Abstract

Keywords
The subject-matter of the present analysis is a judgement of the European Court of Human Rights of 5 March 2020 delivered in the case Grobelny v. Poland (60477/12). The case concerned deprivation of an applicant of her right to the previously received disability pension. The European Court of Human Rights held that it constituted a disproportionate violation of the right to protection of property and consequently – a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. 2
Facts of the case
Mr. Mieczysław Grobelny was insured in the Farmers’ Social Security Fund as a farmer. In the period from 1994 to 31 March 2008, Mr. Grobelny was receiving a disability pension from the Fund because he was completely unfit for farm work. 3 As a result of the examinations conducted by the experts of the Fund, as of 1 April 2008, payment of the disability pension to Mr. Grobelny was refused due to the determination that he was no longer completely unfit for farm work. The court proceedings conducted as a result of an appeal against the decision of the Fund upheld this decision. 4
On 19 January 2010, the applicant re-filed the request for being granted a disability pension. As a result thereof, the Fund considered Mr. Grobelny as being temporarily completely unfit for farm work from 17 December 2009 until 28 February 2011. Nevertheless, on 6 April 2010, the Fund refused the applicant’s request for a disability pension, finding that he had not paid social insurance contributions for the required period of time; one of the conditions for being granted that benefit. 5
As a result of lodging of an appeal against this decision by Mr. Grobelny, the court granted him the right to the benefit as of the request filing date – i.e. 19 January 2010. In the course of the court proceedings, it was determined on the basis of the medical experts that the applicant had also been completely unfit for farm work for the period in which payment of a disability pension to him was refused (i.e. in the period from 2008). Moreover, two experts who had issued the opinion constituting the basis for upholding of the decision on the refusal to pay the benefit stated in the court proceedings conducted in 2010 that they were not provided with the full material necessary for making an assessment of the health condition of Mr. Grobelny and that the documentation provided to them allowed for only a determination of the continuity of the state of being completely unfit for farm work. 6 The applicant appealed the decision of the court, requesting being granted with the right to the benefit not as of 19 January 2010, but as of 01 April 2008. Nevertheless, the appellate court decided that due to the res iudicata principle, it was bound by the findings made in the legally valid judgement issued in the previous proceedings, and that it was impossible to re-examine and re-establish the issue of the applicant’s state of health, even though the experts in the ongoing proceedings had declared him completely unfit for farm work as of 31 March 2008. 7
On 1 August 2011, the applicant filed a suit, requesting compensation of the lost amounts of the disability pension to him for the entire period of being unfit for farm work, starting from 1 April 2008. In the course of these proceedings, even though in both instances (of the first instance and that of the court of appeal) the courts decided that the opinions of the medical experts had been incorrect, due to the res iudicata principle, they could not adopt a different stance and consider the claim of Mr. Grobelny for compensation as legitimate. 8
The applicant lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights based on the refusal to grant him compensation for the period of twenty-one months when, in spite of his recognised incapacity for farm work, he had remained without any financial support from the State. The applicant thus claimed an unjustified deprivation of property. This complaint felled to be examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 9
The essence of the property right according to the Court
The Court stated that article 1 of Protocol no. 1 includes three rules: the first rule is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property; the second rule covers the deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; the third rule recognises that the Contracting States are entitled to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
The Court emphasised the fact that the rules determined above do not have independent character, but that they pervade and complement each other. 10
The Court stated that these rules are applicable when it comes to social and welfare benefits. 11 It emphasised the fact that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention does not establish any limitations for the Contracting Parties in the scope of whether (and what) social security system shall be implemented, and in what amount a benefit should be granted within such system. However, in case when the Contracting State has, in force, legislation providing for the payment as a right of a welfare benefit, that legislation must be regarded as generating possessions falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for persons satisfying its requirements. 12 The Court stated that in the modern democracies, many persons are dependent on receipt of benefits from the social security system. In these cases, when such person meets the conditions for receipt of the benefits of this type, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 should be applicable. 13
In the judgement, the Court also emphasised that the sole fact that the given benefit may be withdrawn on the background of the legal provisions being in force does not prevent it from being a ‘possession’ within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 14 Nevertheless, as it was stated by the Court, if the right to the benefit depends on the given benefit and this condition is not met, the right to the claim for this benefit which expired may not be considered as covered by the term ‘possession’ in the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 15
The Court emphasised the fact that one of the most important requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention is the requisition that any interference by a public authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions should be lawful, 16 in the public interest, and pursue a legitimate aim by means reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realised. 17
The Court referred to the principle of ‘good governance’ as well. This principle requires that in the cases when general interest is involved, public authorities shall act in good time, in an appropriate manner, and with the utmost consistency. 18
The Court also emphasised the fact that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention requires a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the public and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights, so that no disproportionate burden is imposed on an applicant; in particular, that the requisite ‘fair balance’ will not be struck where the person concerned bears an individual and excessive burden. 19 Moreover, there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised by any measure depriving a person of his possessions. 20
Res iduicata principle vs. right to protection of acquired property
The Court stated that it was certain that for the entire period from 1 April 2008 until 19 January 2010 Mr. Grobelny was unfit for farm work and fulfilled the other conditions for obtaining of the benefit pension.
The Court concluded that the fact that the applicant was deprived of the right to obtain a disability pension without any tangible compensation possibility amounts to an interference with his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 21
The Court emphasised the fact that application of the res iudicata principle may constitute a legitimate aim as it is established for public interest. 22 Nevertheless, in the opinion of the Court, the interference in the applicant’s property rights was clearly disproportionate, and due to this fact, it could not be considered as lawful interference. 23 Firstly, the Court decided that excessive burden was imposed on the applicant. In the opinion of the Court, it was not possible to decide that acting in the public interest, pursuant to the res iudicata principle, justified transferring the entire burden of the mistake made by the authorities to the applicant.
The Court also emphasised the fact that the Member State is obliged to observe the principle of good governance. 24 This principle requires the utmost consistency, in particular when dealing with matters of crucial importance to individuals, such as social and welfare benefits and other property rights. 25
The Court decided that the proportionality principle was violated in the analysed case. Such conclusion resulted firstly from deciding that the bases to depart from that principle of legal certainty expressed in the res iduicata principle existed. Furthermore, in the opinion of the Court, departure from the res iudicata principle was not the only solution relieving the applicant from the disproportionate burden that had been placed on him. The authorities could and should have proposed a solution that would make it possible for Mr. Grobelny to obtain compensation of the lost benefits on account of his unfitness to his farm work.
Due to the reasons determined above, the Court adjudicated the amount equal to the sum of the unpaid benefits on account of unfitness to farm work to Mr. Grobelny.
Final conclusion
The analysed judgement should be assessed in a critical way. First, the argumentation of the Court is not very detailed. The Court failed to attempt to present wider argumentation as to why in its analysis the res iudicata principle should be lifted. In fact, in its reasoning, the Court limited itself to stating that excessive burden has been imposed on the applicant. Such justification is necessary as the res iudicata principle is one of the most important rules guaranteeing stability in the functioning of the legal system.
Additionally, the Court’s statement that the Member State should find a way to compensate for the loss suffered by the applicant is an expression which, to a great extent, is abstract from the legal systems being in force in the Member States.
Therefore, it is possible to doubt whether the violation of the property right in the form of the right to the benefit, which certainly took place in this case, had - as decided by the Court - disproportionate character.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
