the previously untested assumption that group efficacy beliefs are a cause of the increased tendency to undertake collective action, the manipulation of group efficacy increased individuals’ collective action tendencies.

We have also extended the model to include a behavioral measure of collective action. This was partly in response to meta-analytic evidence that effects for actual action are smaller than for reported action tendencies (Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 2008). Thus, in Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (in press, Study 2), we offered Italian participants the opportunity to sign a petition at the end of a study about genetically modified food. In the study, we confronted participants with information about European legislation that allowed food producers to use genetically modified ingredients without mentioning this clearly on food labels. The issue thus concerned consumers’ “right to know.” In line with Figure 1, group-based anger and group efficacy predicted collective action tendencies, which in turn predicted signing the petition. Thus, as specified by the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) and in line with Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al.’s (2008) meta-analytic findings, collective action tendencies predicted actual collective action.

Another set of studies focused on primary rather than on secondary appraisal (e.g., group efficacy, social support). We thus tested our predictions that a greater relevance of group identity should increase individuals’ experience of group-based anger and their collective action tendencies (i.e., it facilitates emotion-focused approach coping). In contrast, group efficacy beliefs should be more predictive of collective action tendencies for those for whom their group identity is less relevant (i.e., lower identifiers). That is, relevance of group identity should moderate problem-focused approach coping.

In Van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach (2008), we combined a field study among participants in a student protest with a follow-up experiment to test both the internal and external validity of these ideas. We measured group identification in the field study, and as an experimental follow-up we conducted a laboratory study in which we manipulated the salience of students’ group or personal identity. The other variables were measured through self-report. The results of both studies supported our predictions. As can be seen in Figure 3a, the field study results showed that group identification predicted collective action tendencies through group-based anger. Thus, group identification facilitated emotion-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage. Moreover, group efficacy beliefs were more predictive of collective action tendencies for lower identifiers (see Figure 3b). Thus, group identification indeed moderated problem-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage. The follow-up experiment replicated these results in the laboratory where we first asked students to write about a day in their life as a student or as a unique individual (thus manipulating the salience of group versus personal identity) and then confronted them with collective disadvantage (i.e., increased tuition fees). Replicating the field study, the relevance of group identity facilitated emotion-focused approach coping and moderated problem-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage. Thus, a greater relevance of group identity increased individuals’ experience of group-based anger and their collective action tendencies, whereas group efficacy beliefs were more predictive of collective action tendencies for individuals whose group identity was less relevant.

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Figure 3a.

Relevance of group identity facilitates emotion-focused coping with collective disadvantage

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Figure 3b.

Relevance of group identity moderates problem-focused coping with collective disadvantage

A third line of research offered the first experimental examination of the feedback loop from coping efforts to primary appraisal. In this experiment, we manipulated individuals’ group efficacy beliefs and measured their collective action tendencies (Van Zomeren, Leach, et al., 2010). Although the original articulation of the dual pathway model predicts a causal effect of group efficacy on collective action tendencies, our dynamic model moves beyond this hypothesis by predicting that collective action tendencies also increase the relevance of group identity. Employing a similar setup as in Van Zomeren et al. (2004), we successfully manipulated students’ group efficacy beliefs by having an expert state that collective action would or would not achieve group goals. As predicted, this manipulation increased individuals’ collective action tendencies, which, in turn, increased their group identification (see Figure 4). This supports the idea that approach coping with collective disadvantage can feed back into primary appraisal (e.g., group identification).

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Figure 4.

Group efficacy beliefs increase group identification through collective action tendencies

In a fourth set of studies, we examined the feedback loop between collective action and coping potential. Drawing on Drury and Reicher’s (2005, 2009) qualitative data, we predicted a feedback loop from collective action to group efficacy beliefs to capture an important aspect of empowerment. In three experiments, Van Zomeren, Drury, and Van der Staaij (2011) confronted Dutch students with different collective disadvantages. In one experiment, they manipulated whether or not participants had the opportunity to sign a student union petition. Participants then completed questions about their group identification, group-based anger, and group efficacy beliefs. This design allowed us, for the first time, to investigate experimentally the psychological consequences of collective action. Results showed that those who had, and took, the opportunity to sign the petition indeed reported stronger group efficacy beliefs than those who did not have the opportunity to sign the petition, or those who had the opportunity but did not sign it. The two other experiments replicated this effect in different contexts. These findings demonstrate the predicted feedback loop between approach coping and coping potential. In fact, these findings supplement the Van Zomeren, Leach, et al. (2010) experimental findings by showing that the link between group efficacy and collective action tendencies is reciprocal. Indeed, the effect sizes of both causal effects were similar (η ² = .11 for the effect of group efficacy on collective action tendencies and η ² = .13 for the effect with the reversed causal order).

Evidence From Other Sources

We can also find evidence for the dual pathways in our model in past and present work by other researchers. For instance, our model is corroborated by Mummendey et al.’s (1999) survey of members of the disadvantaged East German group in the context of German unification (also see Kessler & Mummendey, 2002). Their measures of group-based resentment and efficacy both independently predicted wanting to engage in competition with the advantaged group of West Germans (a proxy of collective action intentions). Consistent with our conceptualization of group identification as a primary appraisal of self-relevance, identification as East German predicted social competition only indirectly by promoting group-based anger and efficacy. Several similar studies by Klandermans and colleagues also fit with predictions from the dynamic dual pathway model. For example, Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Van Dijk (2009) found that efficacy beliefs predicted individuals’ motivation to engage in Dutch labor union protests independent of unfairness perceptions (also see Klandermans et al., 2008). Our theoretical model uniquely explains why these empirical links were found in quite different contexts.

Furthermore, Tausch et al. (2011) recently examined dual pathways to collective action intentions in studies of German students’ protest of tuition hikes, Indian Muslims’ reactions to their collective disadvantage, and British Muslims’ protest of British foreign policy. In all three contexts, appraised injustice against the group was associated with group-based anger rather than belief in group efficacy. Also consistent with our model, anger and efficacy were distinct predictors of intentions to engage in the collective action that participants were most willing to perform (e.g., protests, petitions). Moreover, in a study of a community sample of African Americans, Outten, Schmitt, Garcia, and Branscombe (2009) found that higher reported group identification was most associated with reports of using what we refer to as instrumental and emotional social support. Group identification was less strongly associated with reported problem-focused coping through collective action (e.g., “By working together, Blacks change discriminatory practices”). This is consistent with our view that group identity is a primary appraisal that leads to secondary appraisals of coping potential (i.e., social support) rather than directly to the coping effort most closely linked to collective action.

In addition, in a modified role-play study about gender inequality in salaries, Martin, Brickman, and Murray (1984) manipulated the severity of the inequality and whether women were informally and formally organized at the company. Only the manipulation of inequality severity affected individuals’ sense of group-based deprivation (i.e., perceived group injustice and a feeling of discontent). Thus, only a manipulation of unjust disadvantage affected what we view as a secondary appraisal of blame for unfairness and resultant emotion-focused coping. In contrast, Martin et al. found that the formal (rather than informal) organization of women in the organization increased their willingness to do something about their collective disadvantage (also see Klandermans et al., 2008). Thus, in the terms of our model, instrumental social support led to a willingness for collective action through a pathway of problem-focused coping independent of the appraisal of injustice central to the pathway of emotion-focused coping. Thus, Martin et al.’s findings are broadly consistent with our conceptualization of emotion-focused and problem-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage as distinct processes.

Ellemers and Barreto (2009) provide better experimental evidence for the specific links among external blame for unfairness, group-based anger, and collective action. In their studies, women were confronted with either blatant or subtle expressions of prejudice. In regard to the dynamic dual pathway model, the key difference between blatant and subtle prejudice is that blatant prejudice is easier to identify and therefore easier to blame on the (unfair) prejudice of the out-group. As our model predicts, blatant prejudice led to stronger group-based anger than subtle prejudice. In addition, group-based anger led to greater willingness to engage in collective action on behalf of women as a group. Similarly, Iyer and Ryan (2009) also found evidence for emotion-focused approach coping in their recent study of women’s responses to being confronted with lesser-known examples of gender discrimination. They found that the perceived illegitimacy of the women’s poorer position led individual women to experience group-based anger, which in turn motivated their willingness to engage in collective action. Thus, there is clear evidence of emotion-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage in all these studies.

Importantly, there is also evidence from other researchers regarding the dynamics of collective action specified in our model. Research by Drury and Reicher (2005, 2009) has used qualitative methods to document the psychological consequences of participation in actual collective action in the field. Of particular interest to our model is the question of how people cope when their participation in collective action does not have the desired outcome of achieving the group’s goal. Drury, Reicher, and colleagues find that undertaking collective action can empower individuals in a way that shields them from disappointment about the objective outcomes of their actions. This fits with the link between collective action and increased coping potential proposed in our dynamic dual pathway model.

Recent work provides further support for our model’s proposition that coping effort and eventual collective action can feed back to affect antecedents of collective action such as group identity. In their studies of actual protests, Drury and Reicher (2005, 2009) have repeatedly found that participation solidifies and extends group identity in ways that promote further collective action. Thomas and McGarty (2009) showed that intragroup discussions forge new social identities that motivate individuals to engage in action on behalf of that group. Specifically, individuals develop new social identities through discussing collective disadvantage with like-minded others. In two experiments, Becker, Tausch, and Wagner (in press) experimentally led some students to protest against increased tuition fees. They found that such collective action increased group identification, especially when it was focused on the protest movement. In a similar study, Becker, Tausch, Spears, and Christ (2011, Study 2) asked students to imagine engaging in various forms of collective action to protest tuition increases. Imagined collective action increased students’ identification with a student protest movement.

Recent research by others offers further support for our proposal that collective action can lead to anger in a dynamic feedback loop. Drury and Reicher (2005, 2009) have consistently found participation in collective action to feed emotions such as anger. In Becker et al.’s (in press) experiments, leading students to protest against increased tuition fees led to increased anger at the government, which was blamed for the collective disadvantage. In line with field studies of protesters in political science (for a review, see Goodwin et al., 2001), Becker et al. also found that students who engaged in collective action had increased positive feelings about their individual self. Similarly, Outten et al. (2009) found African Americans’ reported problem-focused coping through collective action to be an especially strong predictor of individual life satisfaction and self-esteem. In terms of our model, positive emotion and well-being can be viewed as individual benefits of collective action (also see Klandermans, 1997). These individual benefits can in turn feed back into future cost–benefit calculations of engaging in collective action.

In sum, there is accumulating evidence for the dynamic dual pathway model of coping with collective disadvantage. It is especially noteworthy that other researchers, not always guided by our theoretical model, produce results quite consistent with the predictions of our model. Although the methods and measures employed by individual studies do not always offer a precise test of our predictions, taken together these studies offer broad support for our model. Of course, the studies that we have conducted to directly test the model offer more specific support for the dynamic dual pathway model of approach coping with collective action. Nevertheless, we believe that conceptualizing collective action as a form of approach coping with collective disadvantage provides a broad theoretical framework within which a great deal of theory and research can be integrated.

Implications for Theory and Research on Collective Action

Implications for Theory and Research on Coping

Our model highlights at least two complexities of group-based coping. First, there might be more to the notion of group identification than meets the eye. As noted, the dynamic dual pathway model conceptualizes group identification and social identity salience as determinants of the self-relevance of collective disadvantage. As such, group identification and social identity salience are a primary appraisal and therefore a determinant of whether coping is initiated. However, the dynamic feedback loops in our model, and several studies, attest to the fact that group identification and social identity salience are also affected by coping efforts. For example, Drury and Reicher (2005, 2009) argue that participation in collective action leads to an empowered group identity. This new sense of group identity becomes a resource for future coping efforts and thus increases coping potential (also see Leach et al., 2010). In addition to conceptualizing and examining group identity as a dynamic feature of coping with collective disadvantage, future research on group-based coping might do well to conceptualize and measure group identity in a more nuanced way to determine which aspects of group identification operate as more of a primary appraisal of self-relevance and which aspects operate as more of a secondary appraisal of coping potential (for discussions, see Iyer & Leach, 2008; Leach et al., 2008). The construct of group identification is likely to be central to the dynamic process of group-level coping. Thus, the construct will need to be conceptualized and examined with sufficient nuance to capture its dynamic operation.

A second complexity in a coping approach to collective disadvantage lies in the appraisal of this situation as threatening or challenging. In coping, if demands are thought to outweigh resources, the situation is experienced as threatening. When resources outweigh demands, the situation is experienced as challenging (Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Given our focus on collective action as approach coping, we think it likely that those who engage in collective action view themselves as possessing sufficient resources to be challenged by collective disadvantage. The secondary appraisal of coping potential seems the likely place where group members make this judgment. It will be important to examine this assumption empirically in future work. In keeping with the dynamic nature of our model, it will also be important to examine how group members reappraise threat as challenge in response to coping efforts. There is already some evidence that strong group identification operates as a resource that encourages viewing collective disadvantage as a challenge rather than a threat (Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005). Leach et al. (2010) recently argued that satisfaction with group membership is the component of group identification that best operates as a resource for coping with the devaluation of the group. Other components, such as solidarity, may be an especially important resource for enacting the approach coping of collective action.

Practical Implications

A key practical implication of the dynamic dual pathway model is that it is important to stimulate individuals to make primary appraisals that increase the self-relevance of their group identity. What is often less clear is how to achieve this in the context of collective disadvantage. After all, collective disadvantage often reflects negatively on individuals, and hence they might distance themselves from the group (Ellemers, 1993). Importantly, the dynamic dual pathway model suggests indirect ways of increasing the self-relevance of group identity. Because problem-focused approach coping can affect primary (re)appraisal, increasing coping potential that stimulates problem-focused approach coping efforts will increase the relevance of group identity (Van Zomeren, Leach, et al., 2010). Indeed, Barack Obama’s “Yes we can!” slogan is a good example of a focus on coping potential to build identification with a group and thus increase the self-relevance of collective disadvantage.

Another practical implication of the dynamic dual pathway model is that, at the end of the day, accumulating coping resources is what mobilizes individuals for collective action. Such resources reflect those variables that stimulate or reflect emotion- and problem-focused approach coping efforts (e.g., power, strength, support, networks). Increased resources therefore motivate individuals to engage in collective action. This fits with the emphasis in resource mobilization theory on mobilizing resources (e.g., McCarthy & Zald, 1977), although coping resources are distinctly psychological. The fit with Klandermans’s (1984, 1997) analysis is therefore even better, especially with respect to his ideas about consensus mobilization and action mobilization. Increasing the appraised unfairness of collective disadvantage and emotional social support and thus group-based anger reflects consensus mobilization, whereas increasing instrumental social support and thus group efficacy beliefs reflects action mobilization. Stimulating individuals to make these appraisals is therefore a form of subjective resource mobilization and constitutes a second key practical recommendation.

Both recommendations relate to an important “missing link” in the collective action literature, namely the issue of leadership. Obviously, mobilization attempts are often set into motion by leaders, yet few have connected insights in how to mobilize individuals for collective action with insights into leadership processes (but see Haslam, 2004; Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011). Nevertheless, this enterprise seems fruitful because our model suggests which motivational pathways could be important for the leader to appeal to (e.g., emotion- and problem-focused approach coping). That is, effective leaders should be those who can make collective disadvantages self-relevant for their followers and help them to cope in approach-oriented ways. Future theory and research should therefore seek to integrate insights from these at present unconnected literatures.

Finally, we note that the very same knowledge about which factors afford collective action among the disadvantaged also offer insights into how to prevent collective action from occurring. Indeed, our model suggests that collective action is unlikely when collective disadvantage is not viewed as self-relevant. Collective action is also unlikely when it is impossible to blame those responsible for the unfairness of one’s collective disadvantage and when individuals do not believe in the group’s efficacy to achieve social change. Just as the disadvantaged may benefit from the knowledge accumulated in our model, of course this is also true for the advantaged (or the relevant authorities who represent the social system) if they want to prevent collective action and thus prevent social change.