1.1 I must admit that I have difficulties in understanding the developments
surrounding the Iraqi war and also that I have never written or even thought about
writing on contemporary international issues. Yet, my need to write about the second
Gulf war is not an attempt to decipher my difficulties in understanding the fact that we
were taken to war on the basis of the intelligence report. Such a lack of understanding
of what is really going on in politics is nothing new. Moreover, it is a rather widely
shared feeling. Many of us are still confused about the argument leading to the war: was
the war initiated because of world terrorism, weapons of mass destruction in the hand of
Saddam Hussein or because of the radical Islam of the sort promoted by Osama bin Laden?
John Dunn's (2000) general remark, that neither citizens nor career politicians
understand what politics is about, well describes the puzzlement surrounding the Iraqi
war. The need to write about the recent international developments is not even an
attempt to make sense of my confusion about the complexity of the situation. It is
driven by my surprise that our lack of information about the whole picture and a lack of
clarity how to work out a way of dealing with such complexity, have not stopped us from
judging the political and military developments. The best evidence of it is the fact
that for the last six months a large proportion of citizens of many countries has seemed
to be united in their protest against the Iraqi war.
1.2 Before developing my central point that the unity of the anti-war
movement is illusory, let me stress that here I am interested in a general public's
comprehension of the reasons leading to the war rather than in specialists analyses of
the background to the war (e.g. Bobbitt 2002) or the rationale for fighting it (e.g.
Pollack 2002). While these books are in many ways remarkable, nevertheless their
sophisticated arguments have not really influenced a common discourse on the war. For
example, Kenneth M. Pollack's advice to launch a full scale invasion of Iraq, despite
that his book was published before the war and despite that it includes the impressive
arguments and documentation of the threat that Saddam presented to the United States,
has not resonated with the European public opinion. Furthermore, now is too late to
evaluate the validity of Pollack's assertion that the war with Saddam's Iraq was
inevitable. More valid is other books' suggestion that we now are at a transitional
stage or at a pivotal point in history, where there are no clean lines of divisions,
where there are new kinds of insecurity, where there is a good deal of confusion and
uncertainty (Bobbitt 2002; Kagan 2002). Both Bobbitt's and Kagan's works also seem to
support my point about illusions of globalisation as they argue that states are here to
stay and that, perhaps ironically, the recent development ‘makes the role of the state
all the more crucial in achieving international peace and national security’ (Bobbitt
2002: 813). The state will continue to resist the current wave of globalisation because
it is as ‘indispensable to peace as it was in the era of invasion that gave it birth’
(ibid: 814). In the world of states, Bobbitt writes, the greatest danger still remains
the confrontation between the most powerful states. Since law and strategy continue to
be key instruments of the state and since the choice is not between war and peace, but
between wars that we have anticipated and can mange and wars that we haven't and can't,
we must decide when it is appropriate to use force. In the new post-Cold war world we
ought to decide when to collectively sanction the use of force. ‘This is a matter of
creating precedents and case law’ and, it amounts to ‘deploying the habits of law on
behalf of strategy, and of course, vice versa’(ibid:805). Furthermore, Bobbitt's
assertion, that the avoidance of the war per se can be dangerous because ‘it counsels
against the preparations for war that might avert massive, carefully planed large-scale
attacks by one state on another, and because it actually invites low-intensively
conflicts once aggressors can rest assured they can find sanctuaries where they will not
be troubled by outsiders’(2002:781), suggests a need for careful analyses of a seemingly
united global opposition to the Iraqi war.
1.3 On the surface of it, the global public's ability to judge, despite its
uncertainty and doubts, can be described with a help of Keats' concept of negative
capability. Negative capability refers to a situation when we are ‘capable of being in
uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and
reasons’(Keats, quoted in Trilling 1955:32). Keats also notes that to remain in
half-knowledge should not be an obstacle in coming at a truth. Even more importantly, he
remarks that negative capability is the important sign of the poet's quality because it
makes possible the artistic vision of life. The advance toward negative capability means
greater ‘empowerment’ as it is achieved by creating ‘formative context that soften the
contrast between context-preserving routine and context-transforming challenge and by
expanding ‘mastery over our formative institutional and imaginative context’(Unger
1987:36 and 291). Paraphrasing Keats’ statement, we could say that the global public's
opposition against the war might be seen a sign of its negative capability as it could
be argued that it was this faculty that made possible the public's judgement of the
recent international events, despite their complexities and uncertainties.
1.4 Yet, can we really assume that the global condemnation of the Iraqi war
is valid proof of the international public's negative capability? In other words, have
we really discovered how to work out a way of dealing with enormous complexity?
Following Keats' argument that negative capability depends upon the sense of personal
identity, and therefore it is out of reach of ‘a man who cannot feel that he has a
personal identity unless he has made up his mind about everything’(quoted in Trilling
1955:37), we should enquire whether the ‘global public’ is actually an entity that is
strong and cohesive enough to do without ‘the armour of systematic certainties’
(Trilling 1955:37). Since ‘only the self that is certain of its existence, of its
identity’ (Keats quoted in Trilling 1955:37) can accept living without certainties and
be content with contradictory knowledges, we need to question the nature of the global
consensus. My suspicion is that the global public is still lacking in a common identity
and unity, therefore the global protest against the Iraqi war needs to be seen in less
optimistic colours, namely, as rather an accidental decision and illusionary unity.
1.5 It seems that the perception of the global consensus is merely a mirage
that covers up a wide range of various national responses to the war, which came
together only by chance. Although there were anti-war marches in all major cities around
the world, this image of unity should not lead us to overlook the evidence that these
protests were mainly motivated by national conditions and problems. Despite the illusion
of globalisation, the truth is that explanations of the nature of countries' responses
to the war are rooted in national views and attitudes. Here, it is enough to mention the
different motivations against the war that arose in Turkey, Palestine or Greece.
1.6 If we look at other examples of movements in which various forces come
together, it becomes obvious that such movements' ability to act was created by the
existence of ‘a common enemy’. For example, the Polish Solidarity movement's unity
crumbled once the system that it had united to oppose was swept away. The Solidarity,
which was created in 1980 and became, with 6 million of Poles from all social groups
joining in, a one of the largest social movements, expressed the nation's rejection of
the communist rule. While the movement managed to survive the imposition of martial law
(December 1981) and successfully run against the communist bloc in the first (almost)
free election in 1989, the disappearance of the enemy, that is the end of the communist
state, resulted in the Solidarity's fragmentation into more than twenty small
quarrelsome parties and in the consequent decline of its importance (Misztal 1996). Also
the anti-globalisation movement is held together only by the existence of a common
enemy, that is, the process of globalisation, while the movements’ members cannot agree
on an alternative to it. In the same vein, it can be argued that the recent anti-war
movement is held together only by its opposition to the military action against Iraq,
while beyond that it has very little in common. Yet, probing further, we can ask what is
about the communist rule, the process of globalisation or the Iraqi war that makes each
of them into ‘a common enemy’. It can be argued that what has made possible such a unity
in public condemnations of these three phenomena is the availability of language or
discourse in which people can express their opposition to each of them (communism,
globalisation or war). In the case of the Solidarity it was a language of dignity
/respect (Staniszkis 1984), in the case of anti-globalisation movement it is a rhetoric
of anti-capitalism, while the underlying language of the anti-war movement is a human
rights discourse.
1.7 While it is true that more than half of the population within the
majority of European and non European countries (with the exception of the USA) was
against the war, it has happened within the logic of the forced choice between human
rights and the war. In other words, a paradoxical dilemma that, although we supposedly
live in a global world, our the reactions to the war were dictated by local values and
interests, has been solved with help of the human rights language. The same discourse of
human rights was also used by supporters of the military action against the Iraqi war as
they saw the war as being necessary to eliminate local and regional human rights abuses.
The logic of each choice, the first between human rights and war (meaning here abuse of
human rights) and the second choice between human rights (meaning here war) and tyranny
(meaning here abuse of human rights) suggests that there is only one right option. To
put it differently, it means there is no alternative to the human rights language. By
looking at these two choices along side each other, we can notice that there are some
problems with the discourse of human rights. We already know, as Zizek (2002:17) points
out, that there is ‘the wall separating those covered by the umbrella of human rights
and those excluded from its protective cover’. Apart from this hidden truth of the
discourse on universal human rights, there still seems to be another problem connected
with the use of the language of human rights as a convenient ideology. Such an ideology
helps us to reduce our feelings of responsibility towards less fortunate (because we
have armed them with the language of human rights, they should be able to defend
themselves) and to ease our guilt towards the other (as we are now in some way the
victim as well, and not only because of September 11, but also because of the whole
range of discrimination faced by all of us; from ageism to bullying).
1.8 While politics as it is practised forces us to make either/or choices
(e.g. are you for or against war?), the issue cannot be reduced to ‘are you in favour of
human rights or not?’ The self-congratulatory nature of the human rights language can be
criticized not only for its emptiness, defensiveness or victimology, but also for not
encouraging us to face many ambiguities and difficulties of weighing claims that cannot
be judged without a detailed knowledge. Our task as academics should be to show that the
choice is ‘not that simple’, that we all can benefit from the strengthening our negative
capability or, in other words, from ‘the empowerment that arises from the denial of
whatever in our context delivers us over to a fixed scheme of division and hierarchy and
to an enforced choice between routine and rebellion’ (Unger 1987:279). It seems to me
that judgements which are not accompanied by knowledge and careful thoughts could be
emptied of all responsibility and could lead to escapist tendencies. Without questioning
the centrality of judgment in the construction of understanding, I wonder whether a
detailed knowledge is not equally important? Although we need to ‘understand our own
values, if we are to judge how we in particular have good reason to act’ (Dunn
2000:106), we should also ask whether such a framework of judgement of politics is
really sufficient and where to find reliable information.
1.9 These are important questions because when people try to grasp the
significance of what has been occurring on the international stage solely on the basis
of their own values and on the assumption that they understand the values of others (for
example, as when they declare that Iraqi people love peace or hate tyranny), they run a
risk that their opinions could become too simplistic. Naivety of our understanding of
politics is not, however, a result of our unwillingness or a lack of attempts to inform
ourselves. People listen to news, read newspapers and surf the Internet. They are,
however, increasingly aware that the whole truth is not always disclosed and often
manipulated. During the Iraqi crisis this message was confirmed by many main players,
for example, by the arm inspectors, French diplomats and UK MPs, each of them telling us
not to trust other actors (e.g., American and English officials or even the PM of
Britain). Paradoxically, we supposedly live in an information society, while much of
available information cannot be used as a basis of our action. At the same time, the
less we know what is really going on, the less we understand it and the less likely we
are to act, individually or collectively ‘in a well-advised way’ (Dunn 2000:93).
1.10 The growing complexity of information and the widespread distrust of
such information have created a need for a new foundation for the development of
political understanding and action. This demand has been satisfied with the help of the
only really available, accepted and legitimate ideology, namely the human rights
discourse. It is the language of human rights that has been used to justify and to
establish people's judgement as the main framework for their understanding of politics.
In other words, the imperialism of the human rights discourse (as Hobsbawm, 2003, calls
it) has been made necessary because of both the growing complexity of information and
the widespread distrust of such information. Here is yet another paradox; the less we
trust politics in general, the more we tend to search for ‘faces’, or in other words,
for individual politicians whom we can trust. This trend towards the personalisation of
politics only further undermines our trust in politics. Therefore it can be said the
process of personalization of politics can be seen as a trend which is both a factor
behind and result of public distrust of politics. So, due to the growing significance of
universalism of rights as a criterion of global co-existence in the context of the
growing personalisation of politics, the human rights language has established itself as
the dominant political discourse.
1.11 Observing several years ago the consequences of this trend in eastern
Europe and Russia (where President Yeltsin provided a good illustration of the
personalisation of politics), it became obvious to me that it is not a welcome
development as it does not teach people to trust democratic institutions, weakens the
effective functioning of institutions, allows individuals to be above criticism and it
does enhance personal representation rather than grounded in the system. Today, as the
role the citizen as spectator increases and the media focus people's attention on
personal rather than public relations, politics in Western countries has also become
more personalised (Bobbitt 2002). The most obvious example of the growing
personalisation of politics is the fact that many people see President Bush as the
single greatest threat to the peace world. Furthermore, when politics becomes
personalised and its objects reduce to the subject of media obsession, the issue of
political identity becomes rather problematic and complicated. For example, does John
Howard's (the Australian Prime Minister) argumentation (which comes too close to the
language of the ‘clash of civilisations’ to be acceptable to many Australians) speak for
Australia? Or do Poles identify with Leszek Miller's (the Polish PM) support for the war
(who saw it as a good opportunity to increase his own and the country's visibility on
the international scene)? Another example of problems arising due to the personalization
of politics is the British people's refusal to be convinced by Tony Blair’ personal
crusade to persuade them that the Iraqi state possessed weapons of mass destruction.
1.12 In today's post-Hobbesian age, which has begun with September 11,
terror networks, such as those assembled by Osama bin Laden (which, according to
Bobbitt, is a virtual state), threats from ‘failed’ states (or a ‘rogue’ states, as
Americans prefer to call them) are new and unfamiliar dangers (Kagan 2002). However,
states, as Kagan (2002) notes, are not designed to deal with these kinds of threats,
therefore they try to fit the new threat back into the ‘old frames’. Thus, we witnessed
the Iraqi war and now, at the end of July 2003, Australia leads intervention in the
Solomons. These actions have only been possible when the Iraq's problem and the islands’
troubles have been redefined - in the light of the new doctrine which teaches that
domestic chaos provides a breeding ground for terrorism - not just as a humanitarian
issue but also as a security threat.
1.13 In reality, we do not have a clear idea how to deal with complexities
of a new global, post-cold war world, while at the same time we cannot simply leave it
to the government to decide what it best as it is going to need our support on whichever
path it takes. ‘Consequently, it is critical that we engage in a compressive and
informed public debate and make a choice’ (Pollack 2002:xiii). If our choice is against
the war, we need, as Walzer (2003:4) notes, ‘a complicated campaign against the war,
whose participants are ready to acknowledge the difficulties and the costs of the
politics’. In order to develop such ability we ought to build up the faculty of negative
capability or, in other words, the capacity to live with uncertainties, ambiguities and
complexities and the capacity to contain our emotions and too quick and unreflective
judgements. Since this faculty depends upon the existence of a firm and strong self, we
should nurture the development of the international public and its opinion. Such a
cohesive global public's voice, its radical openness, tolerance and ability to learn,
could provide the basis of any successful response to situations that make significant
and complex demands on people. Secondly, what is required to campaign to defeat
aggression is a project for the development of a strong international system. Only if we
have a global public and an effectively working international system, will we be able to
respond to threats in a non-simplistic way. How to develop an international opinion able
to respond in complex ways to complex situations? Maybe, as the beginning, we should pay
more attention to informal communication, as it plays an important role in public
opinion and collective action formation because it ‘pulls together the scattered
critical potentials of a public that is only abstractedly held together by the public
media and it helps this public have a political influence on institutionalised opinion’
(Habermas 1996:382). Equally important is to enhance international cooperation by
increasing importance and the effectiveness of the United Nations as a promoter of
collective security. To sum up, the revitalization of the complex world of sociability
and the enhancement of international cooperation, seen as the most productive ways in
which we can overcome the inadequacy of our understanding of the complexities of the
global world and reduce threats, are the essential steps towards the construction of the
basis for the development of a global public capable of speaking in one voice.