From Function to Meaning: A Dialogue Between Geertz’s Hermeneutic Anthropology and Behavioral Science

A Landmark in 20th-Century Anthropology

Clifford Geertz, an American anthropologist considered one of the most influential of the 20th century, was the leading exponent of a branch of Anthropology known as Hermeneutic Anthropology (also referred to as Symbolic or Interpretive Anthropology; White, 2007). His ideas transformed the way anthropologists interpret and write about the cultures they study. At least two propositions make his contribution particularly significant. First, Geertz argues that Anthropology should be a discipline of interpretation rather than one focused on mechanistic explanations and the search for universal laws. In this sense, culture should be studied through the analysis of the webs of significance created and shared by the members of that culture (Geertz, 1973, p. 5). Thus, the goal of anthropological science would be the pursuit of meaning (Fonseca, 2023). Additionally, the concept of thick description, introduced by Geertz in the first chapter of The Interpretation of Cultures (1973), establishes that the description and analysis of a given culture must go beyond observable behaviors, emphasizing the meanings those behaviors hold for the group in question. Causal and utilitarian explanations do not constitute the core of Geertz’s model. In other words, a cultural activity does not necessarily need to have a practical effect on the environment or be the result of an adaptive solution to environmental or ecological challenges; rather, it may be essential for maintaining social cohesion and expressing the shared meanings of the group. Thus, Geertz’s Anthropology highlights the power that the narrative constructed by the group – and its intersubjective meaning – exerts on its daily life in terms of social organization and motivation. However, it is important to emphasize that the true interpretation of these meanings, or as Fonseca (2023) puts it, the first-hand interpretation, belongs exclusively to the members of the observed culture; the researcher can only provide approximations.

Considering the importance Geertz assigns to cultural practices in individuals’ lived experiences, we can conclude that he views humans as inherently cultural beings. Geertz does not understand human beings from a stratigraphic perspective (i.e., composed of distinct layers such as biological, psychological, and social). Instead, he argues that because culture is the capacity to create, relate, and substitute symbols, it is itself a biological process that both alters and is altered by human interaction with the environment (Geertz, 1973, Chapter 2). Cultural development – enabled by the variability of responses we can produce (e.g., the creation and use of tools, beliefs, laws, and customs) and transmitted across generations – has modified our anatomy and, ultimately, transformed us into beings dependent on culture (Geertz, 1973, p. 47). This vast capacity for response variation makes it likely that unregulated and imprecise behaviors occur among human groups. Thus, Geertz argues that without culture, human behavior would be “virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos of pointless acts and exploding emotions, his experience virtually shapeless” (Geertz, 1973, p. 46). Culture serves the function of controlling human behavior through networks of meaning that shape individuals and are, in turn, shaped by them in a dynamic interaction.

However, this discussion, as developed in Geertz’s work, does not explain how symbols become meaningful and begin to exert control over individual behavior. At the end of Chapter 3, Geertz suggests that “(…) progress in the scientific analysis of the human mind demands a joint attack from virtually all of the behavioral sciences, in which the findings of each will force continual theoretical reassessments upon all of the others.” In this regard, behavioral science has made significant progress in recent decades in understanding what symbols are and how a given stimulus acquires or changes its function for an individual (e.g., Dougher et al., 2007; Gibbs et al., 2024; Hayes et al., 2001; Perez et al., 2015; Sidman, 1994). Thus, building upon Geertz’s conception of what it means to be human, the experimental investigation of symbol formation and how symbols come to exert control over behavior is essential for understanding humans as cultural beings.

Skinnerian Behaviorism and the Question of the Symbol

Geertz was critical of the behaviorism of his time. Although often indirect, his critiques suggest that the behaviorist practice of observing behavior could be described, in Gilbert Ryle’s terms, as a thin description (Geertz, 1973, Chapter 2). In the first chapter of The Interpretation of Cultures, Geertz introduces Ryle’s concept of thick description and reproduces an example to illustrate its meaning. In this example, two boys quickly close and open their eyelids. The first has an involuntary tic, while the second is winking to send a signal to a friend. In terms of physical movement, both actions are identical; however, the behaviors themselves are fundamentally different. Geertz further complicates the example by adding a third person who imitates the second boy’s wink in an attempt to mock him. This demonstrates how a simple wink can be observed superficially (thin description) or more comprehensively, taking into account all the nuances present in a behavior that, for the second and third boys, is both cultural and symbolic. This critique of behaviorism put forth by Geertz should be examined carefully, as it appears to overlook the complexity of the behavioral analysis, which was already evident in the theoretical and experimental advancements contemporary to his criticisms. On multiple occasions, Skinner - arguably the leading figure of Radical Behaviorism - emphasized the importance of analyzing the function of behaviors rather than merely their topography, both at the individual and cultural levels (Skinner, 2014, 1974). A purely topographical (or thin) analysis would be incapable of understanding the function of a wink, as it would be limited to describing the sequence of events and responses. However, a behavioral analysis, as proposed by Skinner, should take into account the context and the consequences that reinforce a given response. Applying this reasoning to Ryle’s example, as presented by Geertz, analyzing the reinforcement contingencies involved in the act of winking (or the mere contraction of the eyelids) would allow for a thicker understanding of the situation. That is, by examining the contingencies at play, a researcher could identify the function of the blinking behavior – whether it serves to lubricate the eyes, send a signal to a friend, or ridicule someone else.

Given the enduring debate among disciplines that attempt to explain meaning as originating either internally or externally, one might be inclined to position Geertz, with his symbolic interpretation, on one side and Skinner, with his functional interpretation, on the other. However, such a dichotomy can be misleading. In 1974, Skinner devoted an entire volume to addressing what he considered persistent misunderstandings of behaviorism, or the science of behavior. He emphasized that more than sixty years had passed since Watson’s 1913 manifesto ³ —now more than a century—and that the limitations of Watson’s account should be understood primarily in their historical context. Skinner acknowledged that Watson’s stimulus–response formulation had little or nothing to say about intention, purpose, or creativity. In contrast, operant behavior—his principal contribution to the science of behavior—is precisely the domain in which purpose and intention are to be explained. For Skinner, intention is a product of reinforcement contingencies:

(...) when a person is ‘aware of his purpose,’ he is feeling or observing introspectively a condition produced by reinforcement. (…) To seek help is to act in ways which have in the past led to help. If past consequences have not been very explicit, we are likely to look in vague and unproductive ways. (Skinner, 1974, p. 57)

Thus, Skinner explains behavior by identifying the environmental changes that exert control over it. Yet he also noted elsewhere that “men act upon the world, and change it, and are changed in turn by the consequences of their action” (Skinner, 1957). In other words, contingencies—including social and cultural ones—are constituted by the interaction between the organism and its environment. Similarly, Geertz conceived of culture as a biological process that both shapes and is shaped by human interaction with the environment (Geertz, 1973, Chapter 2). Although Geertz’s account differs from and occasionally criticizes behaviorism, the two perspectives are not necessarily opposed, particularly in light of recent developments in the behavioral sciences discussed in the following section. What seems to be the case is that most of Geertz’s critique makes sense only for what is called Methodological Behaviorism (i.e., Watson’s account), even though Skinner was contemporary to him.

That being said, although Skinnerian functional analysis resembles a thick description, there does not seem to be a complete correspondence between function in Skinner’s framework and meaning in Geertz’s. An example of how function and meaning may differ from Geertz’s perspective can be drawn from Marvin Harris’s book Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches: The Riddles of Culture (1974). ⁴ In the chapter Pig Lovers and Pig Haters, Harris discusses the motivations behind the Jewish prohibition against consuming pork. He argues that this prohibition developed because pig farming did not offer advantages in the environment where that group lived. On the contrary, raising pigs had high ecological costs and did not provide secondary benefits such as milk or wool, among other disadvantages. From this practical and material origin, prohibition was later incorporated into religious practice, and its persistence was due to cultural stability and survival. Marvin Harris’s analysis follows a Skinnerian functional approach: he presents the general context, the antecedent stimuli, the responses, and the consequences that select and maintain those responses. In contrast, from Geertz’s perspective, one could infer that a thick description would emphasize the religious or mystical significance of the prohibition of pork consumption for Jewish people. The religious justification that animals must both chew cud and have cloven hooves to be considered fit for consumption (New Jerusalem Bible, 1985, Deuteronomy 14:7–10) is likely the explanation that a Jewish individual would give when asked why they do not eat pork. Although the ecological and social functions are not necessarily discarded, they might be, at the very least, overlooked. Geertz highlights that symbolic networks should be the primary focus of anthropological interpretation and inquiry, as they are what truly matter to a given culture (Geertz, 1973, p. 5).

This raises the question: Where does meaning fit within the functional analysis of contingencies? In this regard, Geertz’s critique still holds weight, as it underscores the primacy of meanings in cultural practices, which are organized through symbolic networks. In other words, what is relevant are the interpretations individuals provide and the emotions they associate with these practices. This marks an important point of divergence between Geertz’s account and Radical Behaviorism (i.e., Skinner’s framework), which treats intention and purpose—namely, individuals’ interpretations—as products of reinforcement contingencies rather than as explanatory terms for understanding meaning (see p. 7). Consequently, a fundamental step in this inquiry is to clarify what constitutes a symbol. The relationship between symbol and reality is of central importance to Geertz’s anthropology, as it underpins his idea of the interdependence between humans and culture. As discussed in the first section, for Geertz, culture is a set of symbols that both control human behavior and are simultaneously shaped by it. On the other hand, Skinner conceptualized culture as a set of practices that evolve because they are reinforced and selected over time (Skinner, 1971). From this perspective, culture should be analyzed in terms of the functional relationship between the contingencies in operation. The field of study that seems most appropriate for exploring Skinner’s conception of symbols is Verbal Behavior (VB), which he considered a crucial component of culture. VB is defined as behavior that is established and maintained by consequences mediated by other individuals (i.e., listeners) who belong to the same verbal community as the person who behaves (i.e., the speaker; Skinner, 1957). However, Skinner rejected the concept of symbol in constructing his linguistic theory, as its origins are linked to referential models that do not align with a behaviorist approach. Because symbols have traditionally been treated as mediators between language and the world, they assume a causal status that is not measurable - contradicting the epistemology of behaviorism (Rocca, 2012; Skinner, 1957).

However, we can understand a symbol as a unit of behavior, in this case, verbal behavior, which depends on reinforcement contingencies - just like any other behavior - and, therefore, does not have a definitive meaning (Skinner, 1957). Rocca (2012) summarizes the implications of this reasoning, explaining that “The basic semantic unit of Skinner’s theory is the set of actions between a listener and a speaker, rather than the correspondence between a word and an object” (p. 191). It is important to emphasize that, for Geertz, the symbols that compose culture are not autonomous creations but result from the interaction between individuals. In his own words, “From the point of view of any particular individual, such symbols are largely given. He finds them already current in the community when he is born, and they remain, with some additions, subtractions, and partial alterations he may or may not have had a hand in, in circulation after he dies” (Geertz, 1973, p. 45). With some caveats, comparing this argument with Skinner’s view leads to the conclusion that the authors agree, at least, that symbols are stimuli selected, maintained, and altered by the verbal community in question.

Skinner’s rejection of the symbol concept does not seem to entirely eliminate the dialogue between the two proposals. Like Skinner, Geertz argues that it is only through analyzing the context in which symbols occur that we can offer any interpretation of what is being observed (Geertz, 1973, p. 14). In this sense, meaning is dependent on the individuals’ learning history within the group. However, the analytical methods proposed by the two authors differ. While Skinner suggests a functional analysis of behavior and the contingencies that maintain it, emphasizing the reinforcing and punishing consequences, Geertz argues that a true understanding of a cultural practice comes through the exercise of hermeneutics and ethnography. Inevitably, this brings to the forefront the difference between function and meaning, as previously noted. Although Skinner’s behavioral analysis explains how consequences select responses that occur in the presence of certain stimuli, emphasizing the control the environment exerts over individual action, it does not sufficiently explain how different stimuli that do not share formal (i.e., physical) characteristics relate to one another to form complex relational systems, evoking strong emotional responses such as those observed in soccer fans, religious followers, or political partisans. Moreover, Skinner’s proposed functional analysis of contingencies does not seem to focus on understanding the intersubjective meaning or the narrative that sustains and gives meaning to a cultural practice.

The Line of Research in Symbolic Behavior

In the decades preceding the publication of The Interpretation of Cultures, the behavioral approach to the study of human language was still heavily influenced by Skinner’s approach (i.e., Verbal Behavior, VB), which emphasized the speaker’s behavior and only addressed the listener’s behavior insofar as it was necessary to explain that of the speaker (Skinner, 1957, p. 2). As will hopefully become clearer later in this section, the listener’s behavior plays a crucial role in the emergence of derived relations and the study of symbolic behavior. Thus, since VB disregarded the concept of symbols, there was not yet a specific research line focused on symbolic behavior and stimulus relations as such. It was primarily the research line on rule-governed behavior that investigated how verbal behavior (i.e., language) could control human behavior (Skinner, 1966, 1969). However, in 1971, Sidman and colleagues discovered that by establishing conditional relations between stimuli, new and untrained relations between these stimuli could be derived (e.g., Sidman, 1971; Sidman & Tailby, 1982), forming what he called a stimulus equivalence class (Sidman, 1994). This field of study became known as Stimulus Equivalence, and subsequent research also demonstrated evidence of transfer of function between stimuli. These studies showed that, in addition to derived relations, the function of a particular stimulus could modify the function of other stimuli related to it without the need for direct training (e.g., de Rose et al., 1988; Dougher et al., 1994; Dougher et al., 2007; Gandarela et al., 2020; Perez et al., 2017). For example, suppose an individual has a phobia of cockroaches. They have learned that the insect (stimulus A) is equivalent to the written word “cockroach” (stimulus B) and the sound “COCKROACH” (stimulus C). By derivation, they will “understand” that the written word is also equivalent to the sound, thus forming an equivalence class that can expand with the addition of new stimuli. Furthermore, if someone shouts “COCKROACH” in their presence, they will likely have physiological reactions similar to those they would experience in the presence of the insect (i.e., transfer of stimulus function).

Sidman acknowledged that using terms like meaning, symbolism, and reference could unsettle many behavior analysts because these are typically treated as explanatory concepts rather than behaviors that need to be explained. However, he argues that he does not refer to a symbol as an explanation for anything, but as a name for a real and observable phenomenon that, in turn, requires explanation (i.e., deriving relations between stimuli and transfer of functions from one stimulus to another in the same class without direct training; Sidman, 1994, pp. 562–563). These findings opened up new perspectives for the behavioral study of language and symbolic behavior (cf. Critchfield et al., 2018; de Rose & McIlvane, 2019; Pilgrim, 2019). From Skinner’s Verbal Behavior and Sidman’s Stimulus Equivalence, new theories emerged, such as Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes et al., 2001) and Naming Theory (NT; Horne & Lowe, 1996). For the purposes of this article, we will focus only on concepts from RFT.

RFT expanded the area of Stimulus Equivalence and proposed the study of other relations between stimuli beyond equivalence relations (also called coordination relations), such as difference or opposition (Perez et al., 2015; Steele & Hayes, 1991), comparison (Diaz et al., 2020; Dougher et al., 2007; Munnelly et al., 2019), temporal relations (Brassil et al., 2019), deictic relations (Montoya-Rodríguez et al., 2017), among others. In the case of studies with these different types of relations, the explicit teaching of a set of relations generates derived relations compatible with the established relations (e.g., two trained opposition relations generating a sameness relation; Sbrocco et al., 2025). Similarly, the functions of related stimuli are modified in a compatible manner ⁵ (Hayes et al., 2001; Perez et al., 2015). For example, Dougher et al. (2007) conducted three experiments with data demonstrating that once a relational network A < B < C is established, if B is paired with a shock and elicits anxiety responses, the eliciting functions of A and C will be altered. Specifically, A will elicit responses with lower magnitudes, while C will elicit responses with higher magnitudes, even though stimulus C was never directly paired with a shock.

The operant behavior studied by RFT is called Arbitrarily Applied Relational Responding (AARR). According to this theory, children with typical socialization are exposed to many situations where relational training between stimuli occurs arbitrarily (Hayes et al., 2001, pp. 25–26). That is, the established relations do not necessarily depend on the physical properties of the stimuli. These relations can occur through different aspects of stimuli that are social/cultural (i.e., arbitrary). For example, a caregiver often names objects in the presence of a child, and the child, in turn, is reinforced by looking at or pointing to the objects. The same happens in the reverse direction: when the child points to an object and says its name, they are reinforced by the caregiver. In this way, training is conducted to allow the discrimination between the relevant features of an object or task (i.e., responding to an event in terms of another based on a contextual cue) and irrelevant features. Eventually, through these many exposures to different relations ⁶ with different objects and names, the child begins to generalize this with new stimuli. This occurs because, in this context, the contextual cues involved and the previous relational training were highly predictive of reinforcement. Thus, the child becomes capable of “abstracting ⁷ ” under the control of arbitrary contextual cues (Hayes et al., 2001b). Here, we can already observe a point of convergence with Geertz’s propositions, who, on page 49 of The Interpretation of Cultures, says: “Man’s great capacity for learning, his plasticity, has often been remarked, but what is even more critical is his extreme dependence upon a certain sort of learning: the attainment of concepts, the apprehension and application of specific systems of symbolic meaning.” Thus, the ability to relate arbitrarily and derive relations from these previously established relations would be a human capacity ⁸ that can alter the effects of other variables already well-studied in non-humans (Lowe et al., 1983, p. 162).

Recent research in RFT has emphasized that human cooperation was the driving force behind the evolution of symbolic language and cognition (e.g., Hayes & Sanford, 2014; Wilson et al., 2014). This seems to be in accordance with Geertz’s conception that cultural development altered our anatomy and transformed us into beings dependent on culture. In Geertz’s words: “ (…) culture provides the link between what men are intrinsically capable of becoming and what they actually, one by one, in fact become. Becoming human is becoming individual, and we become individual under the guidance of cultural patterns, historically created systems of meaning in terms of which we give form, order, point, and direction to our lives” (Geertz, 1973, p. 52). The intersections between Geertz’s conceptions and recent developments in RFT become even greater when we examine the concept of self. As we have pointed out, for Geertz, man (in the sense of mankind) cannot be understood separately from culture. His biological construction depends on access to symbolic structures to construct his own “autonomous” activity pattern (Geertz, 1973, p. 83). For RFT, a basic verbal self (a concept that seems close to what Geertz defines as the “autonomous” pattern of activity) involves three deictic relations ⁹ : the interpersonal “I-you” relations, spatial “here-there” relations, and temporal “now-later” relations. For example, imagine a young child being asked, “What did you have for lunch today?” while having dinner with their family. If the child responds by mentioning what their sibling is eating at that moment, they would probably be corrected with something like: “No, that’s what your brother is eating now, but what did you eat earlier?” This continuous process of adjusting deictic relations helps the child give appropriate responses about their own behavior in relation to others, considering a specific time and place (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2020). The central postulate is that, as children learn to respond based on these relations, they are learning to connect the self with others in specific contexts of time and place. Consequently, increasingly complex forms of AARR form a more complex verbal self, and as a verbal self develops, it likely enables the verbal community to continually refine and enhance its symbols. Thus, for RFT, without this feedback loop between AARR and derived knowledge (or the verbal self), the capacity for relational responding (AARR) would be extremely restricted and limited, not comprehending the complexity and power of human language and cognition (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2020).

RFT also proposes that, in order to better understand how symbols impact and control individuals’ behavior, it is not enough to investigate how individuals interact with the environment by relating stimuli arbitrarily (e.g., “A is larger than B” or “A is the cause of B”), but also to examine what functions these stimuli acquire in the process (e.g., “A is tasty” or “B is soft”). Thus, according to this theory, these arbitrary relations between stimuli would be contextually controlled by relational cues (referred to as Crels), and the functions would be contextually controlled by functional cues (referred to as Cfuncs; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016). In this sense, behavioral science continues to advance, and more recently, RFT researchers have proposed a new unit of analysis that seems to be more aligned with Geertz’s conception of man and culture. This unit of analysis is called ROE-M (Barnes-Holmes & Harte, 2022). ROE-M is an acronym for Relating, Orienting, Evoking, and Motivating. “Relating” refers to the response of relating stimuli arbitrarily (AARR); “Orienting” concerns the degree to which a stimulus is perceived or “stands out” to an individual; “Evoking” refers to the degree to which a stimulus is considered attractive or repulsive ¹⁰ (i.e., what the stimulus “evokes” in the individual); and “Motivating” refers to the intensity of motivational variables, which interact dynamically with the other functions. Thus, the definition of the unit of analysis involved in this generalized pattern of relating stimuli arbitrarily (i.e., AARR) is relating, orienting, and evoking within a given motivational context. Essentially, the main argument for proposing this unit of analysis is that human behavior analysis would be more effective if all psychological acts were conceptualized as resulting from a dynamic and nonlinear interaction between the elements of ROE-M (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2021; Barnes-Holmes & Harte, 2022). This definition highlights the functional aspects (i.e., aspects of orientation and evocation) involved in a human psychological event and allows for the observation that the consequence of a given response not only increases or decreases its probability but also disrupts the dynamic interaction between the elements that constitute ROE-M11 (Barnes-Holmes & Harte, 2022).

Since RFT aims to provide a scientific explanation of human language and cognition (Hayes et al., 2001), to facilitate the dialogue between RFT and Geertz’s propositions, we can understand AARR as language in a broader sense. Therefore, by analyzing a passage in Geertz’s book, we can determine whether language, encompassing its relational (i.e., Crel) and functional (i.e., Cfunc) properties, as well as the ROE-M concept, would complement the behavioral analysis of this situation and help provide a “thicker” description according to the criteria of Ryle and Geertz. On page 52, Geertz explains that for the Javanese people, a group with whom he worked for a long time, “being human is being Javanese.” In this sense, young children, individuals considered insane, immoral, simple-minded, etc., are referred to as “ndurung djawa” or “not yet Javanese.” Geertz further explains that, for the Javanese, a “normal” adult (i.e., a Javanese) would possess the ability to act in terms of an elaborate system of etiquette and have delicate aesthetic perceptions associated with music, drama, and textile design. Thus, being human would not only be speaking but also saying the appropriate words and phrases in the appropriate social situations, with the appropriate tone of voice. It would not just be eating but preferring certain foods prepared in specific ways, and following strict table etiquette while consuming them. It would not just be feeling, but feeling certain emotions that are distinctly Javanese, and so on. From the perspective of RFT, all these perceptions and abilities are only possible through language. As mentioned, language is learned through many exposures to situations where an individual is trained to relate and reinforced for doing so. After many exposures (initially based on physical properties and later on arbitrary properties), at a certain point, the relational response becomes a generalized operant (Perez et al., 2013). It is likely that, through the development of language, understood with its relational and functional properties, a “not yet Javanese” becomes a “human being.” According to RFT, once language is acquired (as well as the concept of the self mentioned above), a “verbal” human being cannot experience or know the world in a non-symbolic manner (Barnes-Holmes & Harte, 2022). Thus, all the nuances of extremely complex behaviors observed in Javanese people (and in all cultures) are understood as controlled by contextual cues that signal the appropriate etiquette for that moment, the correct tone of voice, and even matters considered more “subjective,” such as preferences for certain types of food and the description of specific emotions. For example, when observing an amulet, a member of that community might experience a feeling of reverence and solemnity. Relations have been established between this object and “God” or some deity, which, in turn, have relations established with words referring to “goodness,” “power,” “immortality,” etc. Similarly, relations have been established between the object and a sound (i.e., a word considered its name). The functions of this hypothetical deity eventually transfer to the object or the pronunciation of its name so that it becomes more easily perceived (i.e., the stimulus elicits greater orientation in the individual) and generates a feeling of reverence (i.e., the stimulus acquires positive functions). Thus, language (AARR) modifies the functions of stimuli and comes to control the individual’s behavior and feelings. This process helps us understand complex phenomena in our own society, such as political polarization (de Rose & Rocha, 2023), religion (Hughes et al., 2017), or even rivalry between football teams (Bortoloti et al., 2023).

Final Considerations

In this paper, we aimed to foster an exploratory dialogue between certain aspects of Behavior Analysis and Clifford Geertz’s work The Interpretation of Cultures, discussing several concepts considered relevant (e.g., topography, function, symbol, among others) and the potential contributions of experimental studies on human behavior to the understanding of the author’s Hermeneutic Anthropology. Evidently, the content presented is a selective analysis, and only the concepts deemed most relevant for this discussion were described. Similarly, there was no intent to exhaust the possible dialogues but rather to explore potential intersections between different disciplines, as other authors have recently done (Abdala et al., 2023a, 2023b) and also as Geertz proposed (Geertz, 1973, p. 83).

Abdala et al. (2023a), for instance, selected key concepts from Geertz’s work (i.e., culture, symbol, and meaning) and examined how these are interpreted both within BS and in Geertz’s anthropological framework. Furthermore, the authors draw comparisons between the definitions of these concepts and explore the methodological approaches to cultural analysis and the role of science as proposed in each domain. In doing so, they established potential cross-disciplinary contributions between BS and Geertzian Anthropology in the study of culture. Notably, the authors emphasize that BS’s main contribution to cultural studies may lie in the refinement of analytical methods, whereas Geertz’s Anthropology may offer more sophisticated theoretical conceptions regarding cultural phenomena. Expanding on these interdisciplinary dialogues, Abdala et al. (2023b) investigate potential convergences between recent behavioral therapies—specifically Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT)—and Geertz’s Symbolic Anthropology. The authors argue that ACT could benefit from Geertz’s understanding of culture as networks of symbols, insofar as more precise structural (i.e., cultural) interventions could produce more substantial societal impacts, including in the domain of mental health.

The path taken throughout the present text reveals that the theoretical propositions of behaviorism and the experimental findings of behavior analysis, at the time Geertz proposed The Interpretation of Cultures and critiqued other lines of cultural analysis, were not sufficient to explain symbolic and cultural behavior in the way that is possible today. The rejection of the concept of the symbol and the difficulty in reconciling “function” and “meaning” appear to be key points in this limitation.

Recent proposals and evidence demonstrate how a stimulus becomes part of a network of meanings and begins to control human behavior, evoking specific emotions, whether direct or derived. In other words, these new findings allow for a deeper understanding of how a cultural practice is laden with shared meanings within a group. The ROE-M, as an analytical unit, has the potential to fill some gaps in Geertz’s proposition regarding how symbols and their meanings wield such power in the organization and social motivation that characterizes culture. Thus, we propose that BS could benefit from Geertz’s Hermeneutic Anthropology by continuing to develop theoretical propositions that may (or may not) prove useful in scientific research on symbols and culture across different research areas. Further analyses should be carried out to explore the strengths and limitations of such contributions.