Abstract
As part of Routledge’s impressive and expanding Extremism and Democracy series, this edited volume by Akkerman, de Lange, and Rooduijn stands out. Through the so-called “inclusion-moderation” thesis, it is examined whether and how West European populist radical right-wing parties have become part of the mainstream. This thesis argues that participation in democratic institutions will, over time, “amend the radical nature and ideology of political parties” (p. 3). Mainstreaming, in this book, is defined narrowly as radical right-wing parties becoming more like mainstream parties. Considering the media attention lavished on such parties, their sustained electoral successes over the last few decades, and their increasing importance in West European politics, it is a timely question to explore.
The book is divided into two parts: (1) a comparative section that examines whether radical right-wing party programs and voters have become more like their mainstream counterparts and (2) a section composed of case studies. While the editors have written the introduction, the comparative section, and the concluding chapter, the case studies have all been written by country experts. The cases included are all parties that have had an electoral breakthrough and for which national office is a realistic option: the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Danish People’s Party (DF), the True Finns (PS), the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP), the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), the Flemish Bloc (VB), the French Front National (FN), and the UK Independence Party (UKIP). The only West European case that is noticeably absent is the Italian Lega Nord.
Though one often can find parts to nitpick about in a book—especially an edited one—this is not the case for this work. Despite some obvious stylistic differences between the chapters, it does not read like it is an edited volume. That is because each of the case studies closely follows the framework established in Chapter 2. Mainstreaming is measured along four dimensions: (1) the extent of radicalness, (2) how niche the party is, (3) how anti-establishment the party is, and (4) how extremist the reputation of the party is (p. 31). All the case studies follow this format by first chronologically outlining whether mainstreaming occurred along these dimensions, and then examining what strategic choices parties made through the years. This helps drive home one of the main arguments made: parties have agency, and within reason, are free to opt for a mainstreaming strategy (or not).
So are these parties actually mainstreaming? The answer given is nuanced—a real strength of the volume. It is argued that it really depends on the strategic choices made by party leaders. For example, if the party elite decide to pursue an office-seeking strategy—as the FPÖ (Chapter 4) and the DF (Chapter 5) did—then the party tends to moderate its positions to become more salonfähig. In both cases, the strategy paid off. The FPÖ joined a governing coalition in 2000, and the DF grew its electoral share to such an extent that it was able to influence policy through its support for minority governments from 2001 to 2011, and again from 2015 onward. However, moderation comes at a cost. Becoming increasingly unhappy with the party’s ideological shift, the rank-and-file of the FPÖ balked. Internal strife followed and the FPÖ split in two in 2005. Afterwards, the FPÖ once again radicalized its program further. Following the FPÖ’s 2013 and 2014 electoral success, it once again appears that the party is switching from a vote-seeking toward and office-seeking strategy by moderating its positions with regard to sociocultural issues. Accordingly, mainstreaming is not a one-way process: it can be initiated—or reversed—depending on what strategy party elites pursue. To complicate matters further, as shown through the discussion of the SVP in Chapter 9, office-seeking does not always lead to moderation. Features unique to the Swiss political system actually allowed the SVP to pursue a radicalization strategy while in office. The extensive use of direct democracy in the Swiss system made this a feasible strategy.
The SVP example makes it clear that choices are often influenced by the institutional environment in which parties operate. The discussion of Front National (Chapter 11) and the UK Independence Party (Chapter 12) also show how environmental factors matter. Unlike the other cases discussed, UKIP and the FN both have to operate in majoritarian electoral systems. Downsian logic holds for these parties: they have to pursue the median voter to succeed at the national level. Even in these cases, it is not a one way street toward moderation. In the case of the FN, the party has shifted its stance several times with regards to moderation and radicalization over the last two decades.
As the above discussion makes clear, there is no straightforward answer as to whether populist radical right-wing parties are actually mainstreaming. However, as discussed in the book’s concluding chapter, there are trends that are discernable (pp. 276–278): except for the FN, the DF, and the Norwegian FrP, parties have remained radical in their position with regard to sociocultural issues; even though their ideologies have not really changed, when pursuing office radical right parties do moderate their behavior; when pursuing office, socioeconomic programs broaden to expand a party’s electoral appeal.
Finally, with regard to European integration, the findings of this book are especially interesting—and worrisome if this is something that one favors. Radical right-wing and mainstream party programs and voters are moving closer to one another on this issue, though not because radical right-wing parties and voters have moved closer to the mainstream. Instead, the opposite is true. In the light of Brexit and the continued success of the radical right, this does not bode well for the European project.
Given its nuanced take and the richness of the cases covered, this volume is a must-read not just for those who study populism, but also those who are interested in party system development more generally.