Globalisation,immigration and multiculturalism – the European and Australian experiences

Migration and multiculturalism – the latter defined generically as a strategy for ‘managing ethnic diversity’ (see Pakulski in this volume) ¹ – are closely related. Mass migrations inevitably raise issues of social and political ‘management’ of ethno-cultural relations, and this very ‘management’ becomes problematic when mass migrations intensify and/or significantly alter the established ethnic composition (as well as the socio-cultural status quo that accompanies it). Sudden surges of migration have regularly occurred in Europe and Australia throughout the last two centuries. The latest such wave started in the 1990s, triggering a destabilising backlash in Europe; Australia was left largely immune to the ‘shock of immigration’, except for the intensified debate about ‘boat people’. This is just one reason among many to devote this Special Issue to a comparison of the Australian and European experiences of recent mass migrations and the increasingly strained strategies for managing them.

In the most general sense, the recent intensification of mass migrations (estimated globally at 210–250 million people, with 45 million refugees alone) is an integral part of ‘globalisation’ – the increasing cross-border flows of information, internationally portable capital, globally ‘tradeable’ goods and services, values and norms, and, most importantly, ever more ‘mobile’ people (Livi-Bacci, 2012). This last dimension of globalisation – the increased mobility of people – has proven the most problematic and difficult to manage on the European continent. There are six interrelated reasons for these difficulties (and the accompanying anti-immigration backlash), all explored in the articles contributed to this volume:

Reactions to these new circumstances seem to have been similar throughout Europe: a backlash against mass immigration and ‘tolerance of ethno-cultural diversity’, the latter often identified with ‘multiculturalism’ (Berezin, 2009). Outside the EU’s eastern borders, especially in Russia, mass migrations, especially from Central Asia, cause serious ethno-religious and ethno-racial tensions. As Markowski et al. (in this volume) point out, these migrations also exacerbate the social and political tensions between Russia and the EU, especially over competing patterns of economic association. In the EU’s eastern regions, ethnic minorities have attracted the hostile attention of an increasingly vocal extreme right. In western Europe, there has been a shift in leaders’ and the public’s attitudes away from tolerant ‘multicultural acceptance of cultural diversity’ towards suspicious ‘assimilationism’ (see Lesinska in this volume). Some even diagnose a more radical shift towards ‘post-multiculturalism’ that salvages some liberal elements, such as civic nationalism, but sacrifices others, such as ethno-religious tolerance (see Gozdecka in this volume).

Even in Australia, which has not experienced significant ethno-religious strain and terrorism on its soil, and has been largely immune to the economic crisis and connected anti-immigrant backlash, public attitudes to immigration have started to change, and the issues of ‘border control’ and ‘asylum seekers’ have divided the formerly immigration-friendly elites (see Markus in this volume). While Australian multiculturalism – integrative, reciprocal and respectful of majority – has remained the officially approved strategy for the management of ethnic diversity, it also attracts criticism, often based on misconceptions about its strategic goals and underlying philosophy (see Pakulski in this volume).

However, these general statements, as almost all contributors have stressed, require some clarifications and qualifications. For a start, the European backlash seems to be directed mainly towards uncontrolled ‘crisis migration’, especially the inflow of ‘economic refugees’ from outside Europe. ‘Illegals’ are suspected of abusing the system and resisting integration. While the leading role in spreading these suspicions has been played by right-wing movements and parties, anti-immigrant attitudes have gradually percolated to mainstream political parties and leaders. In France, the anti-immigrant and pro-assimilationist National Front leads in opinion polls; in October 2013 over 24 per cent of polled French voters intended to support it, compared with 22 per cent supporting the conservative UMP and less than 19 per cent declaring support for the ruling Socialists. As recently as 2009, the National Front was still a marginal party attracting only 6 per cent of the popular vote in European Parliament elections. The anti-immigrant Freedom Party in Holland proposes a pan-European alliance before the 2014 EU parliamentary elections aimed at restricting immigration and asserting cultural assimilation. In crisis-ravaged Greece, the extremist, neo-Nazi New Dawn organises attacks on immigrants and threatens forced expulsion of refugees. The Eurosceptic Five Star Movement in Italy proposes drone surveillance of the Italian coast and strict control of the inflow of African refugees. The Bulgarian government is constructing a razor-wire wall on its border with Turkey to stem the inflow of illegal immigrants; this is in response to a wave of refugees from war-torn Syria. Britain’s xenophobic UKIP, supported by the popular press, has started a campaign against illegal immigrants and their alleged (without evidence) abuses of the British welfare system. In response to this campaign, the ruling Conservative government of David Cameron has restricted legal immigration (especially student and family visas), extended public monitoring of immigrants through banking and medical services, limited welfare payments to immigrants and ended immigration through ‘non-genuine’ marriages.

The backlash has resulted in tighter control of ‘crisis migration’ and further restrictions in assistance to refugees. The ‘legitimate’ ‘labour market migrations’ within the EU, by contrast, create less controversy; they are largely accepted as a part of the integration process. The accompanying policy shift may not be as comparatively illiberal as some critics suggest. This is partly because all European countries have always embraced assimilationist policies – less tolerant of cultural diversity than Australian multiculturalism – and partly because the radical backlash is kept under control by liberal elites. Also public attitudes, policies and elite strategies in Europe are diverging. The most crisis-afflicted societies, like Greece, Italy, Spain and, increasingly, also France, have experienced the strongest political backlash, with anti-immigration and anti-immigrant parties gathering strength. The less affected societies, like Germany, Poland and most of the Scandinavian countries, control the backlash by distinguishing between legitimate (legal and intra-EU) and illegitimate immigrants, with the latter facing stronger controls and restrictions. Finally, the non-EU countries, like Russia, seem to be embracing quite distinct strategies of immigrant selection and adaptation.

Thus, the backlash has resulted in some shifts and restrictions, but also in some differentiation between the strategies of European governments. One interesting outcome is an emerging ‘stratified’ treatment of immigrants. The ‘regular’ (legal and controlled) movements of workers across EU borders are reluctantly accepted as a part of the process of EU integration, while increasing suspicion-cum-hostility is directed at extra-EU ‘economic refugees’, especially those who arrive ‘illegally’ and form ‘visible’ and welfare-dependent minorities.

Similarly, the backlash against ‘multiculturalism’ – often misconstrued as an uncritical cult of ethno-cultural diversity (‘Multikulti’) – takes different forms. It is illiberal mainly at the political fringe. The critics belonging to the political mainstream, however, remain liberal; they point to the social pathologies that often accompany poorly managed mass migrations. Their attitude towards ethnic diversity is more cautious, perhaps more circumspect and conditional, than the attitudes of the extremists. Thus very few observers realise that Angela Merkel’s criticism was directed at ‘Multikulti’ and not ‘multiculturalism’. ‘Multikulti’ – a superficial and uncritical celebration of cultural diversity, with little concern for social integration – is a caricature of multiculturalism as understood and practised in Australia. The problem is that the ‘finer points’ escape public (and media) attention, and that the public denunciations of ‘Multikulti’ by a powerful and popular EU leader have been widely interpreted as being directed at mainstream liberal strategies. This has caused ‘collateral damage’ to the reputation of integrative multiculturalism.

Australia seems to have been less affected by political backlash and anti-liberal policy shifts. As noted by Markus, public attitudes to immigration and multiculturalism in Australia remain largely approving, though there are signs of a growing apprehension towards uncontrolled immigration and ‘unassimilable’ minorities (especially Muslim refugees, who are often seen as resisting integration). This apprehension, though, has not altered the traditional approval of mass, controlled immigration and Australian integrative multiculturalism, both still widely regarded as success stories by governments and the general public. This lasting approval reflects not only the generally successful integration of immigrants, but also the failure of anti-Asian and anti-immigrant mobilisations in the 1990s, such as Pauline Hanson’s One Nation movement and party.

This Australian immunity to radical backlashes may also reflect, as argued by Pakulski (in this volume), a specific character of Australian multiculturalism: its integrative, reciprocal and respectful nature. Australians remain supportive of mass migration, but less and less tolerant of uncontrolled ‘crisis migrations’, especially by ‘boat people’, who are seen as illegitimate ‘queue jumpers’, though they also attract sympathy when thought of as the hapless victims of people smugglers. Similarly, in spite of occasional criticisms of multiculturalism, and in spite of the ‘collateral damage’ the concept has suffered at the hands of some European politicians, there are no signs of multiculturalism being abandoned. Australia’s official adaptation strategies towards immigrants and ethnic minorities remain tolerant and bi-partisan, though the integrative nature of multiculturalism is also emphasised more explicitly.

Thus the differences in immigration and ‘management of diversity’ strategies have widened within Europe, as well as between Europe and Australia. The eastern non-EU parts of Europe are moving towards a distinct kind of migration regime aimed at strictly controlling immigrants from Central Asia. The EU countries are adopting distinct tactical responses reflective of their vulnerability to crisis and political backlash, while they also discuss a coordinated strategy involving (1) EU-wide operational procedures (by member states) that respect human rights; (2) more integrative-cum-assimilationist strategies towards immigrants and minorities; and (3) different treatment of different categories of immigrant, with more restrictions placed on uncontrolled and semi-controlled flows of ‘crisis-migrants’. At the same time, political rhetoric in Europe has shifted in a ‘post-multicultural’ direction.

What is the future of Australia’s immigration policies and multiculturalism? Four observations seem most relevant to answering this question. First, immigration is likely to remain high in volume and selective in mode. The (relatively) vibrant Australian economy, as well as a strong elite consensus about the value of mass immigration, are strong predictors of such an outcome. Second, while ‘multiculturalism’ continues to mean different things to different people, its original Australian version – integrative, reciprocal and respectful of the majority – remains widely accepted by Australian elites, including political leaders, and the general public. Third, this integrative multiculturalism looks quite successful as a method of management of diversity and as a nation-building strategy. In spite of a continuous mass intake of ethnically and religiously diverse immigrants, Australian society remains relatively free of the pathologies of immigrant mal-integration (while facing a challenge in relation to its Aboriginal minorities). Ethno-religious and ethno-communal conflicts and tensions are mild and rare. Levels of ethnic concentration – often used as an indicator of mal-integration (‘ethnic ghettoisation’) – are also low. Ethnic minority and immigrant labour force participation is high, which also indicates a high level of occupational integration, even though, like everywhere else, new immigrants to Australia face a greater likelihood of unemployment and longer job-seeking periods than more established immigrants. Similarly, the level of political engagement of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Australia is high – all major parties have a strong contingent of ‘ethnic’ politicians (Jupp and Clyne, 2011; Jupp et al., 2007; Marcus et al., 2009). While one has to be careful about attributing all these outcomes to the integrative impact of multiculturalism alone, the ‘social-historical record’ of multicultural strategies remains strong. Fourth, the symptoms of migrant mal-integration are diagnosed much more frequently – and in a more severe form – in countries that have shunned multiculturalism. As Pakulski and Gozdecka et al. (in this volume) remind us, the most publicised cases of ethno-religious mal-integration come not from Australia or Canada, but from the UK, France and Germany – the countries that have never embraced the policy of integrative multiculturalism. Mal-integration pathologies, it seems, are correlated with the assimilationist strategies embraced by governments in continental Europe, and with the ‘tolerant and benign neglect’ of immigrants embraced by British authorities.

Even if one concludes, cautiously, that Australia’s integrative multiculturalism seems viable (or at least it works better than the rival strategies embraced by European elites), there is no assurance of its bright future. This is not because multiculturalism faces widespread – albeit often confused – criticism, but because Australia is facing some new challenges of the ‘third immigration revolution’. The first such ‘immigration revolution’ occurred in the late 1940s and early 1950s as a result of a mass inflow of non-British immigrants – and it spawned the original incarnation of Australia’s integrative multiculturalism. The second ‘revolution’ started in the late 1970s, and it accompanied a mass of post-Vietnam War immigrants from South East Asia. It also caused a shift in the emphases of multicultural strategies in an ‘adaptive-integrative’ direction. Now Australia faces a ‘third revolution’ in the form of a mass inflow of immigrants and refugees coming not only from crisis-ravaged parts of Europe, but also – and increasingly – from East and South Asia (including Afghanistan), from the war-ravaged Middle East, and from the destabilised parts of Africa. Like many recent non-European migrants to Europe, these new ‘New Australians’ face a much more difficult adaptation, partly because of their relatively low social resources (skills, knowledge, networks), partly because of wider religious differences and ‘cultural distance’ from the host society, partly because of rising competition for jobs, and partly because of mounting security concerns and the negative stereotyping of ‘illegal’ immigrants. Whether Australia’s relatively open immigration policies and tolerant multiculturalism will survive the test of this third ‘immigration revolution’ is an open question.