Resilience,Reinvention and Transition during and after Quarantine

Introduction

The Covid-19 pandemic has led to quarantine measures virtually everywhere and instigated reflections on the viability of our models of thinking and organizing, from Marxist David Harvey (Harvey, 2020) to popstar David Byrne (Byrne, 2020; for an overview see Elden, 2020). In the period of quarantine, new selectivities are introduced, power relations shift, and a return to the old order cannot be literal (Mooney, 2015). It has to be a reinvention. This modifies the answers to the question whether the virus and the responses it provoked should be read as a reason to build more resilient societies, or rather, a radical transition. We emphasize that the quarantine is a sign of bigger issues but is also a thing in itself, and that our answers to bigger questions should inspire caution in the organization of quarantine: what happens in quarantine, doesn’t stay in quarantine.

Isolation and Its Effects on Selectivity

Quarantine can create a liminal space, a space of structural difference, a pressure cooker that alters the before but also plays a vital role in connecting the before and after. Many cultures know such liminal times and spaces (Bigger, 2009; Shields, 2013), and their experiences tell us that isolation has functions and is never isolated. A complete and enduring lockdown of societies would put an end to societies. Quarantine isolates some humans, but it doesn’t isolate narratives. During isolation, people share stories to make sense of the situation and these stories affect what comes back after quarantine. Both the pandemic and the quarantine magnify certain discourses, and in many countries, one can witness a very contrasting set of responses (see for an overview Matteo, 2020). Social cohesion and solidarity are praised, nationalists’ discourses are strengthened (Legrain, 2020), and disaster capitalism currently runs on steroids (Solis, 2020). New selectivities are introduced—some quietly, others less so—through altered power relations, shifting forms of economic competition and social support, and through transformation of discourses, including identity narratives and understandings of viable futures.

After Quarantine

A small but significant part of public discourse considers the world after the disaster. Idealized and dystopian versions of the future are in the making. Discourses, narratives, and ideologies created in quarantine will shape what comes afterwards. In evolutionary terms, a post-quarantine society never rebounds or returns to its pre-quarantine state. Any stabilization should rather be seen as a reinvention (Van Assche et al., 2014). A reinvention moreover which is shaped by quarantine life in a double sense.

First, what comes back hinges on the level and kind of selectivity applied in all visible domains, by which we mean the selection in surviving social, economic, legal, or ecological relations. Resilience, in its evolutionary version, as the ability to change, adapt, or transform in response to stress (Davoudi et al., 2013) always implies such selectivity: not everything can survive the stress and the elements and their relations that seem to survive are never entirely the same. Mechanisms that allow for regeneration of elements and relations deemed essential, are subjected to pressure. If they disappear, a revival in a fashion which keeps the system recognizable (Beunen et al., 2017) is less likely to happen. The “comeback” can thus be possible from a seemingly desperate state, while an apparently less dramatic situation can be irreparable. What can be missing and essential can include institutions, trust, infrastructures, markets, values, and differentiation (Luhmann, 1989).

Second, discourses, narratives, and ideologies themselves can alter identities in several ways (Butler, 2011; Foucault, 1994). This is possible through reflexivity, meaning that a new ideology, a new group identity, and a new sensibility might awaken and might be aware of its own awakening. But reflexivity might be absent. Society stabilizing after the pandemic might for the participants look like a rebound—a return to the situation before the stress. This appearance might veil a dramatically restructured society. Lingering fears might inspire a desire for continuity, and the rhetoric of revival of the old is usually stronger than a more subtle analysis of reinvention. Any conservative revival, for example, will have an element of reinvention. Even if the desire to return to the past is real, that past has transmuted, has been reinterpreted during quarantine, and the same happened to the traditionally held ideas on possible and desirable futures. In addition, the filtering of relations mentioned will make it technically impossible to go back. Stories, relations, and possibilities to organize are renewed, even if we’re not aware of it.

Discourses, narratives, and ideologies of quarantine are not homogeneous. Increased pressure can both amplify and hamper reflexivity, as it can both encourage communal spirit and grow divisions. Both conflict and reconciliation can be fostered, sometimes in concert. Narratives can harden and soften, emphasize boundaries and transcend them. This applies to identity narratives, but also to ideologies, which can mobilize more easily in times of crisis. When ideologies present an explanation and a way out, the appeal is there. If one believes the current crisis is caused by global capitalism, then a Marxist response is to take it apart afterwards (e.g., Harvey, 2020). If it is interpreted as a result of environmental destruction, then one might urge to focus on environmental justice and restoration. If it is believed to be a fluke in an imperfect technocracy, then the answer might be a strengthening of the high modernist state, and no need to rethink any other systems beyond, for example, by imagining a transnational health care policy (Butler, 2020). And if people believed Armageddon was close, then they are convinced it’s really close now.

Quarantine in the World as a Socio-ecological System

Shifting patterns of interactions and other selectivities triggered by quarantine will affect the resilience of societies. While the crisis triggers reflection on resilience. If we see the world as a socio-ecological system, then the resilience of the social and ecological sides might be quite different. Indeed, people have ruined a rich menu of ecosystems, therewith illustrating a direct influence of the social on the ecological (Buscher & Fletcher, 2020). The influence of the ecological on the social is much more complex, nonlinear, and always mediated by the observation and interpretation of ecological systems by social systems (Van Assche et al., 2017).

The quick and almost global responses to the spread of the Covid-19 virus illustrates that what matters in the governance of social-ecological systems are not the material changes by themselves, but rather the way in which these are observed, interpreted, and translated into actions (Duineveld et al., 2017; Luhmann, 1989). What also matters is the configuration of social systems, the position of particular observations versus each other, and the influence of different observations on the political system, where collective-binding decisions are made.

Also, the self-organization of social systems is largely different than that of ecological systems. Societies collapse more easily, and what exactly is a tipping point, or what needs to be preserved to make societies more resilient (beyond narrow definitions of resilience as response to one type of shock) is not entirely clear. If we think of “social distancing” for instance, it may be problematic since in practice it can also erode resilience, as millions of people live under conditions where isolation means death (think only of houses with no water supply). Klinenberg’s (2003) research showed that communities with weak social ties were much more vulnerable to the deathly consequences of a heat wave. While physical distance may be needed to slow the virus, social proximity is critical to absorb its impact. Moreover, societies can thoroughly collapse, and be reduced to smaller, less complex, less interdependent systems, which do not have the internal mechanisms to build themselves up again. Social and ecological systems can indeed be considered entwined, yet the social, even without environmental shocks, can easily wipe itself out.

A few essential questions emerge now: should the virus, the responses, and what is concocted and revealed in quarantine be read as enough reasons to build more resilient societies? Or does it amount to a demand for more radical transition? We would say: both. For recent versions of resilience thinking, transformation sometimes can be radical; persistence is the essence. Societies want to come out of the pandemic to a world they at least recognize, in a society which still fits their values and aspirations, in a web of relationships that is as complex as before. In that sense, yes, resilience is needed. Reinforcing certain institutions; increasing vigilance, civic engagement, environmental protection, and climate action; and fighting inequality might all help to prevent, minimize, and absorb shocks triggered by changes in the ecological system. At the same time, what is touched upon here, the series of actions that might engender resilience in a broad sense, also point at the need for a radical transformation, transition. We might first need transition, then resilience, that is, radical reinvention into a society that is more flexible in the face of shocks. The COVID shock might be harnessed to that end: necessary measures can build buffer capacity, and visible disasters might wake up governments.

The Reinvention of the World during and after Quarantine

Quarantine is a governance strategy, the result of a drive of societies for immunization (Sloterdijk, 2011). The strategy leans heavily on science, and quarantine buys time for preventative and curative technologies to develop. Quarantine is also a transitional space, which can harden identities and create new ones. Distancing and isolation reconfigure the social and the spatial through the selectivities discussed, and varying affinities with the crisis narrative can engender contrasting social outcomes: for some, each day of distance is a reminder of a rotten regime, for others, a reminder of old ties which have to be reconsidered or remade. Quarantine links past and future through a liminal stage, a stage of transition. Quarantine is also a sign of shock, a shock big enough to become a sign of other things, and here the discourses of quarantine and ideologies meet. It can be an argument for structural transition, addressing root causes, and developing buffers and responses, so a next crisis can be avoided. Yet ideologies refract the crisis through their lens, offer their own interpretation. The crisis reveals that resilience has to be redefined once again and might indeed take a form that many others have called transition or reinvention (Geels, 2011).

What would a reinvention look like? A rather stark transition now can enhance future resilience. In our view, a starting point can be a collective reflection on dichotomies that have polarized societies, veiled and hampered insight, and disabled adaptive governance and resilience. We can think of political left versus right distinctions, capitalism versus socialism, local versus global, development versus environment, and distancing versus proximity (cf Sinclair, 1997). All of those prevented insight in real adaptation options. All of those either kept things on a risky track or preached revolution as the only alternative. All of those meant that transition and resilience look incompatible. Maybe and hopefully episodes of quarantine contribute to discussion that break open the distinctions, helping us to see what to adapt and what to keep in place—key for the resilience of systems in complex and unpredictable environments. Reducing inequalities, rethinking resource streams, protecting the environment, and selectively localizing production and consumption can all contribute to resilience in the longer run. Maintaining differentiation, meanwhile, hampers overview and quick coordination, but allows societies to manage complexity better in the long run (Van Assche et al., 2019).

The new vulnerabilities exposed by the quarantine highlight the need for long-term perspectives and long-term strategy in governance. The situation further points at the risks of any ideology that becomes an obstacle for reflexivity and keeps things blindly on a path, whether in the name of progress, justice, economic development, sustainability, or other ideals. Complexity and uncertainty are features of life, of social-ecological systems, and many of our tricks to reduce uncertainty have just ignored or displaced it. Which brings us to the possibility of transitional governance (Van Assche et al., 2020). While the quarantine itself is a form of transitional governance, with limited aims and an acknowledgment of a temporary shortening of time horizons (i.e., let’s get through this first), we believe there is an argument to collectively consider a generalized transitional governance. We agree with the observers who see a signal in the quarantine, a signal that the current system does not work (Butler, 2020; Harvey, 2020; Littlejohn, 2020). But rather than positioning a priori an alternative, or emphasize a strengthening of system features invigorating a rebound, we believe there is real value in keeping the options open, and in recognizing that we simply don’t know yet which general form of social and economic organization offers better perspectives for people and planet in the long run. While the outline of the system after transition is not clear, some desirable features (as mentioned earlier) are clear, as are the risks and damages of the current system, and the argument for transitional governance.

The quarantine can inspire a reorientation towards what is considered of value, possibly a base for a new selectivity, and new procedures to figure out which transitions and reinventions are desirable. Transitional governance can entail the building of capacity, both intellectual and organizational, to deal with change while building a new and more inclusive long term. This means investment, a distance from ideology and from ideologies of small government, service delivery, and efficiency. We need redundancies, and we need governance to be ambitious, to reflect on and articulate collective goods, for the short and long term. Stressors can force the system into a new state of stability, but for social ecological systems, we have some influence on that new stability, and we need to maintain the tools to imagine, organize, push in the direction of a new stability that is actually desirable and resilient (Walker & Salt, 2006).