Abstract
The demand for equal pay constitutes a cornerstone of European social law. When the European Economic Community (EEC) was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the focus was clearly on the creation of a common market and the promotion of economic freedom, whereas social policy issues were rather neglected by the signatories of the Treaty. Against this background, Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome marks an exception within the legal framework of the EEC by enshrining the principle of equal pay. This provision is generally considered to be the very core from which the whole system of European social and antidiscrimination law has evolved gradually over time. Despite its fundamental role in European Union law, the principle of equal pay – now laid down in Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – is rather limited in scope. As stated in Paragraph 1, the provision guarantees equal pay (solely) “for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value”. By contrast, the book reviewed here deals with the demand for pay equality in a much more radical sense. Its authors discuss the pros and cons of an equal pay rate for all workers – irrespective of the job or profession performed. Should surgeons and nurses, pilots and cab drivers, professors and cleaners all earn the same amount of money?
From a purely legal perspective, constitutional law as well as European and international law all constitute a probably unsurmountable obstacle to the implementation of such a radical form of equality. A regulatory intervention imposing equal pay for all workers would massively interfere with fundamental individual freedoms — most notably, individual contractual freedom and the right of social partners to set wages through collective bargaining. However, as the editor of the volume, Anders Örtenblad, emphasises in the introductory chapter, the book is meant to address the topic from a philosophical perspective: would it be desirable to introduce equal pay for all in an ideal world where the legal restrictions of the existing legal order do not apply? That is not to say that the insights gained from this philosophical exercise cannot be used to shape the existing legal framework – on the contrary, they may be relied upon by politicians and activists to develop policy proposals and draft legal reforms.
The book is organised into four parts. The first part contains contributions rejecting the idea of equal pay for all workers. One of the main arguments brought forward in this context is that equality of pay would remove incentives to work and, in particular, incentives to perform jobs that are in the general interest and beneficial to society as a whole. Introducing equal pay would mean that remuneration would no longer be determined by demand and supply on the labour market, but by the government or some other kind of centralised institution (on what criteria?). While it is certainly true that markets too often fail to produce a fair distribution of income, it should not be overlooked that the price mechanism underlying free markets fulfils an important coordinating function, attracting labour supply to the economic sectors where it is needed most. This coordinating function would be thwarted if pay rates were set by the state.
The arguments in favour of equal pay are presented in the fourth part of the book. It is argued that rewards other than money could be used to incentivise activities and professions that have a positive impact on society. The authors advocating equal pay for all refer, above all, to solidarity, pointing to the fact that the amount of pay earned by workers often depends on factors for which workers are not accountable, such as health or certain physical abilities. A possible objection to this argument is that ‘equal’ and ‘just’ are not necessarily synonymous terms. As known since Aristotle's time, only like cases are to be treated alike. Thus, the equal treatment of unequal cases is unjust. Can all works performed really be said to be equal or of equal value? Moreover, granting an equal rate of pay may not result in equal economic treatment of all workers, since some individuals may have greater needs than others due to disease or other natural disadvantages, for example. In my view, the authors supporting equal pay for all could have discussed these aspects more thoroughly.
What these considerations show is that an equal rate of pay is neither sufficient nor necessary to achieve an egalitarian system of wealth distribution. This fact is acknowledged by the authors of the second and third parts of the book, which – in my opinion – contain the most convincing contributions. Here, various regulatory alternatives to equal pay that are designed to reduce income disparities are discussed, such as a minimum income for all citizens or pay ratios (i.e., provisions requiring that the highest wages in an organisation or profession cannot be x times greater than the wages of the lowest-paid workers). Compared with the idea of an equal pay rate for all workers, these regulatory proposals seem much more practicable and may be of actual interest for policymakers.
In sum, the book offers many different views and perspectives by experts from a wide array of disciplines. It is absolutely worthwhile reading for lawyers, philosophers, economists, social scientists, and policymakers alike.
