The impact of power and powerlessness on blaming the victim of sexual assault

Defining Power and Powerlessness

Power differentials are a salient feature of society; people frequently navigate social situations in which they feel that they have, or do not have, power over others. We conceptualize power as the ability to influence or control others using methods of persuasion, legitimate authority, or coercion (see Copeland, 1994; Fiske, 1993; French & Raven, 1959; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Turner, 2005). Research has typically focused on the effects of power at each end of a theoretical continuum—from low power to high power.

People who do not have power typically have limited access to resources, making them more vulnerable to punishments (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002), more dependent on others, and more sensitive to how others evaluate them (Keltner et al., 2003). Those in powerless positions are also more likely to attend to individuating information about others (especially powerful others) in order to better predict their behavior (Bugental, Lyon, Krantz, & Cortez, 1997; Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Stevens & Fiske, 2000). Thus, powerless individuals may be more able to adopt another’s perspective due to their greater attention to individuating information. For instance, using socioeconomic status as a marker of power, Kraus, Piff, and Keltner (2009) demonstrated that low-power individuals were more likely to use contextual and situational cues to explain a variety of situations, including the emotions of others.

In contrast to their powerless counterparts, people high in power are less dependent on others (Dépret & Fiske, 1993), likely because desired resources are more accessible (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). Consequently, people in power are more likely to behave in ways that are consistent with their own personal values (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Keltner et al., 2003). High-power people demonstrate low motivation to form accurate appraisals of others and thus are less likely to adopt others’ perspectives (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; Keltner & Robinson, 1997). One outcome of this reduced motivation to form accurate impressions and reduced perspective-taking is an increased tendency to attend to stereotype-consistent information as opposed to stereotype-inconsistent information about others (Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000).

Rape Myth Endorsement

Stereotypes about sexual assault, victims, and assailants are commonly referred to as rape myths (Burt, 1980). For example, some rape myths serve to trivialize the event (e.g., “Women tend to exaggerate how much rape affects them”), others identify factors found within a “typical” assault (e.g., “Rape is unlikely to happen in the woman’s own familiar neighborhood”). Acceptance of rape myths perpetuates the tendency to blame the victim, as rape myths may be used to dismiss the severity of cases that don’t match prototypical rape scenarios (e.g., “If a weapon isn’t used it can’t be considered rape”), and others reflect a lack of consideration of the victims’ motives and feelings (e.g., “Women claim rape when they agreed to have sex and regret it later”). Such myths define rape narrowly and cast blame on the victims while simultaneously denying and/or justifying male sexual aggression against females (Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994; see also Peterson & Muehlenhard, 2004). Furthermore, rape myths that deny victims’ experience as rape by asserting that they are lying or exaggerating their experience suggest a failure to recognize the feelings experienced by victims of sexual assault. Thus, in the current work we use this subset of rape myths as a subtle marker of a (lack of) perspective taking.

Prior research suggests that rape myth acceptance may be influenced by the extent to which one endorses power hierarchies. Specifically, Hockett et al. (Hockett, Saucier, Hoffman, Smith, & Craig, 2009) found that social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1988) predicted greater endorsement of rape myths and negative attitudes toward rape victims, respectively. These findings are consistent with the prediction that personal feelings of power/powerlessness may also influence endorsement of rape myths. Research also suggests that endorsement of rape myths increases the likelihood of victim blaming in specific rape cases (Blumberg & Lester, 1991; Feild, 1978; Jenkins & Dambrot, 1987; Muehlenhard & MacNaughton, 1988). Further, men generally endorse rape myths to a greater extent than women (see Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994, and Suarez & Gadalla, 2010, for a review), and empathize less with rape victims (Bell, Kuriloff, & Lottes, 1994; Brady, Chrisler, Hosdale, & Osowiecki, 1991; Davies, Pollard, & Archer, 2001; B. H. White & Kurpius, 2002). In the research reported here, we consider adherence to myths and stereotypes surrounding sexual assault—especially those that deny the feelings of rape victims—as a marker of low perspective taking, an outcome sensitive to power priming.

Blaming the Victim

In the context of sexual assault, blaming the victim (BTV) refers to the tendency to hold victims responsible for their assaults (Eigenberg & Garland, 2008; Ryan, 1971). In determining blame, people often attribute an assault to the presence of drugs or alcohol (Hayes-Smith & Levett, 2010; Wild, Graham, & Rehm, 1998); the attractiveness of the victim (Calhoun, Selby, Cann, & Keller, 1978; Gerdes, Dammann, & Heilig, 1988) and assailant (Deitz & Byrnes, 1981); the extent to which the victim did not attempt to resist the assault (Krulewitz, 1981; Krulewitz & Nash, 1979); and the clothing worn by the victim (Cassidy & Hurrell, 1995; Loughnan, Pina, Vasquez, & Puvia, 2013; Moor, 2010; Muehlenhard & MacNaughton, 1988; Whatley, 2005; Workman & Orr, 1996). The tendency to blame the victim is particularly likely in the context of acquaintance/date rape (situations in which the victim and assailant have some prior association with one another) as compared to stranger rape (situations in which the victim and assailant do not know one another). Stranger rapes are typically viewed as the stereotypical rape scenario, while deviations from this stereotype, as in the case of acquaintance rape, are met with greater victim blaming (e.g., Bell et al., 1994; Grubb & Harrower, 2008; Tetreault & Barnett, 1987). Indeed, individuals who strongly endorse rape myths tend to believe that only stranger rape is “real rape” (e.g., Bridges, 1991; Gerdes et al., 1988; L’Armand & Pepitone, 1982; Tetreault & Barnett, 1987). In the present research, we examine whether feelings of power/powerlessness influence the extent to which observers adhere to rape stereotypes and blame victims of acquaintance rape.

The Current Research

What influence might feelings of power versus powerlessness have on victim blaming? Feminist scholars have long proposed that sexual assault is motivated by power, with violence against women a function of gendered sex roles that support male domination and female exploitation (Brownmiller, 1975; Burt, 1980; Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994; Ward, 1995). This power motivation, as opposed to sexual motivation, is recognized by third-party perceivers asked to identify the motives of perpetrators of sexual assault (Perrilloux, Duntley, & Buss, 2014). Societies that are largely “rape free” are characterized by egalitarian views of men and women’s contributions to society (A. M. White, Potgieter, Strube, Fisher, & Umana, 1997), and correlational research suggests that endorsement of gender inequality and traditional gender roles is associated with greater acceptance of rape myths and victim blaming (Brownmiller, 1975; Burt, 1980; Deitz, Tiemann, Blackwell, Daley, & Bentley, 1982; Edwards, Turchik, Dardis, Reynolds, & Gidycz, 2011; Whatley, 2005).

Yet there is relatively little experimental research investigating the effects of power (and powerlessness) on victim blame. The present research aims to fill this gap. In Study 1, female and male participants were primed with power or powerlessness, or a power-irrelevant neutral prime, before engaging in a thought-listing task about the typical victim of a sexual assault. In Study 2, participants were again primed with power, powerlessness, or a neutral prime, then read and evaluated a case of sexual assault.

On the basis of research suggesting that high power increases reliance on stereotypes and lessens perspective taking (Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Fiske, 1993; Galinsky et al., 2006; Goodwin et al., 2000; Keltner & Robinson, 1997), we predicted that high-power participants would rely on victim rape myths as explanations for the assault, which would manifest as more stereotype-consistent cognition (e.g., thinking about victim behaviors that may have contributed to the event) and more victim blaming in open-ended responses, compared to powerless and neutral-prime participants. Conversely, given that powerlessness is associated with greater sensitivity to power differentials and situational cues (Bugental et al., 1997; Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Kraus et al., 2009; Stevens & Fiske, 2000), we predicted that powerless participants would rely less on stereotypical explanations for the assault and thus blame the victim less than high-power and neutral-prime participants.

We also expected to find a typical gender difference in victim blaming, with men blaming victims more than women (see Grubb & Harrower, 2008, for a review). But additionally, we anticipated that power priming may have differential effects on women and men. The two studies will test among several alternative forms this Gender × Power Priming interaction might be expected to take:

Importantly, both studies also sought to investigate a potential mediator of victim blame: participants’ ability to adopt a perspective that deviates from typical rape myths. Since powerlessness tends to reduce reliance on stereotypes, we expected that powerlessness would promote increased attention to the feelings experienced by victims (Study 1), and decreased reliance on rape myths (Study 2), which, in turn, would contribute to lower victim blaming.

Study 1

Results

Both primary variables of interest were analyzed simultaneously using a 2 (Participant Gender: male, female) × 3 (Power Condition: high power, low power, neutral) between-subjects multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Means and standard deviations for each variable by gender within each condition are reported in Table 1.

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Table 1.

Means and standard deviations on thought listings by power condition and participant gender (Study 1).

	Low powerM (SD)	NeutralM (SD)	High powerM (SD)
Men	n = 16	n = 19	n = 22
Blaming the victim	1.75 (1.97)	4.13 (2.55)	3.64 (2.41)
Perspective taking	4.53 (3.15)	1.58 (2.24)	1.75 (3.27)
Women	n = 21	n = 35	n = 26
Blaming the victim	3.24 (1.93)	2.50 (2.12)	2.27 (2.29)
Perspective taking	2.43 (2.56)	2.41 (2.61)	4.33 (3.60)

Analyses revealed no main effects of gender, F(2, 132) = 0.86, p = .43, or power condition, F(4, 266) = 1.58, p = .18 on the variables of interest, but the interaction was significant, F(4, 266) = 4.56, p = .001. Looking at each outcome separately, the interaction was significant for both blaming the victim, F(2, 133) = 6.03, p = .003, and perspective taking, F(2, 133) = 6.56, p = .002.

We decomposed these interactions by testing the effects of gender within each power condition and the effects of power condition for each gender. We focused on each variable of interest separately. In the case of significant simple main effects, we further tested the pair-wise comparisons. We applied a Bonferroni correction to the pair-wise alpha levels, given that we conducted multiple pair-wise comparisons.

Moderated Mediation

To test whether the Gender × Power Condition interaction on victim blaming was mediated by perspective taking, we conducted a moderated mediation analysis using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (A. F. Hayes, 2013, Model 8). We regressed victim blame onto two dummy-coded variables reflecting the (a) high-power versus low-power and neutral conditions and (b) the low-power versus high-power and neutral conditions, with perspective taking included as the mediator. Because the neutral condition was always coded as zero and each dummy code was entered in the model simultaneously, we could test the two comparisons of interest: high power versus neutral and powerless versus neutral. Gender was included as a moderator variable of both the a path (i.e., power condition dummy code on perspective taking) and the c path (i.e., power condition dummy code on victim blaming).

Obtaining appropriate model coefficients for each comparison of interest required running the PROCESS macro twice (K. Preacher, personal communication, September 3, 2015). In the first step, the dummy code testing the power versus neutral comparison was included as the independent variable and the second dummy code was entered as a covariate. Thus, the first step calculated indirect, direct, and total effects for the comparison between the high-power and neutral conditions. In the second step, the same model was run but with the dummy code testing the powerless versus neutral comparison entered as the independent variable, and the second dummy code entered as the covariate. Thus, the second step calculated indirect, direct, and total effects for the comparison between the powerless and neutral conditions.

Step 1: High power versus neutral

The moderated mediation model in Step 1 reproduced the significant Gender x Power Condition interactions on perspective taking and blaming the victim as explained in the MANOVA (see Figure 1). Furthermore, the overall moderated mediation model was significant, index of moderated mediation = 1.24, SE = 0.52, 95% CI [0.29, 2.33]. Specifically, the conditional indirect effect of perspective taking was significant for female participants, indirect effect = −.98, SE = 0.36, 95% CI [−1.79, −0.35], but not for male participants, 95% CI [−0.44, 0.96]. Women in the high-power condition, compared to those in the neutral condition, showed greater perspective taking which, in turn, decreased victim blaming.

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Figure 1.

Indirect effect of high-power versus neutral condition on blaming the victim through perspective taking, for women in Study 1.

Step 2: Low power versus neutral

The moderated mediation model in Step 2 also reproduced the significant Gender x Condition interactions discussed before (see Figure 2). Furthermore, the overall moderated mediation model was significant, index of moderated mediation = −1.45, SE = 0.47, 95% CI [−2.42, −0.59]. Specifically, the conditional indirect effect of perspective taking was significant for male participants, indirect effect = −1.34, SE = 0.39, 95% CI [−2.16, −0.61], but not for female participants, 95% CI [−0.42, 0.63]. Men in the low-power condition, compared to those in the neutral condition, showed greater perspective taking which, in turn, decreased victim blaming.

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Figure 2.

Indirect effect of powerless versus neutral condition on blaming the victim through perspective taking, for men in Study 1.

Discussion

Study 1 demonstrated that power priming affects the thoughts called to mind when imagining the “typical victim of a sexual assault,” and that these thought patterns differ for women and men. The neutral and high-power conditions replicated the typical pattern of greater victim blaming by men compared to women, and powerless priming reversed it: Men led to feel powerless, compared to women placed in the same mindset, generated fewer thoughts indicating victim blame.

In the introduction, we laid out three possible patterns of interaction between power priming and gender. With regard to the male exacerbation hypothesis—that the expected effects of power priming would be exaggerated in men—one aspect of our results supported this hypothesis: Men engaged in less victim blaming than women when they were low in power, and blamed victims more than women under conditions of high power. But the fact that men’s victim blaming did not differ between the high-power and neutral conditions is inconsistent with the exacerbation view. This suggests that a mechanism other than greater salience of power cues to men was operative.

The default status deviation prediction was based on the idea that social status differences between the sexes mark powerlessness as the default for women, and power the default for men. Deviations from these defaults may therefore have greater influence, with women more likely to blame the victim when experiencing high power (but showing no differences between powerlessness and neutral conditions), and men less likely to blame the victim when experiencing low power (but showing no differences between the high-power and neutral conditions). Consistent with this hypothesis, men’s thought listings did not differ in the high-power versus neutral conditions, whereas men in the low-power condition showed increased perspective taking and decreased victim blaming. Also consistent with this hypothesis, thought listings in the low-power and neutral conditions did not differ among women. At odds with the default status deviation prediction, however, was the fact that women in the high-power condition did not differ from those in the neutral condition in degree of victim blaming, and high-power women showed greater, not less, perspective taking. Overall then, this prediction was supported in the case of men, but not women.

The third hypothesis suggested that powerlessness in the context of sexual assault may be threatening for women, leading to increased victim blaming as a means of personal threat reduction. Consistent with this threat account, it was the case that low-power women’s thoughts, relative to those of low-power men, indicated less perspective taking and more victim blaming. However, the threat account would also suggest increased victim blaming by women in the low-power (compared to neutral) condition, and though the means were in this direction, the difference was not significant.

Not accounted for in any of our hypotheses was the fact that women engaged in greater perspective taking and lower ratings of blame when in the high-power condition. This finding suggests that when primed to feel powerful, women may be more likely to express their own personal values, rather than engage in defensive victim blaming (Chen et al., 2001; Keltner et al., 2003).

Overall, Study 1 suggests different mechanisms may be operating among men and women in their evaluations of victim blame. The most striking finding in the data was the effect of powerlessness on men: Powerlessness led to increased perspective taking, and the lowest levels of victim blaming across all conditions in the study. As further evidence of this unique effect of powerlessness on men, mediation analyses indicated that the decreased tendency to blame victims among men in the low-power condition was driven by their increased perspective taking. Among women, high-power priming increased perspective taking, which in turn, reduced victim blame, though there were no overall condition effects on victim blame for women. We continue to examine these patterns and the competing predictions about the interaction between power priming and gender in Study 2.

Study 2

Study 2 aimed to provide a more controlled examination of the effects of power priming on victim blaming by having all participants evaluate the same sexual assault case. Furthermore, we aimed to show converging evidence for mediation by perspective taking, operationalized in this study as (low) endorsement of rape myths that deny, or fail to take into account, the feelings of rape victims. In particular, we measured participants’ beliefs that victims lie and want to be assaulted, which we view as markers of low levels of perspective taking. Finally, we continued to examine competing hypotheses about the interaction between power priming and gender in Study 2, as the new methodology and measures offered the opportunity for conceptual replication and reconsideration of these alternatives.

Method

Results

All variables were analyzed using a 2 (Participant Gender: male, female) × 3 (Power Condition: high power, low power, neutral) between-subjects MANOVA. Means and standard deviations for each variable by gender within each condition are reported in Table 2.

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Table 2.

Means across condition by participant gender (Study 2).

	Low powerM (SD)	NeutralM (SD)	High powerM (SD)
Men	n = 18	n = 20	n = 19
Blaming the victim	4.19 (1.69)	5.34 (1.59)	5.30 (1.15)
RMA	2.33 (0.91)	2.78 (0.73)	2.75 (0.69)
Perspective taking	5.78 (0.94)	5.01 (1.01)	5.20 (0.71)
Women	n = 30	n = 21	n = 22
Blaming the victim	5.18 (1.23)	4.26 (1.27)	4.47 (1.06)
RMA	2.23 (0.89)	2.16 (0.60)	2.13 (0.77)
Perspective taking	5.43 (1.09)	5.92 (1.02)	5.72 (1.02)

Note. RMA = overall Rape Myth Acceptance Scale.

Analyses revealed no main effects of gender, F(2, 123) = 2.38, p = .10, or power condition, F(4, 248) = 0.21, p = .93 on the variables of interest, but the interaction was significant, F(4, 248) = 4.69, p = .001. The interaction was significant for both blaming the victim, F(2, 124) = 7.83, p = .001, and perspective taking, F(2, 124) = 4.61, p = .01. As in Study 1, we decomposed these interaction effects by testing pair-wise comparisons of condition for each gender, and of gender within each condition. We focused on each outcome variable separately, applying a Bonferroni correction to the pair-wise alpha levels.

Indirect Effect of Power on Victim Blame

To test whether the condition effects on victim blaming were mediated by perspective taking, we conducted a moderated mediation analysis using the same procedure and coding scheme as Study 1.

Step 1: High power versus neutral

The moderated mediation in Step 1 reproduced the significant Gender x Condition interactions on perspective taking and blaming the victim as explained in the MANOVA (see Figure 3). The overall moderated mediation model was not significant, index of moderated mediation = .12, SE = 0.17, 95% CI [−0.16, 0.53].

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Figure 3.

Indirect effect of high-power versus neutral condition on blaming the victim through perspective taking, for women in Study 2.

Step 2: Low power versus neutral

The moderated mediation in Step 2 also reproduced the significant Gender x Condition interactions on perspective taking and blaming the victim as explained in the MANOVAs (see Figure 4). The overall moderated mediation model was significant, index of moderated mediation = −.37, SE = 0.21, 95% CI [−0.92, −0.07]. Specifically, the conditional indirect effect of perspective taking was significant for male participants, indirect effect = −.85, SE = 0.40, 95% CI [−0.61, −0.03], but not for female participants, indirect effect = .14, SE = 0.12, 95% CI [−0.03, 0.46]. Men in the low-power condition, compared to those in the neutral condition, showed greater perspective taking, which in turn, decreased victim blaming.

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Figure 4.

Indirect effect of powerless versus neutral condition on blaming the victim through perspective taking, for men in Study 2.

Discussion

Using a concrete depiction of a sexual assault scenario and a different operationalization of power priming in Study 2, we generally replicated the results of Study 1 regarding interactions between gender and powerlessness priming, and completely replicated the effects of priming on men. Specifically, low-power priming reduced victim blaming and increased perspective taking in men, and there was no difference between the high-power and neutral conditions. Additionally, low-power men were less likely to blame the victim than low-power women, a reversal of the typical gender difference in victim blaming that held in both the neutral and high-power conditions.

Considering the effects of power priming on women, two key differences from Study 1 emerged. First, in Study 2, women in the low-power condition were significantly more likely to blame the victim than women in the neutral and high-power conditions. It is worth noting, however, that the means from Study 1 were also consistent with this pattern, with women’s highest level of victim blaming occurring in the low-power condition.

The other difference was that in Study 1, women in the high-power condition showed greater perspective taking than women in the other conditions, and this tendency, in turn, predicted reduced victim blaming. This pattern was not replicated in Study 2, nor were the means consistent with this pattern. This inconsistency may be due to the differences in methodology used across the studies, and/or to the change from a university sample to a community sample, both of which we elaborate on in the following section. Instead, we focus on the stable pattern for men across both studies, and the consistent pattern for women of greater victim blaming when powerless compared to the other conditions.

What do these findings mean for the hypotheses regarding interactions between gender and power condition? Again, some support may be claimed for the male exacerbation hypothesis: Men engaged in less victim blaming than women when low in power, and blamed the victim more than women when high in power, suggesting a stronger influence of power priming on men than women. However, the fact that the high-power condition again did not differ from the neutral condition for either gender indicates only limited support for this hypothesis.

Supporting a default status deviation explanation, men in the high-power and neutral conditions demonstrated no differences in victim blaming or perspective taking. But perhaps as an indication of the novelty of low power for men, men blamed the victim less and adopted the victim’s perspective more than men in the neutral condition. Providing further evidence for the unique effect of powerlessness among men, mediation analyses indicated that decreased victim blaming among men in the low-power condition was driven by their increased perspective taking for victims of assault. For women, findings were inconsistent with the default status prediction: High-power priming showed no unique effects relative to the neutral condition, and low power led to increased victim blaming.

This latter finding—that low-power women blamed the victim more than their neutral and high-power condition counterparts—supports the third hypothesis that powerlessness in the context of sexual assault is particularly threatening for women. In fact, women in the low-power condition showed less perspective taking and blamed victims more than men in the same condition. In other words, reminders of being powerless appeared to encourage a defensive reaction from women. This pattern also appeared in Study 1 (see Table 1), but did not meet conventional levels of significance in that case. Considering the effects of low-power priming for both women and men, we come to a modified version of the powerlessness as threat for women prediction: Powerlessness is threatening for women, but encourages benevolence in men.

General Discussion

Across two studies, we demonstrated the effects of differential feelings of power on victim blaming. For men in particular, we found clear evidence that priming a sense of powerlessness reduced victim-blaming tendencies. Previous literature indicates that powerless individuals are more sensitive to power differentials and more attentive to stereotype-inconsistent information (Bugental et al., 1997; Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Kraus et al., 2009; Stevens & Fiske, 2000). In the context of sexual assault, such sensitivity may translate into victim perspective taking. Using two different operationalizations of perspective taking, both studies demonstrated that powerless men were less likely to blame the victim because of their increased tendency to adopt the perspective of the victim.

The observed effects among male participants in both studies are consistent with a default status deviation explanation of power on victim blaming. Powerlessness is inconsistent with men’s typical status, and may therefore heighten attention to the powerlessness of victims of sexual assault, increase perspective taking, and reduce victim blaming. However, the default status deviation account did not hold for women, as the high-power condition—the deviation from default—had relatively little effect. The one exception was that in Study 1, women primed with high power adopted the perspective of victims more so than women in the neutral condition. This unexpected positive effect of high power may reflect the tendency for powerful individuals to express their personal values more strongly than others (Chen et al., 2001; Keltner et al., 2003). That is, absent of power manipulations, women typically blame victims less than their male counterparts (see Grubb & Harrower, 2008, for a review). When led to feel powerful, this tendency may be enhanced.

Also inconsistent with the default status deviation account was the finding that powerlessness—the default status for women—did affect women relative to the neutral condition in Study 2. Women primed with powerlessness showed increased victim blaming in Study 2, and tended to do so in Study 1 as well (see Table 1). This pattern is more consistent with the powerlessness as threat for women prediction: Powerlessness among women may signal their potential to be a victim, resulting in greater distancing from the victim by blaming the victim for her plight (Lerner, 1980).

These findings regarding powerlessness in women, in conjunction with the consistent pattern of positive consequences of powerlessness priming in men, point to a fourth, perhaps hybrid perspective on how gender and power interact: Powerlessness means something different for women and men, at least in the context of sexual assault with a female victim and male assailant. For women, feeling low in power in these cases is threatening, producing a defensive response of victim blaming and reversing the typical gender difference in victim blaming. For men, low power—perhaps because of its deviation from default—increases perspective taking and reduces victim blaming, consistent with the broader literature on the positive consequences of powerlessness. Future work should continue to explore the possibility that different mechanisms are responsible for low-power effects in women versus men. For instance, to further explore the link between powerlessness and perspective taking among men, direct measures (or manipulations) of perspective taking, and its resulting emotional state, empathy, should be explored (Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002; Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981). Among women, the defensive response to powerlessness should be examined more directly, perhaps via direct measures of threat and just world beliefs (R. M. Hayes, Lorenz, & Bell, 2013).

Unfortunately, the current studies offer little information about the potential effects of priming individuals to feel powerful, as the high-power conditions generally did not differ significantly from the neutral conditions across both studies. Perhaps the “high-power” side of our manipulation was simply less strong than the powerless side: Participants may not have been able to recall truly high-power experiences in Study 1, or may not have felt their judgments would actually have much impact on the sexual assault case in Study 2. Because we used an established means of manipulating power, we did not include a manipulation check in Study 1. A research assistant blind to condition, however, examined the writing responses of participants and guessed the condition to which they had been assigned (high power, low power, control). The coder was accurate 97.10% of the time, suggesting that the manipulation was effective. Further, a poststudy manipulation check was conducted using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Specifically, 96 participants (52% female) were given the same instructions and writing task primes used in Study 1 before being asked to rate their current mood state. Embedded within the original 20 items from the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) we inserted “powerful” and “powerless.” A 2 (Participant Gender: male, female) × 3 (Power Condition: high power, low power, neutral) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on the outcome emotions of interest. No significant differences emerged on ratings of feeling powerful: priming condition, F(2, 90) = 0.23, p = .80; gender, F(1, 90) = 1.01, p = .83; interaction, F(2, 90) = 0.26, p = .77. There was a significant main effect of condition on ratings of feeling powerless, F(2, 90) = 3.51, p = .03, such that participants in the low-power condition felt significantly more powerless (M = 1.79, SD = 1.29) than those in the neutral (M = 1.24, SD = 0.43, p = .01) or high-power (M = 1.30, SD = 0.73, p = .03) conditions. There was no significant difference between the high-power and neutral conditions assessments of powerlessness (p = .75) and no main effect of gender, F(1, 90) = 0.06, p = .81, or the Gender × Condition interaction, F(2, 90) = 0.55, p = .58. These findings suggest that the recall task was more effective in priming low- than high-power experiences, though women’s responsiveness to the high-power prime may have been due to its relational nature. Even when writing about having power in a relationship, women may have responded with greater perspective taking and understanding for female victims of sexual assault.

We also did not include a manipulation check in Study 2, but we conducted a poststudy manipulation check using a separate group of 103 (44% female) undergraduate students. Participants were asked to rate their current mood (including “powerful” and “powerless”) after being randomly assigned to one of the three power conditions utilized in Study 2. Once again, no significant differences emerged on feelings of power: condition, F(2, 97) = 0.51, p = .60; gender, F(1, 97) = 2.52, p = .12; interaction, F(2, 97) = 0.47, p = .62, however there was a significant main effect of condition on ratings of powerlessness, F(2, 97) = 4.16, p = .02 such that participants in the low-power condition felt significantly more powerless (M = 1.35, SD = 0.65) than those in the neutral (M = 1.08, SD = 0.28, p = .04) or high-power (M = 1.13, SD = 0.34, p = .01) conditions. There was no significant difference between the high-power and neutral conditions assessments of powerlessness (p = .68) and no main effect of gender, F(1, 97) = 2.74, p = .10 or the Gender × Condition interaction, F(2, 97) = 1.00, p = .37. Given the lack of significant effects of the high-power prime in Study 2, we are not surprised to find that the high-power prime was not successful in our manipulation check. Supporting our findings, however, the low-power prime did again prompt greater feelings of powerlessness, as intended.

These poststudy manipulation checks indicate that a stronger instantiation of high power—perhaps by directly placing participants in an impactful role or position (Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 2010; Chen et al., 2001; Stel, van Dijk, Smith, van Dijk, & Djalal, 2012)—may help to exaggerate differences between the high-power and neutral group and better allow for a test of the male exacerbation and deviation from default status predictions. Taken together, however, the results of our manipulation checks provide additional support for our consistent finding: powerless men adopt the perspective of victims of sexual assault more, leading to lower assessments of victim blame. The efficacy of our low-power prime also provides additional support for the emerging trend among low-power women in our studies: powerless women blame the victim more than women in the neutral condition. As discussed before, future work is needed to investigate an appropriate mediator for this effect, as perspective taking was not a significant mediator among low-power women.

Another limitation of the current study concerns the participant samples. While Study 1 consisted of a fairly diverse online sample, Study 2 was comprised of university students whose responses to a sexual assault case may not accurately reflect those of the general population. For instance, endorsement of rape myths and predisposition to find the defendant guilty prior to reviewing a case had greater influence on guilty verdicts in sexual assault cases in a community sample than a university student sample (Keller & Wiener, 2011). These sample differences, however, do not consistently emerge (e.g., Hosch, Culhane, Tubb, & Granillo, 2011; Lassiter, Geers, Handley, Weiland, & Munhall, 2002), and may also be influenced by the ecological validity of the assessments used. For example, Keller and Wiener (2011), who found sample differences, assessed guilt on a 1 (not at all guilty) to 9 (guilty) scale, whereas our studies used a dichotomous measure of guilt as in actual courtrooms (Diamond, 1997; Weiten & Diamond, 1979). Further, due to the sensitive nature of the material used in this study, we limited our university sample to include only students who indicated that neither they, nor anyone close to them, had been a victim of a sexual assault. Although this may reflect defense attorney preferences for jurors in most sexual assault cases, it limits the generalizability of the findings. It is likely that individuals who have been victimized themselves, or know someone who has, would have stronger reactions to the scenario depicted in Study 2.

Compared to other violent crimes, rapes and sexual assaults are among the most underreported (Fisher, Daigle, Cullen, & Turner, 2003; Koss, 1992). Victims are unwilling to report a sexual assault to the authorities if they do not believe doing so will be effective (Felson, 2002; Fisher et al., 2003). Our findings are relevant in the legal domain in which verdicts of guilt and the severity of punishment often are guided by judgments of personal blame (Carroll, 1979). In jury selection, consideration might be given to how the relative feelings of personal power/powerlessness among the jury members may influence evaluations of victim blame. For instance, an individual assigned as foreperson may feel uniquely powerful relative to the other jury members, while a disproportionately male jury may make patriarchal gender roles more salient and cause female jurors to feel relatively powerless. To address this, future work should explore how jury instruction prior to deliberation might lessen the impact of personal feelings of power on victim blaming.