The role of authenticity in transformative experience

Introduction

Authenticity is a central theme in contemporary identity discourse, understood as a fluid construct shaped by psychological, cultural, and experiential dimensions. Psychologically, identity involves the perceived coherence of the self over time, integrating personal self-awareness with external influences. Anthropological perspectives emphasize its cultural grounding, shaped by rituals, narratives, and social practices. Meanwhile, phenomenology presents identity as an evolving lived experience—never fully grasped in reflection yet continuously shaped through interactions with the world. Rather than reflecting a fixed essence, authenticity is now understood as an evolving process—emerging through the interplay of individual experience, interpretation, and social context. This article explores how authenticity emerges through transformation—not as a static attribute but as a process requiring continuous openness to change. It unfolds through the dynamic interplay of personal experience, social influences, and the narrative frameworks that shape identity.

Transformation is often reduced to two simplistic models: a linear progression toward a predefined goal or a sudden, external rupture. In reality, however, it unfolds unpredictably—combining deliberate choices with unintended consequences and reshaping cognition, perception, and self-experience. This complexity reveals a fundamental dimension of human existence, one that may be described as an existential truth: the fragility of human life, its susceptibility to external influences, and its capacity for constant reinterpretation. The article devotes particular attention to two models of transformation: epistrophē, understood as a return to origins, and metanoia, signifying a radical existential shift. While both concepts are rooted in spiritual traditions, contemporary research highlights their broader applicability in analyses of authenticity. The modern culture of authenticity evolves against a backdrop of individualism, value pluralism, and technological transformations, which continuously reshape the experience of selfhood and one’s relationship to the world.

In this light, Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of the “heaviest burden”—the idea of life affirmation in the face of its inevitable recurrence—gains particular relevance. Similarly, Heidegger’s notion of Entschlossenheit (resoluteness) underscores authenticity as the conscious assumption of responsibility for one’s existence. Authenticity, however, does not merely consist in making deliberate choices but in one’s capacity to navigate existential uncertainty and maintain psychological flexibility, enabling the ongoing reconfiguration of identity in response to a dynamically evolving reality. Within this framework, crisis experiences—such as anxiety, loneliness, and alienation—are explored. These experiences frequently necessitate a reinterpretation of the self, compelling individuals to confront and revise their prior convictions and cognitive schemas. Authenticity, therefore, does not manifest as a fixed attribute but rather as a continuous process of revision and integration, aligning new experiences with a coherent sense of self.

This study examines authenticity as a dynamic and relational phenomenon, emphasising the interplay of three complementary dimensions: experience, narrative, and action. These elements illuminate how authenticity emerges within transformative processes and how conceptual structures shape its formation. Contemporary research on the ethics of authenticity and its intersections with psychology indicates that authenticity is an ongoing process of identity adaptation, mediated through social interaction. It also entails reflective value choices, which contribute to an individual’s authentic sense of self and facilitate the coherent integration of new experiences.

This perspective draws inspiration from the phenomenological frameworks of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and László Tengelyi, both of whom emphasise the dynamic tension between narrative and embodied experience, conceptualising them as mutually constitutive aspects of human existence. While narrative provides structure and meaning, corporeality introduces unpredictability and materiality into lived experience. In this context, Jacques Derrida’s notion of hauntology offers an intriguing lens through which to view authenticity—not as a stable foundation but as an entanglement with the past, alternative possibilities, and future configurations of meaning yet to be realised. Thus, authenticity emerges as a fluid and dynamic process, in which the individual continuously negotiates their identity in the face of existential uncertainty.

Research on authenticity

The concept of authenticity has been explored across philosophy, psychology, anthropology, and cultural studies, shaping diverse interpretations of identity and selfhood. ¹ While medieval thought linked authenticity to mastery and Christian virtues, modernity recast it as a cornerstone of self-realisation and personal autonomy (Taylor, 1991). Historically, the term has described both artistic originality and the integrity of human character, reflecting a long-standing tension between external validation and inner truth. In everyday language, being oneself denotes an individual’s alignment with their beliefs and emotions. ² When someone behaves uncharacteristically, it is often said that they are not themselves. Research on authenticity highlights its ambiguous and difficult-to-operationalise nature (Hicks et al., 2019). The absence of a consensus on its definition, the insufficient understanding of the psychological conditions that foster a sense of authenticity, and the unclear reasons why people value it so highly remain open research questions.

Despite its conceptual ambiguity, research identifies four core dimensions of authenticity. First, it is widely regarded as a positive value, shaping self-perception, social evaluations, and even consumer preferences (Beverland et al., 2008; Newman & Bloom, 2012). Second, it correlates strongly with psychological well-being, predicting mental health outcomes even beyond self-esteem (Goldman & Kernis, 2002; Wood et al., 2008). Third, authenticity carries normative weight—people intuitively link it to morality, reinforcing the belief that the „true self” is inherently good (Newman et al., 2014; Strohminger et al., 2017). Finally, cognitive biases shape authenticity judgments, as individuals tend to perceive it as an essential, immutable quality (Christy et al., 2019; Newman, 2016).

In psychological research, as well as in fields such as marketing, management, aesthetics, and tourism, authenticity is classified in various ways. A key aspect relevant to the perspective presented here is existential authenticity, which refers to the experience of being true to oneself, independent of social conventions or external norms (Newman, 2019). In psychology, it is often regarded as a specific form of values authenticity, which emphasises the alignment between internal beliefs and actions (Newman, 2019). However, it differs from more external forms of authenticity, such as historical authenticity, which is based on an object’s conformity to its established origin, and categorical authenticity, which defines the degree of alignment with predefined standards within a given category (Grayson & Martinec, 2004; Wang, 1999). Rooted in existential philosophy, existential authenticity does not concern objective truth or historical fidelity but rather the subjective experience of being authentic in relation to one’s existence (Hicks et al., 2019). It is a state in which an individual experiences deep alignment with themselves through conscious choices and actions, driven not by social pressure but by a sense of personal integrity (Kraus et al., 2011; Schlegel et al., 2009). In this sense, it can be understood as a process of personal transformation, enabling the reconfiguration of identity and the fuller realisation of one’s values and potential.

In philosophical discourse, authenticity is associated with naturalness, spontaneity, self-actualisation, and freedom, as well as with the modern understanding of subjectivity (Ferrara, 1998; Taylor, 1991; Varga, 2011). As an ideal, it plays a crucial role in reflections on human identity and development, positioning itself within the tradition of philosophical anthropology, which raises fundamental questions about human nature (Haeffner, 1989). The concept of authentic living frequently emerges in critiques of contemporary Western culture. On the one hand, social and economic structures are seen as potential constraints that limit an individual’s pursuit of self-actualisation. On the other hand, critics argue that overemphasising authenticity—understood as absolute individual autonomy—may lead to a weakening of traditional social norms or even to individualism detached from communal context (Taylor, 1991; Varga, 2011).

Authenticity can be analysed in three primary dimensions: as a personality trait, a situational state, and an ethical ideal. As a personality trait, authenticity refers to a stable disposition that enables an individual to act in accordance with their internal beliefs and values (Maltby et al., 2012; Wood et al., 2008). It is a key component of self-actualisation, encompassing resilience to external influences and the ability to reflectively shape one’s identity. Humanistic psychology highlights its fundamental role in fostering an individual’s harmonious development (Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1961). As a situational state, authenticity refers to a temporary experience of coherence between inner experiences and external behaviour (Lenton et al., 2013). This is a dynamic process, shaped by social and relational contexts, and may be transitory. Research indicates that experiencing authenticity in specific situations enhances psychological well-being and improves interpersonal relationships (Wood et al., 2008). As an ethical ideal (Vannini & Franzese, 2008; Varga, 2011), authenticity plays a key role in shaping modern identity. It enables individuals to define themselves in relation to social norms, traditions, and moral values, serving as a foundation for self-reflection on one’s place in the world.

Modern theories distinguish between authenticity and sincerity, highlighting that sincerity does not necessarily imply authenticity. Trilling (2009) notes that sincerity once referred to alignment between feelings and their expression, but modernity has exposed its limitations. It is possible to be sincere while simultaneously experiencing inner alienation—for example, when an individual consistently expresses their emotions and beliefs in socially appropriate ways while feeling a deep disconnect from their inner experience. In response, authenticity has evolved into a more demanding ideal—it is no longer sufficient to align with social norms; instead, it requires fidelity to one’s deeper sense of self.

The concept of authenticity frequently emerges in discussions of its absence and the experience of alienation (Wood et al., 2008). Self-awareness and the perception of one’s experiences are closely linked to a sense of embeddedness in social reality. A lack of authenticity can lead to internal tension, cognitive dissonance, and even mental health disorders, such as depression and anxiety (Naumova & Naumov, 2022). Alienation can be examined on multiple levels—it may arise from social pressure imposing specific norms, result from an internal conflict between the “actual self” and the “ideal self”, or stem from fear of judgment and rejection. Contemporary research on authenticity suggests that individuals who frequently experience situational authenticity tend to exhibit greater self-acceptance and psychological resilience (Lenton et al., 2013).

In psychology, research on authenticity is widespread, encompassing both theoretical models and empirical studies. Various approaches have been developed, including Wood et al.’s model of authenticity (Wood et al., 2008), analyses of the relationship between authenticity and psychological well-being (Kernis & Goldman, 2006), and considerations of authenticity as a dynamic psychological process (Lenton et al., 2013). ³

Conversion as transformation: The interplay between metanoia and epistrophē

The contrast between epistrophē and metanoia reveals two distinct yet interwoven dimensions of transformation: one as a return to origins, the other as a radical existential shift. Studies suggest that these processes often overlap, forming a nuanced model of personal change in contemporary contexts (Ellwanger, 2020). While traditionally associated with religious conversion, transformation extends beyond spiritual domains, shaping ethical, philosophical, and cultural self-redefinitions. The idea of returning to one’s “true self” carries an undeniable appeal but also sparks debate—critics argue that it may foster cultural narcissism or an overly individualistic ethos, particularly in a postmodern landscape that challenges fixed identities (Bauman, 2000; Giddens, 1991; Taylor, 1991). Furthermore, the modern imperative of authenticity, increasingly linked to productivity and self-branding, exposes the risk of its commodification—an expectation of constant self-reinvention that serves corporate rather than existential ends (Illouz, 2007; Rosa, 2013).

Pierre Hadot (1992) describes conversion as a decisive shift in one’s life trajectory. He distinguishes two classical forms: epistrophē (ἐπιστροφή), a return to one’s origins and true self, and metanoia (μετάνοια), a radical reconfiguration of identity. While epistrophē suggests a cyclical movement of self-restoration, metanoia entails a rupture—an irreversible transformation of perspective and values. Hadot (2021) illustrates the concept of epistrophē with examples drawn from Stoic and Neoplatonic traditions, where the term describes the movement of the soul striving for equilibrium between centrifugal and centripetal forces. This movement, aligned with the cosmic order, enables self-recognition and a return to one’s essence. Neoplatonism, in turn, adapts this process to the rhythm of breathing, situating the soul within the eternal movement of being and the return to a forgotten source—the original unity (anamnesis). Epistrophē can thus be compared to the process of awakening, in which an individual becomes aware of their relationship with the broader environment. An example of metanoia is Christian conversion, defined as a complete spiritual reorientation (bouleversement), a radical renewal, and a return to rebirth. Metanoia also involves a stage of returning to one’s fundamental origins, which Hadot describes as a return to the “mother’s womb”. Faith in Christ as the Saviour signifies a profound inner transformation, leading to the abandonment of one’s former life and the beginning of a new existence based on Christian values. Hadot emphasises that both forms of conversion respond to the same existential aspiration and reflect the ambiguity of human reality. On the one hand, they reveal the capacity for complete transformation, while on the other, they highlight the crucial role of external influences in shaping the subject. These two forms of conversion can take various shapes and often overlap. The history of Western tradition appears as a continuous sequence of attempts to refine conversion practices. However, Hadot cautions against a stereotypical interpretation of this phenomenon, which assumes the existence of a universal pattern of transformation. This is particularly evident in religious conversion narratives, which—following the model of Saint Augustine’s experience—often unfold as a prolonged and chaotic search, culminating in a sudden transformation under the influence of transcendent enlightenment.

Richardson (1985), in his research, identifies a new paradigm of conversion, which emphasises the active role of the individual in the process of identity change and spiritual transformation. Unlike the traditional model of conversion, which is based on sudden, dramatic transformation and passive submission to external influences, the new paradigm views conversion as a gradual, socially embedded, and meaningful process. In this modern approach, conversion is a dynamic journey encompassing multiple phases and directions of exploration. The individual actively participates in shaping their spiritual path, making decisions based on personal experiences and social relationships. Conversion, therefore, is a negotiated and interactive process, rather than a one-sided submission to religious or social authority. The new paradigm highlights the social conditions of conversion, demonstrating that an individual’s choices are shaped by their environment, past experiences, and cultural narratives that define authentic transformation. Contemporary contexts, such as the rise of new religious movements, the individualisation of spirituality (Roof, 1999), and the influence of postmodernism (Woodhead et al., 2005), make conversion a fluid and open-ended process, allowing for multiple redefinitions of identity throughout life. Conversion is no longer merely a shift in beliefs or religious affiliation but a reinterpretation of one’s existence. This transformation occurs through the narrative reconfiguration of one’s biography, where past events are reinterpreted in light of a newly adopted identity (Bamberg, 2011; McAdams, 1993). As a result, the convert not only changes their beliefs but also reconstructs their past, creating a coherent personal narrative.

Ellwanger (2020) introduces a hybrid model of conversion, arguing that metanoia and epistrophē increasingly intersect in contemporary transformations. Traditionally, metanoia implied a decisive break with the past, while epistrophē evoked a return to an authentic self (Foucault, 2005). However, modern metanoia no longer entails total renunciation; rather, it involves reinterpreting one’s past through the lens of a newly emerging identity. The key difference between the modern and traditional models of conversion is the elimination of guilt and penitence. In traditional metanoic narratives, conversion was linked to renouncing one’s former life and acknowledging it as wrong or sinful. In modern metanoia, however, transformation is not driven by a need for atonement but rather by a pursuit of affirmation and the recovery of a lost self. This process is not a singular event but rather a gradual and long-term adaptation to a new identity, often requiring social or psychological intervention and recognition. (Bamberg, 2011; McAdams, 1993; Woodhead et al., 2005). In traditional conversion models, transformation was primarily internal, expressed through verbal declarations and testimonies (Freccero, 1986). In the modern model, however, it is more external transformation—changes in appearance, lifestyle, and social roles—that validates the authenticity of an inner identity shift (Ellwanger, 2020). Conversion is thus not only about changing oneself but also, to a large extent, about adapting external reality to an original self—one that had previously been suppressed by social conventions.

Modern metanoia shifts from instantaneous transformation to a process-oriented approach, emphasising gradual self-discovery rather than a sudden spiritual awakening (James, 1902; Richardson, 1985). Unlike traditional models, where conversion was driven by external forces—divine intervention or institutional structures—modern metanoia centres on individual agency, allowing for autonomous identity formation (Woodhead et al., 2005). Ellwanger’s hybrid model integrates both metanoia and epistrophē, reconciling rupture with continuity. Contemporary transformations, such as gender transition and racial redefinition, challenge stable identity categories, as they involve both subjective self-perception and social recognition mechanisms. While gender and race were historically seen as fixed and biologically determined, contemporary debates highlight their narrative and cultural fluidity (Ellwanger, 2020).

Ellwanger identifies key criteria of authenticity that determine social recognition of transformation. One such criterion is biology, traditionally seen as the foundation of identity, now contested in debates between essentialism, which considers it an unchanging determinant of belonging (Ellwanger, 2020), and constructivism, which argues that identity is shaped socially and narratively (Butler, 1990). The tension between these perspectives makes biological authenticity ambiguous, raising questions about the extent to which the body and genetics define the truth of personal transformation. Equally important is external identification—authenticity in the eyes of others relies on the coherence of appearance, behaviour, and cultural norms (Goffman, 1959). The social acceptance of transformation depends on its alignment with recognised categories; if the change fits established frameworks, it is more readily embraced. Conversely, deviation from these norms may lead to accusations of imitation or identity appropriation (Brubaker, 2017).

In contemporary debates, internal self-identification has gained increasing significance. An individual’s subjective experience is now frequently regarded as the decisive factor, requiring no external validation (Ellwanger, 2020). However, the absence of objective criteria blurs the boundary between authenticity and the rhetoric of authenticity, raising questions about whether self-identification alone suffices as proof of transformation (Salamon, 2010). Going further, the performativity of declarations plays a crucial role. According to John Austin’s speech act theory, identity can be created through its verbal articulation (Butler, 1990). However, authenticity based solely on verbal claims is not always convincing. Critics argue that declarations alone may not be sufficient without additional evidence, such as changes in appearance or lived experience within a particular social group (Dolezal, 2015). Another critical aspect of social validation is historical continuity. A compelling transformational narrative integrates change within a biographical continuum, presenting it as the realisation of a hidden truth rather than an arbitrary identity shift (McAdams, 1993). The more a new identity appears as a logical consequence of past experiences, the greater its social acceptance (Ellwanger, 2020). Additionally, suffering plays a significant role—social recognition of transformation often requires evidence of struggle and internal conflict. Those who have experienced marginalisation, exclusion, or profound internal turmoil are more likely to be perceived as authentic converts (Frank, 2013). The absence of such experiences may lead to suspicions of strategic, rhetorical, or superficial transformation. The political dimension reveals that authenticity in transformation is not merely an individual matter but is subject to institutional and cultural frameworks that regulate which identity transformations are accepted and which are contested. Transformations such as gender transition or racial redefinition are entangled in legal and social debates, leading to tensions between individual rights and existing political structures (Brubaker, 2017). Ultimately, narrative coherence remains a key element of social recognition. Authentic metanoia requires a stable, logical, and convincing narrative—if a transformation contains contradictions, inconsistencies, or appears arbitrarily constructed, its credibility is undermined (Gergen, 1991).

Modern metanoia is therefore not a clear-cut act of rupture but rather a negotiated process within the social sphere. It unfolds through the dynamic interaction between individual experience, institutional mechanisms of recognition, and cultural definitions of authenticity. Transformation is not solely about changing oneself but also about reshaping the context in which this change is recognised or rejected.

The ethics of authenticity and modern identity

In the modern era, the significance of metanoia—understood as a process of profound personal and cognitive transformation—has become particularly pronounced. It is not only a philosophical concept but also a narrative reconfiguration tool, enabling individuals to construct a new identity in response to the destabilisation of traditional values (Ellwanger, 2020). In this context, metanoia functions as both an existential redefinition of the self and a rhetorical strategy through which identity undergoes social validation (Taylor, 1989). The crisis of dominant worldviews, the disintegration of traditional structures, and the fluidity of identity drive individuals to seek new ways of self-definition (Taylor, 1989; Thompson, 2022). The decline of cultural authorities fosters uncertainty but also creates space for the formation of new interpretative frameworks, allowing experiences to be integrated into coherent narratives (Baumeister, 2019).

Anthony Giddens (1991) highlights that in postmodernity, individuals are compelled to shape their identity reflexively. The erosion of traditional norms means that the self requires continuous reconstruction, while shifting social conditions reinforce the role of expert knowledge in shaping individual self-awareness. This knowledge is no longer merely a means of understanding the world but also a tool for self-definition. In this context, authenticity takes on particular significance as the foundation of self-realisation and social trust. Individuals navigate between traditional moral structures and the need to adapt to changing realities, where the pressure for innovation and social acceleration (Rosa, 2013) can lead to a disconnection of identity from its historical and cultural roots. Despite this, the need for stability and coherence remains strong, prompting individuals to seek existential points of reference (Taylor, 1989).

Charles Taylor (1991) proposes a dialogical approach, arguing that authenticity is not isolation but rather a form of identity rooted in culture and social relationships. It involves both inner self-discovery and engagement with communal values. This perspective contrasts with Giddens’ emphasis on radical individualism, which suggests that self-creation is the primary path to identity. Taylor compares modern individualism with classical conceptions of Platonism and Stoicism. While ancient models of self-improvement were based on harmony with the cosmic order, contemporary authenticity focuses on subjective experience. Augustinian introspection, originally embedded in a theocentric model of self-knowledge, evolves into secular self-reflection, marking a shift from metaphysical reconciliation to individual self-creation (Taylor, 1989). ⁴

Ellwanger (2020) develops this idea further by examining the rhetorical dimension of authenticity and its social character. He suggests that identity must not only be internally experienced but also communicated and recognised within the social sphere. This underscores the necessity of external validation and the role of narrative in the transformation process. Modern approaches to authenticity also consider the influence of technology and global narratives, leading to “protean” identity (Lifton, 1999) and “saturated” identity (Gergen, 1991). Both models reveal the tension between the need for internal coherence and the dynamic shaping of identity within global transformations (Brinkmann, 2010). In light of these analyses, authenticity is not a final state but rather the ability to navigate ambiguity and continuous transformation.

Charles Taylor (1991), in The Ethics of Authenticity, examines the relationship between individual self-realisation and the socio-cultural structures that enable it. He argues that individuals cannot discover their authentic self in isolation but require external frameworks of meaning that give direction to their lives. He critiques modern radical individualism, which can lead to moral relativism and a weakened sense of communal responsibility. Authenticity, as Taylor points out, is often misinterpreted as a purely subjective pursuit, detached from social and historical contexts. In his view, it has a dialogical character—it is shaped through interactions with others and in relation to broader cultural and ethical horizons. Individuals do not construct themselves in a vacuum but rather within existing traditions and values, which require reflective engagement. Taylor (1991) also critiques “soft relativism”, which arises from an uncritical acceptance of value pluralism. While diversity of lifestyles is important, not all choices are equally justified merely because they are subjectively endorsed. Authenticity requires grounding in “horizons of significance”—shared cultural and moral frameworks that give meaning to individual commitments.

Somogy Varga’s (2011) embedded practice model aligns with Taylor’s concept, emphasising that authenticity is not an arbitrary act of self-creation but rather a mediation between individual agency and historically shaped social structures. Varga critiques individualistic conceptions of authenticity, arguing that personal choices are not entirely free—they must align with cultural norms that provide them with meaning. He underscores that authenticity is a dynamic process of negotiation between inherited values and individual experience. It is not a passive reproduction of tradition but rather its reinterpretation and development within social practice. In this context, existential choices, much like those examined in Heidegger’s analyses, are not purely arbitrary decisions but require a process of articulation and the reconfiguration of meanings rooted in culture (Varga, 2011).

The concept of authenticity in late modernity takes on new significance in the context of the “decentring of the subject” (Taylor, 1989). The widespread turn inward can lead to a disruption of previously stable identity structures, revealing a crisis of value affirmation and the difficulty of recognising an objective hierarchy of goods. ⁵ Taylor highlights this issue through Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche, who explore the tension between self-affirmation and alienation. Kierkegaard situates authenticity within religious affirmation, where the “leap of faith” marks a transition from pleasure-driven existence to ethical and spiritual commitment, requiring trust in the invisible and transcendent beyond rational calculation (Kierkegaard, 1985). Dostoevsky, in contrast, frames authenticity as affirmation of the world and human relationships, despite the temptation of isolation and contempt. He links it to kenosis (Gr. κένωσις)—self-giving to others as a defining act of existential commitment. Nietzsche, on the other hand, presents a vision of authenticity, which will be the focus of further discussion, through his concept of the “eternal return”. While his philosophy contains a critique of false identity constructions, he ultimately rejects the possibility of returning to an original, true self.

From a phenomenological perspective, existential and transformative choices differ in their relationship to identity and authenticity. An existential choice affirms an existing identity, serving as an act of self-reflection and consistent self-creation. The individual chooses in alignment with their values, maintaining the coherence of their self (Varga, 2011). An example is Luther’s decision to remain true to his beliefs—a choice that was not so much rational as necessary for the integrity of the subject. A transformative choice, by contrast, alters identity, leading the individual into an epistemic gap—its consequences cannot be fully anticipated. Here, authenticity is not about fidelity to oneself but rather openness to change and a willingness to embrace the unknown. These two types of choices also differ in their understanding of freedom. An existential choice emphasises the necessity of self-determination and responsibility for one’s life, in line with Sartre's (1993) concept of freedom. A transformative choice, however, redefines freedom as the acceptance of radical uncertainty and the willingness to reshape oneself (Paul, 2014; Varga, 2011). Despite these differences, both types of choices can intersect—an existential choice may lead to transformation, while a transformative choice, upon reflection, may become integrated into the subject’s narrative coherence. The former embodies fidelity to oneself, while the latter reflects the capacity to transcend one’s own limits in a decentred manner, engaging in an ongoing pursuit of the self without ever fully capturing its essence. This resonates with the notion of decentring the subject, where identity remains fluid, perpetually eluding final definition.

Authenticity and eternal return

Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal return functions both as an existential challenge and a thought experiment, compelling the individual to fully affirm their life and transform themselves in such a way that they would will to live it an infinite number of times, without regret or a sense of loss. In The Gay Science (§341), Nietzsche describes a scene in which a demon appears to a person in their “loneliest loneliness” (einsamste Einsamkeit), declaring that their life will repeat eternally in identical form (Nietzsche, 1974). This is not so much a metaphysical or cosmological claim about the repetition of reality as it is an analysis of the psychological and existential consequences of accepting this idea (Remhof, 2018). The eternal return serves as an existential test, confronting the individual with the question: Can they affirm their life in its entirety—without emotional detachment, without seeking radical revision of their biography, and without reference to an expected or imagined alternative? The structure of this test is precise: the appearance of the demon symbolises a confrontation with the truth of one’s life, which may initially evoke fear as it reveals the irreversibility of past choices, the inescapability of one’s existence, and the absence of any transcendental escape or future compensation. This forces the individual to directly and unconditionally confront their existence in all its contingency, limitations, and susceptibility to suffering. This existential tension presents the individual with a choice: full affirmation of life in its repetition or its rejection, leading to nihilism—the belief that existence is devoid of value, which may result in emotional detachment, indifference to one’s fate, or a destructive resignation from the pursuit of meaning and authenticity. The reference to “the loneliest loneliness” (einsamste Einsamkeit) is crucial, as in a moment of extreme isolation, the individual cannot rely on social conventions or external expectations—they must confront themselves in the deepest sense (Pippin, 2009). Unlike solitude, which may be a deliberate choice, loneliness (Einsamkeit) signifies a radical existential isolation, in which the individual is confronted with the totality of their fate (Cacioppo & Patrick, 2009; Remhof, 2018).

Why does the vision of the eternal return emerge precisely at the moment of deepest loneliness? The answer is unsettling: Nietzsche assumes that we may initially fail this test—we may shrink back and reject what is revealed to us. The thought that life will repeat infinitely, experienced in a state of extreme isolation, intensifies the existential crisis, making it impossible to grasp or impose meaning. However, this is not ordinary loneliness—otherwise, one might remain indifferent to it. The eternal return reveals itself in the moment when all points of reference collapse, leaving the individual suddenly faced with the inevitability of their existence, with nowhere to escape. The transformative power of this test lies in its ability to shift one’s mode of self-experience. The crisis it provokes is not meant to weaken but to act as a catalyst for self-knowledge: the individual is, in a sense, forced to either accept their life as valuable and worthy of repetition or to reject it (Motta, 2023). It appears that the affirmation of the eternal return does not imply a mechanical return to an original identity but rather a complete acceptance of one’s life in all its complexity—without a sense of uprootedness, alienation, or nostalgia for an alternative existence. This is an act of integration with one’s experience, in which the past does not appear as a burden but as a constitutive dimension of being oneself.

Nietzsche does not adopt a teleological or melioristic approach in his reflections—he does not propose a vision of ultimate fulfilment or harmony but rather a process in which acceptance of the past and future becomes simultaneous with the present. For this reason, the eternal return does not resemble metanoia—a sudden transformation akin to religious conversion—but is, to a great extent, an epistrophē, a return to oneself in an affirmative form (Ellwanger, 2020; Loeb, 2006). In this sense, it does not embody an ideal of asceticism or world-denial but rather its full affirmation. According to Remhof (2018), Nietzschean solitude fosters profound personal transformation, emerging from confrontation with the thought of the eternal return. The experience of “deepest loneliness” compels the individual to reflect on existential tension and a sense of disorientation, initiating a process of self-transformation. Notably, a critical stance towards social values can lead to loneliness, but loneliness itself can also prompt the questioning of those values. Isolation—one of the key themes in Heidegger’s analyses—reveals the tension between values authentically lived and those imposed by the social context.

Nietzsche’s eternal return can be interpreted as an existential exercise, prompting reflection on its potential therapeutic applications, particularly in existential crises, depression, and social isolation (Remhof, 2018). However, Fromm-Reichmann (1959) challenges the view of loneliness as transformative, describing “real loneliness” as a psychopathological state that erodes self-perception and impairs interpersonal relationships, leading to emotional and cognitive disintegration. Gallagher and Janz (2018) conceptualise solitude as ambivalent, shaping or diminishing autonomy depending on whether it expands or restricts affordances—possibilities for action provided by the environment. While voluntary solitude can enhance self-development, enforced isolation (e.g., psychiatric confinement, extreme isolation) leads to identity destabilisation and cognitive disturbances. They highlight narrative as a crucial factor in shaping solitude’s impact, structuring experience and influencing an individual’s sense of agency.

Nietzsche’s “Become who you are” aligns with the existentialist view of self-creation, rejecting a fixed essence in favour of continuous identity formation through choices and actions (Solomon, 2003). The eternal return is not passive acceptance of fate but an active assumption of responsibility, requiring meaning-making and self-affirmation despite suffering.

Authenticity in Heideggerian perspective

Similar themes appear in Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity, which is a key element of his existential conception of Dasein in Being and Time. Authentic existence involves a conscious acceptance of one’s finitude, full engagement with one’s possibilities, and resistance to the conformist tendencies of Das Man (the “they-self”). Heidegger distinguishes between two modes of existence: everydayness and authenticity. In the former, the individual loses themselves in anonymous social norms, passively adopting dominant interpretative frameworks, whereas authenticity requires a conscious assumption of responsibility for one’s own being.

Inauthentic existence is characterised by absorption in the everyday structures of life, submission to the norms of Das Man, and succumbing to idle talk, which Heidegger refers to as Verfallen (fallenness). In this state, Dasein distances itself from its deepest possibilities for being, losing the capacity to shape its existence in a conscious and reflective manner. Heidegger conceives existence as a biaxial structure: on the one hand, it is oriented towards everydayness and subject to social norms, while on the other, it strives to construct a coherent and consistent existential narrative. Within this tension between everydayness and authenticity, the individual discovers their true mode of existence—not by uncovering a fixed essence, but through the ongoing process of self-formation within the context of their possibilities and limitations. Heidegger’s concept of authenticity does not entail a complete rejection of the social world but rather requires conscious engagement with its structures in a way that does not lead to the loss of individual responsibility for one’s own being.

An authentic stance emerges as a result of confrontation with the experience of negativity and human finitude, which manifest in existential anxiety (Angst) or an encounter with one’s own mortality—both of which constitute key moments of self-reflection and an awareness of one’s place in the world. In §40 of Being and Time, Martin Heidegger analyses Angst as a fundamental affective state (Grundbefindlichkeit), revealing the underlying structure of Dasein’s existence. Unlike fear (Furcht), which relates to a specific threat, Angst does not concern any particular danger but rather reveals the radical uncertainty of existence. Dasein finds itself confronted with its being as thrown (Geworfenheit), deprived of any stable foundation or existential guarantees. Angst is not merely a psychological state but a fundamental experience that discloses the ontological structure of existence. When the world loses its everyday self-evidence, things that typically provide a sense of orientation become indifferent and meaningless. Dasein realises that its existence is not anchored in any fixed foundation and that the meaning of reality requires constant re-establishment.

Angst disrupts Dasein’s immersion in the everyday world, revealing nothingness (das Nichts). Unlike fear, which arises in response to a specific threat, Heidegger’s Angst exposes the contingency of existence and a radical openness to one’s possibilities. This experience leads to a sense of Unheimlichkeit—“uncanniness”—in which Dasein realises that it is not at home in the world and that its existence lacks an ultimate foundation. Heidegger emphasises that in Angst, Dasein is thrown into its most authentic mode of being, while simultaneously experiencing its groundlessness. Angst discloses the finitude of existence and its dynamic, ever-forming nature. At this moment, authentic being (eigentliches Sein) becomes possible—the acceptance of full responsibility for one’s existence, embracing its uncertainty and openness. Similarly, in Nietzsche’s thought experiment of the eternal return, the experience of deepest loneliness may trigger a radical shift in self-perception. In the context of transformative existential experiences, Angst reveals the fundamental structures of human existence. These can be compared to limit situations (Grenzsituationen), such as the loss of a loved one or the confrontation with one’s own mortality, which, in existential psychology, often lead to profound changes in one’s perception of oneself and the world. Angst operates in a similar way, disrupting routine existence, forcing individuals to reflect on their being and make conscious choices regarding its direction.

Heidegger’s concept of being-toward-death (Sein-zum-Tode) is also a central element of authenticity. In Being and Time (§51–53), Heidegger argues that the recognition of one’s mortality enables the possibility of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), in which the individual projects their existence consciously and responsibly (Blattner, 2013). Confrontation with death allows Dasein to grasp the finitude and limitations of its possibilities, while at the same time motivating a turn toward a more authentic mode of being. When things lose their everyday significance, the fundamental structure of care (Sorge) is revealed as the primary way in which the individual relates to themselves and the world. In the face of an existential crisis or the collapse of previously accepted values, established projects lose their self-evidence, exposing their contingency and the necessity of reinterpretation (Heidegger, 1962). This is not a matter of abstract speculation about death, but rather an existential engagement with one’s own life. Heidegger stresses that awareness of mortality does not lead to nihilism but instead opens the individual to the possibility of authentic being. Being-toward-death is not a passive acknowledgment of finitude but an active acceptance of one’s death as an inevitable and constitutive aspect of existence, which demands the conscious projection of one’s life (Guignon, 2004). In this perspective, the reinterpretation of history—both individual and collective—does not consist in merely repeating the past but rather in creatively reclaiming it through the lens of future possibilities (Withy, 2015).

Heidegger points out that authentic existence does not require a radical break from the past but instead demands its re-engagement (Wiederholung), necessitating reflective work on meanings shaped by socio-cultural conditions. It is through this constant movement between past and future that the individual’s existential project is formed—unique yet open to further transformations. In this light, interpretations of authenticity as solipsistic or isolated appear incomplete. Heidegger does not present authenticity as a romantic vision of a creator detached from the world but rather as an existential engagement that inevitably places the individual within history, tradition, and community (Guignon, 2004). Being-toward-death (Sein-zum-Tode) does not lead to existential alienation but rather to a radical acknowledgment of one’s finitude as the condition for authentic existence, where the individual not only assumes responsibility for their life but also recognises that their existence is inseparably linked to the structures of the world and social relations (Withy, 2015).

Charles Guignon, in his interpretation of Heidegger, critiques contemporary notions of authenticity, which often reduce it to individualistic self-realisation or self-expression, neglecting its relational, historical, and communal dimensions. According to Heidegger, authenticity is not an isolated, introspective project but requires engagement with history, tradition, and the social conditions that shape the very possibility of authentic choice (Guignon, 2004). Guignon (2004) and Varga (2011) critically examine the instrumentalisation of authenticity in contemporary capitalism and its assimilation into positive psychology. Guignon (1993) argues that authenticity has been appropriated by neoliberal ideology, where it no longer signifies existential self-knowledge but is instead subordinated to the logic of optimising individual productivity and self-marketing. A concept originally associated with existential responsibility and deep self-understanding has been reduced to a performative tool, tailored to consumerist values. In this transformation, authenticity ceases to be an existential commitment and instead becomes a mechanism for self-management and image control (Guignon, 1993).

Varga (2011) expands on this critique, pointing out that capitalism does not reject authenticity but rather incorporates it as an imperative for individual expression and personal branding. In this context, the “true self” becomes commercialised, subjected to constant optimisation, and shaped according to market demands rather than existential reflection. Authenticity no longer signifies autonomy but is instead embedded in strategies of self-presentation and personal success. Paradoxically, the pursuit of authenticity leads to conformity with pre-established, socially sanctioned identity models (Varga, 2011). These analyses reveal a fundamental discrepancy between Heideggerian authenticity—rooted in existential responsibility and openness to being—and its modern, market-driven version, which functions as a mechanism for adapting individuals to the economic structure.

Resoluteness, spectrality, and self-loss

A key aspect of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity is Entschlossenheit—resoluteness, which plays a fundamental role in discussions on identity, existential decision-making, and the process of individual transformation. Resoluteness is not a one-time act of choice but rather a sustained ontological stance, enabling Dasein to remain open to its most essential existential possibilities. As Guignon (2004) notes, Heidegger contrasts resoluteness with inauthentic existence, in which the individual becomes immersed in the normative structure of Das Man, conforming to social conventions and pre-established modes of action. Resoluteness represents a radical engagement in a mode of being that is not reducible to arbitrary decision-making but instead demands a consistent openness to one’s existential truth (Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2002). Heidegger rejects an instrumental understanding of resoluteness and existential decisions as calculative choices subordinated to a means-end framework. Rather than being a pragmatic decision, resoluteness is an existential commitment, in which the individual confronts the openness of their future, continuously negotiating the meaning and direction of their existence.

At the core of this concept lies Heidegger’s notion of conscience (Gewissen), which, as McManus (2015) emphasises, does not provide normative guidelines or moral imperatives but instead reveals to the individual their own possibility of being authentic. Conscience does not impose predefined rules or offer clear directives but functions as a deep, internal call to recognise one’s finitude and assume responsibility for shaping one’s existence. Existential choices cannot be dictated by external commands or social frameworks but must instead be rooted in the fundamental experience of one’s existence—in an awareness of its fragility, openness, and inevitable end (Sein-zum-Tode—being-toward-death).

In the context of existential possibilities, Heidegger’s distinction between an authentic and inauthentic relationship to history and tradition is crucial. Guignon (2004) stresses that authenticity does not imply a complete rupture with cultural heritage but rather its creative reinterpretation and repetition (Wiederholung), allowing the individual to consciously situate themselves within the historicity of their existence. This tension is exemplified in the tragic figure of Stavrogin in Dostoevsky’s Demons—a character whose pursuit of radical autonomy and rejection of social and historical references leads to nihilism and self-destruction. Stavrogin’s fundamental mistake lies in his total severance from the context in which he was formed, resulting in the disintegration of his identity and a loss of orientation in the world. ⁶

In this way, Heideggerian resoluteness reveals its ambiguity: it is both an act of openness to one’s possibilities and a risk of misinterpreting authenticity as isolated individualism or an arbitrary will to power. The crucial question, then, is how an individual can responsibly shape their existence while remaining connected to their historical context and community. Authenticity emerges as a fundamental yet elusive dimension of existence, structured by the tension between being oneself and the impossibility of fully possessing oneself. The subject is not a fixed center but an ongoing openness to possibilities. Authenticity is not a state to be attained but a dynamic engagement with time and history (Guignon, 2004; Russon, 2008). Rooted in existential uncertainty, it defies fixed criteria. Heidegger’s anticipatory resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) reflects this—openness rather than rigid determination (Heidegger, 1962). Similar ideas appear in Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal return and his thought experiment “The Heaviest Weight,” which confronts the individual with the necessity of fully affirming their existence, without retreating into illusions or essentialist assumptions about an immutable identity. Authenticity is not a fixed state but rather a dynamic tension between being and absence, between what is actual and what is merely possible. From a hauntological perspective, inspired by Derrida’s analysis (1994), the subject is never fully itself because its identity is shaped in relation to traces of the past—to what could have happened but never did. Mark Fisher (2014) highlights that the hauntological experience emerges in moments of existential crisis, when an individual loses their stable point of reference and is forced to develop a new way of being. Transformation is not about attaining a “true self” but continuously negotiating identity in response to change. This tension—between stability and the self’s elusiveness—renders authenticity a dynamic process of self-surpassing. Both Heideggerian phenomenology and Derridean deconstruction frame existence as unfolding within tensions: presence and its traces, decision and openness, the pursuit of authenticity and its inherent elusiveness.

The gradual shift in Heidegger’s thought from a focus on active decision-making (Entschlossenheit) to an open readiness for being (Gelassenheit) marks a significant change in emphasis. ⁸ As O’Brien (2008) notes, Gelassenheit can be interpreted as an evolution in Heidegger’s understanding of authenticity—initially conceived as an active project requiring continuous readiness for decisive action. In his later thought, however, Heidegger highlights Gelassenheit as an openness to Ereignis—the event of being, which is not fully within the subject’s control but rather reveals itself in the way being grants itself, as seen, for example, in the creative process, where an artist relinquishes total control over their work, allowing the form to emerge spontaneously through engagement with the medium.

Charles Guignon expands on this perspective, contrasting two modes of understanding authenticity: self-possession and self-loss (releasement). According to Guignon, the traditional approach—dominant in contemporary culture—focuses on self-ownership, involving introspection, the identification of personal desires, emotions, and beliefs, and their consistent expression in actions. In this view, authenticity becomes a personal value, directed towards defining and fulfilling one’s own identity (Guignon, 2004). However, Guignon identifies an alternative possibility, which he finds in Heidegger’s concept of Gelassenheit. Understood as releasement, a “letting be” or “letting go”, it opposes the attitude of complete self-control and mastery over the world. In his later works, Heidegger strongly critiques the modern tendency to instrumentalise reality, reducing everything—including human beings—to a resource to be managed according to predefined objectives (Heidegger, 1996). The approach of self-loss also aligns with Georg Gadamer’s concept of dialogue, in which participants “lose themselves” in the subject matter, allowing the process of shared inquiry to shape mutual understanding (Gadamer, 2004). In this perspective, authenticity is no longer understood as individual introspection and self-assertion but rather as a dynamic openness to being, the world, and others. At the same time, the opposition between self-possession and self-loss is not entirely dichotomous—as Guignon emphasises, a well-lived life should incorporate elements of both orientations. Self-possession plays a crucial role in the modern world, enabling self-reflection and the clear articulation of one’s convictions. However, the ability to embrace releasement is equally essential—the capacity to move beyond one’s ego and engage with reality in a way that is not controlled but deeply conscious and co-creative (Guignon, 2004).

Authenticity, experience, narrative

Existential and transformative decisions are deeply interconnected, as both entail a fundamental shift in self-perception, values, and one’s relation to the world. The critique of naïve authenticity (Ferrara, 1998; Varga, 2011) challenges the notion of a “true self” existing in isolation, emphasizing instead the socially embedded and dynamic nature of authenticity. This perspective underscores the complexity of transformative experiences, which unfold through continuous negotiation rather than a simple return to an essential identity. These insights provide the foundation for a transformative triad model, which captures the variability of self-transformation by integrating experience, interpretation, and action. Within this framework, several key aspects emerge:

Conclusions

Authenticity in the context of transformative experience is neither a stable state nor an unchanging core of subjectivity. It is a process unfolding in tension between experience and its interpretation, continuously negotiated and subject to revision. Identity is not a homogeneous construct but rather a dynamic structure, shaped through relationships with others and in response to changing existential and cultural conditions. Research on authenticity requires sensitivity to cultural and social contexts, as it is within these frameworks that individuals make decisions about their identity and the direction of their transformation. Understanding these processes demands an interdisciplinary perspective, integrating psychology, philosophy, and anthropology to capture both the subjective experience of authenticity and its embedding in broader social structures.

Phenomenology and hermeneutics allow authenticity to be understood as a spectral phenomenon—something that appears attainable yet continually eludes grasp. Limit experiences and moments of conversion do not lead to the discovery of a “true self” but rather reveal the fundamental fragility and processual nature of all identities. Authenticity is thus not a static ideal but a transitional moment in which the individual oscillates between the need for self-definition and the impossibility of fully capturing oneself. The transformational triad—experience, narrative, and action—provides a framework for grasping this dynamic interplay within both social and cultural contexts. Experience reveals how transformation is lived phenomenologically and intersubjectively. Narratives structure and integrate change, not by ensuring complete coherence but by foregrounding authenticity as an ongoing reconfiguration of meaning in dialogue with oneself, others, and broader sociocultural frameworks (Gallagher, 2024). Action, by contrast, extends beyond self-reflection—authenticity manifests in the ways individuals embody their values and beliefs in life, often with unpredictable social consequences.

The relationship between psychology and phenomenology in the analysis of authenticity reveals divergent understandings of subjectivity. Narrative psychology emphasises narrative coherence as the foundation of identity, whereas phenomenology exposes its fragmentary, embodied, and pre-reflective nature. This tension suggests that the pursuit of a coherent identity arises not only from a psychological necessity but also from normative cultural models that impose coherence as an ideal. In this light, transformative experience is not a singular act of self-discovery but rather an ongoing existential openness, in which the subject remains in continuous reinterpretation of their existence in relation to social and cultural expectations. Authenticity does not reside in the discovery of a hidden essence but in participation in an unending process of self-negotiation and transformation within interpersonal relationships and structural conditions. It is a continuous process of engaging with one’s existence, never reaching a final state but remaining in motion, oscillating between the possibility of self-definition and its inevitable incompleteness.