Worker Misclassification and the Struggle for Collective Power in Ultimate Fighting

Structural Foundations of Fighter Exploitation

MMA traces its origins to 648 BC, debuting at the 33rd Ancient Greek Olympics as pankration, Greek for “all powerful.” The freestyle fighting combined boxing and wrestling and served as the climactic final Olympic event for centuries. ² Across the globe, from Japanese shootfighting to Bruce Lee’s cross-disciplinary philosophy, the idea was always to test fighting styles against each other. ³ The UFC debuted in 1993, and no-holds-barred fighting became modern MMA. ⁴ Crowds’ reactions to UFC fighters’ injuries are a significant factor in the organization’s success. Iconic moments include the initial twenty-six seconds of UFC’s first event in 1993, when Gerard Gordeau landed a roundhouse head-kick to the face of his opponent Teila Tuli and knocked out four teeth, two flying into the audience and two sticking in Gordeau’s foot. ⁵

Purchased for $2 million in 2001 by brothers Frank and Lorenzo Fertitta, UFC rapidly grew and generated $600 million in annual revenue by 2015. In 2017, UFC co-promoted the record-breaking match between retired and undefeated boxing champion Floyd Mayweather Jr. and UFC’s highest-paid fighter Conor McGregor, which generated over $1 billion in global wagers, $4.3 million in domestic pay-per-view (PPV) buys, and over $55 million in ticket sales. ⁶ Two years later, UFC signed a five-year $1.5 billion deal giving ESPN exclusive broadcasting rights. ⁷

UFC even grew during the Covid-19 pandemic, becoming the first major professional sporting event in the United States to return to a live broadcast. In early 2021, UFC 261 (the numbers indicate a specific PPV event) in Jacksonville, Florida, became the first major professional sporting event in the United States to host a sold-out, full-capacity crowd since the pandemic’s onset. ⁸ The explosive success continued in 2021 with lucrative sponsorships such as the ten-year $175 million deal with Crypto.com; a five-year $350 million deal with DraftKings; a speculated nine-figure deal with Migu, exclusive broadcaster for UFC in China; and an estimated $10 million per annum extension of the multi-year partnership with TikTok. ⁹ UFC reached a lucrative milestone in early 2023 when the talent agency Endeavor and UFC merged with World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE) under the newly publicly traded company TKO Group Holdings. UFC owns a 51 percent majority stake holding with White reigning as the president, and WWE shareholders own 49 percent with its former CEO Vince McMahon initially remaining executive chairman.^10,11

UFC has witnessed some of sports’ most gruesome injuries.

UFC’s revenue in the first nine months of 2023 was more than $1 billion. In November 2023, UFC beat its own record by becoming the second highest-grossing event in Madison Square Garden history, with live gate sales of over $12.4 million. ¹² UFC began 2024 with its most extensive sponsorship, a purported six-year, $100 million deal with Anheuser-Busch. The Apex, UFC’s 130,000-square-foot state-of-the-art production facility and arena space, brought in more revenue in 2025. And UFC extended its partnership with Abu Dhabi through 2028 for approximately $25 million per event and brought its first fight to Saudi Arabia in February 2025 for “roughly $20 million.” ¹³

UFC has witnessed some of sports’ most gruesome injuries. ¹⁴ June 2004’s UFC 48 witnessed a bone-chilling armbar when Frank Mir snapped opponent Tim Sylvia’s forearm just fifty seconds into the fight. Sixteen years later and without health insurance or assistance from UFC, Sylvia pleaded for financial aid on Instagram, while his girlfriend started a GoFundMe page to raise $20,000 for surgery. ¹⁵ Retired UFC fighter Julie Kedzie has suffered from symptoms of chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE), a degenerative brain disease caused by repeated head injuries. ¹⁶ Three weeks later at UFC 168, Anderson Silva broke his leg after opponent Chris Weidman checked his kick with his shin, rendering an immediate fracture to Weidman’s tibia and fibula. Onlookers were horrified when they saw his “distorted limb swinging in the air.” ¹⁷ Within seventeen seconds at April 2021’s UFC 261, Weidman suffered the same injury when he threw his first kick at opponent Uriah Hall and immediately plummeted in agony when his tibia broke like a “shotgun going off.” ¹⁸ At UFC 180 in November 2014, Leslie Smith’s cauliflower ear, a prevalent MMA injury, burst and spewed blood when her opponent, Jessica Eye, delivered a right-hand strike. ¹⁹ In July 2021 at UFC 264, McGregor attempted a simple low kick at opponent Dustin Poirier that connected to Poirier’s elbow instead. As McGregor took an awkward step back, his leg buckled with a sickening crack. For a split second, his weight bore down on the fractured upper segment of his shin, as the lower portion, stretched with taut skin, dangled then settled at a grotesquely askew angle. ²⁰

Emotional, physical, and financial impacts persist beyond these moments. Disclosing injuries to White is reportedly met with indifference if correlated to poor performance. ²¹ Retired UFC fighter Vaughan Lee wiped tears as he recollected being “pretty lucky” that the most significant injury sustained during his fifteen-year fighting career was a broken orbital bone resulting in double vision. ²² MMA fighters endure skin lacerations and dermatologic infections with no post-fight aftercare, including complications that arise from injuries sustained in fights. ²³ UFC itself leaves no room for ambiguity in its contracts by detailing the inherent and “abnormally dangerous” risk of “severe and permanent physical injury,” paralysis, or even death. ²⁴

UFC fighters dedicate the majority of their time to rigorous and intense training to climb the ranks and secure high placements in prominent matches. Fighter injuries during training occupy 80 percent more time than their actual bouts in the ring, with the most affected areas being the head, neck, and lower and upper extremities. These training-related injuries often go unnoticed but can have cumulative effects on a fighter’s health, particularly neurological damage. ²⁵ A significant aspect of MMA fighters’ training life is the intense competitive pressure to gain muscle mass and rapidly meet pre-fight weigh-in requirements. Rapid weight loss typically involves dangerous practices such as consuming large amounts of water over a short period followed by a drastic reduction of fluid intake. Severe dehydration is achieved via fluid restriction, diuretics, laxatives, hot water and salt baths, and excessive sweating. The health risks from these practices can persist after weigh-ins and include electrolyte imbalances, reduced bone mineralization (leading to stress fractures), emotional disturbances, and cognitive impairments. ²⁶

Despite the immense physical, mental, and emotional tolls, MMA fighters pursue UFC championships for prestige and wealth. Prominent athletes generate substantial income through sponsorships and endorsement deals. In 2020, Conor McGregor, arguably UFC’s biggest star, was the highest-paid athlete in the world, with a reported $180 million in earnings ($39.3 million from fights, ranking McGregor as UFC’s highest-paid fighter, and the remaining majority from his whiskey brand). ²⁷ Undefeated 2023 Hall of Fame inductee Khabib Nurmagomedov, one of the greatest fighters in UFC history, retired in 2020 with approximate career earnings of $22 million; his final two wins each earned him $6.09 million. ²⁸

But McGregor and Nurmagomedov are rare exceptions, and their substantial earnings starkly contrast with their colleagues’ lower pay despite the same physical risks and expenses. Excluding high-paid outliers, UFC fighters are among the lowest-paid athletes in professional sports compared to other major sports leagues. The promoter allocates less than 20 percent of revenue to fighter compensation. SEC filings show that “athlete costs” and fighter purses in 2022 dropped to 13-14.5 percent of league earnings. ²⁹ UFC fighters do not benefit from revenue-sharing models like the major leagues and instead must negotiate their own contract with a minimum pay of $10,000 per fight. Factors that can increase fighter earnings include $50,000 in discretionary and arbitrary performance bonuses, up to $42,000 in UFC-exclusive sponsorships, event placements like PPV fights, negotiation skills, popularity, and ranking. An experienced fighter’s average pay is around $84,000 annually. Comparatively, the NBA and NFL guarantee a minimum salary of $898,000 with a 50-percent revenue share and $480,000 per year with a 48-percent revenue share, respectively. ³⁰

Excluding high-paid outliers, UFC fighters are among the lowest-paid athletes in professional sports compared to other major sports leagues.

UFC signs few fights per contract, and only a small portion can compete on main cards and PPV events, fueling a large pool of desperate, underpaid competitors for remaining bouts. The compensation structure for UFC fighters is significantly lower than that of athletes in other major sports, including boxing; the disparity is further exacerbated by UFC’s restrictive contracts and unscrupulous business practices that severely limit outside earning potential, even in retirement. Labor law scholar Zev Eigen described a UFC contract as the worst he had ever seen in sports entertainment, ³¹ amounting to forms of procedural and substantive unconscionability and contracts of adhesion, which “is made by a party with superior bargaining power and is essentially a ‘take it or leave it’ deal where the lesser party only has the opportunity to accept or decline the offer.” ³²

UFC fighters negotiate their own contracts in isolation without an advocate, bargaining power, or collective representation. Although classified as independent contractors, their contracts are tightly controlled by UFC. Negotiations are typically conducted individually, and any representation by agents or managers must operate within UFC’s standardized agreements, with little room for substantive modification. UFC’s dominUFC fighters negotiateation over approximately 90 percent of the MMA market leaves few alternatives for high-level competition or comparable pay, and fighters who refuse to sign risk losing their roster positions. Contract negotiations are strategically timed to align with fighters’ losses or pivotal career moments, pressuring them to accept lower pay.

UFC fighters negotiate their own contracts in isolation without an advocate, bargaining power, or collective representation.

Due to UFC’s virtual monopoly over MMA, fighters frequently have no viable alternative to signing long-term contracts with financially detrimental tolling clauses. This extends the duration of the contract between bouts, including when fighters are recovering from injuries sustained in competition or when they decline a fight, effectively binding them to the agreement indefinitely. These extensions lack any form of equitable compensation. Fighters do not receive any guaranteed income during inactive periods, and UFC does not compensate a fighter if it unilaterally cancels an event. UFC maintains full control over scheduling and event decisions, while fighters bear the financial risk of inactivity. UFC also has extensive authority to terminate fighter contracts under broad conditions such as fight losses, criminal charges, and any breaches of contractual terms, including wearing attire deemed “inappropriate.” Fighters waive their right to participate in class action lawsuits, dissolving any recourse to contest contractual terms and employment conditions collectively. ³³ At close, these contracts state: “Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be construed to make Fighter an employee of [the UFC].” ³⁴

Even upon retirement or disability, fighters are not released from their contracts. If any bouts remain, the contract is effectively paused, preventing the fighter from competing with other promoters, including non-UFC events. Remarkably, fighters are also required to grant UFC control posthumously with the “perpetual right” to use its content, including “fictionalized versions” of events containing “any element of Fighter’s Identity,” including name, likeness, movements, signature, voice, tattoos, and biometric data ³⁵ —leaving fighters financially dependent on UFC-regulated income streams. Given their inherently short, injury-prone careers, many athletes are compelled to remain with the organization through their prime years, possessing little agency over contractual terms or career decisions. ³⁶

Fighters’ economic dependency on UFC is further deepened by restrictions on fighters supplementing their income through independent sponsorships or participation in crossover sports such as boxing or professional wrestling. Prior to 2015, fighters freely negotiated their own sponsorships, offering a revenue stream often exceeding fight purses. However, beginning July 2015, UFC banned all non-approved sponsorships under an exclusive outfitting deal with Reebok, replacing individualized deals with a tiered payment system based solely on tenure. In April 2021, UFC transitioned from Reebok to Venum with slightly higher tiered stipends but retaining the same restrictive structure. ³⁷

Nearly every issue for workers outside UFC exists within it: misclassification, individualism, high turnover, international complexities.

While many fighters prioritize securing the highest possible earnings in negotiations, former UFC champion Francis Ngannou focused on long-term value and structure rather than immediate financial gain, attempting to negotiate for other fighters and accepting a lower salary in exchange for benefits like health insurance. UFC’s purported offer to Ngannou was the highest pay of any UFC heavyweight fighter. In response to health insurance discussions, UFC representatives argued that he could afford it given the money they offered. Ngannou, advocating for low-tier fighters who only make $10,000 if they lose a fight, asked, “How about those guys at the bottom?” ³⁸ Dana White told press that Ngannou walked away from the deal out of greed and to circumvent fighting skilled opponents. ³⁹ Feeling “slapped in the face with money,” ⁴⁰ Ngannou exited UFC with a vacated champion title and joined the smaller Professional Fighters League (PFL) in May 2023 for significantly more pay and freedom. He also focused his negotiations on other fighters receiving fair compensation, establishing a new MMA standard by securing a minimum $2 million payout for his PFL opponents and negotiating the freedom to compete in boxing. ⁴¹

Issues in Organizing

Organizing UFC is long overdue. Nearly every issue for workers outside UFC exists within it: misclassification, individualism, high turnover, international complexities. Misclassification as independent contractors denies fighters economic security and collective bargaining power and limits access to benefits provided by most mainstream sports, such as Social Security, Medicare, health and disability insurance, workers’ compensation, retirement, and legal protections under labor law. Fifteen factors in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Twenty-Factor Test, which the IRS uses to determine whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor, support classifying UFC fighters as employees. ⁴² And misclassification exacerbates fighters’ financial challenges. As a ranked UFC contender explained in an MMA fighter survey, “Pretty much 40 percent right off the top is gone.” When adding steep domestic and foreign taxes to the “core block of four expenses: management, coaches, nutrition, and travel,” MMA fighters are left with little income. One U.S.-based UFC fighter’s $65,000 purse was reportedly reduced to $20,000, while a foreign UFC fighter reported their purse was reduced by 85 percent. Even top MMA earners are not exempt. After accounting for taxes and other expenses, one former MMA champion retained only $380,000 of a $1 million purse. ⁴³ “I’m lucky if I bring 10 percent of my fight money home,” one former UFC title challenger said. “I spent the first few years paying to fight and not making any money at all.”

Power Dynamics

Over the past two decades, UFC has dominated MMA by systematically eradicating competition through acquisitions, monopolizing high-profile venues with exclusive contracts, and counterprogramming tactics like scheduling its own events to conflict with rivals’. By acquiring rival promotions, UFC consolidated most of the MMA talent, thus commanding near-total control over fighters’ contracts. ⁴⁴ UFC fighters’ battles with the monopsony are met with failure, retaliation, and harsher contracts with chilling effects. Three-time former UFC Welterweight Champion Georges St-Pierre and colleagues Cain Velasquez, Donald Cerrone, T.J. Dillashaw, and Tim Kennedy launched the Mixed Martial Arts Athletes Association (MMAAA) in 2016 to advocate for fighter pay, health insurance, and pensions for fighters.

“The UFC effectively ended my fighting career because I spoke up in favor of joining in union with my fellow MMA fighters.”

Widespread fear of UFC retaliation and lack of open support for the group brought MMAAA an “unceremonious death” in 2017. ⁴⁵ Hall of Famers Randy Couture and Tito Ortiz and former UFC Champion Andrei Arlovski have publicly campaigned for better pay, left the promotion at the height of their careers, and ultimately returned to UFC. ⁴⁶ Couture, a five-time world champion, has advocated for fighter rights since the early 2000s. His push for better pay and contract transparency intensified in 2006, producing significant UFC retaliation. In 2013, Couture was banned from working his son Ryan Couture’s corner in bouts and excluded from promotional materials; today, finding UFC-created highlights of Couture on social media platforms such as YouTube is nearly impossible—part of the organization’s blackballing strategy against those who challenge the organization. ⁴⁷

In February 2018, UFC fighter and longtime labor rights advocate Leslie Smith launched Project Spearhead to “force the issue” on reclassifying UFC fighters as employees. The now-defunct site educated fighters on misclassification and how to organize. Smith stated that the impetus for Project Spearhead was primarily due to the new Reebok sponsorship payment guidelines UFC unilaterally implemented, which allowed UFC to withhold not only the Reebok sponsorship payments but also fighters’ purses and bonuses. Her contract was not renewed at Project Spearhead’s height, and she was effectively terminated. ⁴⁸ “The UFC effectively ended my fighting career because I spoke up in favor of joining in union with my fellow MMA fighters,” Smith said. ⁴⁹

The balance of power within UFC is structured to favor the employer, reinforced by a presidential administration hostile to union activity and a protracted National Labor Relations Board process constrained by weak enforcement powers. From the organization’s formative years to its rise as a multibillion-dollar enterprise, fighters have carried brutal physical and financial burdens while the company has exercised near-total control over their careers. Restrictive contracts, sponsorship prohibitions, and the misclassification of athletes as “independent contractors” have left them without meaningful leverage, autonomy, or protection. Those who have attempted to collectively organize have faced the same hardships experienced by workers across industries: retaliation, intimidation, and the gradual weakening of solidarity under pressure.

Organizing UFC fighters is a formidable undertaking but not impossible. Tepid signs of labor movement revitalization have stalled under the current presidential administration, but public support for unions remains high, and a change in administration in coming years could change all workers’ fortunes, including UFC fighters’. MMA fighters possess visibility, influence, and grit capable of transforming principle into action. Achieving such a goal requires a disciplined strategy guided by seasoned organizers well-versed in traditional tenets of unionism and community-based mobilization. Without that, the UFC will continue to exploit these fighters’ labor in whatever ways they see fit.