Experience of Time by People on the Go

Abstract

We explore the psychological interface of time and motion. Locomotion, the proclivity toward movement and change, constitutes a significant determinant of persons’ orientation toward time, both as a valuable resource and as a flow advancing from past to future. High locomotors act quickly, multitask and refrain from procrastination, thus conserving time as a resource. Their preoccupation with movement, moreover, affects their relation to the flow of time. High locomotors are future oriented and eschew preoccupation with the past. They are optimistic, experience little regret, generate few counterfactuals, feel little guilt about past wrongdoings, and leave behind past friends. Evidence accumulates that locomotors’ “fast forward” orientation pervades diverse aspects of their behavior and has significant consequences for individuals and societies.

Keywords

individual differences interpersonal processes judgment/decision making motivation/goals close relationships

The experience of time, much debated by philosophers and physicists, affects humans in two major ways: as a resource and as a flow. As a resource, time is an all-purpose medium essential for the attainment of things. It constitutes a valuable possession that may be quantified and measured. It may be saved but also squandered, effectively managed as well as mismanaged. The popular “time is money” adage reflects the notion of time as a valuable resource. Modern technology seems in a constant race to come up with ever more efficient time-saving devices; cell phones, tablets, laptops, fast trains, and so on, are among the myriad of contemporary tools designed to fill every free moment with a goal driven activity, so that no time is ever “wasted.” Glaring newspaper ads explicitly enjoin drivers to use express lanes to “take control of their time.”

As a flow, time represents a dynamic flux extending from past to future. It thus defines an imaginary line on which events are sequentially ordered. This in turn enables inquiry into the causes of things, affording the practice of science and the study of history. It is generally maintained that humans subjectively experience time’s flow and pervasively distinguish between its phases.¹ They have remembrances of things past, make choices in the present, and draft plans for the future.

These two facets of the experience of time are distinct from one another. As a resource, time is a dimensionless supply of a commodity, much akin to money. Like most things human, our time is limited, hence the ubiquitous counsel to use time wisely in quest for the “good life.” In contrast, time as a flow is limitless and infinite. Having neither beginning nor end, it represents a relentless current where happenings chase each other in perpetual succession.

Movement, which is a quintessential property of all living things,² is inextricably intertwined with time both as a resource and as a flow. Carrying out movement occurs in time; hence, it requires time-investment, reflecting the resource aspect of time. Moreover, movement extends in time representing the flow aspect; purchasing a house, proposing marriage, driving to work all represent (psychological and often physical) movements that occur in time from their initiation to their completion.

Movement’s temporal aspects carry important implications for the psychology of actors. Specifically, locomotors, who are individuals with heightened concerns with initiating and managing movement (Higgins, 2012; Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000), should exhibit a stronger temporal orientation. This should be true whether their heightened locomotion state derives from a chronic predisposition to be in this state or from situational forces that induce it. Regardless of which it is, individuals in a state of locomotion should be more preoccupied with time (compared with individuals with low locomotion concerns). We assume that locomotors (a) will behave as temporal misers jealous of their time and selective about its use, and (b) in their zeal to move on, will downplay the past and instead emphasize what is yet to come. We propose that these time-related features of locomotion will have profound consequences for locomotors’ cognitions, emotions, and social relationships—impacting the behavior of individuals and societies.

In the present article, we elaborate these notions in a theory about the interface of locomotion and temporality. We begin by introducing the concept of locomotion and describing its major properties. We subsequently derive the implications of locomotion for the resource and flow aspects of time, and review empirical evidence for these implications. Next, we relate the present theory to current research on the psychology of time. Finally, we discuss our theory’s broader ramifications and its potential impact concerning individual and societal affairs.

Locomotion: The Rush Forward

Desire itself is movement, not in itself desirable; only the cause and end of movement.

—T. S. Eliot (2009, Burnt Norton)

Motion and change are the essential aspect of action. Although all persons engage in action of some sort, not all are equally predisposed toward movement or desirous to effect change. Indeed, individuals differ in their proclivity for movement, and the same person may be more or less inclined toward movement in different situations. Recent psychological research identified a dimensional construct, called locomotion (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000), which taps personality and situational differences in individuals’ predilection for movement and change. The locomotion construct thus expresses the propensity to experience, effect, and manage movement. High locomotors are motivated to initiate and manage movement; that is, to effect (control) the greatest amount of movement per unit time. When in a state of rest, high locomotors are “simply itching” to get going. Simply maintaining the status quo seems loathsome, and opportunities for initiating and managing movement are readily embraced.

Such opportunities include goals that individuals may form. Goals provide direction for the movement. It is noteworthy, however, that whereas goals or desired end-states represent the outcomes or consequences of a movement, locomotors are focused more on the process of movement, and they view outcomes to a large extent as justifications (or excuses) for movement. As we discuss in greater detail later, this property of locomotion distinguishes it from other motivational tendencies that are concerned with goals as desired outcomes to be attained rather than as just providing direction for the movement process.

Prototypically, movement is oriented forward, and one generally faces the direction of one’s motion, “looking where one is going.” Thus, for individuals in a high locomotion state, the shift forward is essential, and they are upset by barriers, blockages, retreats, and delays because these interfere and disrupt their managing to effect (control) movement.

Conceptual Uniqueness

The locomotion construct is distinct from other kindred concepts with which it shares a “family resemblance.” As noted earlier, high (vs. low) locomotors have a process motive to effect movement. In contrast, most kindred motivational concepts identified in the psychological literature pertain to goal outcomes. For example, promotion and prevention are concerned with attaining or maintaining valued outcomes rather than just managing the process of goal pursuit (e.g., Higgins, 2012). To highlight the difference, consider the difference between promotion and locomotion. Both orientations are motivated to move away from the current status quo (unlike prevention). The difference is that promotion wants to move to a better state, to end up with a gain (i.e., increase positive outcomes), whereas locomotion simply wants to effect (control) movement in direction of the goal. Indeed, locomotors would prefer to effect a move away from the status quo even if it is possible that the new state will be worse rather than better: “I would prefer to make mistakes than do nothing at all.” As other examples, consider the need for achievement (McClelland, 1965) or the need for affiliation (McClelland, 1987). They too pertain to wanting desired outcomes—respectively, the outcome of valuable accomplishments and the outcome of having close contact with others. The need for cognitive closure (e.g., Kruglanski, 2004) pertains to the desired outcome of possessing firm beliefs and so on.

Similarly, locomotion differs from Gollwitzer’s (1990) pre-actional goal pursuit orientations of implementation and deliberation. Again, these orientations revolve around the desired outcomes an individual strives to attain at distinct pre-actional phases of an action sequence. The desired outcome of the deliberation phase is to become committed to pursue a particular goal, and the desired outcome of the implementation phase is to have identified and selected the appropriate means of goal pursuit (the mode, time, and place of goal pursuit). It is interesting in this regard that although the implementation phase is more about planning the managing of goal pursuit and thus would seem to be more like locomotion, Scholer and Higgins (2012) have shown that the locomotion variable is not uniquely associated with the implementation phase but can apply equally to the deliberation phase. This is because deliberation’s desired outcome of commitment to pursue a goal requires a commitment to change from the current state and toward the new goal state, and stronger locomotion means stronger commitment to change (Scholer & Higgins, 2012). Thus, locomotion functions as a moderator of what happens in the deliberation phase. It should also be noted that locomotion moderates the implementation phase as well because high (vs. low) locomotors want the planning to be quick and decisive to end these two pre-actional phases and enter the actional phase where the goal pursuit movement actually begins.

The locomotion construct may also seem similar to Kuhl’s (1985) notion of action orientation. Here too, however, the overlap is more apparent than real. In Kuhl’s (1985) theory, a developed action structure includes a represented relation between a present state and a desired future state, and represented behavioral alternatives believed to transport the individual from the former to the latter. Individuals display an action orientation when their attention is focused on such fully developed action structures. As described by Kuhl (1985), then, the concept of action orientation pertains to an action-schema; that is, essentially, to a cognitive (rather a motivational) construct referring to a mental representation of a goal and its means of attainment. Locomotion and action orientation are distinct concepts because locomotion highlights a motivational concern with managing the process of movement whereas action orientation addresses the cognitive representation of action structures.

Measuring, Inducing, and Validating Locomotion

Stable individual differences in the locomotion tendency are measured via a 12-item scale whose psychometric properties have been described by Kruglanski et al. (2000). Sample scale items are, “I don’t mind doing things even if they require extra effort,” “I am a doer,” and “I enjoy actively doing things rather than just watching and observing.” By now, the locomotion scale has been translated into numerous languages (and has been implemented in numerous studies carried out in different cultures, cf. Higgins, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2008). Also, a situationally induced state of locomotion can be produced by having individuals recall instances from their past when they have behaved like a high locomotor (e.g., Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Mauro, Pierro, Mannetti, Higgins, & Kruglanski, 2009; Orehek, Mauro, Kruglanski, & van der Bles, 2012).

In an effort to validate the locomotion construct, Kruglanski et al. (2000) carried out extensive psychometric work in which the locomotion scale was compared with a variety of alternative constructs to examine its convergent and discriminant validity. Demonstrating convergence, the locomotion measure exhibited moderate relations with a large number of variables such as preference for action over deliberation, attentional control, psychological vitality, achievement strivings, and conscientiousness (e.g., being planful). Locomotion was found to have only a moderate association with Kuhl’s (1985) Action–Decision subscale of the Action Orientation measure, and no significant correlations with the remaining subscales of this construct. More recent research (Higgins et al., 2008) found that locomotion exhibits similarly moderate relations with promotion and prevention. Importantly, none of the numerous measures examined in our wide-ranging inquiry (Kruglanski et al., 2000) accounted for more than 32% of the variance in locomotion. Thus, the individual-difference measure of locomotion doesn’t appear to be tapping previously identified individual-difference variables.

Attesting further to the discriminant validity of the locomotion measure, it was essentially uncorrelated with participants’ self-reported political orientation and with social dominance orientation. Locomotion was uncorrelated with a measure of in-group favoritism (attitude toward one’s own racial/ethnic group minus mean attitude toward other racial/ethnic groups, for example, “Asians,” “Blacks,” “Hispanics,” “Whites”; see Shah, Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1998), and it was uncorrelated with age and sex (for further details concerning the convergent and discriminant validity of the locomotion scale, see Kruglanski et al., 2000).

Locomotion Versus Assessment

Within regulatory mode theory (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & Higgins, 2013; Kruglanski et al., 2000), locomotion and assessment are conceptualized as critical ingredients of action in which the assessment function is to select the right or best goal and to select the right or best means to pursue that goal, whereas the locomotion function is to carry the action forward by managing what happens. In this sense, assessment and locomotion constitute a “dynamic duo” wherein the former informs and guides the latter to go “in the right direction” and the latter ensures that “going” actually happens rather than getting lost in thought. Thus, each mode supports and constrains the other (Higgins, 2012). While recognizing that assessment and locomotion work together to determine action interdependently, regulatory mode theory treats assessment and locomotion as essentially independent proclivities each of which can receive differential emphasis and be related to different phenomena (cf. Kruglanski et al., 2013). The phenomenon of temporality is a case in point.

Specifically, the relation between locomotion and time is direct and inherent; in contrast, assessment is largely irrelevant to temporality. To be sure, like any pursuit at all, assessment also takes time. Thus, persons high in assessment may spend considerable amount of time critically evaluating and comparing various options. But this is not because they care about time as such any more than do low assessors. It is just that making selections takes time and this is true whether you are a high or low assessor. Whether the decision process happens to be fast or slow is irrelevant. What matters for assessors is whether the choice is right. For that reason, low assessors might not be any faster in their performance of activities than high assessors. Instead, low assessors might allow themselves to be distracted, engage in day dreaming, and procrastinate, thus approximating the time taken by high assessors.

In summary, the construct of locomotion has been firmly established as a unique psychological variable manifest both on the trait and the state levels, and distinguished both conceptually and empirically from a number of seemingly similar psychological tendencies identified in prior research. The present objective is to address a heretofore unexplored implication of locomotion as it interfaces with time: If locomotion is essentially about movement as such (rather than about vitality or the attainment of desired outcomes, for example),³ and if, as we have argued, movement is inherently tied to temporality, then locomotion as measured and manipulated in theory-testing research should display a set of unique relations to time in both its resource aspect and its flow aspect. We now turn to elaborate and empirically examine the nature of those relations.

The Temporal Lives of Locomotors: A Theory of the Time and Motion Interface

In the sections that follow, we explore the locomotion construct in reference to its uniquely temporal implications. We derive those implications from a number of general postulates about the time and motion interface, pertaining to the resource and the flow aspects of temporality, respectively. Although these features of time are conceptually independent, they converge when it comes to motion, locomotors’ quintessential concern. Locomotors’ goal to maximize movement orients them to the future, where their movement is heading, and they view the resource aspect of time as a means to that goal. This goal-means framing provides the conceptual link that ties locomotion to both aspects of temporality: In their striving to be on the move, locomotors are both future oriented and concerned about utilizing time to the fullest.

A major objective of the following analysis is conceptual integration: As will be seen, our theory serves to synthesize under a common conceptual roof a plethora of seemingly unrelated findings concerning diverse psychological phenomena that on first blush would seem to have little if anything in common.

Resource Postulates

Postulate 1: Time is a limited resource

An essential characteristic of the human condition is awareness of the limits of our temporal existence. No one exactly knows how much time one has, but that one’s time is limited is hardly in doubt (Becker, 1973). Vivid testimony to time’s finitude is its “parcellation” into circumscribed units: seconds, minutes, and hours measured by clocks; days, months, and years tagged in calendars. The value attached to time as a resource is reflected in common epithets, for instance, “time is money,” or in familiar complaints about “life being too short” or about there being “only 24 hours in a day.”

Postulate 2: Managing movement takes time

Time is the backdrop of all occurrences. Movements occur in time and they consume time. It is experientially incoherent to be doing x and not-x at the same time. Changing from one state to another takes time. Therefore, less time is available for alternative pursuits, or alternative movements.

Postulate 3: Locomotors strive to maximize movement per unit time

Their quest is to effect as many changes as possible, hence to cover as much psychological distance as possible within a given temporal interval. Because managing change from one state to another takes time (Postulate 2), and because time is limited (Postulate 1), high locomotors should be particularly concerned about using time efficiently.

Postulate 4: Locomotors experience positive affect when they maximize movement per unit time

People experience greater positive affect when there is a good fit between the structure of their environment and their motivational orientation. Accordingly, locomotors should experience positive affect in conditions that afford the maximization of movement per unit time. Because locomotors strive to maximize movement (Postulate 3), they should be satisfied in circumstances where this is possible, and prefer those circumstances over alternatives.

The foregoing general postulates afford derivations pertaining to specific domains of application. In what follows, we examine a non-exhaustive set of such derivations.

Derivation 1 (speed)

A major way in which movement can be effected while preserving time is by doing things expeditiously. It follows that persons in a heightened state of locomotion would be faster on the tasks they perform, that is, carry them out at a higher pace, than persons whose locomotion orientation is low.

Consistent with the foregoing derivation, research suggests that locomotors focus on speed, occasionally at the expense of accuracy (Kruglanski et al., 2000; Mauro et al., 2009). In one study (Kruglanski et al., 2000, Study 5), for example, high (vs. low) locomotors were found to exhibit a Type A behavior pattern, r(n = 192) = .56, p < .001, characterized by considerable time urgency and impatience (M. Friedman & Rosenman, 1959). In another study (Kruglanski et al., 2000, Study 9, n = 99), participants engaged in a proof-reading task in which they checked several pages of a sample copy against a master copy. Time to completion was measured surreptitiously by the experimenter. Participants’ locomotion scores, controlling for assessment scores, and instruction type, were significantly and inversely related to longer completion time, F(1, 95) = 4.77, p < .04, reflecting the fact that as locomotion score increased the participants’ completion time of the proof-reading assignment decreased.

Derivation 2 (speed potential)

Because they prefer to move through tasks speedily, individuals who are high (vs. low) in locomotion should prefer to pursue goals whose subjective probability of attainment is high (vs. low), thus promising swift and uninterrupted movement toward them, and they should tend more (than their low locomotion counterparts) to select means whose perceived speed of delivery is high (vs. low). Difficult, low likelihood tasks are psychologically like obstacles to smooth movement that prevent the continuous “cruising” preferred by locomotors. Therefore, high (vs. low) locomotors should prefer tasks whose instrumentality to goal attainment is high rather than low. Note that people often prefer tasks with high (vs. low) instrumentality to goal attainment, and thus even low locomotors could have this preference, though it should be even higher for high than low locomotors.

Consistent with this implication, Kruglanski et al. (2000, Study 10, N = 63) found that, compared with low locomotors, high locomotors, controlling for assessment scores and attainment value, prefer the pursuit of goals that seemed easy to attain (i.e., whose attainment expectancy was high) over the pursuit of goals that seemed difficult to attain (i.e., whose attainment expectancy was low), F(1, 56) = 12.66, p < .001.

In another series of experiments, Orehek et al. (2012) found that high (vs. low) locomotors tended to choose unifinal means assumed to constitute a more instrumental and secure route to goal attainment over multifinal means even when the latter promise a higher value. A unifinal means is uniquely connected to a single goal, whereas a multifinal means is connected to other goals as well. Research on the dilution effect suggests that the multifinal means’ multiple associations with several goals dilute or weaken those perceived associations. In turn, diluted associations are construed as having less instrumentality as a means to any of its associated goals. Thus, for any given goal, a unifinal means is perceived as more effective or instrumental to that goal’s attainment than a multifinal means (Kruglanski et al., 2013; Zhang, Fishbach, & Kruglanski, 2007).

The tendency of high locomotors to prefer unifinal means over multifinal means that promise greater value (accruing from the multiplicity of goals that such means serve; Orehek et al., 2012) suggests that should a goal pursuit process become more difficult due to obstacles, high locomotors would be less motivated to persist in that pursuit. Barriers that interfere with smooth movement toward a goal do not fit high locomotors’ motivational orientation because they disrupt movement toward that goal (Higgins, 2006) and undermine their motivational readiness to pursue it (Kruglanski, Chernikova, Rosenzweig, & Kopetz, 2014). There is indirect support for this possibility in a study by Marguc, Van Kleef, and Förster (2012, Study 2). They found that high (vs. low) locomotors made smaller font size estimates after thinking about how to reach a personal goal with versus without an obstacle. Smaller perceived font size implicitly suggests a greater distance of the perceiver from the fonts in question. Thus, the findings of Marguc et al. (2012) could reflect locomotors’ tendency to “step back” and disengage from the blocked avenue of goal pursuit that prevents speedy progress toward the chosen objective.

Derivation 3 (promptness)

High locomotors’ concern about efficient use of time should lead them to minimize the amount of time devoid of movement change. Periods of time when no change is happening is avoided by locomotors. Therefore, persons in a heightened state of locomotion should be more prompt in their task initiation and to procrastinate less than persons whose locomotion orientation is low.

Several recent studies (Pierro, Giacomantonio, Pica, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2011) provide supportive evidence for this proposition. In an initial study, participants responded to the locomotion scale and also to the Tuckman Procrastination Scale (TPC; Tuckman, 1991) that includes items such as, “When I have a deadline, I wait until the last minute” and “Putting things off until tomorrow is not the way I do it” (reverse scored). After other procrastination-related personality factors were statistically controlled, the correlation between locomotion and procrastination was significantly negative, r(n = 221) = −.40, p < .001. The second study used a two-wave longitudinal design to investigate whether students who were committed to taking an exam in the first available session ended up postponing it to a later session. In line with present theorizing, postponement was significantly and negatively related to students’ locomotion scores, r(n = 102) = −.29, p < .01.

These results were replicated in yet another study that found, in addition, that the negative relation between locomotion and procrastination, r(n = 216) = −.20, p < .01, was mediated by high (vs. low) locomotors’ reported ability to stay focused on the task (i.e., keep moving) and resist distraction. In two subsequent studies, the negative relation between students’ locomotion and procrastination, r(n = 121) = −.44, p < .001 and r(n = 103) = −.38, p < .001, respectively, was mediated by high (vs. low) locomotors’ tendency to persevere on their tasks and complete assignments despite distracting conditions.

Finally, in a study conducted in an organizational setting (workers at an insurance agency in Rome), participants listed two work-related goals that they would like to accomplish within the next 3 months. Three months later, they were asked to report the extent to which their movement toward these goals was interrupted and their attainment was postponed. Responses to these questions were combined into a common index of procrastination. In this context too, locomotion was negatively related to procrastination, r(n = 99) = −.28, p < .01, including after perceived goal importance, past goal attainment, and goal attainability were statistically controlled. Results of a meta-analysis across all of these studies show an average effect size of −.33 (SD = 0.09), t(5) = −9.03, p < .001; χ²(5, N = 862) = 8.39, p < .13 (for more details, see Pierro et al., 2011). These results suggest that the effects of locomotion on procrastination were homogeneous and robust across all of the studies.

These studies find that the relation between locomotion and procrastination is mediated by high (vs. low) locomotors’ reported ability to stay focused on the task and resist distraction. There are two possible interpretations of this finding. One interpretation is that measures of procrastination might be picking up on behavior after a task has been initiated. Our interpretation is that the ability to stay focused and resist distraction enables high locomotors to translate their decision to engage in a task (e.g., their decision to commence studying, to clean one’s desk, or to do one’s taxes) into actual engagement rather than procrastinating, that is, promptness in initiating a task in the first place after a decision has been made. In other words, the same proclivity to focus on the task after it has been initiated could also induce promptness of initiating task engagement to begin with. Indeed, high locomotors’ negative answer to questions, such as “When I have a deadline, I wait until the last minute,” and positive answer to questions, such as “Putting things off until tomorrow is not the way I do it,” imply that high locomotors do perceive themselves as prompt at task initiation. Notably, the two-wave longitudinal design that tapped high locomotors’ stronger tendency to stick to their decision to take an exam in the first session rather than postponing it to the second session also appears to attest to promptness of initiation. Nonetheless, future experimental research should investigate further whether actual exposure to distracting stimuli causes greater delays in task initiation for low locomotors than high locomotors.

Derivation 4 (time management)

To maximize the amount of movement, that is, change per unit time, there needs to be efficient management of time. High locomotors’ should be particularly concerned to avoid “a waste of time” and to utilize the available time to the utmost by “packing” it with activity. Consequently, high locomotors should develop and reflect considerable time-management ability as compared with persons whose locomotion orientation is low.⁴

The procrastination research reviewed above provides evidence that locomotors guide their time jealously and are highly concerned about avoiding the “waste of time.”

Additional evidence is provided by studies that measured time management (Amato, Pierro, Chirumbolo, & Pica, 2014). In two sub-samples investigated in this research (students at an Italian university, n = 249, and workers in a medium-sized firm, n = 90), participants responded to the locomotion scale and to the Time-Management Behavior Scale (Macan, Shahani, Dipboye, & Phillips, 1990). That scale measures three dimensions of time management: setting goals and priorities, mechanics of time management, and preference for organization. To measure perception of time management, participants also responded to five items from Macan et al.’s (1990) perceived control over time scale, which measures people’s beliefs about their sense of control over their time, such as “I feel in control of my time,” and “I must spend a lot of time on unimportant tasks” (reverse scored). In both sub-samples, locomotion was significantly and positively related to each of these different measures of time management (p < .001 in all cases, see Figure 1). Moreover, the effect of locomotion on perceived control over time was significantly mediated by setting goals and priorities and by preference for organization (see Figure 1).

In summary, extant evidence is consistent with the notions that high (vs. low) locomotors may be more able to avoid procrastination (Derivation 3), and to manage their time in accordance with their priorities (Derivation 4). Moreover, it appears that both tendencies stem (or are mediated by) high (vs. low) locomotors superior ability to resist distraction, though additional evidence for this is needed.

Derivation 5 (multitasking)

High locomotors’ concerns with efficient time management should lead them to engage in as much movement as possible per unit time. Therefore, persons in a heightened state of locomotion should be more likely to engage in “multitasking” than persons whose locomotion orientation is low. Our assumption here is based on cognitive neuroscience research showing that what has been described as multitasking actually refers to switching back and forth between tasks (Han & Marois, 2013). In this vein, we assume⁵ that, when multitasking, individuals utilize temporal interstices (natural rest junctures) in the performance of one task in order to switch to another task and in this way manage not to waste time. Just like a skillful chef who, for example, when making a soup switches to cutting up the vegetables once the activity of heating up the chicken stock has been initiated, so multitasking individuals may switch from one task to another task when the former task involves waiting for something to finish. Wasting time while sitting around doing nothing is not acceptable to a high locomotor.

Although no evidence is available at this time regarding high (vs. low) locomotors’ differential tendency to engage in multitasking, there is evidence that pertains to a related derivation concerning affect experienced in situations of multitasking.

Derivation 6 (positive affect from multitasking)

Recall that according to Postulate 4, high (vs. low) locomotors should experience positive affect when the situation affords considerable movement. Because multitasking affords more movement than the pursuit of one task at a time, high locomotors should experience more positive affect at “multitasking” than persons whose locomotion orientation is low.

Three different studies support the hypothesis that locomotors tend to prefer situations where multitasking is possible (Pierro, Giacomantonio, Pica, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2013). The first of these, carried out with a sample of Italian university students in Rome, found a significant positive correlation, r(n = 248) = .29, p < .001, between locomotion scores and the inventory of polychronic (multitasking) values, including items such as, “I like to juggle several things at the same time” (Bluedorn, Kalliath, Strube, & Martin, 1999). In a different study, carried out at an Italian publishing company, workers indicated the extent to which their job involved multitasking (Hecht & Allen, 2005) as measured by items such as, “My job demands that I juggle several activities at the same time.” This study found that the perceived multitasking opportunity was positively related to job satisfaction, β(n = 175) = .35, p < .001, and negatively related to stress, β(n = 175) = −.26, p < .01, and turnover intentions, β(n = 175) = −.40, p < .001, for high locomotors, whereas it was negatively related to job satisfaction, β(n = 175) = −.53, p < .001, and positively related to stress, β(n = 175) = .46, p < .001, and turnover intentions, β(n = 175) = .46, p < .001, for low locomotors (see Figure 2).

To provide a stricter test of the causal relation between locomotion and multitasking, the next study (n = 60) was an experiment in which both locomotion and multitasking were manipulated. High state of locomotion was induced by having participants recall three instances in which they “acted like a doer” and “decided to do something and couldn’t wait to get started.” Low locomotion was induced by having participants recall three instances where they recalled situations in which they “behaved like a person characterized by low energy” and “decided to do something but didn’t feel the urgency to do it.” Multitasking was manipulated by having participants perform a set of three tasks (creativity task, attention task, and anagram task) sequentially in one condition, or together in another simultaneous condition. It was found that participants randomly assigned to the high locomotion condition exhibited higher positive affect, M = 3.32 versus M = 2.87; F(1, 56) = 5.30, p < .05, η² = .09, and lower negative affect, M = 1.09 versus M = 1.51; F(1, 56) = 7.13, p < .01, η² = .11, in the simultaneous condition compared with the sequential condition. In contrast, participants in the low locomotion condition evinced higher positive affect, M = 3.28 versus M = 2.88; F(1, 56) = 4.56, p < .05, η² = .08, and lower negative affect, M = 1.20 versus M = 1.61; F(1, 56) = 7.74, p < .01, η² = .12, in the sequential (vs. the simultaneous) condition.

It should be noted in passing that derivations concerning the relation between locomotion and affect aren’t exclusive to multitasking but rather are applicable to all situations that support the maximization of movement. For instance, high (vs. low) locomotors should experience more positive affect where speedy movement is possible and where speed potential (likelihood of speedy advancement) is high. Similarly, they should experience negative affect in situations where their movement is thwarted or speedy advancement is interrupted. These additional derivations could be profitably investigated in future research.

In summary, substantial evidence to date supports the theory that the locomotion dimension of individual differences is significantly related to the tendency to use time efficiently as a resource. High locomotors are faster than low locomotors (i.e., they use less time to advance to their objectives), they prefer activities that afford swift movement, they tend to enjoy multitasking more, and they tend to be prompt and procrastinate less. More generally, and as a consequence, they report better overall success in managing their time.

Equally important as locomotors’ relation to time as a resource is their relation to time as a directed flow. We address this topic next.

Flow Postulates

Postulate 5: Locomotors tend to be oriented toward the future (vs. the past)

Human movement coincides with time-flow from present to future. Locomotors are bent on effecting change from the current state to a new state. Thus, they head toward future states and away from present states. They “rush into the future” as it were.

Postulate 6: Movement is typically directed

Movement generally consists of relocating with some place, some destination, in mind. Such destination is provided by goals that individuals adopt. Thus, locomotors should be quick to adopt goals because goals provide a direction to movement by identifying a destination to which one may strive to arrive.

Postulate 7: Movement involves change

In carrying out movement, individuals change from one state to another, thereby altering their psychological and/or physical location. Because locomotors are particularly inclined to engage in movement, they should be comfortable with change and embrace it.

Together, Postulates 5, 6, and 7 suggest that high (vs. low) locomotors will focus their attention on the future rather than dwelling on the past, and that they would welcome and/or initiate goal-directed change. This suggests several specific derivations, as follows:

Derivation 7 (optimism)

Because setting a goal provides a justification for movement and managing movement without disruptions or obstacles is desired, believing that the goal pursuit will go smoothly supports locomotion concerns. Given this, high (vs. low) locomotors should be optimistic about their future potential successes. Consistent with this hypothesis, we have found that there is a significant and positive relation between locomotion and optimism, r(n = 192) = .38, p < .001 (Kruglanski et al., 2000, Study 5).

Derivation 8 (lessened concern about goal value)

High versus low locomotors should give less weight to the value of goals because it is a goal’s function of providing direction for movement that matters to them rather than the outcomes from attaining a goal. Even though locomotors need goals to initiate and maintain movement, their overriding concern is with movement as such and less so with the final outcomes that the movement can yield. Hence for high (vs. low) locomotors, the role of goals tends to be more as a justification or excuse for directed movement rather than providing outcomes from goal attainment. In a study relevant to this derivation, Orehek et al. (2012) found that high (vs. low) locomotors tended to prefer an instrumental means (i.e., a movement affording means) that yielded low value (by serving a single goal only) over a less instrumental means that could potentially deliver greater value (by serving multiple goals at once).

Derivation 9 (commitment to change)

Change from one state to another typically entails movement, which is what locomotors want. Therefore, high (vs. low) locomotors should exhibit greater commitment to change. Scholer and Higgins (2012, Studies 1 and 2) tested this hypothesis using a five-item scale (Klein, Wesson, Hollenbeck, Wright, & DeShon, 2001) of commitment designed to tap the intention to devote effort to change, persist in change, and unwillingness to abandon the pursuit of change, via items such as, “I am strongly committed to pursuing the goal of changing” and “It would not take much for me to abandon the goal of changing.” Consistent with Derivation 9, it was found that commitment to change was significantly and positively related to the locomotion orientation, controlling for strength of the assessment orientation. Using a different paradigm, Scholer and Higgins (2012, Study 3) additionally found that locomotion was significantly related to the choice of switching experimental tasks (i.e., change) where the possibility of doing so was provided.

Derivation 10 (positive evaluation of change in general)

High locomotors should evaluate change in general more positively than low locomotors. Scholer and Higgins (2012, Study 3) specifically assessed the degree to which locomotion is related to valuing change in general. On a series of nine 11-point semantic differential scales (bad–good, harmful–beneficial, worrying–reassuring, unpleasant–pleasant, unsatisfying–satisfying, negative–positive, punishing–rewarding, foolish–wise, worthless–valuable), participants indicated how they would complete the sentence “Change in general is . . .” In support of Derivation 10, locomotion was significantly and positively related to positive evaluations of change in general.

Derivation 11 (coping with change)

High (vs. low) locomotors should cope better with change imposed upon them than low locomotors. Because movement entails change and because high locomotors are motivated to experience movement, they should be more comfortable and cope better with change that was imposed upon them than low locomotors.

Four studies of organizational change (Kruglanski, Pierro, Higgins, & Capozza, 2007) offer evidence in support of this derivation. The first study was conducted with a sample of nurses in Rome, Italy, in the context of new regulations that altered their nursing role from an auxiliary role under tight supervision by a physician to being an active, responsible, and autonomous health care professional. Participants filled out the Locomotion Scale and a scale of coping with organizational change developed by Judge, Thoresen, Pucik, and Welbourne (1999). They also responded to the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), an item on the impact of the change on their everyday activities, and questions on demographic variables like age and gender. As predicted, controlling for need for closure, impact of change and demographic variables, stronger locomotion was significantly and positively related to coping with change, β(n = 110) = .36, p < .000.

The second study was conducted at a Postal Service Center in central Italy. Because of a privatization of this sector, the Postal Service was recently subjected to far-reaching changes, including a revamping of the computer system, downsizing, increased flexibility of job descriptions, personnel reduction, and incentives for transfer to alternative roles in the organization. Replicating Study 1, controlling for need for closure, demographic variables, impact of change, and intrinsic motivation, stronger locomotion was significantly and positively related to coping with change (Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994), and demographic variables, β(n = 105) = .38, p < .000.

The third study was conducted with municipality workers in the City of Rome who, along with other workers in the Italian Public-Administration System, were undergoing far-reaching reforms having to do with integration of various sectors and a re-organization of incentive-systems. This study used a different measure of coping with change, yet it too found that controlling for other variables such as need for closure, impact of change demographic factors, and support for innovation, locomotion was significantly and positively related to coping with change (Siegel & Kaemmerer, 1978; β(n = 69) = .25, p < .006). This same significant and positive relation between locomotion and coping with change in the Postal Service system (controlling for need for closure, expectancies about change, impact of change and demographic variables) was found in a fourth study that employed a longitudinal design in which locomotion was measured a month before coping with change was assessed, β(n = 47) = .50, p < .003.

To examine further the effects of the locomotion orientation on coping with change, we conducted a meta-analysis across all four studies described above, using, as a basic measure of effect size, the semi-partial correlations. Results of this meta-analysis showed a mean effect size of .34 (SD = .09); t(3) = 7.13, p < .007; χ²(3, N = 331) = 1.43, p = .69 (for more details, see Kruglanski, Pierro, Higgins, & Capozza, 2007), indicating that the effects of strong locomotion on coping with change were homogeneous and robust across all of the four studies. Together with the Scholer and Higgins (2012) finding, these results suggest that high (vs. low) locomotors are more open to change and cope with it better.

Derivation 12 (nostalgia)

Nostalgia is the sentimental remembrance of past events that are self-relevant, involve close others and carry a positive (“sweet”) affective tone. Due to their predominant future orientation, high (vs. low) locomotors should be less nostalgic.

Consistent with this prediction, in a study that used Italian participants (Pierro, Pica, Klein, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2013), locomotion strength was negatively related to measures of nostalgia, including the Southampton Nostalgia Scale (SNS; Routledge, Arndt, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2008), r(n = 113) = −.25, p < .01, the Batcho Nostalgia Inventory (BNI; Batcho, 1995), r(n = 113) = −.19, p < .05, and a subset of nostalgia relevant items from the Time Perspective Inventory (TPI; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999), r(n = 113) = −.18, p < .05.

In a second study, a strong locomotion orientation was situationally induced experimentally (Avnet & Higgins, 2003) by having participants remember three different situations, in which they personally exemplified high locomotion, namely, “Think of a day when you made many different things”; “Think of a time when you finished one project and did not wait long before you started a new one”; “Think of a time when you decided to do something and you could not wait to get started.” Following the induction, participants responded to a three-item nostalgia measure (Wildschut, Sedikides, Arndt, & Routledge, 2006; Wildschut, Sedikides, Routledge, Arndt, & Cordaro, 2010). Participants in the control condition responded directly to the latter measure without undergoing a prior manipulation of any sort. It was found that experimental participants in the locomotion condition (n = 46) exhibited significantly, F(1, 107) = 4.59, p < .05, η² = .041, less nostalgia (M = 2.70, SD = 1.10) than the control participants (n = 63, M = 3.21, SD = 1.33).

Derivation 13 (self-forgiveness)

Locomotors’ tendency to downplay the past should result in their greater inclination to be self-forgiving and to feel less guilt about their past wrongdoings and mistakes.

This prediction was tested in two recent studies by Pierro, Pica, Kruglanski, and Higgins (2014). The first study was carried out with two samples of Italian participants (university students, n = 168, and professionals, n = 155, respectively). Following a procedure developed by Wohl, DeShea, and Wahkinney (2008), participants were asked to recall a significant experience where they had wronged someone else. They then responded to four items taken from the Self-Forgiveness Scale (Wohl et al., 2008) in relation to that event. These items inquired whether participants felt: rejecting of themselves (reverse scored), accepting of themselves, disliking themselves (reverse scored), and forgiving themselves. The four items were averaged to create a composite Self-Forgiveness score. Across the two samples, locomotion was significantly and positively related to self-forgiveness—Sample 1, r(n = 168) = .30, p < .001; Sample 2, r(n = 155) = .19, p < .05; total sample, r(n = 323) = .27, p < .001, respectively.

A second study situationally manipulated locomotion (Avnet & Higgins, 2003) as described earlier. Participants then completed the same four-item scale of self-forgiveness used in the previous study. Those in the control condition proceeded directly to the self-forgiveness scale without the locomotion manipulation. Conceptually replicating the prior study, participants in the locomotion condition (n = 33) had significantly, F(1, 62) = 4.05, p < .05, η² = .061, higher self-forgiveness scores (M = 3.2; SD = .46) than the control participants (n = 31; M = 2.8, SD = .65).

Derivation 14 (counterfactuals and regret)

Because of their future directedness and withdrawal of attention from the past, persons in a heightened state of locomotion should be less inclined to generate counterfactuals or exhibit regret than persons low in locomotion.

Two studies carried out in the context of economic decisions examined the relation between locomotion and counterfactual thinking and regret (Pierro et al., 2008). In one of the studies, after having responded to the locomotion scale, participants read a vignette about a protagonist (Paolo) who purchased a computer that turned out to be flawed. Participants were then asked to role-play the protagonist and to write down the thoughts that came to mind (Tsiros & Mittal, 2000). Independent observers then classified these thoughts into the counterfactual category (e.g., “I should have asked for advice rather than deciding for myself,” “I should have chosen the other brand”) versus the category of “other” possible thoughts. To measure the amount of regret, we used a special scale with items like, “If you were Paolo how much would you regret choosing a Siemens over a Compaq notebook?” (Tsiros & Mittal, 2000). Locomotion was significantly and negatively related to counterfactual thinking, r(n = 83) = −.21, p < .05, and negatively related to regret, r(n = 83) = −.21, p < .05.

Rather than reading a vignette, participants in the next study were asked to recall their own unfortunate purchasing decision. Most participants mentioned a relatively expensive product or service such as a cell phone, a DVD player, a vacation, or registration into a college. Next participants responded to regret items and ones assessing counterfactual thinking. As in the previous study, locomotion was negatively related to counterfactual thinking, r(n = 81) = −.27, p < .01, as well as to regret, r(n = 81) = −.43, p < .001.

Derivation 15 (devaluation of past friends)

High locomotors thrive on movement and abhor immobility. Thus, rather than “resting on their laurels” after attaining a goal, they should be motivated to turn their attention to new goals that allow them to move forward once again. As one consequence of this, persons with high (vs. low) locomotion should turn their attention away from past goal pursuits, including the means of the goal pursuit. Given that the means of goal pursuit include friends and allies who assisted in the goal pursuit, high locomotors would tend to devalue more past friends and allies who assisted them in past goal pursuits.

These notions were tested in a pair of recent studies carried out by Orehek, Fitzsimons, and Kruglanski (2014). In the first study, American undergraduates first completed the locomotion scale and next listed the most important academic achievement goal that (a) they completed during the previous semester and (b) they were pursuing in the current semester. For each goal, they listed the most helpful significant other for that goal (i.e., friend, family member, romantic partner), and rated how much they liked each person. We computed a difference score between liking of the significant other who served as a means to a current (not yet completed) goal versus liking for the significant other who served as a means to a previous (completed) goal, and regressed this difference score onto participants’ centered locomotion scores. This analysis revealed a significant and positive relation between the difference score and locomotion strength, β(n = 86) = .22, p < .05, reflecting the fact that strong locomotors liked more a significant other who is currently serving as a means to an ongoing goal attainment than a significant other who previously served as a means to goal attainment.

Orehek et al.’s (2014) second study experimentally manipulated both goal attainment and locomotion. In addition, it used an unconscious (implicit) measure of liking. In a first session, participants (n = 85) nominated a friend who facilitated their academic achievement goal. Two to three days later, they returned to the laboratory for a second, ostensibly unrelated, experimental session in which half of the participants had a high locomotion state manipulated as described earlier (Avnet & Higgins, 2003). The other half of the participants had a low locomotion state manipulated by asking them to “Think back to the times when you were a ‘low energy person,’” “. . . when you procrastinated rather than moving forward,” and “. . . when you rested because you had just completed a goal.”

Next, participants completed a manipulation of perceived progress in the academic achievement domain (adapted from research by Koo & Fishbach, 2008). Participants responded to one question (on a 9-point scale) designed to highlight either progress achieved to date (high progress condition; “In thinking about the past and the work you have done so far, how much progress have you made toward your academic achievement goals?”) or progress still required (low progress condition; “In thinking about your future and the work you have remaining, how much progress do you still have to make toward your academic achievement goals?”). Prior research has demonstrated that this manipulation affects participants’ sense of progress on their academic achievement goals (Fitzsimons & Fishbach, 2010).

Participants’ evaluation of friends who assisted them with goal attainment was assessed via a modified Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) that in prior work was shown to be effective in tapping participants’ evaluation of various objects. In this procedure, a prime, the friend’s name, is presented for 75 ms; it is then backward masked by a string of Xs lasting for 125 ms, which is followed by a Chinese ideograph for 100 ms and a screen of white noise. Participants are asked to press one key if they liked the Chinese ideograph (referred to as a “drawing”) and another if they did not. The proportion of positive responses to the friend (presented as a subliminal prime) was computed, as was the proportion of positive responses to neutral stimuli (“gray”). The assumption underlying this procedure was that affect aroused by the friend’s name is then generalized to the Chinese ideograph, thus allowing an implicit evaluation of one’s liking for that friend.

As shown in Figure 3, in the situationally induced high locomotion condition, participants’ implicit evaluations of their friend were significantly more positive in the low progress condition than in the high progress condition, F(1, 80) = 4.72, p < .05. In the low locomotion condition, the progress manipulation had no effect on the implicit evaluation of friends, F(1, 80) = .002, p = .96. When participants were in a high locomotion state, however, and they felt they had already made high progress toward goal attainment, they liked a helpful friend less than participants in the other three conditions, t(80) = 2.38, p = .02. These findings support a central tenet of locomotion theory—that individuals high in locomotion orientation do indeed “move on” from their goals more readily, including moving on from friends (i.e., liking them less) who may have facilitated their past attainments but are no longer relevant to their current pursuits.

Derivation 16 (reconciliation)

Leaving friends and allies behind when they are seen as no longer relevant to current goal pursuits may seem to be a socially unsavory consequence of high locomotors’ futuristic orientation. Yet, their eschewal of the past has socially salutary implications as well. One of these is the tendency toward reconciliation in conflict situations. Remaining in a conflicted mode means getting stuck in an impasse and an inability to move on. This is a condition that individuals in a heightened state of locomotion should dislike. Thus, they should be more prone than their low locomotion counterparts to engage in reconciliatory activities that could end the deadlock.

A recent study (Webb, 2012) bears on this possibility. Participants responded to the locomotion scale and read six vignettes involving conflict such as the following:

Imagine that you and a friend are having a conflict over differing ideas of how to spend more time together. You have both recently desired “expanding your horizons” by meeting new people, and think it would be fun and beneficial to your friendship to have these new experiences together. However, it is beginning to feel like you are seeking to widen your social circle in different ways (for example, you are excited about going to museums and art galleries; your friend is excited about going to parties and social events). As a result, your friend is becoming involved in a somewhat different “scene,” and although makes an effort to include you, realizes that you are not as eager. You make the effort to be inclusive of your friend as well, but feel that he/she is not as enthusiastic. It feels like your mutual goal of wanting to experience new things together and advance your friendship is being thwarted by different ideas on what those experiences should be.

Following each scenario, participants responded to a 16-item Reconciliation Questionnaire including statements, such as “I am motivated to reconcile with my partner” [reconciled] and “I have negative feelings as a result of this conflict [not reconciled].” Aggregating over all six scenarios, it was found that locomotion scores, controlling for assessment scores, were positively correlated with the motivation to reconcile with one’s adversary’s, β(n = 89) = .29, p < .02, and negatively correlated with negative feelings about the conflict, β(n = 89) = .32, p < .02. As predicted, then, high (vs. low) locomotors tend to be more conciliatory and motivated to end a conflicted deadlock.

General Discussion

As the foregoing review attests, there is considerable evidence consistent with the present theory regarding the locomotion–temporality interface. Admittedly, some of this evidence is correlational, with its attendant direction of causality issues. Yet, the supportive evidence also included (a) experimental manipulations (e.g., Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Mauro et al., 2009; Orehek et al., 2014; Orehek et al., 2012; Pierro, Giacomantonio, et al., 2013; Pierro et al., 2014) that situationally induced the locomotion orientation and yielded findings that conceptually replicated the correlational results supporting the present theory, and (b) longitudinal designs in which the locomotion tendency was measured at a considerable period (a month, 3 months) prior to collection of the dependent variables, effectively ruling out the reverse causality interpretation. We believe that there is no plausible support for reverse causality or third variable explanations of our total pattern of findings. For instance, there seems to be little reason to believe that a weakened tendency to wallow in nostalgia, experience regret, or refrain from counterfactual reasoning would produce a strong locomotion orientation.⁶

It is noteworthy also that the body of evidence consistent with the present theory appears to possess considerable external validity. Specifically, our framework is supported by research (a) carried out in a variety of contexts including diverse real world settings (hospitals, business organizations) as well as experimental laboratories, (b) carried out in multiple cultures (see Higgins et al., 2008), and (c) carried out across a variety of different measures. Thus, beyond self-reports (inherent to phenomena such as nostalgia or regret), our research addressed actual behavior (Mannetti, Pierro, Higgins, & Kruglanski, 2012), speed of performance (Kruglanski et al., 2000), preference and choice (Orehek et al., 2012), interpersonal liking (Orehek et al., 2014), actual postponement of activities (taking of exams; Pierro et al., 2011, Study 2), a behavioral measure of multitasking (Pierro, Giacomantonio, et al., 2013), and generation of counterfactual thoughts (Pierro et al., 2008).

Integrative Potential

Especially noteworthy is the integrative power of the present theory. The notions that locomotors are concerned with movement and movement relates to time unify under a common conceptual umbrella (and in this sense synthesize), a wide variety of findings that would otherwise appear unrelated. On the face of it, performance speed, promptness, time management, or multitasking might seem to have little to do with nostalgia, regret, conciliatory tendencies, or the inclination to leave behind previous helpers. The present theory, however, connects those disparate “dots” and points out how these seemingly “strange bedfellows” are interconnected through the time and motion nexus tapped by the construct of locomotion.

Differentiation From Other Constructs

The breadth of the present theory and its integrative nature marks its uniqueness and its distinctiveness from other frameworks. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine alternative conceptual schemes that would bring under a single conceptual roof as large an array of phenomena in as large a number of domains. Whereas some competing concepts may offer alternative interpretations to some of our findings, none is likely capable of doing so for the entire body of the present evidence. Consider the A-type personality syndrome (H. S. Friedman, 2000) that shares some commonality with (and is empirically related to) the locomotion variable. Although both high locomotors and A-type personalities may be characterized by time urgency and impatience, only the locomotion tendency seems plausibly related to future orientation exhibited in such effects as absence of regret or counterfactual cognitions, optimism, and so on.

Similarly, whereas optimism might partially account for locomotors positive expectancies of goal attainment, it seems largely irrelevant to performance speed, multitasking, or the eschewal of nostalgia. Other variables like action orientation (Kuhl, 1985), implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1990), vitality (Ryan & Frederick, 1997), or promotion focus (Higgins, 2012), while possibly relevant to some phenomena associated with locomotion, do not seem capable to account for the panoply of effects to which locomotion is manifestly related.

On the empirical level, several studies have obtained significant locomotion effects while controlling for the Big Five personality factors (Kruglanski et al., 2000; Pierro et al., 2011; Pierro, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2006), Action–Decision subscale of Kuhl’s (1985) action orientation variable, and the Fear of Invalidity (Pierro et al., 2006; Thompson, Naccarato, & Parker, 1992). Thus, both conceptual and empirical considerations counter-indicate the possibility that the findings that support our locomotion–temporality theory could be alternatively explained by other constructs.

Limitations and Future Directions

Evidence for the present theory

Although the body of data consistent with the present theory is rather substantial, several of its major derivations were supported exclusively by correlational designs, as mentioned earlier. This was true of data bearing on the relation between locomotion and (a) speed of performance; (b) promptness of task initiation; (c) time management; (d) optimism; (e) valuing, commitment, and coping with change; (f) generation of counterfactuals and regret; and (g) agreeability and reconciliation. Furthermore, experimental research is thus needed to establish more clearly the direction of causality underlying those relations.

It is noteworthy, however, that correlational findings consistent with our theory were experimentally replicated in a number of domains including locomotion’s relation to (a) preference for activities that promise quick progress (i.e., those with considerable speed potential), (b) self-forgiveness, (c) (the relative absence of) nostalgia, and (d) the tendency to devalue means to already attained goals, including devaluing no longer instrumental friendships. Such replications are encouraging. Clearly more are needed, especially in reference to theoretical derivations where the only supportive findings so far have been correlational.

Further extensions

Although the present theorizing about the locomotion–temporality interface is already broad, it may afford yet further extensions concerning the psychology of time. This may lead to novel hypotheses to be pursued in subsequent research.

Time perspective

Research on time perspective (Keough, Zimbardo, & Boyd, 1999), for instance, found that individuals with a more (vs. less) pronounced present time perspective (PTP) reported a more frequent use of alcohol, drugs, and tobacco, whereas future time perspective (FTP) was negatively related to reported substance use. The relative abstinence from substance abuse of future-oriented individuals might stem from a concern with uninterrupted movement to which individuals’ energies may be dedicated, and which could be impeded by energy-sapping substances. Thus, it is possible that the abstinence findings of Zimbardo and colleagues (e.g., Boniwell & Zimbardo, 2004; Keough et al., 1999) could be moderated by the locomotion orientation. This interpretation also suggests that future-oriented individuals, to the extent that they are acting in the service of the locomotion orientation, might instead seek out substances that promise to vitalize or even speed up their movement as long as they are not disruptive, such as coffee or energy drinks. In other words, future-oriented high locomotors might avoid substances that disrupt movement and seek out ones that support it.

Temporal discounting

The locomotion construct may also be related to temporal discounting (e.g., Loewenstein, Read, & Baumeister, 2003), in which rewards are devalued as they move further away from the “here and now.” Because locomotors want to get moving from a state of rest, and because they treat goals as justifications for initiating and maintaining movement, they tend to avoid delays and report prompt initiation of activities, as discussed earlier. Delays might additionally introduce doubts as to whether movement ultimately will be possible, hence reducing the expectancy of effective movement. For these reasons, high locomotors might also find it difficult to delay gratification (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989) and might be more willing to trade higher rewards in the future for lesser rewards in the present, especially rewards that are associated with “getting on with it.” Importantly, this suggests that, although locomotors are hypothesized to be future oriented, they might be more attuned to the proximal future rather than to the distal future, that is, to activities that can be executed in the near time period rather than in the far time period. This is another way that high locomotors would be different from individuals high in promotion focus who are motivated to make progress toward distant ideals.

Oblivion to the present

In their quest for continuous movement, high locomotors may be relatively oblivious to the present per se. They may be disinclined to enjoy leisure, “smell the roses,” or, as the poet W. H. Davies put it, “(just) stand and stare” (Hooper, 2004).⁷ This in turn could limit their power of observation because of their emphasis on the proximal future. It is even possible that they would exhibit a limited ability to profit from incidental learning (e.g., Postman & Adams, 1960) because of the “blinders” that the intensive forward focus may induce.

Affective forecasting

High (vs. low) locomotors may be particularly susceptible to affective forecasting biases because the latter are assumed to result from (a) narrow focalizing on the assumed affective impact of an event (e.g., winning at a lottery) while neglecting other possible events that might affect one’s emotional reaction, and (b) underestimation of one’s psychological immune system (coping defenses) that may truncate the duration of events’ affective impact (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). In both cases, the bias could be greater because of locomotors’ single-minded concentration on movement toward a focal goal. Such single-minded focus could take attention away from other relevant factors that can contribute to affective reactions. Individuals high in locomotion are known to display single-mindedness and to be immune to movement-irrelevant thoughts or distractions (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000; Pierro et al., 2011). Given this, it is possible that they would exhibit especially pronounced inaccuracies in affective forecasting.

Temporal construal

A narrow focus on changes in movement may also pertain to phenomena associated with temporal construal (Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010), such as the tendency for individuals with a high construal to exhibit essentialism or understanding events in terms of their “high level” features while neglecting incidental “low-level” details. High locomotors should have moderate level construal because their focus is on the future rather than the present, but their concern is with the near future rather than the distant or remote future.

Embodiment effects

Recent studies have discovered intriguing embodiment effects related to the time and motion interface. Miles, Karpinska, Lumsden, and Macrae (2010) reported that illusory sensations of forward motion prompt thoughts about the future, whereas illusory sensations of backward motion prompt thoughts about the past. This attests that backward and forward movement in physical space is psychologically associated with backward and forward movement on the time dimension. In this vein too, it was found that people tend to lean backward when thinking about the past, and to lean forward when contemplating the future (Miles, Nind, & Macrae, 2010). Because high locomotors’ orientation toward movement is associated with their future focus, they might be expected to exhibit such embodiment effects to a greater extent than would low locomotors, particularly in reference to proximal rather than distal future.

Recent evidence also attests to a “temporal Doppler effect” (Caruso, Van Boven, Chin, & Ward, 2013) whereby future events are psychologically closer than past events of equivalent objective distance. According to the authors, the reason for this asymmetry is that the experience of movement through time (with future events getting closer and past events getting temporally more remote) resembles the physical experience of moving through space. In support of this notion, experimental reversal of the forward motion (inducing participants to move backward through virtual space) completely erased the past–future asymmetry. Again, these effects may be even more pronounced for high (vs. low) locomotors, with the future looming closer, especially the proximal future, because their anticipated movement through time into the future is more rapid than that of low locomotors.

Societal Impact

Cultural differences in locomotion and time orientation

Differences in the tendency toward locomotion are not restricted to individuals; they may pertain to cultures and societies as well. In a recent cross-cultural comparison involving nine nations (England, India, Korea, Israel, Italy, Japan, Poland, Spain, and United States), it was found that Italy and the United States had particularly high locomotion scores and Korea and Japan had particularly low scores (Higgins et al., 2008). There is also evidence that cultures differ considerably in their orientation toward time (Fulmer, Crosby, & Gelfand, 2014). Intriguingly, these cultural differences in temporal orientation pertain to both the resource and the flow aspects of time. With respect to the resource aspect, many Western and industrialized countries, more so than pre-industrial and developing countries, highly value clock time because it allows individuals to plan their activities precisely and to assess the efficiency of their performance (Bluedorn & Denhardt, 1988; Levine & Norenzayan, 1999).

With respect to the flow aspect, Americans and other Westerners tend to be more future oriented than Asian societies, whereas Asian societies tend to be more past-oriented than Westerners (Block, Buggie, & Matsui, 1996; Guo, Ji, Spina, & Zhang, 2012; Núñez, Cooperrider, Doan, & Wassmann, 2012; Rojas-Méndez, Davies, Omer, Chetthamrongchai, & Madran, 2002; Spadone, 1992). The findings that cultures that tend to be higher (vs. lower) on the locomotion dimension have different orientation toward time afford the speculation that these tendencies are causally related. If so, then increasing a cultural emphasis on locomotion might also affect the members’ temporal orientation and possibly the corresponding nations’ pace of economic development. These possibilities may well merit systematic exploration in subsequent research.

Adverse impact of locomotion on foreign relations

Although strong locomotion orientation on the national level might have salutary consequences for societies by increasing efficiency and spurring strong economies, it can have significantly deleterious effects as well, particularly in the arena of foreign relations. These stem from (a) the impatience that is a hallmark of locomotion, stemming from the resource aspect of time, and from (b) the devaluation of former allies who are no longer perceived as being instrumental to current goal pursuits, which stems from locomotors’ future orientation and concerns the flow aspect of time. Intriguingly, both impatience and devaluation might pose serious difficulties for American foreign policies in their encounters with other cultures.

Impatience

Anticipating by roughly a century and a half the finding that Americans are high on the locomotion dimension (Higgins et al., 2008), Alexis de Tocqueville (in his Democracy in America) commented on American impatience: “It is strange to see what feverish ardor the Americans pursue their own welfare, and to watch the vague dread that constantly torments them lest they should not have chosen the shortest path which may lead to it” (de Tocqueville, 1863, Volume 2, Chapter XIII, p. 163). Intriguingly, in this connection, the American negotiator team for the Paris Peace Talks, charged with ending the Vietnam War, arrived in town with a 1-week hotel reservation, whereas their Vietnamese counterpart had leased a property for a year (Adler & Gundersen, 2008)!

American impatience can exact a dear price at the negotiation table. In a striking empirical demonstration of this phenomenon, Salmon et al. (2013) found that in negotiations with a preprogrammed agent, Americans achieved significantly lower negotiation outcomes as compared with Lebanese. Moreover, in this study, subjective time perception mediated the relationship between culture (American vs. Lebanese) and negotiation behavior and outcomes. Americans’ proverbial impatience is hardly lost on their adversaries. Awaiting the drawdown of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan, the Taliban has been fond of the aphorism “Americans have the watches but we have the time” (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/opinion/04jones.html). Indeed, time will tell what price to U.S. interests and international stature will its impatience exact in this and other instances as well.

Leaving friends behind

The tendency of locomotors to “never look back” and leave friends behind who are no longer relevant to current goal pursuits (Orehek et al., 2014) might characterize the policies of nations high on the locomotion dimension and undermine their credibility as allies. Indeed, the allegation that the United States has been an unreliable ally has been made time again in commentaries about America’s foreign policies (http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bob-corker-obama-is-an-unreliable-ally/2014/08/05/83f99670-1c92-11e4-ae54-0cfe1f974f8a_story.html, http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/10/17/is_the_us_a_reliable_ally_turks_are_wondering, http://www.economist.com/node/10809314). The abandonment of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak who had been America’s faithful supporter for 30 years, of the Shah of Iran, toasted by President Carter as a “great ally,” and of the South Vietnamese allies in the Paris Peace Accords of 1972, are well-known examples of such alleged neglect (http://www.gingrichproductions.com/2013/08/egyptian-realities-vs-american-fantasies/). A salient recent example of American “abandonment” is the reputed tardiness of the U.S. handling of visas to Iraqi and Afghan translators who risked their lives to assist American troops (for a critique of this tendency, see http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/23/afghan-iraq-interpreters-siv_n_3481555.html).

The deleterious consequences of excessive locomotion may be tempered by other variables such as high tendency toward assessment. Indeed, extensive research suggests that high locomotors who are also high assessors are both able to accomplish tasks speedily and avoid errors, and that groups and organizational teams whose composition includes high locomotors and high assessors turn in better performance than teams with other combinations of the locomotor and assessor types (Higgins, 2012; Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2013; Kruglanski et al., 2000). Just as strengthening nations’ locomotion orientation might contribute to their efficiency and economic functioning, balancing such orientation by a stronger assessment emphasis might decrease their tendencies to rush headlong into ambiguous involvements with no apparent exit strategy (http://www.npr.org/2011/04/14/135402149/can-u-s-keep-from-getting-bogged-down-in-libya) and jeopardize their trust relations with valuable allies.

Coda

The interface of locomotion and temporality suggests significant trade-offs for individuals with heightened locomotion concerns. Although locomotors’ impatience may inoculate them against the wastes of procrastination, it may also undermine the quality of their performance and induce them to settle for suboptimal results. Although locomotors’ drive forward may proliferate their professional accomplishments, it may adversely impact their social relations through a devaluation of past friendships no longer relevant to current goal pursuits and overweighting of others’ instrumentality to current objectives.

In summary, a growing body of findings suggests that locomotors’ temporal orientation has far-reaching consequences for diverse facets of human behavior. But further research is needed into the locomotion–temporality interface to extend the available knowledge on these issues while addressing the shortcomings of existing data and theory. By increasing our understanding of the locomotion–temporality nexus, we could develop the conceptual tools needed for interventions and programs designed to maximize the benefits of locomotion while reducing and constraining its potential downsides for individuals and societies.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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