Abstract
In 2025, Singapore’s first anti-discrimination law, the Workplace Fairness Act (WFA), was enacted after decades of resistance against the use of legislation by the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP). This was a rare policy u-turn by a technocratic government well known for its long-term strategic policymaking. Informed by interest convergence theory, this article argues that the WFA was enacted primarily not because of a new-found political commitment to the principle of equality but because of the PAP’s misappropriation of the language of discrimination in response to an increasingly anti-immigration electorate. Given Singapore’s reliance on open flows of capital, trade and labour, the PAP shifted the discursive frame from its liberal immigration policies to labour protectionism disguised as anti-discrimination to balance between its electoral objectives and the country’s economic development. As a result, the WFA is not only narrowly drafted in terms of the protected characteristics and the types of proscribed conduct but also ironically enshrines discriminatory treatment on the basis of nationality against non-resident workers. Theoretically, this case study reveals the slippery foundations of the legal concept of discrimination and the risk that it may result in the entrenchment, rather than eradication, of inequality at the workplace and beyond.
Keywords
Introduction
In 2025, Singapore passed the country’s first anti-discrimination legislation, the Workplace Fairness Act (WFA). First announced 4 years earlier at the 2021 National Day Rally (NDR), the announcement came as a pleasant surprise to campaigners: just months before, proposals by several lawmakers to legislate against workplace discrimination had been dismissed by the government on the basis that it was not necessarily more effective than other measures. 1
What prompted this rare policy u-turn? Existing scholarship generally points to two main drivers for the enactment of anti-discrimination law in other jurisdictions: domestic pressure and international law. 2 However, for decades, these factors have failed to persuade the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) government, which has governed the country since it gained independence in 1965, to legislate against workplace discrimination. In applying interest convergence theory to the Singapore context, this article argues that the dominant motivating factor behind the enactment of the WFA is the rise of nativist politics in Singapore and the state’s misappropriation of the concept of “discrimination” to quell a growing sense of discontent among Singaporeans regarding its liberal immigration policies. Given Singapore’s geographic reality and reliance on open flows of capital, trade and labour in its economic development, the state could not adopt overtly insular or isolationist immigration policies in the same way that governments elsewhere may be more empowered to do. This is because such a shift would seriously threaten the country’s economic growth and the PAP’s own performance legitimacy. Instead, to maintain its electoral dominance, the PAP strategically shifted the discursive frame from immigration policy to labour protectionism disguised as discrimination: according to this logic, the reason why Singaporeans are losing their jobs to immigrants therefore is not because of the state’s liberal immigration policies, but because of so-called “nationality discrimination” where errant employers purportedly exploit the immigration system to discriminate against citizens in favour of foreign labour. In doing so, the legal concept of discrimination was exploited by the PAP to balance between rising nativism and the country’s pursuit of economic growth, culminating in the WFA that ironically perpetuates, rather than proscribe, the unequal treatment of vulnerable and minority communities.
Conceptually speaking, “nationality discrimination” may not be an entirely accurate application of the legal concept of discrimination. An employer’s preference for immigrant labour is more likely not because of their nationality per se but other factors that are incidental to their precarious immigration status such as their willingness to accept lower salaries and tolerate poorer working conditions. In cases where hiring managers have allegedly preferred candidates or employees from the same country, it is also more likely that the discrimination was on the ground of race, language or social origin rather than nationality. Nevertheless, these nuances have not prevented the idea of “nationality discrimination” from taking root in Singapore’s political discourse. The policy solution to “nationality discrimination” developed by the PAP government is “workplace fairness,” which represents a somewhat nebulous and contradictory notion that workers should not be discriminated against on the basis of their personal attributes, including their nationality, at the same time that citizens deserve to be prioritised in the labour market. This latter idea of labour protectionism rests on what scholars have coined the logic of “differential fairness,” which conceives of “fairness [as] based on differences in rights and entitlements between natives and migrants.” 3 Hence, for example, the WFA was drafted such that, while nationality is recognised as a protected characteristic under the WFA, discrimination on the ground of nationality is prohibited only if the discrimination disadvantages Singaporeans or permanent residents (PR); in contrast, discrimination against immigrants is not only legally permissible but in fact mandated: the WFA makes it an offence for employers to apply for a work pass on behalf of an immigrant hire without first advertising the role to and considering local candidates. Paraphrasing Macbeth, a legislation that purports to promote workplace fairness may upon closer scrutiny appear more foul than it is fair.
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. First, the next section outlines the scope and operation of the WFA and calls attention to the key areas of divergence between Singapore’s legislative approach to workplace discrimination and international standards. The article then turns to examine the driving factor behind the WFA. Second, while the conventional account of anti-discrimination legislation focuses on the pursuit of equality, the subsequent section demonstrates how nativist politics permeated the policy developments preceding the enactment of the WFA, the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary discourse surrounding the WFA and the drafting of the WFA itself. Finally, the article evaluates the WFA by engaging with the conceptual tensions underlying the legislation. Clarity regarding these matters can inform the necessary reforms that need to be implemented for the legislation to meaningfully achieve its intended objectives. The article concludes by calling attention to the critical role of equality law scholarship in defending the law from misuse and ironically perpetuating, rather than reducing, discrimination.
Workplace discrimination in Singapore
The issue of workplace discrimination first sparked public outrage in the 1980s when Singapore’s immigration rules were eased to facilitate the employment of foreign workers in response to manpower shortages. 4 In response, a tripartite taskforce set up in 1984 sought to address the challenges faced by these older workers, who were being “pushed down by the inflow of foreign workers.” 5 Subsequently, in 1999, the issue of racial discrimination in job advertisements triggered calls for regulation; 6 in response, a spokesperson from the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) argued that the more effective solution was not to legislate against such practices but to deploy “education and moral suasion.” 7 In 2006, the Tripartite Alliance for Fair Employment Practices (TAFEP), a combined effort of the tripartite partners, namely MOM, the National Trade Union Federation (NTUC) and the Singapore National Employers Federation (SNEF), was set up and issued the Tripartite Guidelines on Fair Employment Practices (TGFEP), mainly to address age discrimination faced by older workers. 8 Dismissing doubts about TAFEP’s effectiveness given the lack of legislative power to enforce its guidelines, the then Minister of State for Manpower reiterated that “raising awareness is more effective than legislation in the long run [and] countries which have introduced anti-discriminatory laws have not eliminated the problem of discriminatory practices in employment.” 9
This position would persist until 2021 when it was announced that the PAP would pass the WFA. This sudden shift is notable: just less than a year ago, a legislator had advocated for the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation on the basis that existing administrative penalties may not be “so powerful… as a lever of control or influence” when the employer does not rely significantly on foreign employees. 10 Another legislator similarly called for the TGFEP to be enshrined into law given that the existing approach to restrict or curtail work pass privileges “does not really make sense” in relation to gender and pregnancy discrimination. 11 In rejecting these suggestions, the then Manpower Minister (MM) reiterated the government’s position that “legislation is quite a blunt tool.” 12
Legislating against workplace discrimination
A month before the announcement, the Tripartite Committee on Workplace Fairness (TCWF) was convened in July 2021 to study policy options to “strengthen workplace fairness.” Comprising political officeholders, including the MM, as well as representatives from NTUC and businesses, the TCWF’s recommendations were fully adopted by the government in drafting the WFA. The Workplace Fairness Bill was tabled in Parliament on 12 November 2024, and passed on 8 January 2025 after 2 days of debate. Subsequently, in October 2025, a second Bill, titled the Workplace Fairness (Dispute Resolution) Bill, setting out the framework for workers to seek redress under the WFA, was tabled and passed the next month on 4 November 2025. At the time of writing, the WFA is expected to come into force by the end of 2027.
During the Second Reading of the WFA, the MM set out several principles that guided the drafting of the legislation. 13 First, in only the second paragraph of his speech, he emphasised that “a complementary foreign workforce remains important to Singapore’s continued economic success as well as ensuring good jobs and good wages for locals… [but] these benefits will only accrue to Singaporeans if there is a level playing field that prevents discriminatory practices.” Second, the law should not undermine the “hard-earned harmony in our workplaces and society.” Finally, the law aims to give effect to the principle of meritocracy by requiring employers to “hire and assess workers based on their ability to do the job well.” In this regard, the WFA is intended to “complement” the TGFEP, which seeks to protect all workers from all forms of discrimination. However, and ironically, the enactment of the WFA has created a two-tier legal framework where some groups enjoy formal legal protection under the WFA while others do not since the TGFEP is not legally binding and affords aggrieved workers neither right nor recourse.
Who is protected?
The WFA identifies eleven protected characteristics, namely age, nationality, sex, marital status, pregnancy, caregiving responsibilities, race, religion, language ability, disability and mental health condition. This contrasts with the four constitutionally prohibited grounds of discrimination under Article 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Singapore Constitution), namely religion, race, descent and place of birth. During the parliamentary debates, the MM explained that the characteristics were identified because they were “areas where there is broad societal consensus and… national policy imperatives to prevent discrimination in the workplace.” 14 However, some of these characteristics have been defined narrowly and the law has expressly or implicitly excluded various groups that are particularly susceptible or vulnerable to discrimination at the workplace.
First, in relation to the definition of disability, unlike disability discrimination legislations elsewhere that adopt more general functional definitions, 15 the WFA’s definition of disability simply lists four categories of disabilities: autism, intellectual disability, physical disability and sensory disability. 16 Civil society groups had earlier urged legislators to adopt a more inclusive definition of disability but were unsuccessful in their advocacy. 17 This categorical approach excludes persons with chronic health conditions, such as HIV/AIDS, long COVID and cancer, learning disabilities and other bodily impairments that affect a person’s ability to work or perform daily activities.
Second, the WFA explicitly excludes protection on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) by specifying that the characteristic of “sex” does not include those attributes. 18 In a forum letter, an MOM representative asserted that this was because sexual orientation and gender identity did not constitute “common and familiar forms of workplace discrimination.” 19 Despite various legislators raising concerns that such explicit exclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity under the WFA may amount to a legislative affirmation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) discrimination, the MM attributed the exclusions to the “difficulty in reaching a unified position because these issues are complex and they are multifaceted.” 20
This is unsurprising, considering the earlier enactment of article 156 of the Singapore Constitution, which immunises marriage-related laws and executive actions from being struck down by the courts on the basis that they violate the constitutional rights of LGBTQ persons. 21 Introduced at the same time that the colonial-era section 377A of the Penal Code 1871, which criminalised “gross indecency” between men, was repealed by the legislature in November 2022, article 156 was justified on the basis that “the experiences of other jurisdictions show the perils of court-led change… with drastic social repercussions that polarise society.” 22 In this regard, the Singapore government may have been concerned by the Supreme Court of the United States’ (SCOTUS) decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, which held that “sex” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 included SOGI. 23
From an international human rights perspective, the definitions of “disability” and “sex” under the WFA are inconsistent with Singapore’s obligations under the CRPD and CEDAW respectively. On disability, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee) had expressed concern in 2022 that Singapore law did not “contain a formal definition of disability, framed in conformity with article 1” of the CRPD. 24 Similarly, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Committee) explicitly urged the Singapore government in June 2024 to ensure that the WFA addresses discrimination against lesbian, bisexual, transgender and intersex women.” 25
Furthermore, as highlighted in the introduction, the WFA does not protect all workers from discrimination on the basis of their nationality. Instead, section 26 of the WFA requires employers to consider applicants who are citizens and PR first before looking beyond Singapore’s shores for foreign candidates. Furthermore, while nationality is enshrined as a protected characteristic under section 9, section 22 specifies that it is not discrimination for an employer to make an employment decision that adversely affects an individual on the ground that they are neither Singaporean nor PR. The permissibility of discrimination against non-Singaporeans may also explain why the WFA diverged from the Singapore Constitution in enshrining nationality as a protected characteristic rather than the constitutionally prohibited grounds of descent and place of birth.
What is prohibited?
Under the WFA, discrimination is prohibited in three aspects of the employment lifecycle: first, the making of an employment decision that adversely affects an individual on the ground of any protected characteristic; 26 second, the issuance, communication or publication of any discriminatory direction, instruction or policy which directs, instructs or influences the making of employment decisions that adversely affects an individual on the ground of any protected characteristic 27 ; and finally, the use of advertisement or description relating to possible employment that mentions (expressly or by implication) a protected characteristic as a condition, criterion, requirement, advantage, disadvantage or disqualification for employment. 28
These three prohibitions are facets of direct discrimination, which refers to the situation where an employee is subject to less favourable treatment because of a personal attribute of theirs that is a protected characteristic under the WFA. The drafters chose not to legislate against other forms of discrimination-related conduct prohibited in anti-discrimination legislations elsewhere and under international human rights law, including indirect discrimination, the denial of reasonable accommodation and harassment. This was despite recommendations from human rights experts to the contrary. For example, the CRPD Committee had urged the Singapore Government in 2022 to prohibit direct and indirect discrimination and recognise the denial of reasonable accommodation as a form of prohibited discrimination in the employment context. 29 The CEDAW Committee similarly recommended that the WFA cover indirect discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace. 30
In rejecting calls to prohibit these different forms of discrimination, the TCWF asserted that legislating against indirect discrimination and the denial of reasonable accommodations was impractical and could undermine workplace harmony. In particular, it alleged that a legal prohibition against indirect discrimination “imposes very wide legal obligations on employers, resulting in uncertainty for both employers and employees” and may result in a more legalistic employment relationship. 31 Similarly, legislating the denial of reasonable accommodations was considered to be “an overly rigid approach that risks creating a more litigious workplace, and could inadvertently affect the employability of [disabled persons].” 32 Instead, the TCWF took the position that TAFEP could help facilitate a resolution between workers and their employers on a case-by-case basis. During the parliamentary debates, the MM similarly defended the omission of other types of discrimination in the WFA on the basis that the government did not wish to make the law “overly prescriptive… to avoid undermining labour market flexibility and inhibiting our ability to leverage our long-standing and successful model of labour relations to manage such complex issues.” 33 However, empirical research has debunked the myths that the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation fosters a more litigious culture or that employees will make claims against their employers willy-nilly; instead, victims face significant barriers in seeking recourse through the law and overwhelmingly fail to exercise their legal rights against errant employers. 34 Moreover, mediation is a mandatory step that employees must take before they file a direct discrimination claim against their employer; if the other forms of discrimination are also prohibited under the WFA, employees would likely have been required to attempt to resolve such disputes through mediation first anyway.
How to seek recourse?
In enacting the WFA, the Singapore government took pains to emphasise its desire to maintain “workplace harmony.” At the beginning of his parliamentary speech during the Second Reading of the WFA, the MM explained that “we want to keep our hard-earned harmony in our workplaces and society.” 35 Workplace harmony was also articulated as one of the guiding principles behind the TCWF’s recommendations and influenced the three-step process set out in the WFA. While the concept of workplace harmony is not defined, a key facet appears to be the maintenance of a non-litigious workplace culture. In this regard, the three-step process requires an employee to attempt to resolve their grievances with their employer through the employer's internal processes first before attempting mediation. A claim may be filed only after parties are unable to resolve the dispute at these two earlier stages.
First, employers are required to introduce grievance handling processes to facilitate the resolution of worker complaints. Section 27 of the WFA stipulates the elements of the grievance handling process: first, the employer must inquire and review, in a stated manner, into each grievance raised; second, the employer must inform the employee of the outcome of the review; third, a written record of each inquiry and review must be retained for a stated period; and finally, the employer must not disclose the identity or any information in relation to any inquiries to any person unless reasonably necessary. Curiously, there is no statutory obligation on employers to comply with the grievance handling process. The only obligations imposed under the WFA are for employers to develop the grievance handling process and to inform all its employees in writing of the said process.
Second, if the grievance cannot be resolved internally by the employer, the employee must then attempt mediation with the employer before they can bring a claim under the WFA. 36 If mediation fails, then the mediator must issue a claim referral certificate (CRC) in respect of each unresolved dispute if they are satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of a settlement. An employee must obtain the CRC if they wish to commence an action for the statutory tort of discrimination against the employer under the WFA before the Employment Claims Tribunal (ECT) or the General Division of the High Court (GDHC). The ECT can hear claims under the WFA up to SGD 250,000 while the GDHC will hear claims above that limit.
Third, departing from the principle of open justice, the proceedings before the ECT and the GDHC are conducted in private. According to the MM, this is intended to firstly, “create a safe environment where parties can share their honest views and focus on the ongoing case, without third parties present who may publicly misrepresent and sensationalise issues, resulting in inflamed social tensions” and secondly, “protect the reputations of both the workers as well as the employers.” 37 A decision of the ECT or the GDHC may only be appealed on any ground involving a question of law or on the ground that the claim was outside the ECT’s jurisdiction. 38
What motivated the enactment of the WFA?
The notion that workplace discrimination is objectionable and should be proscribed by law is largely self-evident today, with an overwhelming majority of countries having passed anti-discrimination legislations to deter and punish errant employers. 39 That said, this was not always the case and the proliferation of anti-discrimination law can be attributed to either or a combination of domestic pressure and the diffusion of international law, as was the case in Hong Kong and Australia. 40
However, these factors do not adequately explain the policy u-turn in Singapore that led the PAP government to enact the WFA. First, Singapore had ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the International Convention Against All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) years ago. Notably, it is one of a handful of countries that has not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) nor the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 1958 (No. 111), both of which impose state obligations with respect to equality and non-discrimination generally and in the employment context respectively. 41 Second, civil society activists have been unsuccessful at convincing the PAP to legislate against workplace discrimination. For example, in 2018, advocates called for the enactment of a comprehensive employment discrimination legislation in response to a public consultation on proposed amendments to the Employment Act to no avail. 42 From a labour policy perspective, the PAP has also favoured tripartite cooperation over legislative oversight and the relationship between the PAP and the NTUC has resulted in what one scholar described as a “certain placidity… viz a shortfall of active, independent challenge to the Government’s view of the ideological parameters to be observed by the trade unions.” 43 The ineffectiveness of both civil society and the labour movement in effecting policy change in Singapore is not surprising. If neither the political pressure from social movements nor compliance with international law was the primary motivation for the enactment of the WFA, what else can explain the PAP government’s decision to abruptly change its tack on the issue of workplace discrimination?
Interest convergence theory
Drawing on interest convergence theory, this article argues that it was predominantly nativist politics that motivated the unusual about-turn in Singapore’s approach to workplace discrimination that culminated in the WFA. The concept of interest convergence was first developed by Derrick Bell, who argued that SCOTUS’ seminal decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 44 which held that laws racially segregating public schools were unconstitutional, cannot be understood simply as the result of some newfound racial enlightenment among the judges or the broader public. Instead, he theorised that “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.” 45 According to Bell, the Brown decision should be approached from a geopolitical perspective, where the judgment “helped to provide immediate credibility to America’s struggle with Communist countries to win the heart and minds of emerging third world peoples.” 46 In the racial context, interest convergence theory as informed by Brown suggests that racially progressive judgments should be analysed as “the outward manifestations of unspoken and perhaps subconscious judicial conclusions that the remedies, if granted, will secure, advance, or at least not harm societal interests deemed important by middle and upper class whites.” 47 Other scholars have gone on to apply the theory to explain the legalisation of same-sex marriage, the election of the US’ first Black president and US immigration policy. 48 Framed generally, interest convergence theory posits that socially progressive social, policy or legal developments would occur only if “it lies in the self-interest of influential majoritarian groups to modify the current system in a fundamental fashion.” 49
While existing scholarship has hinted at the notion of interest convergence in Singapore, this article represents the first attempt to explicitly engage with this theory in analysing the enactment of the WFA. In the context of gender, one scholar coined the term “strategic egalitarianism” to explain how the PAP government had granted equality to women in various aspects of life but which were “contingent upon meeting specific political and economic goals,” such as the promotion of female labour participation. 50 For example, in 2004, a constitutional amendment gave women equal right to pass down citizenship to their foreign-born children when previously only men could do so; while this policy shift was a step towards gender equality, it was motivated by population and economic concerns arising from dwindling birth rates. 51 With respect to race, scholars have drawn attention to the political and electoral advantages afforded to the incumbent PAP through the introduction of racial quotas in parliamentary and presidential elections in the name of multiracial representation. 52
The pursuit of workplace “fairness”
The enactment of the WFA therefore should be analysed not simply in terms of how it offers legal protection to minority or marginalised groups but more saliently in terms of how it safeguards the interests of the PAP in maintaining its electoral and parliamentary dominance. To do so, it must address the concerns of voters who may otherwise cast their votes for opposition candidates. Through the lens of interest convergence, the political function of the WFA therefore is to signal the PAP’s commitment to addressing the discrimination that local workers face in the job market because of errant employers who unfairly prefer foreign labour. To be clear, the WFA also affords the PAP electoral benefits with respect to the groups that would enjoy legal protection under the WFA. However, this article suggests that it was the rise of nativist politics that ultimately tipped the scale towards the PAP’s decision to finally legislate against workplace discrimination after decades of resistance against such a move. This is interest convergence in action: minority and marginalised groups in Singapore now enjoy greater legal protection because their interests coincide with the interests of the majority, that is Singaporean workers at large, and more critically the elites, i.e., the ruling PAP government.
As a starting point, Terence Ho has suggested that anti-immigrant anxieties in Singapore are fuelled by two fears: first, that Singapore is being used as a “stepping stone” by immigrants to greener pastures (i.e., other economically advanced nations) and second, that citizens will be displaced economically and culturally by immigrants. 53 Ironically, the nativist fears of the Singapore electorate can be attributed to Singapore’s own liberal immigration policies since the 1990s to become the “talent capital” of the world, including short-term accommodation housing schemes, company grant schemes to reduce the cost of hiring foreign talents and overseas recruitment missions to market Singapore as a destination for skilled labour. 54 This was a highly successful strategy, with the increase in the foreign population contributing both economically to the country’s GDP growth and demographically to support an otherwise shrinking local population. 55 Yet, despite the country’s relatively successful economic performance, anti-immigrant sentiments finally came to a head, in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis that resulted in significant unemployment and exacerbated socioeconomic precarity. Ho has also suggested that the PAP’s own survivalist rhetoric, that emphasised the nation’s “precarious nature and its lack of natural resources,” may have exacerbated the anti-immigrant backlash by “laying the ground for national anxieties over material competition, the national and individual quest for excellence, precarious national existence, national duties and sacrifices.” 56
At the 2011 general election (GE2011), the PAP suffered its worst electoral results since the country’s independence, with the lowest vote share (60.1%) and the loss of its first Group Representation Constituency (GRC), comprising five parliamentary seats, to the Worker’s Party (WP) since the GRC scheme was introduced in 1988. 57 One of the key factors behind these disappointing results was the PAP’s liberal immigration policies that have made the city feel more crowded, competitive and costly to voters. 58 At the same time, Singapore cannot simply end immigration given the existential demographic threats of an ageing population and precariously low birth rates. Furthermore, as a tiny island nation with no natural resources, it was critical for the country to remain an attractive regional hub for multinational companies and skilled labour if Singapore were to maintain its economic growth and status.
The persistent rise of nativism presented a thorny policy dilemma to the PAP as it sought to balance between its own electoral interests and the country’s long-term growth and progress. On one hand, a growing proportion of voters are demanding less immigration and a more insular approach to the economy. On the other hand, given Singapore’s geographical realities, doing so could spell disaster for the country’s economy and, as a result, its own performance legitimacy. This article suggests that the PAP struck a delicate balance between the two with the policy narrative of “nationality discrimination.” Doing so discursively shifted the spotlight away from the PAP’s own immigration policies and instead laid the blame on discriminatory employers and foreign managers for the challenges that local workers face in finding jobs and staying employed. Put another way, the message to aggrieved local workers is this: you have been unfairly treated at the workplace because of bad actors in the market, never mind the lapses in our immigration, housing and manpower policies to carefully manage the influx of immigrants.
The solution to “nationality discrimination” was twofold: first, proscribe such “discriminatory” employment practices through the development of policy measures aimed at “workplace fairness” and punish errant employers for engaging in “unfair” employment practices; and second, tighten immigration policy. However, because immigration reforms are framed within this narrative of “nationality discrimination,” such policy changes are less likely to cause economic alarm than if they were framed as a populist response to the rise in nativism in the country. In this regard, the WFA was drafted not solely to enshrine labour protectionism by proscribing “nationality discrimination”; instead, it was framed more generally to tackle workplace discrimination, which included other forms of discrimination on the basis of sex, disability and other characteristics and would potentially help the PAP win more voters from minority groups. Oddly, while the WFA was mentioned in the 2023 White Paper on Singapore’s Women Development as an example of the government’s commitment to promoting “equal opportunities in the workplace,” it was not referenced at all in the Enabling Masterplan 2030 (published in the same year) despite the role it could play in addressing the troublingly low employment rate of workers with disabilities. 59 Further, as detailed earlier in the article, the law lacks teeth to address common and pernicious forms of discrimination despite repeated exhortations of civil society groups and international human rights bodies. Taken together, one wonders how important discrimination faced by these groups at the workplace was to the drafters and whether the WFA was chiefly motivated by their lived experiences (if at all).
The rest of this section traces chronologically how the narrative of workplace discrimination came to be enmeshed with nativist politics.
The Singaporean core
We begin with the aftermath of the 2011 General Election (GE2011). At that year’s NDR, the then Prime Minister (PM) Lee Hsien Loong announced that his government would work with tripartite partners to “develop guidelines for fair employment practices and responsible recruitment practices so that when you have a Singaporean working side by side with a foreigner, they both feel fairly treated and nobody feels that he is at a disadvantage.” 60 These guidelines were issued 2 months later in October 2011 by way of a new section in the TGFEP titled “Hiring and Developing a Singaporean Core.” 61 In addition to promoting merit-based employment practices, the TGFEP called on employers to ensure that job advertisements are open to Singaporeans and to work with universities and other educational institutions to recruit Singaporeans. During the same period, the criteria for obtaining an Employment Pass was tightened while an eligibility certificate programme which allowed foreign professionals who were graduates of specific universities or who had held skilled migrant visas from other countries to remain in Singapore to find a job for up to 1 year was scrapped. 62
The idea of a “Singaporean core” emerged in an earlier speech by PM Lee that year, revealing the government’s recognition of the growing public disaffection with its immigration policy: “[W]e have to preserve a Singaporean core in our society. We need immigrants to reinforce our ranks, but we must maintain a clear majority of local-born Singaporeans who set the tone of our society and uphold our core values and ethos.” 63 The updated TGFEP thus marked the first time that the idea of prioritising employment opportunities for Singaporeans became entangled with the concept of workplace discrimination. Whereas the rest of the guidelines are underpinned by Singapore’s commitment to meritocracy, the section on the Singaporean core demands that employers give preferential treatment to local workers over non-citizens.
Fair Consideration Framework
In January 2013, the government released a Population White Paper which sets out the key considerations and roadmap for Singapore’s population policies to address the twin demographic challenges of a declining birth rate and an ageing population.
64
Given the dwindling birth rate among Singaporeans, a significant majority of the population increase was projected to come from new immigrants. The White Paper intensified anti-immigrant sentiments among Singaporeans and sparked rare public protests.
65
Despite the growing dissent, the PAP forged ahead to endorse the White Paper with rare dissent from some lawmakers, including from its own ranks. In defending the government’s approach, the then Deputy PM explained: “If we do too little to address our demographic challenge, we risk becoming a shrinking ageing society, and our young people may leave to seek more exciting opportunities elsewhere. But if we take in too many immigrants and foreign workers, we may weaken our social fabric and national identity. We need to strike a fine balance.”
Instead of slowing down immigration given the demographic and economic challenges, the PAP turned to the narrative of “nationality discrimination” to attempt to quell public discontent and affirm its commitment to the Singaporean core. Hence, months after the White Paper controversy, in September 2013, MOM introduced the Fair Consideration Framework (FCF) that required employers to consider Singaporean applicants first before recruiting foreign candidates. Failure to prioritise local workers is considered a discriminatory hiring practice that may result in additional scrutiny from the authorities and the curtailment of the company’s work pass privileges. In particular, the company must show that it complied with this job advertising requirement in its application for an Employment Pass for any foreign employee that it hires. 66 The FCF was also enshrined in law, such that the Controller of Work Passes may consider whether the employer “made reasonable efforts to provide fair employment opportunities to citizens of Singapore, including efforts to attract and consider such citizens for employment or to train them and develop their careers and potential in the workforce” when deciding whether to bar an employer from applying for or being issued with a work pass. 67
In July 2015, the FCF was enhanced to require firms to publish the salary range of job vacancies to improve labour market transparency; employers who apply for work passes where the job advertisement did not comply with this requirement would have their applications rejected. 68 In the same month, the minimum salary requirements for foreign workers to sponsor dependent visas for their spouses, children and parents were further increased. These announcements preceded the 2015 general election (GE2015), which took place just 2 months later. GE2015 saw the PAP turn its fortunes around to achieve one of its best electoral performances in decades. 69 Commentators have suggested that the significant shift from GE2011 can be attributed to the introduction of policies that addressed the public’s concerns about key policy issues, including immigration and its effects on employment, housing and the cost of living. 70
There would continue to be further tweaks to the FCF in the following years. Notably, in January 2020, the penalties imposed on errant companies was doubled from a minimum period of 6 months’ debarment from work pass applications and renewals to 12 months. Egregious cases of discrimination may result in up to 24 months’ debarment. 71 At around the same time, the minimum qualifying salary for obtaining an employment pass was raised in March 2020 to protect local workers whose livelihoods were threatened by cheaper foreign labour.
Considering that the FCF was intended to address both discriminatory employment practices proscribed under the TGFEP as well as employers’ non-compliance with the advertisement requirement, the administrative penalties that it imposed on errant employers (i.e., visa restrictions on the hiring of foreign workers) seem odd. Such penalties are irrelevant in respect of discrimination on the basis of other grounds, particularly if the employer was not reliant on foreign labour.
This discrepancy did not go unnoticed. In 2014, some parliamentarians questioned whether MOM had sufficient enforcement power to punish employers engaging in discriminatory employment practices that are not related to nationality but to other attributes such as age and gender. 72 Specifically, one legislator asked if the Ministry would consider “implementing specific workplace-related anti-discrimination laws as a final option, if and when cases of discrimination do increase in the coming years.” 73 That same year, another legislator cited a survey which found that a significant proportion of racial minorities perceived discrimination at the workplace and urged the government to pass legislation to address the issue. 74 In response, the then MM argued that detractors may have “underestimated how serious it is for businesses in Singapore to have their work pass privileges curtailed [since] not so many businesses are able to operate with a 100% local employment workforce… [and] this kind of a penalty is actually much more painful than… introduce a fine.” Yet, despite the Minister’s belief in the effectiveness of the FCF, multiple studies suggest that workplace discrimination remains prevalent in Singapore, including on the basis of race, 75 age, 76 and gender. 77
Legislating differential fairness
It was not until July 2021 that the PAP shook off its earlier disavowal of workplace discrimination legislation when the newly appointed MM Tan See Leng announced that he would set up a Tripartite Committee to “examine if legislation is the best policy option to advance on the gains that we have made.” 78 Tan was responding to an adjournment motion titled “Strengthening the Singaporean Core”, which called on the government to take further steps to protect local workers and level the playing field against the ready supply of foreign workers that employers had easy access to. In his speech, Tan declared that the goal of enacting such a law is to “continue to give Singaporeans the best chance to get ahead and to secure their livelihoods” (emphasis added). 79
The next month, in August 2021, PM Lee announced that his government would pass a new legislation to address workplace discrimination. That nativist politics had motivated the enactment of the WFA can also be gleaned from the PM’s speech. The section within which this announcement was made is titled “Work Pass Holders” and sought to address the problem where employers or hiring managers “hire from their own countries, using familiar links and old boys’ networks, rather than on merit [a]nd they give foreigners the jobs and opportunities, and only make token gestures with locals.” 80 At the same time, the PM announced that the government will “further tighten the criteria for EP and S passes over time.” In contrast, discrimination on other grounds were raised in the speech almost as an afterthought with the PM noting that the new law “will also prohibit other kinds of discrimination covered by TAFEP” (emphasis added).
The structure of the MM’s speech during the Second Reading of the WFA is also telling as to the motivation behind the WFA. He began his speech by recalling how “a complementary foreign workforce remains important to Singapore’s continued economic success as well as ensuring good jobs and good wages for locals.” 81 At the same time, he explained that “these benefits will only accrue to Singaporeans if there is a level playing field that prevents discriminatory practices.” In particular, with respect to the protected characteristic of nationality, he acknowledged the “lived experiences and concerns of Singaporeans about whether foreigners are taking over their jobs” and pointed to the WFA as the government’s “next step to further strengthen protections for Singaporeans and ensure a fair playing field.” In the same breath, he referenced the exception which permits discrimination against those who are neither Singaporean nor PRs under the WFA on the basis that it will give employers “the flexibility to strengthen their local workforce core, to build stronger local networks and greater resilience to disruptions like the recent pandemic, and hence achieve stronger business outcomes.” Shortly after the WFA was passed, Tan appeared on a radio talk show where he fielded questions from listeners about their concerns over immigration and employment. 82 In particular, he referred to the WFA as one of several “significant safeguards” to protect local workers from so-called nationality discrimination while claiming that the number of discrimination complaints had dropped in the previous years. Yet, this reasoning is counterintuitive: why is there a need to go one step further to legalise against workplace discrimination if it is becoming less of a problem in Singapore?
What likely triggered the PAP’s policy u-turn at the time is the increasing disaffection among Singaporeans on the issue of immigration leading up to the 2020 general election (GE2020), that ended with PAP losing four more parliamentary seats - when the WP won a second GRC - and almost losing several others by narrow margins. During this period, several cases of xenophobic and racist violence against South Asians were blamed on “a whispering campaign” against the India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), a free trade agreement (FTA) between Singapore and India. Anti-immigration advocates have latched on the notion that CECA was responsible for what they considered to be an excessive influx of Indian immigrants, who are taking away the jobs of Singaporeans, especially in the technology and finance sectors. A key proponent of the anti-CECA narrative is a new anti-immigration political party, the Progress Singapore Party (PSP), which contested in GE2020 and called for stricter restrictions on immigration and a review of FTAs, including CECA. 83 Despite being an entirely new party, the PSP came close to beating the PAP in West Coast GRC. As a result, two of its candidates entered Parliament under the Non-Constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP) scheme which offers parliamentary seats to up to 12 losing opposition candidates with the highest percentage of votes to ensure that there is a minimum number of opposition politicians in Parliament. In his maiden speech in Parliament, PSP NCMP Leong Mun Wai emphasised that his party is a “pro-Singaporean, pro-Singapore party” and called for “immediate actions be taken to restore the balance of interests between Singaporeans and the foreigners in our country.” 84
The PSP’s criticism of the PAP’s approach to immigration and foreign manpower would lead to numerous clashes both in and outside Parliament. For example, at an earlier parliamentary sitting on 6 July 2021, Tan was compelled to deliver a ministerial statement alongside another PAP minister to defend the positive impact of FTAs and CECA as well as Singapore’s immigration policies on the country’s economy. 85 In particular, Tan highlighted how the government has sought to address “nationality discrimination” which arises because “not all employers play by the rules.” Nevertheless, he noted that the government would “do more to clamp down on egregious employers with discriminatory employment practices” and was “studying various options,” including “strengthening our levers to give more bite to the [TGFEP].” Subsequently, in September 2021, Leong filed a private member’s motion calling on the government to “take urgent and concrete action to address the widespread anxiety among Singaporeans on jobs and livelihood caused by the Foreign Talent Policy and the ‘movement of natural persons’ provisions in some free trade agreements like the [CECA].” 86 In response, Finance Minister Lawrence Wong - who would later become PM in May 2024 - filed a competing motion “acknowledg[ing] Singaporeans’ anxieties about jobs and competition in a globalised and fast-changing economy [while] affirm[ing] Singapore’s needs to stay open and connected to the world in order to grow and prosper.” 87 Wong specifically called attention to the PAP government’s decision to enact a new workplace discrimination legislation to address what he described as “the pain and the frustration of those who feel unfairly treated by a foreign boss or a foreign colleague.”
Arguably, the PAP could have simply enshrined labour protectionism in law without disguising it as the prohibition of workplace discrimination. Instead, it (mis)characterised labour protectionism as a measure to address what it conceived as the problem of “nationality discrimination” that Singapore residents suffer. According to a former MM, “nationality discrimination” manifests in three main ways. 88 First, hiring managers may have a preference for “candidates that they are familiar with or of the same nationality.” Second, hiring managers may wish to hire as quickly as possible and “rely on recommendations from others or a ready stock of foreign candidates supplied by head-hunters.” Third, employers may prefer foreign candidates who are as qualified as a local applicant but who is willing to work for a lower wage. However, legally speaking, none of the three scenarios above amounts to discrimination on the ground of nationality. In the first scenario, there is nothing to suggest that the familiarity that a hiring manager may have with a candidate is because they share a nationality. In fact, it is more likely because they share the same race, religion, caste or language, rather than the same nationality, that the hiring manager may prefer the candidate compared to others. The second scenario similarly has no connection with nationality save that head-hunters purportedly are more likely to have a ready supply of foreign candidates compared to local candidates, simply based on the much larger populations in other countries. Finally, employers are arguably entitled to pick a candidate based on the salary that they are willing to accept and such hiring decisions cannot be said to be on the ground of the candidate’s nationality, even if it is more likely that foreign candidates are willing to accept lower salaries than local ones.
Conceptually, the idea of “nationality discrimination” is therefore not based on the legal principles of equality and anti-discrimination, but what has been coined the nativist logic of “differential fairness,” which is “not based on the equality of rights… but on the differentiated rights and entitlements between [Singaporeans] and migrants.” 89 This logic is fuelled by feelings of unfairness arising from government policies that Singaporeans consider to have disadvantaged them in terms of their ability to access gainful employment and public resources. The sense of entitlement that Singaporeans feel arises from other government policies that impose obligations on them but not foreigners. This includes conscription for male citizens and the Central Provident Fund (CPF) policy, a mandatory retirement savings scheme that requires Singaporeans and PR to contribute a part of their income that is matched at varying percentages by their employers. This requirement for employers to match CPF contributions has raised concerns that it makes local candidates more costly than foreign candidates.
Over the years, the logic of differential fairness has informed the PAP government’s reforms, which have increasingly distinguished between locals and foreigners be it in the context of housing, healthcare or employment. One scholar has traced such differentiation policies to the mid 2000s, which sought to “reinforce the sense of citizenship as a valuable possession” by emphasising the “perks” of citizenship. 90 However, in the context of employment, this creates an intractable problem since the logic of differential fairness directly conflicts with the legal concepts of equality and non-discrimination. As a result, while the WFA purports to prohibit discrimination generally, its nationality-related provisions demand the discriminatory treatment against non-residents to shield local workers from the competition brought on by globalisation and the cross-border flow of labour. To be fair, nationality is not the only protected characteristic which an employer is permitted to consider in its employment decisions. Other exceptions set out in Part 5 of the WFA include age and disability. However, the justifications for these exceptions, as a form of affirmative action or positive action to uplift a minority or marginalised group, do not apply comfortably to the majority - and arguably privileged - status of being a Singaporean or PR. Generally, there are three main justifications for such measures, namely (i) compensation for the pernicious effect of past discrimination, (ii) distributive justice to increase opportunities for a socially disadvantaged group and (iii) the value and utility of diversity and differences in society. 91 However, these justifications arguably apply more strongly in favour of migrants, rather than local workers.
Reforming the WFA
Despite the nativist impulse underlying the WFA, the legislation remains a significant step towards the pursuit of workplace equality in Singapore if the misnomer of “nationality discrimination” can be resolved. For the WFA to operate effectively in protecting workers from all forms of discrimination, it is crucial to scrutinise its conceptual foundations so as to implement the necessary reforms. In doing so, this article fills a lacuna in the existing literature on the WFA, which has focused on more practical concerns relating to the scope and operation of the legislation. 92 This final section turns to three issues that the WFA must contend with: (differential) fairness versus equality; the coercive ideology of harmony; and the limits of anti-discrimination law. It is unfortunate but not surprising that these concerns received scant attention throughout the policy consultation and legislative processes, which were primarily driven by nativist politics rather than the pursuit of equality.
(Differential) fairness versus equality
As the previous section has demonstrated, the guiding philosophy behind the WFA was to give effect to the logic of differential fairness, with the other protected characteristics enjoying legal protection because of interest convergence. Notably, there was practically no engagement with the concepts of equality or discrimination during the parliamentary debates. This is troubling, considering the nature of equality as an “empty idea” that may be used to achieve different normative goals. 93 It is therefore crucial to pin down what form of equality one is speaking of and aiming towards, be it formal equality, substantive equality or intersectional equality. 94 Yet, none of these considerations or complexities were addressed or dealt with in the parliamentary debates. Instead, the only reference to equality articulated by the MM is that of formal or procedural equality as encapsulated in the principle of meritocracy, where employers “must hire and assess workers based on their ability to do the job well… without employment decisions being distorted by discriminatory biases.”
However, all formal equality demands is that like be treated alike and has no regard for the outcome. This may explain, for example, the MM’s position that the concept of indirect discrimination is plagued with uncertainty. However, the fear of such uncertainty likely resulted from a lack of appreciation that substantive equality requires not only the eradication of disparate treatment but also the disparate impact that equal treatment may have on different groups. 95 After all, every legal test – whether in the context of equality law or otherwise – necessarily involves some level of uncertainty because the law must be sufficiently general to apply to diverse factual scenarios. It is also worth noting that the reluctance to statutorily prohibit indirect discrimination under the WFA stands in contrast with the recent constitutional development in the courts, where the GDHC accepted (albeit in obiter) that the constitutional right to equality under article 12 of the Singapore Constitution prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination. 96
At the same time, it may also have been a deliberate policy decision to avoid robust engagement with the concept of equality because doing so would swiftly expose the incompatibility of the logic of differential fairness with the principles of equality and non-discrimination. In particular, if there was a sincere commitment to the principle of equality under the WFA, the drafters would not have sanctioned discrimination against a worker on the basis of their nationality if they are not a Singaporean or PR in the legislation. Any reform to the WFA so that it can meaningfully realise substantive equality therefore demands an end to the misappropriation of the legal concept of discrimination to disguise what really is a policy of labour protectionism.
Instead, the prioritisation of local workers should be achieved through immigration policy as is the case in other jurisdictions. In this regard, the recent introduction of the points-based Complementarity Assessment Framework (COMPASS) is a step in the right direction that regulates the circumstances where employers are eligible to sponsor work visas for foreign hires. 97 Under this new framework, an application must earn sufficient points that are granted based on various factors such as the employee’s qualifications, whether the employee possesses skills that are in shortage in Singapore and the number of foreign employees that the employer already employs.
The coercive ideology of harmony
In passing the WFA, the concept of workplace harmony was repeatedly articulated as a key policy consideration. However, as a matter of definition, there was no clarity during the parliamentary debates as to what workplace harmony entails though it was often used in the context of a non-litigious workplace and the speedy resolution of disputes between employer and employee. Troublingly, it was also taken for granted as a normatively desirable policy objective without any consideration as to what else may have been sacrificed in its pursuit.
This has several practical implications in relation to how the WFA was drafted, including in refusing to legislate against indirect discrimination and the denial of reasonable accommodations, the mandatory requirement for employees to attempt mediation before filing a claim, and the exclusion of LGBTQ workers from legal protection. Indeed, the concept of workplace harmony first appeared in the context of companies fostering LGBTQ inclusion at the workplace: the TGFEP was updated in January 2023, the same month that male same-sex intimacy was decriminalised, to include a new set of guidelines on “Exercising Sensitivity for a Harmonious Workplace.” Specifically, the guidelines state that “employees should not be required or pressured to participate in events, programmes and policies that are not related to work.” 98 Though LGBTQ inclusion was not explicitly mentioned, the timing made it quite clear that the guidelines were intended to reassure workers who did not support LGBTQ inclusion. Just 2 months prior, in November 2022, some lawmakers had called on the government to ensure that no organisation or company can “compel their staff… to participate in gay community projects if they do not subscribe to the same values.” 99
The prioritisation of harmony therefore may come at the cost of equality or social justice. In this regard, anthropologist Laura Nader coined the term “harmony ideology,” which she refers to as to the “belief that harmony in the guise of compromise or agreement is ipso facto better than an adversary posture.” 100 This ideology is coercive, because it is “accompanied by an intolerance for conflict” and an “intention to prevent the expression of discord rather than to deal with its cause.” 101 From a historical perspective, Nader suggests that harmony ideology is “most likely part of the hegemonic control system that spread throughout the world with European political colonization and Christian missionizing.” 102 In the Singapore context, some scholars have examined how the pursuit of racial and religious harmony may come at the expense of racial and religious minorities whose experiences of injustice and inequality are subordinated to the public maintenance of social harmony. 103
In the realm of labour relations, the tripartite model in Singapore aims to achieve two objectives: industrial harmony and labour market flexibility. As Gabriel Wong noted, this approach has “helped in the prevention of disputes and to make the process of dispute settlement more efficient and facilitate a win-win outcome” and the maintenance of harmonious workplace relations “contributes to teamwork and increased productivity, greater certainty for businesses and increased investor confidence.” 104 At the same time, some scholars, such as Michael Barr, have questioned whether this approach may have resulted in the stifling of dissent in favour of bureaucratic-authoritarian corporatism. 105 The narrow approach to the WFA therefore is perhaps unsurprising, given that it was informed by the recommendations made by the TCWF made up of representatives from each of the tripartite groups.
Future reforms to the WFA therefore requires a more robust engagement with the value of workplace harmony and whether the trade-offs that its pursuit may involve are justifiable. Insofar as the WFA is intended to provide a legal mechanism to those who otherwise lack voice or power at the workplace, an emphasis on harmony may ultimately limit the effectiveness of the legislation in empowering these individuals in seeking recourse and justice through the law.
Beyond anti-discrimination law
While the enactment of the WFA is a positive first step in stamping out workplace discrimination, the policy and legislative imagination in Singapore remains limited. In fact, while the TCWF was initially convened to review the framework for workplace fairness in July 2021, it did not appear to consider alternative approaches other than the enactment of an anti-discrimination legislation. Notably, less than a month after it was set up, the announcement that the WFA would be passed was made in August 2021 at the NDR. Legislating against workplace discrimination however only imposes negative obligations on employers not to discriminate against their workers. It does not necessarily result in a more diverse or inclusive workplace; in fact, empirical research has demonstrated how anti-discrimination law has not resulted in greater workplace diversity and may sometimes even backfire by reinscribing hierarchy through the legal process and inflict further harm on claimants. 106
Accordingly, beyond reforms to the WFA itself, Singapore should look beyond anti-discrimination law and consider other legal and policy mechanisms that can realise substantive equality at the workplace. One key mechanism is through affirmative action, which would impose positive obligations on employers to take proactive steps to ensure that workers from historically underrepresented and marginalised groups can enjoy equal opportunity at the workplace. It is curious that these measures were not been considered at all leading up to the WFA, considering that similar quotas have been implemented in the parliamentary and presidential electoral processes in the name of multiracialism. From an international law perspective, such measures are also consistent with Singapore’s obligations under CEDAW and the CRPD, both of which recognise the use of temporary specific measures to accelerate or achieve substantive equality for women and disabled persons.
Conclusion
Applying interest convergence theory in the Singapore context, this article has demonstrated how the influence of nativist labour protectionism has informed the Singapore government’s decision to enact the WFA. While it is an encouraging first step, it is doubtful whether the legislation can effectively foster more equal and inclusive workplaces in the country. That said, this legislative move has arguably been an electoral success insofar as it was calculated to shore up support for the incumbent PAP government; in GE 2025, the PAP won by a shocking landslide with an overall vote share of 65.57%, up from 61.24% in GE 2020. 107 Notably, the WFA was cited in the PAP’s election manifesto as part of its commitment to “strengthen safeguards for fair employment” to support white-collar workers in particular. 108
Theoretically, this article’s analysis of the WFA in Singapore reveals the slippery foundations of the legal concept of discrimination and the risk that it may be misappropriated to entrench, instead of eradicate, inequality. As Colm O’Cinneide argues, the norms of equality and anti-discrimination remain an “‘under-theorised’ set of concepts” that open themselves up to “profound disagreements… about both the philosophical basis for these norms and the outcomes they should generate when applied in certain specified situations.” 109 Troublingly, anti-discrimination laws have become increasingly exploited to maintain an unjust status quo rather than remedy inequality, exemplified by the recent SCOTUS decision to prohibit race-conscious college admissions programs. 110 However, whereas developments elsewhere have often played out in the judicial arena, the enactment of the WFA in Singapore reveals how the slipperiness of these norms may also be employed by other branches of government to illiberal ends. Worryingly, the US appears to be following in Singapore’s footsteps, with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission recently declaring its intention to “protect American workers from anti-American bias” by taking enforcement against employers for allegedly violating of the CRA’s prohibition against national origin discrimination on the basis that these employers were “preferring illegal aliens, migrant workers and visa holders or other legal immigrants over American workers.” 111
Looking ahead, this article calls attention to the urgent task facing equality law scholars to clarify the legal and political underpinnings of anti-discrimination law beyond the Aristotelian principle to treat like cases alike. It also highlights the critical role that scholars, lawyers and activists must play in increasing legal literacy about equality and law among policymakers and the public. These challenges will determine whether anti-discrimination legislation will be employed to foster a fairer or fouler society in an increasingly uncertain future.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to Professor David Oppenheimer, who supervised an earlier version of this paper at Berkeley Law, the anonymous reviewers for their feedback and guidance, and the journal’s editorial team. All errors remain the author’s own.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.