Abstract
Why does electoral reform occur, what are the politics surrounding this change and who are the proponents of change? These are the primary questions Alan Renwick addresses in his book The Politics of Electoral Reform, and in answering them he makes a major contribution to the literature on electoral system reform.
Renwick argues that ‘Major electoral system reform in established democracies is a very rare event … because politicians usually control the electoral system and those politicians with the power to change the system are typically those who benefit from it and therefore want to keep it unchanged’ (p. 10). But the story is more complex than this. Renwick does not shy away from this, arguing that we need to engage with ‘the complexity and contingency of diverse electoral reform processes’ (p. 2).
The book is broken into three parts: the first part outlines the ‘building blocks’ of electoral reform which take in a wide range of factors which contribute to electoral reform. Renwick argues that while we know many things about the electoral reform process, this knowledge is not very systematic (p. 25). His book is an attempt to correct this and he makes a good job of it.
Renwick then looks at two main types of electoral reform; what he labels ‘elite majority imposition’ and ‘elite mass interaction’. These form the main argument of the book. Chapters 5–8 outline examples of elite majority imposition. The case studies are France (1945–1946, 1951, 1958, 1985, 1986, 1991–1992, 2007–2008), Italy (1953, 1954, 1994–2001, 2005) and Japan (1947, 1956, 1973). He then outlines examples of elite mass interaction (Chapters 9–12): Italy (1993), Japan (1994) and New Zealand (1993).
Elite majority imposition is ‘where the political majority controls electoral reform’ and ‘power calculations predominate’ (p. 139). For example: ‘The Italian reform of 2005 was imposed by politicians, voters having failed to use their power to initiate referendums to secure change’ (p. 163). Although complexity remains, ‘electoral reforms by elite majority imposition are simple affairs: politicians dominate and are overwhelmingly concerned with pursuing power; these reform processes tend to last months rather than years’ (p. 163).
In part three of the book, Renwick argues that the elite mass interaction process occurs in three stages: a minority of politicians espouse reform; they initiate reform but don’t have sufficient strength alone to impose reform; they then go above the heads of the other politicians and take the issues to the people; but at a third stage the public force politicians to acquiesce to reforms that they do not really want.
This process is obviously the more democratic of the two. In this typology, politicians are not concerned primarily with their own power interests. Renwick finds that ‘politicians’ genuine beliefs in democratic and other values do typically matter’ (p. 167). While he finds that most politicians remain concerned with their own power interests, he also highlights cases of key individuals being motivated by a genuine concern with improving the democratic system. This section is counter to those who see electoral reform as a game of naked power interests. The chapter on New Zealand is the most interesting. Throughout the process in New Zealand, the majority of MPs opposed electoral reform, the Electoral Reform Coalition played a large part and eventually the citizens were able to achieve change.
Renwick challenges two commonly held assumptions in regard to electoral reform: First, he challenges the assumption that politicians dominate electoral system reform and pursue their own power interests. Rather, Renwick argues that citizens can have a say over some electoral reform process, while also acknowledging that complete loss of control by politicians is unlikely. This is encouraging. Second, he argues that the process of electoral reform has not resulted in a general trend toward greater proportionality. In his case studies, Renwick finds nine cases of evidence of greater proportionality and seven against it (p. 250).
While the book’s comprehensiveness is to be praised, some may miss the absence of an elegant or parsimonious theory. Renwick deals with this head on, arguing that reality is much more complex than parsimonious theory would suggest. He claims that the ‘complexity of electoral reform must be regarded as part of the main action, not as inconvenient noise on the sidelines’ (p. 250). There is no real effort made to produce a parsimonious model and he acknowledges ‘laundry lists’ as useful (p. 25). Some may be more satisfied with this approach than others.
As for whom this book is written: it will likely find readers among graduate students and academic researchers. It should also be of interest to electoral administrators and perhaps even politicians interested in electoral reform. Politicians bent on electoral reform may be encouraged by how much influence they can have over the process but also be deterred by the complexity of the process which politicians have sometimes partially lost control of.
This is a major contribution to the literature on electoral system reform. It deals very comprehensively with electoral system change and doesn’t simplify what are complex matters. Renwick does a fine job at explaining this complexity and creating an interesting narrative around the various types of electoral reforms. This book will sit comfortably alongside, and complement, the classic works on electoral reform.