Abstract
Interest in the topic of human flourishing has burgeoned. This article discusses what is required for a general account of flourishing. It builds on three previous critiques of flourishing conceptualization that clarified the lack of systematic theorizing, the overemphasis on psychometric investigations, and the acultural manner of conceptualization. Addressing these difficulties is necessary to move toward a more cohesive, cumulative science of flourishing. The first theme of the article is a vital first step toward providing a systematic theory of flourishing. The article appropriates Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia (flourishing or good living) to contemporary concerns. The proposed Eudaimonic Theory defines flourishing, specifies its content in terms of human goods, discusses flourishing as a way of life (i.e., not a one-time achievement or subjective experience), and discusses virtue traits in a flourishing life. A second theme reaffirms the Aristotelian commitment to empirical (broadly conceived) verification. Psychometric evaluations of flourishing measures are useful, but insufficient evidence for a flourishing science. Therefore, hypotheses are provided for heuristic research guidance. The third theme is that flourishing must be made sufficiently capacious to accommodate the substantial cultural variation in flourishing conceptions. The article concludes with a promising proposal for formulating a general account of flourishing.
This article was inspired by the question of whether a general theory of human flourishing is possible. This question has been debated for millennia. Although there is no end in sight for this debate, we think the next logical step is to formulate a contemporary theory of flourishing. This is because psychologists and others have recently become very interested in empirically assessing flourishing and have developed multiple psychometrically evaluated flourishing measures. Although this seems to cut the Gordian knot of endless theoretical discussion, the authors of these measures have offered little, if any, theory to underwrite their measures, leaving the measures unexplained, unjustified, and choices among them subjective (Fowers et al., 2023). That is, in their haste to create measures, psychologists have sidestepped the theoretical debate about what flourishing is. Rather than continuing to rely on subjective intuitions about flourishing theory, we see the development of that theory as essential.
Despite the conceptual murkiness, many authors have argued that flourishing is a vital topic (e.g., Cooke et al., 2016; Fowers et al., 2023; Ryff, 1989; VanderWeele, 2017), and we think that argument has been established, so we will not repeat it here. People want to live well, but there is considerable confusion and disagreement about what that means (Fowers et al., 2023; Martela & Sheldon, 2019), making this an ideal domain for systematic theory. Answering the question of the desirability of a good life seems obvious, but it can also be formulated as
Beginning to formulate a systematic theoretical account of flourishing is the primary aim of this article, and it is necessary for three reasons. First, it is necessary to understand a concept before attempting to measure it, or, at the very least, to pause along the way of measurement to develop a systematic theoretical account of the subject matter. To our knowledge, this article is the first serious step toward a theory of flourishing in psychology. 1 We acknowledge that many flourishing measures have been extensively assessed psychometrically, and that this is generally taken as sufficient for the validity of the instruments. We argue in this article, however, that theoretical validity must be added to psychometric validity because they are two distinct forms of justification that answer different questions. Neither is a substitute for the other because there are both conceptual and empirical (including psychometric) questions about flourishing.
Second, a theoretical understanding of what one means by flourishing can indicate which constructs should be included, excluded, and how the constructs relate to one another. Without systematic theory, such decisions can only be made in an intuitive or ad hoc manner. The theoretical account we provide gives warrants for the inclusion of specific components that constitute flourishing. We organize this article into a series of hypotheses that can be investigated to understand what flourishing consists in and how to best study it. We offer many general hypotheses
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that can be broken down into more specific hypotheses, and we offer a few examples of such specific hypotheses. We recognize that some of these hypotheses already have significant empirical support and some of them will seem so obvious when we state them that empirical support will just confirm what already seems plain. We see both probabilities as supporting rather than diminishing the value of the hypotheses. Figure 1 contains a listing of the hypotheses. Flourishing hypotheses.
Third, the tension between the cultural relativity and the universality of flourishing has not been directly addressed in psychology. Psychological instruments have been created and presented (implicitly or explicitly) as universal measures of human flourishing (Diener et al., 2010; Fowers et al., 2023; Ryff, 1989; VanderWeele, 2017). To date, no theoretical basis for the claim of either the cultural relativity or universality of flourishing has been offered in psychology. The question of whose flourishing is being theorized or measured must be answered on pain of imposing Western views on the entire world. We discussed this shortcoming elsewhere (Fowers et al., 2023; Kiknadze & Fowers, 2023), and our theory of flourishing begins to address it. The question of cultural relatively/universality has both theoretical and empirical elements, requiring a theoretical argument for one’s position and data that support its plausibility.
Our central aim in this article is to outline what a theory of human flourishing requires and to indicate one possible direction for such a theory. At a minimum, a theory of human flourishing must provide us with (1) an understanding of what flourishing is, (2) heuristic guidance about the components that constitute it and how to study them, and (3) a compelling argument about the relativity/universality question. This article is structured to respond to those three provisions. We also suggest many hypotheses for empirically assessing the value of that theory. That is, we see the empirical tractability of the theory as a basic requirement. Finally, we address the question of whether this theory can be general or must be limited to a specific cultural group.
We recognize there are many approaches to flourishing. Despite our critical perspective, we understand that we would not be in a position to address the shortcomings of this research domain without the pioneering work of many scholars, and we are grateful to them. We also understand that our approach is unlikely to be universally adopted. Therefore, we do not pretend to have the final word on flourishing. We see this article as merely another effort to get closer to an elusive, if vital understanding. We see the next logical step in working toward a cumulative science of flourishing as pausing to take stock of our conceptual resources and attempting to fill the lacunae that we find.
Toward a Systematic Theory of Human Flourishing
We begin to theorize flourishing with Aristotle’s (1999) account of eudaimonia because he is the most widely cited theorist of flourishing in contemporary psychology and his views have been influential for over 2500 years (e.g., Fowers, 2005; Ryff, 1989; Vittersø, 2016). We deem it worthwhile to start with Aristotle (1996, 1999) as a major theorist, particularly with his Nicomachean Ethics (NE) and Politics due to the prominence and longevity of his moral philosophy. We will translate the Greek term “eudaimonia,” as “flourishing.” He defined flourishing as a multidimensional representation of a rich, full life characterized by the activities and experiences that render that life good. 3
There are, of course, many other theoretical views of flourishing (e.g., Stoic, Buddhist, and Christian). Other scholars may fruitfully introduce additional theoretical sources and the theoretical and empirical dialogues about what each source has to offer will be important in developing a science of flourishing. The most important thing, in our view, is to take the theoretical element of flourishing seriously and avoid the understandable temptation to rush to measurement and data collection.
There is a longstanding tradition in psychology to limit attention to the best kind of life to the subjective views of individuals, which has often focused on positive emotion and life satisfaction. More recently a lengthy and important debate that has occurred in psychology about the sufficiency of such subjective or “hedonic” approaches for understanding the good life. Some see hedonic measures as sufficient (e.g., Martela & Sheldon; Kashdan et al., 2008). Others have suggested that “eudaimonic” approaches are necessary because they include richer, multidimensional concepts of the good life such as meaning, personal growth, and positive relationships (e.g., Fowers, 2005; Ryff et al., 2021; Vittersø, 2016).
Most contemporary psychologists who favor a eudaimonic approach hark back to Aristotle, and he was only one of the Ancient Greek philosophers who saw eudaimonia as the best kind of life. Although these philosophers were not univocal about its meaning, its current usage is to denote a good life that is richer and more complete than is possible with subjective evaluations of an individual’s emotions and life satisfaction. Aristotle’s (1999) account of eudaimonia is the most widely cited philosophical theory of flourishing in modern psychology (e.g., Fowers, 2005; Ryff, 1989; Vittersø, 2016). He thought positive-affective states were important in flourishing because the flourishing person should generally experience their lives as pleasurable and satisfying because they are living well, but he did not see positive emotions or satisfaction as sufficient.
Notwithstanding the qualms of those wishing to limit assessment of the good life to hedonic measurement, psychologists have continued to develop eudaimonic measures, most often denoted by terms like flourishing or thriving, which evidences the value scholars place on flourishing (Diener et al., 2010; Fowers et al., 2023; Ryff, 1989; VanderWeele, 2017). Virtually all contemporary conceptualizations of flourishing portray it as a multidimensional set of constructs that is not reducible to a single facet (de Chavez et al., 2005; Lomas et al., 2015). Even when flourishing scholars create or use single dimensional scales, the items of the scales are designed to encompass various flourishing dimensions (Diener et al., 2010; Novak et al., in press). There are also multiple studies that suggest that hedonic and eudaimonic well-being are related, but distinct (e.g., Fredrickson et al., 2013; Thorsteinsen & Vittersø, 2020).
Our Neo-Aristotelian Theory of flourishing, Eudaimonic Theory, builds on Aristotle’s theoretical structure of a good life and appropriates it to contemporary life, This theory has four central theoretical elements: (1) a definition of the good life; (2) a definition of human goods; (3) a portrayal of flourishing as a way of life (neither a momentary nor an exclusively subjective attainment); and (4) a recognition that virtues are activities that conduce to the good life. In this section, we discuss the definition of flourishing provided by Eudaimonic Theory: flourishing is the active, lifelong, imperfect pursuit of good living that is actualized through virtue-related actions. In subsequent sections, we delineate three other elements of the Theory.
Aristotle (1996, 1999) begins and (on our reading) ends both the NE and the Politics with two related definitions of the good life for humans. The opening line of the NE is “Every art or applied science and every systematic investigation, and similarly every action and choice seem to aim at some good” (1094a 1–2). 4 He asserts, then argues, that this good is to be attained through the best kind of politics, wherein the good life for humans applies to both the individual and the collective. Similarly, Aristotle begins the Politics by stating that “Every state is a community [polis] of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good” (1252a 1–2). The final portions of the two books include lengthy discussions of the good life that are not as easily captured in brief quotes. Nonetheless, he argued that the good life consists in the active pursuit of valued goals. This emphasis on actively pursuing goods and worthwhile goals is the first and most central element of Aristotle’s ethics.
These quotes and their explicit reference to the good life may seem foreign to many psychologists. To clarify, an Aristotelian account of flourishing is unabashedly devoted to illuminating the good life for humans. Psychologists tend to avoid claims about what is good for people, generally eschewing such terms in favor of more euphemistic concepts such as health, functioning, or efficacy. The avoidance of evaluative terms is part of the effort to separate facts and values in psychology. Many scholars have discussed the general failure of the attempt to keep facts and values entirely separate (e.g., Brinkmann, 2011; Cushman, 2019; Fowers, 2022; Fowers et al., in press), and we will not recount those discussions here. Suffice it to say that we agree with Aristotle (1999) that an account of human flourishing must address what is good for humans and that the concept of flourishing is one that clarifies that living well must be understood in both factual and value terms. That is, we believe that flourishing is, at the same time, empirically demonstrable and a highly valued aim, and that there is no bright line that unquestionably separates the factual and valuable aspects of a good life. As Margolis et al. (2021) concluded, “There is no such thing as a value-free measure of human flourishing” (p. 403). We challenge those who want to maintain a fact/value dichotomy to demonstrate a clear separation of the two (beyond simply asserting it as a dichotomy).
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General
To further clarify what we mean by a good life, we must distinguish two definitions of “good.” In the realm of ethics, the most common usage is to take “good” as an adjective that describes, for example, a “good person,” one who is ethically disposed, acts ethically, and merits moral approbation. The other usage is to take “good” as a noun, which describes some aim that is seen as valuable or worthwhile. We recognize that the noun “good” is unusual in psychology, so we define it further here. A good is a desirable aim that is relatively abstract and is too expansive for any individual or group to fully attain. Nevertheless, goods are readily translatable into sets of more concrete goals that can be achieved. For example, one can pursue the good of knowledge without the naïve view that one could attain all knowledge. One could pursue knowledge through concrete goals, such as taking a course, reading a set of books, making observations of natural events, conducting an experiment, and so forth. The language of goals is much more accessible to psychologists. Aristotle (1999) believed that what makes a good person good is that the person is devoted to pursuing the best sorts of goods for humans, so he saw the good life as deserving moral approbation because it incorporates the ongoing pursuit of worthwhile aims.
The Aristotelian approach raises the question about the relationship between the moral life and the good life, which is contentious (e.g., Driver, 2001; Tessman, 2005). We do not attempt to resolve that debate here. Instead, we follow Aristotle’s interpretation that the moral goodness of persons is primarily due to their pursuit of the best sorts of aims, meaning that there is extensive overlap between the moral life and the good life. Of course, all these terms must be carefully defined, scrupulously assessed, and debated. We offer some initial definitions of some specific goods below. We can begin investigations with general
In contrast to the standard contemporary understandings of morality either as a matter of following moral rules, obeying moral imperatives, or as a form of subjective self-evaluations, Eudaimonic Theory suggests that morality is found in the pursuit of aims that are worthwhile for humans, which is what it means for people to flourish on this view. We now discuss some substantive human goods and their empirical ties to flourishing.
Substantive Human Goods
The second element of the Eudaimonic Theory is the identification of human goods that clarify the content of flourishing. First, Aristotle believed that there are many goods for human beings, not just one (e.g., pleasure for the hedonist). Aristotle identified these goods or ends through the function argument 6 but that approach is contested by many (e.g., Glassen, 1957; Hardie, 1965) and unfamiliar to many others. Therefore, we will identify what is good for humans in a more inductive way, relying on empirical results about the relationships among some frequently cited features of human life and indicators of human flourishing. We recognize that this is more an illustration of flourishing than a complete argument for its contents, but we think that that is what is possible in a single article.
For the purposes of this section, we will not differentiate among the multiple, common Western conceptualizations of good living because these conceptualizations tend to be strongly related (Haybron, 2013; Huta, 2016; Thorsteinsen & Vittersø, 2020). Accordingly, we propose
Virtually all contemporary accounts agree with Aristotle in seeing flourishing as multidimensional, but these accounts disagree strongly about which dimensions should be included and how they are defined (see Cooke et al., 2016; Novak et al., in press). Nevertheless, empirical results tend to support multidimensionality (Fowers Mollica & Procacci, 2010; Ryff, 1989; Su et al., 2014). In our neo-Aristotelian approach, the dimensions are the substantive aims or goods toward which people aspire. We suggest that it is important to identify at least some of the dimensions of flourishing, and we define them as “goods” using the term as a noun, as described above. Aristotle was a realist about goods, meaning that he thought they are tangibly accessible in the world, not simply subjective constructs.
Although we wish to distance ourselves from the connotations of objective that lead to a subject/object dichotomy, it is worthwhile to make a distinction between subjectively identified flourishing (e.g., self-reports) and intersubjectively observable flourishing (e.g., other-reports, health assessments, and observable pursuits of goods). Virtually all empirical approaches to flourishing overemphasize self-reported flourishing (Cooke et al., 2016; Fowers et al., 2023). Self-reports are useful and valid despite their limitations, but Eudaimonic Theory insists that self-reports be supplemented with intersubjectively available observations of flourishing. There are some instructive examples of intersubjective observations related to flourishing. For example, Fowler and Christakis (2008) created a social network of participants in the Framingham Heart Studies and found that the nature of participants’ social ties were related to their happiness. In another study, Fredrickson et al. (2013) reported that eudaimonic well-being was related to a down-regulation of cellular physiological stress markers, whereas hedonic well-being was related to an up-regulation of those markers. This indicated that those reporting greater eudaimonic well-being were likely more resilient to stress than those reporting greater hedonic well-being. Recognizing that both happiness and well-being measures in these two studies were self-reported, we endorse the researchers’ use of both subjective and intersubjectively observable assessments in flourishing research. General
Fortunately, many studies document relationships between aspects of human life and a variety of measures of well-being (including positive emotions, life satisfaction, and flourishing). We exemplify three goods in the next three subsections and provide evidence of their relations with various indicators of flourishing to illustrate the concept of human goods. We see the pursuit of these aims as good for humans because they are associated with human welfare in systematic and intelligible ways. Of course, we cannot describe all human goods and their relations to well-being in this article. Instead, we exemplify the idea of goods by describing studies of three such goods (group belonging, close relationships, and meaning), which are among the most frequently included dimensions in flourishing measurement (Kiknadze & Fowers, 2023). We suggest that similar analyses are possible with other human goods (e.g., justice and social harmony).
Group Belonging
Aristotle (1996, 1999) highlighted the necessity of group belonging for flourishing, especially in the Politics and Eudaimonic Theory follows his lead. Large cross-sectional studies suggest that being embedded in social networks is related to well-being (e.g., Fowler & Christakis, 2008; Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010). Moreover, research indicates that perceiving and being perceived as belonging to a group or groups is related to well-being (Li et al., 2020; McPherson et al., 2006). It is also important to note that the opposite of social engagement, such as feelings of exclusion, loneliness, and isolation, strongly influences ill-being, illness, and mortality (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2015; Steptoe et al., 2013). In fact, loneliness is a stronger predictor of mortality than the well-known factors of smoking, obesity, or lack of exercise (Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008). Therefore, we suggest that social belonging is a crucial concern for humans. That is, it is both empirically describable and of significant value to people (i.e., both a fact and a value). We want to encourage research investigating general
We also wish to emphasize the collective nature of belonging in addition to any individual’s perception of belonging. Belonging transcends subjective perception in two ways. First, one could be in error in one’s perception, either believing one belongs to a group when most other group members do not agree or believing that one does not belong to a group when most other group members do not agree with that. Therefore, belonging requires significant consensus between the individual and other group members and is not merely a subjective perception. Second,
We also think it is important to differentiate group belonging from the next category of close personal relationships, partly because the latter is an overweening focus in psychological research. The key difference between the two is that close personal relationships are unavoidably personal and based on person-to-person contact. Group belonging is often impersonal (group members identify with the group, but do not necessarily know one another), and group belonging does not necessarily require person-to-person contact (Brewer, 2007).
Close Personal Relationships
Aristotle (1999) also emphasized the importance of Close Personal Relationships (CPRs) as well, discussing friendship as a vital good, and Eudaimonic Theory also follows this lead. Although some scholars lump all social relationships into a single category (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2017), we argue elsewhere (Fowers, 2015; Kiknadze & Fowers, 2023; Novak et al., in press) that the processes of group belonging and CPRs are quite distinct, relying primarily on group level dynamics in the former and on dyadic processes in the latter. Moreover, one can succeed in one domain and flounder in the other, so they should not be conflated.
The relationships among CPRs, including friendships, romantic relationships, and first-order family ties have strong relationships with life satisfaction (Lee & Ono, 2012; Robles et al., 2014), positive affect (Demir et al., 2013), flourishing (Anderson & Fowers, 2020), health, and longevity (Shor et al., 2013). Merely being in a CPR is positively related to well-being, but if the quality of the relationship is included in the study, the correlation with one’s quality of life is much stronger (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2013; Robles et al., 2014). These areas of research clarify what is generally obvious in everyday life; that CPRs are essential for living well. It is important to recognize that there are many types of CPRs, and the focus on romantic relationships in contemporary psychology is a cultural emphasis rather than a feature of human nature (Hawkins et al., 2007).
The empirical research supports general
It is important to point out that the specific relationships and ways of relating within those relationships (both CPRs and group belonging) will vary across cultures and people will belong to varying groups, with different self-definitions, mores, and practices. Moreover, scholars must expand this research to include CPRs beyond romantic relationships, especially in cultures where a romantic relationship may not be the most important form of CPR.
Meaning
Meaning is among the most common elements in the contemporary literature on flourishing (Cooke et al., 2016; Novak et al., in press) and is often discussed in combination with purpose (e.g., King & Hicks, 2021; Ryff, 1989). Purpose has been defined in terms of having one’s activities guided by personally valued goals and meaning relates to the significance and coherence of one’s life (King & Hicks, 2021). As a prominent researcher of meaning, Steger (2012) made the necessity of meaning clear in defining it as “the web of connections, understandings, and interpretations that help us comprehend our experience and formulate plans directing our energies to the achievement of our desired future. Meaning provides us with the sense that our lives matter … and that they are more than the sum of our seconds, days, and years” (p. 165).
Measures of meaning have been found to be relatively stable over time (e.g., Steger & Kashdan, 2007) and consistently positively related to indicators of well-being and negatively related to depression (e.g., King et al., 2006; Steger et al., 2006; Steger & Kashdan, 2007) and suicidal ideation (Corona et al., 2019). Correlations between meaning and life satisfaction have ranged from .41 to .71 (Steger & Kashdan, 2007).
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Ryff (1989) also took purpose as one of the six components of Psychological Well-Being, and her Purpose in Life scale is consistently correlated with the other five elements of Psychological Well-Being. Another purpose scale was positively correlated with life satisfaction, mental health, physical health, and vitality in multiple samples (Sheier et al., 2006). In our in-depth assessment of prominent instruments designed to measure flourishing, meaning and purpose scales or items were the only ones that were universally included (Novak et al., in press). Therefore, general
In contrast with the ubiquity of meaning in modern accounts of flourishing, Aristotle (1999) did not directly discuss it as part of flourishing. Of course, Aristotle thought that a flourishing person would have a ready understanding of human purpose, which would also include the telos or purpose of one’s life, but he treated this relatively lightly, whereas it is prioritized in most contemporary accounts of flourishing (Kristjánsson, 2020; Novak et al., in press). This discrepancy is an important example of the historical variation in conceptions of flourishing, and it is another clear indicator of why our account is neo-Aristotelian. That is, Eudaimonic Theory is based on Aristotle’s thought, but we have adapted his philosophy in important ways to accommodate modern sensibilities and requirements. We see Aristotle’s views on the second-class status of women and on some people being “natural” slaves as due to his being an ancient Greek, where neither view was significantly challenged. These views are generally unacceptable in the Modern West, so we have expunged them in our theory. Similarly, we think that Aristotle could take meaning and purpose for granted in the ancient city state, but, for modern Westerners, questions about meaning in and purpose of life are open questions that require some response in the good life.
Eudaimonic Theory suggests that meaning and purpose have always been important for humans, but these elements have become explicitly and individually important in the modern West because the universe and even societies have been frequently and powerfully portrayed as indifferent to human, and especially, individual, concerns (Sartre, 1956; Taylor, 1989). This makes the meaningfulness and purposiveness of life open and pressing questions for Westerners. The reaction to the portrayal of the universe as indifferent to human concerns has been very strong, we believe, because the idea that human life could be meaningless or purposeless is devastating to humans.
If meaning and purpose can be taken for granted, as we think Aristotle did, meaning is not a problematic question. For him, flourishing was made possible by one’s membership is a specific polis or community, which provides a collective and historical source of meaning. We suggest that the sourcing and availability of meaning is an important area of cultural and historical variation, with meaning likely being seen collectively and taken for granted in many non-Western cultural groups. This variation is one of the reasons that accommodating cultural variety is so important. Whereas meaning that is understood as specifically personal (personalized) and explicit meaning-making tends to be prioritized in the West, collective and likely more implicit meanings may be sufficient for flourishing in many groups. Therefore, it seems that some source of meaning is important to flourish, and research can usefully focus on what the sources of meaning are (personal, relational, social, spiritual) and on how membership in various cultural groups might influence the presence, absence, or form of meaning. We suggest general
Other Goods
We have selected three human goods to illustrate the importance of goods in human flourishing, but Eudaimonic Theory suggests that there are many human goods, without a canonical list. We can state this proposition provisionally as
We also propose general
Virtues and Flourishing as a Way of Life
The third feature of Aristotle’s thought and Eudaimonic Theory differs from most contemporary accounts of flourishing (see Fowers [2016] and Huta [2016] for exceptions). Aristotle saw flourishing as the culmination of one’s life as a whole rather than something that can be achieved at a particular moment or simply subjectively experienced. He believed that flourishing must encompass the entirety of one’s life because it can be lost due to poor decisions or catastrophic mischance. He went so far as to say that flourishing means that one’s life is concluded as one moves “beyond the reach of evil and misfortune” (1100a 17). Therefore, flourishing is an ongoing way of life according to Eudaimonic Theory, rather than a momentary or subjective achievement. General
Aristotle also emphasized that flourishing is an activity rather than a psychological state, and Eudaimonic Theory follows this lead. That is, flourishing is a matter of expressing the best in one’s humanity, not simply a subjective state of positive emotion or satisfaction. Tiberius (2013) contrasts the modern and ancient views on the centrality of subjective assessments of flourishing: “No one in the ancient world thought that what things are good for you could be determined by your own subjective attitudes… Subjectivism is so much the default now that we don’t even see it as a view in need of any justification; it’s like water to us fishes” (p. 29). Therefore, general
Virtuous Activities as Conducive to Flourishing
The fourth element of Eudaimonic Theory is that the kind of activity Aristotle (1999) had in mind was the “activity of the soul [psyche] in conformity with excellence or virtue” (1098a 16–17). Virtue is, as Broadie (1991) noted, “nothing but a characteristic which makes the difference between functioning and functioning well” (p. 37). That is, virtues are not mysterious; they can be understood as a matter of acting excellently rather than in an ordinary way. Moreover, virtues are intersubjectively observable in behavior.
Some authors (Fowers et al., 2021; Fowers et al., in press) proposed a philosophically informed and empirically tractable model of virtue in which virtues can be assessed as acquired traits that are responsive to situations and social roles and directed toward flourishing. They cite scores of studies that have examined virtues in these ways. One way to be empirically tractable is for virtues to be measurable, and Fowers et al. (2021) and Fowers et al. (in press) documented that many virtues have been measured, such as generosity, kindness, fairness, humility, and compassion. Other ways to be empirically tractable are through observations, interviews, or third-person accounts.
The reason that virtues are seen as trait-like is that they must be relatively stable characteristics that can be expressed consistently and appropriately (i.e., also part of one’s way of life). It is necessary to have stable virtue traits in order to structure one’s life in such a way that flourishing reliably ensues. According to Aristotle and Eudaimonic Theory, one can only flourish if one can respond well to life consistently. Although this generally scalar view of virtues has been confirmed with many virtues, Fowers et al. (2021) and Fowers et al. (in press) clarified that this work is far from complete, with difficulties in the forms of measurement for some virtues and lack of measurement for other virtues and that more in-depth qualitative research is needed to clarify flourishing and its constituents (Nicolas et al., 2023). Therefore, although general
Eudaimonic Theory suggests that virtues are acquired traits because no one is born with virtues. Therefore, virtues must be cultivated and developed for the right reasons: precisely because they are conducive to flourishing (Fowers, 2005). Aristotle (1999) was rather vague about the developmental process of virtue cultivation, and this process is still being formulated conceptually by neo-Aristotelians (e.g., Fowers et al., in press). This is not unique to Aristotelian virtue theory because the psychological subfield of moral psychology is replete with debate about the process of moral development (Krettenauer, 2022; Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015). Therefore, the process of virtue acquisition remains a promissory note, yet it is relatively easy to recognize the difference between early childhood examples of generosity or fairness and more mature instances of these characteristics. General
The moral philosopher Flanagan (1991) made another influential point about virtues, when he suggested that any plausible moral psychology must be psychologically realistic. This means that perfectionistic views are idealizations and are therefore not realistic. It should come as no surprise that no one can exercise all the virtues at every moment. Even the very best people fall short due to fatigue, illness, or other internal or external limiting factors in both their virtuous action and the degree to which they flourish.
In contrast to moral perfectionism, Fowers et al. (2017) argued that human frailty is inherent to virtues and flourishing. For example, they suggested that the reason courage is important is that human life is fraught with many risks, that those risks induce fear, and courage is necessary to respond well in fear-inducing circumstances. These authors make similar arguments for the virtues of compassion, generosity, and justice. Their general point is that far from running away from human frailty and limitations, virtue scholars need to embrace that imperfection and recognize its centrality. This is why both virtue development and flourishing itself must be lifelong projects that are responsive to human limitations and roles, as well as the constraints of the world in which we live (Fowers et al., 2021; Fowers et al., in press). This means that virtues describe the activity conducive to flourishing, and that premise is the fourth key element of the Eudaimonic Theory.
We recognize that there are many unanswered questions with this outline of the Eudaimonic Theory. Some of those questions will be conceptual disagreements with the neo-Aristotelian perspective itself (e.g., Driver, 2001; Korsgaard, 1996), others will be theoretical disputes among neo-Aristotelians (e.g., Annas, 1993; Russell, 2009; Thomson, 1997), and still others are empirical questions, as we have been discussing. In addition, there are important aspects of the Eudaimonic Theory that we have not discussed but are addressed elsewhere, such as the role of practical wisdom or phronesis (Darnell et al., 2022; Grossman et al., 2020; Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024; Wright et al., 2021), the inherently shared constitutive properties of virtues and goods (Fowers, 2005, 2012), and the specific relation between this neo-Aristotelian account and a well-founded account of human nature such as an evolutionary account (Arnhart, 1998; Fowers, 2015).
Nevertheless, we believe that the account provided in this article, with its four central theoretical elements (the good life, human goods, flourishing as a way of life, and virtue) is a good beginning for a systematic theory of flourishing. Eudaimonic Theory appropriates and amends Aristotle’s theory, which is widely cited in both moral philosophy and psychology and has been a leading theory of flourishing for over two millennia. Eudaimonic Theory specifies that flourishing is an active, lifelong aspiration or aim engaged in by imperfect humans with many limitations and constraints and is supported by virtue traits that are acquired to foster the aim of flourishing.
So far, our account may appear to be no more than another Western viewpoint on flourishing, but Eudaimonic Theory also claims that there are some goods that are important to all humans qua humans, and we discuss that generality more in the last section of the paper. That is, we are hypothesizing that goods such as group belonging, close relationships, and meaning are valuable to humans in general, not just to Westerners. This understanding has been based on research indicating that people live better when these goods are built into their lives and that they tend to languish in the absence of these goods. We recognize that these empirical results have limits in the representativeness of the samples (mostly Western Educated Industrialized Rich and Democratic or WEIRD; Henrich et al., 2010), individual differences, and error. Stronger claims for these and other goods as necessary constituents of flourishing have been made elsewhere (Fowers, 2012, 2015), and such claims require empirical assessment. Eudaimonic Theory includes the expectation that its propositions will be answerable to empirical research and generative of additional research, which is the subject of the next section.
The Empirical Tractability of Flourishing and Eudaimonic Theory
The hypothetical approach and attention to empirical data are consistent with Aristotle (1999) and many neo-Aristotelian virtue scholars (e.g., Flanagan, 1991; Fowers, 2005; Kristjánsson, 2020; Wright et al., 2021), who hold that a good theory of flourishing must be answerable to empirical research. This means that we need to be able to assess the indicators of flourishing, and this assessment capacity has been a primary aim of contemporary psychological scholars of flourishing (Fowers et al., 2023). Qualitative studies of flourishing are vital as well, to allow for more in-depth exploration of flourishing and its constituents (e.g., Nicolas et al., 2023).
Therefore, we welcome the expansion of empirical interest in the concept of flourishing. We have learned that various approaches to flourishing are measurable (Ryff, 1989; Su et al., 2014; VanderWeele, 2017), are reasonably distinct from hedonic measures such as positive affect and life satisfaction (e.g., Huta, 2016; Thorsteinsen & Vittersø, 2020), that various flourishing measures are associated, as expected, with measures of other relevant constructs (e.g., Fowers et al., 2010; Fredrickson et al., 2013; Huta, 2016), and are appropriately responsive to interventions (e.g., Nelson et al., 2016). In addition, we are finding that the concept of flourishing has currency in many different cultural groups (Nicolas et al., 2023), albeit the interpretations and expressions differ across these groups.
Contemporary flourishing researchers have been very attentive to some empirical questions. There is a large body of psychometric research that suggests that multiple self-report measures of flourishing function as expected in the U.S. and Europe (e.g., Diener et al., 2010; Ryff, 1989; VanderWeele, 2017), which partially fulfills our second criterion. As detailed elsewhere (Fowers et al., 2023), the most prominent measures of flourishing were developed in the U.S. and Europe as single timepoint, self-report scales. Several measures have also shown good psychometric properties in cultures around the world (e.g., de Carvalho et al., 2021; Senol-Durak & Durak, 2019). We noted above that because flourishing is dependent on a whole life, single timepoint and subjective assessments of flourishing must be supplemented with longitudinal research (
There are two additional difficulties with this this research, however. First, the development and initial testing of flourishing measures occurred in WEIRD societies, and the measures were simply translated into other languages and administered to people in those language groups without explicit mention of assessing how culturally appropriate the measures were. Flourishing researchers in psychology have not gathered significant data about the variety of cultural understandings of flourishing (Kiknadze & Fowers, 2023; Lambert et al., 2020). The assumption seems to have been that flourishing is the same for all humans. We suggest that this assumption is unwarranted, and that the questions about the universality of flourishing require both extensive theoretical justification and empirical investigation. Therefore, we proposed general
Second, as we stated at the outset, there are at least three distinct domains of questions that require answers. Flourishing measures require: (1) systematic theory to define what flourishing is and in what it consists; (2) empirical support (psychometric studies contribute to this); and (3) demonstrable cultural appropriateness. Although all three domains of questions are related and need to be integrated, none of them can substitute for the others. To believe that psychometric results can answer theoretical or cultural questions is to make a category mistake. All three types of questions require answers in their appropriate domains.
Nevertheless, the empirical knowledge already available on flourishing is a very good start to its study. As we have argued (Fowers et al., 2023), greater theoretical specification is vital to advancing this research domain because the plethora of measures has sown confusion. The current theoretical disarray of this field leaves many questions unanswerable because there are at least as many possible answers as there are flourishing measures (e.g., prevalence of flourishing, components of flourishing, and individual and cultural diversity of human flourishing). Our belief is that better theory will lead to better research, and that better theory and research will enable better public policy and intervention. Elsewhere, we have argued that although there is a nominal and superficial consensus among researchers about the components of flourishing, a review of what the measures assess reveals large discrepancies in what flourishing means (Novak et al., in press). Sorting out this diversity and moving toward consensus is partly dependent on conceptual clarity about questions such as what we mean by flourishing, what we hypothesize it consists in, and how we conceptualize cultural influence on flourishing. As we have been at pains to emphasize, clarifying our understanding of flourishing is also partly dependent on empirical research. But all three sets of questions (theoretical, empirical, and cultural) require proper answers within their relative domains, none can substitute for the others.
A Culturally Capacious Concept of Flourishing
A key unanswered question is whether any theory of flourishing can be sufficiently capacious to include the substantial cultural variation that exists. Despite the frequent assumption that a universal account of flourishing is possible and relatively straightforward, the prospects of a general account of flourishing, capacious enough for the great diversity of human life, has not been theoretically argued or empirically demonstrated. Multiple sources in psychology indicate the complexity of understanding a concept such as flourishing from differing cultural perspectives (e.g., Ford et al., 2015; Lambert et al., 2020), but the overwhelming evidence for diversity in such understandings comes from anthropologists who have studied many cultures in depth (e.g., Barletti, 2016; Mathews & Izquierdo, 2009). The question is not so much whether there are significant cultural variations in what people mean by good living as whether those variations can be accommodated within a single overall theory.
Eudaimonic Theory suggests that it is possible to accommodate the cultural variation in how flourishing is understood. The basis for this belief is that humans are a single species, which suggests that there should be a significant degree of overlap in what facilitates flourishing for members of that species.
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The evidence of variation and the potency of culture, however, clarify that such an account will not be simple and suggests that there may not be complete overlap in the elements of flourishing across cultures (Fowers et al., 2023; Nicolas et al., 2023). Eudaimonic Theory takes this complexity as a beginning point and suggests three provisions as necessary for the success of this endeavor. Therefore, we proposed general
Flourishing Formulated in Terms of Species-Characteristics
The first provision for a general account of flourishing is that it must be formulated from a systematic theory that is based on a reasonable account of what humans have in common as a species. The Eudaimonic Theory we outlined above is one such theory, and we recognize that there are other candidate theories. A core premise of Eudaimonic Theory is that living well can be defined in terms of the kind of species that we are. For example, humans have been a group-living species for the entire existence of homo sapiens (e.g., Buss, 2016; Fowers, 2015). Recognizing this group-living aspect of our species leads us to see that an individual’s capacity to flourish should be at least partly dependent on the stable experience of belonging to at least one group. There have been different levels and forms of group belonging throughout human history, from small work groups, to bands, to nations, to humanity as a whole (Brewer & Caporael, 2006). As we detailed above, the experience of belonging is, as expected, strongly related to many indicators of good living, and experiences of loneliness or exclusion are strongly related to indicators of languishing. Eudaimonic Theory suggests that these relationships are species characteristic for humans and that there should be positive relationships between indicators of flourishing and human goods such as belonging (
Of course, there are many scholars who cast doubt on the idea that humans have anything like a common nature (e.g., Dreyfus, 1987; Gergen, 2011). For evidence, they point to the cultural diversity that problematizes any general account of human characteristics and claim that accounts of human life must therefore be culturally relative. The question is whether that cultural relativity is total, as in the claim that cultural variation is so fundamental that there is no human nature. We agree that recognizing cultural diversity does indeed problematize current, general accounts of flourishing, but we think cultural relativists have underestimated the breadth and depth of our common human nature (hence,
We cannot settle the millennia-long debate about human nature in this article, and it is partly an empirical question. We will point to two reasons to believe that there is a human nature, however. One reason to doubt that cultural differences eliminate the possibility that humans have a common nature is that culture itself is an aspect of human nature (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Every durable human group develops and maintains a set of socially transmitted beliefs, aspirations, and practices that deeply shapes its members. Virtually every human being is born into and shaped by a culture, and humans have an extremely well-developed capacity for the social learning that is necessary to internalize these cultural patterns (e.g., Clay & Tennie, 2018; Kenward, 2012). In other words, humans are a cultural species. From this perspective, the contents of culture vary, but the presence and importance of culture are ubiquitous among humans and the very idea that culture and human nature are in opposition is shown to be a confusion. We suggest that flourishing has a similar structure. Its contents will vary, but living well as a human being is an important interest across culture and time, even if some specific contents of the good life vary culturally or temporally. Of course, the presence and quality of such a given culture is likely to be a key factor in flourishing. It is difficult to imagine a human being living well in a cultural group suffused with conflict, contradictions, or shorn of its guiding premises and practices. Yet we suggest that the interest in living well is virtually universal (
Another reason to recognize that there is a common human nature is the simple fact that 99% of human genetic material is identical across individuals (Plomin, 2018). This is the reason that any normal sperm and egg pairing from any normally developed humans can result in successful reproduction. The capacity for successful reproduction of offspring that can themselves reproduce is one of the hallmarks indicating that a population consists of a single species.
Identifying the Appropriate Level of Abstraction
One of the keys to developing a general account of human flourishing is to find the most fitting degree of abstraction for the concept of flourishing and its components. One of the easiest ways to go wrong is to focus on terms that are too concrete and narrow. For example, long-term, choice-based romantic relationships appear to be very important for flourishing in the United States (Hawkins et al., 2007), but the love- and choice-based relationships that characterize this kind of bond are far from universal in the world, both culturally and historically (Fowers, 2000). This lack of universality marks seeing long-term, choice-based romantic relationships as too specific to be a universal component of flourishing because it is not generally present. At the other extreme, some theorists lump all social relationships into a single category (Ryan & Deci, 2017). This seems overly broad and abstract because the origins, processes, and outcomes of various types of social relationships seem rather different and seem to require different conceptualizations. As already noted, the differences between romantic relationships and group membership are substantial. Combining these two forms of social relationships into a single category conflates important differences without any useful gain in breadth.
Instead, we favor a minimum of two types of social affiliation. We suggest that the first is for close personal relationships, which could include romantic relationships, friendships, and first-degree family relationships, and we expect close relationship quality to be positively related to flourishing (
We also have reason to believe that group belonging is important to flourishing (
We have only illustrated the idea of the appropriate level of abstraction in this section with two potential components of flourishing, but we think identifying the appropriate level of abstraction can be a guiding principle for the construction of a general theory of flourishing. We have also cited the presence of meaning as a contributor to flourishing, but there are numerous potential subcategories of meaning, such as personal meaning, the meaning of human life, explicit and implicit meaningfulness, and tradition-focused meaning. For some, explicit personal meaning may be a necessary prerequisite for flourishing, while for others, the necessity of meaning may be fulfilled by the meaningfulness of human life in general or by the implicit meaning readily available in many cultures and groups (
We recommend similar conceptual and empirical research on other potential components of flourishing, such as justice and social harmony. Therefore,
Investigating Cultural Conceptions of Flourishing
Our third provision for a general account of human flourishing is that it must be investigated and tested for its capacity to accommodate and illuminate the many cultural variations in how people understand good living. This will require in-depth research (both quantitative and qualitative) to understand the significant variations in how people understand and pursue good living in various cultures (
To address the universalist tendency in psychological research, Fowers et al. (2023) and Kiknadze and Fowers (2023) documented how much WEIRD psychologists’ assumptions have shaped and delimited their research on flourishing. Fowers 2022 and Fowers et al. (in press) argued that the widespread (but only rarely understood) influence of individualism (Kiknadze & Fowers, 2023) has led to psychologizing flourishing by de facto rendering it, conceptually and empirically, a matter of internal psychological contents that are to be accessed virtually entirely through self-report. We recognize that flourishing has a subjective component, and that self-report can be a valuable data collection method, but we are very skeptical of views that render flourishing primarily or entirely subjective or that suggest that self-reports developed in WEIRD societies are uniformly applicable to all cultures. In stating this, we are not blaming or condemning any particular researchers or their efforts with this problem. Along with others, we see the influence of individualism and the lack of understanding of the role of cultural values and beliefs as general problems afflicting psychology and many other social sciences (Richardson et al., 1999; Smith, 2015; Taylor, 1989). Therefore, this shortcoming is one that has been built into many disciplines and that follows traditions and practices associated with many other Western cultural assumptions. Therefore, the bias is to be expected, and this bias has only recently come into view. We hope that increasing recognition of this tendency will lead to greater self-reflection and perspicacity about cultural assumptions, especially as we attempt to construct a more general account of flourishing.
In partial recognition of the importance of culture, contemporary researchers have made significant good-faith efforts to assess the psychometric validity of their flourishing measures in many cultural settings. Despite the admirable effort and useful information involved in these endeavors, there is no reason to see psychometric assessment as adequate for addressing cultural differences in understandings of flourishing (Fowers et al., 2023). The simple reason for this critique is that these researchers first developed WEIRD conceptualizations of flourishing without significant (or at least clearly documented) reflection on the cultural assumptions they were making, created self-report measures to assess that conception, then translated their WEIRD measures into other languages and obtained self-report data from members of non-WEIRD samples. The assumption that their measures would be appropriate to other cultures is clear, but quite troubling. There is little, if any, documentation that these researchers inquired into the cultural appropriateness of their measures of flourishing in various cultures. This seems like a good example of how pursuing the standard practices of a discipline like psychology without self-reflection can result in a bracing form of cultural imposition that requires correction.
At the other extreme, some researchers seem to assume that cultural differences render concepts such as flourishing unintelligible across cultural contexts and then use apparent cultural differences as evidence for this non-intelligibility (e.g., Gergen, 2011) without carefully examining whether specific cultures also have commonalities. There has been some effort to reduce the power of this assumption. In their book on cross-cultural variations in happiness, Mathews and Izquierdo (2009) noted that their collection of essays on the ethnographic particularities of well-being indicated that there are “complex varieties of well-being that exist around the world…” but that they believe it is possible to “map these varieties onto a common human framework. and point to at least the possibility of a broader, perhaps universal comparison of well-being” (p. 16). They reported that we instead see human universals in the pursuit of well-being, that come to the fore differently in different societies and different social contexts but that are present in every society. Human beings need the support of, if not necessarily their families, then very definitely their human social world. Human beings also tend to seek freedom from coercive control...Human beings also need a sense of life being worth living in a given society. If that is not the case, a serious ‘legitimation crisis’ is at hand, then a society will lose its members’ allegiance in various ways. (p. 254)
We think that Mathews and Izquierdo (2009) were on the right track in looking for commonalities among variety, and that a great deal of work remains to identify and “map” these commonalities.
We recommend in-depth investigation of what is meant by good living in the world’s cultures, based on the kind of systematic theory that can help us recognize both differences and commonalities (
Future Directions
To make progress in creating a science of flourishing, we think the beginning point must be greater clarification about what flourishing is. This theoretical clarity is sorely lacking in this research field, as recently highlighted by Fowers et al. (2023). Theoretical clarity can lead to the systematic development of ways to assess the relevant content, in contrast to the intuitive and weakly justified assessment selection processes that are predominant in this domain (Novak et al., in press). Quantitative measures will need to pass muster psychometrically, through reliability, validity, and factor analytic studies. Qualitative studies can also deepen and broaden our understanding of flourishing in ways inaccessible to quantitative research. As pointed out by Kiknadze and Fowers (2023), assessments must also be culturally valid, which is a form of analysis that is independent of psychometric analysis (Hardin et al., 2014).
Moreover, accommodating cultural variation will require a significant expansion of the concept of flourishing. Researchers in this domain widely view it as a multidimensional construct (Novak et al., in press). Our discussion of the cultural elements of flourishing in another article (Kiknadze & Fowers, 2023) clarified that there are multiple components of flourishing in many cultures that have not been included in these WEIRD measures, including social and environmental harmony, duty to others, and religion/spirituality. Outlining a new approach to conceptualizing flourishing is a very substantial task, which requires the kind of stock-taking we have engaged in and reflection on cultural variations in conceptions of flourishing (Kiknadze & Fowers, 2023). We briefly suggest one procedure through which a science of flourishing can be conceptually and culturally pursued.
We envision a profile approach that will include some currently prominent concepts (e.g., meaning and belonging) and others that that have been left out (e.g., harmony with others, harmony with the environment, and collective flourishing).
Although the development of consensus about flourishing seems daunting, and it will doubtlessly take significant efforts by many over a substantial period, it appears to us that it is an aim worthy of this investment, especially given the importance of flourishing for human beings. Our primary hope is that we have contributed to this endeavor by illuminating some areas of common ground and some disagreements in this important area.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have suggested three provisions that must be fulfilled for the successful development of a general account of flourishing and many hypotheses for assessing that account to move toward a science of flourishing. First, it must be based on systematic theory, which will include an account of what humans have in common that could provide the basis for a general theory (or a clear argument that a general account is not possible). Second, the theory must be assessed by and consistent with research on the topic, as well as heuristic for future research. Third, the theory must be based on knowledge about many world cultures and be conceptually and culturally capacious enough to accommodate many cultural understandings of good living. Failure on any of these counts would mean that a general account of flourishing may not be possible. In general, psychological scholarship to date has not done well in addressing cultural viewpoints, and this must be corrected. This correction cannot be resolved by continuing to pursue research as usual and simply noting that cultural assumptions may play a role in those investigations. This improvement must involve a dramatic course correction that takes cultural values seriously, especially in this inextricably value-imbued domain. At present, there is some evidence for criterion two, but little evidence or argument for criteria one and three.
We developed these criteria and recommendations in response to current research on flourishing with standard psychological methods and canons that focus on measurement, tend to psychologize the topic, emphasize psychometrics over conceptualization, and pay minimal attention to cultural assumptions (Fowers et al., 2023). We believe that it is time to come to grips with this set of limitations and chart an alternative path forward.
We also presented an outline of what a general theory of flourishing could look like. We adopted a neo-Aristotelian approach to flourishing which is systematic in defining and delimiting flourishing and specifies four key components of flourishing (a definition, human goods, seeing it as a way of life, and virtues) and how each helps to constitute flourishing. Above all, our Eudaimonic Theory is built on a foundation of recognizing common features of humans, which makes a general account of flourishing possible. We think a profile approach based on an as yet unspecified set of culturally valid dimensions provides a promising direction for this theory. Second, the success of our approach depends on empirical assessment and is heuristically valuable in pointing to fruitful lines of research. Finally, we see this approach as very promising in accommodating cultural variation in understandings of living well. We recognize that Eudaimonic Theory is only one among many ways to proceed, but we believe that it offers the theoretical resources necessary for a general theory. We welcome other theoretical accounts of flourishing that have comparable scope, empirical tractability and heuristic value, and cultural capaciousness. It is possible that the approach we have articulated may fail on one or more of the criteria and hypotheses we have proposed or that there may be alternative criteria or hypotheses that our approach cannot meet. It is also possible that another theoretical approach may prove to be superior to Eudaimonic Theory on one or more criteria. The only way to gain clarity about these questions is to continue our conceptual and empirical inquiry into this vital topic, and we see this article as just one contribution to that endeavor.
The topic of human flourishing is immensely important and is just beginning to be mapped. It is critical that researchers approach this topic with open minds and with reflection on their cultural assumptions. The better we can understand how humans can flourish, the better our chances for building a world that promotes that flourishing.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Funded by the Templeton World Charity Foundation
