Managing disagreement through yes,but … constructions: An argumentative analysis

Sequential treatment of concessive constructions

Discourse and conversation analysts have long scrutinised the dialogical uses of yes, but. . . and similar constructions. ¹ In her seminal study, Pomerantz (1984) treated but as a marker that allows expressing conversationally dispreferred disagreements under the conditions of the preference for agreement. The partial agreement signalled by the yes-clause was seen to delay and soften the confrontational elements contained in the but-clause. Much of the following literature has confirmed and extended Pomerantz’s analyses (Antaki and Wetherell, 1999; Billig, 1991; Mulkay, 1985). For instance, Mulkay (1985) and Billig (1991) have shown how initial expressions of agreement, or agreement prefaces, are used for devising argumentation in a more agreeable way. The initial agreement has also been examined as a device for mitigating the face-threatening nature of confrontational, argumentative discourse in conversation (Czerwionka, 2012; Holtgraves, 1997; Obeng, 1997; Rees-Miller, 2000; Sifianou, 2012).

Among the efforts to systematise the sequencing of agreements and disagreements, one may count Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson’s (2000) analysis of cardinal concessives. In this concede-and-contrast sequence co-produced by two speakers, B’s concession (X′) to A’s original proposition (X) is a version of A’s original point, which nevertheless allows B to uphold her own contrasting proposition (Y):

Speaker: Structure: Symbolically:

A: Proposition X

B: Concession X′

 Contrasting proposition Y

B’s sequence (X′–Y) can prototypically be realised through yes, but… constructions. Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson (2000) also discuss two important derivations of the cardinal scheme. In the first derivation, the contrasting position (Y) is not explicitly expressed, but only signalled by the – prosodic or semantic – way the concession is made (X′ only implying Y). In the second derivation, which is well documented (e.g. Antaki and Wetherell, 1999; Lindström and Londen, 2013), the contrasting position is expressed twice. Here, the concessive move comes only after the utterance of a contrasting position – an initial disagreement (Y) – which is reprised after the concessive move.

For Antaki and Wetherell (1999), this proposition–concession–reprise sequence (Y–X′–Y′) is initiated by speaker B expressing her position, followed by a somewhat disingenuous show concession, and concluded by reasserting her initial position. ‘It makes a show of using a form which, ostensibly, is evidence that the speaker appreciates the other side’s point of view, displaying to listeners that the speaker is not wholly blind to others’ positions’ (Antaki and Wetherell, 1999: 24). By contrast, ‘not making a show of it [concession] tends towards making it sound like its “literal,” dictionary definition of agreement and yielding’ (p. 12). In other words, speakers can either make concessions (X′) seriously, abandoning their position (Y), or just concede to X ‘for show’, thereby being able to maintain Y.

However, Antaki and Wetherell (1999) also admit that the proposition–concession–reprise structure ‘is the sort of device that might be particularly advantageously used when the speaker is in an environment where being rational and fairminded is at a premium’ (p. 25). In our view, this suggests that arguers can make genuine concessions (X′) while upholding their initial position and ‘re-launch it as a basis for further discussion and negotiation’ (Lindström and Londen, 2013: 349). On these grounds, Lindström and Londen have argued that ‘the practice of conceding and reasserting does not limit itself to specific rhetoric purposes’ and is a generally available device that ‘enhances intersubjectivity in interaction’ (p. 331). A similar point is made by studies employing the approach of Social Representations (Castro and Batel, 2008; Mouro and Castro, 2012). These have emphasised how concessive constructions are orientated towards negotiation, playing an important role in the re-signification and hybridisation of conflicting meanings (Castro, 2012). This is achieved by distinguishing what is considered acceptable at the level of the societal debate (expressed in the yes-clause) from what is contested (in the but-clause) in the ongoing interaction in which arguments are privileged according to other, contextual, specificities (Mouro and Castro, 2012). Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson (2000: 385) similarly observe that while in general ‘X and Y are understood by participants as potentially contrasting’,

[T]he nature of the potential contrast in the third move [Y] is open, since people’s inferential capabilities are open. That is, the exact way in which X and Y are understood by the participants as contrasting is not definable in advance, but is interpreted and negotiated by the participants in the situated context. In some contexts, for example, Y is taken by the participants to directly contrast with X, while in others Y may contrast with an inference from X, rather than X itself. (p. 382)

This summary thus highlights that ‘the nature of the potential contrast’ between conceding (yes…) and (re)asserting (but…) remains somewhat obscure in the literature and reinforces the need to develop a better understanding of what exactly happens – in terms of argumentation – between these two conversational units. Therefore, in the following section, we take the clarification of the argumentative relations between the yes- and the but-clauses as our main task and then focus on them in our analysis.

Argumentative functions of yes, but … constructions

From the perspective of argumentation theory, the first important clarification concerns the relations between the concession (X′) and the contrasting proposition (Y). In her extension of the work of Anscombre and Ducrot on the argumentative functions of but, Snoeck Henkemans (1995) examines these relations at length. Consider the following constructed dialogue, based on an example (‘This restaurant is good, but expensive’) discussed by Snoeck Henkemans (p. 284):

[Two friends discussing where to go for dinner]

A: It’s a good restaurant. (So let’s go there!)

B: Yes, it’s good, but expensive. (So let’s go somewhere else!)

In her utterance, B first accepts the good quality (X) of the restaurant and then introduces another concern – its expensiveness (Y). Following Anscombre and Ducrot, but can be said to function here in the following way: (1) X counts as a possible argument p for a possible conclusion R, (2) Y is presented as an argument q against this conclusion and, crucially, (3) q is presented as a more important argument for not-R than p is for R. Hence, B’s utterance (p but q) can be seen as a defence of not-R. This happens when speaker B admits that an argument p advanced in support of R is true or acceptable, but does not justify R in the particular context, given that there is q.

In sum, through the yes-clause an arguer ‘accepts the propositional content of the argument, but rejects its argumentative potential’ in the but-clause (Snoeck Henkemans, 1995: 287) and can thus uphold her standpoint in that situation. The fact that the argumentative potential of a proposition may be rejected brings to the fore what has so far been overlooked in the analyses of concessive constructions: that speakers can employ different types of argumentative criticism. According to one well-known typology of criticism (Johnson and Blair, 1994), an arguer can reject the acceptability of an opponent’s argument (it’s not true), its sufficiency to justify the standpoint (it is not enough) or its relevance for supporting the standpoint (it doesn’t matter).

Furthermore, Snoeck Henkemans (1995) considers some variations of Anscombre and Ducrot’s structure. Noticeably, after but an arguer can directly express the conclusion not-R, instead of an argument q against R:

B: Yes, it’s good, but (still) I don’t think we should go there.

Another important variation regards the relative weights of p and q – instead of q counting as weightier a reason than p, the two may count more or else equally:

B: Yes, it’s good, but expensive, so I don’t really know whether to go there or not.

A second important clarification, from the perspective of argumentation theory, concerns what actually is conceded in the affirmative yes-clause; that is, the relationship between A’s X and B’s X′, in Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson’s (2000) cardinal concessive scheme. While each X′ involves some departure from X, the cases in which the differences between the two are significant further complicate the analysis: What are we to make of cases where a speaker concedes to a significantly different version of someone else’s point? Is she conceding or is she not? Many conversation analysts take pains to avoid passing normative judgements regarding the quality of the conceded discourse (e.g. Antaki and Wetherell, 1999). Yet, when they speak of ‘Trojan Horse’ concessions making ‘a caricature description of the other side’s case’ (Antaki and Wetherell, 1999: 17ff), they just stop short of calling it a fallacy.

Recent work on interpretation in dialogical argumentation (Lewiński, 2011, 2012; Lewiński and Oswald, 2013) has examined the issue of re-presentation ‘of the other side’s case’, with the aim of differentiating between acceptable and ‘caricature’ (fallacious, straw man) re-presentations. This task requires both a descriptive analysis of pragmatic and rhetorical mechanisms behind re-presentations of others’ argumentation and a normative study of the violations of conditions for a reasonable argumentative discussion. While this work acknowledges there are no ‘real’ or ‘objective’ interpretations (Lewiński, 2012), it argues that there is a contextually plausible space for interpreting disagreements and arguments.

Based on these insights, our specific goals in this article are to examine the following:

Cardinal scheme 1: Sufficiency criticism

In the second episode, the climate activist featured in the video-excerpt (henceforth, the activist) contests the utility of carbon offsetting mechanisms by drawing a contrast between such consumer-based efforts and broader systemic changes. Our interviewees clearly oriented to various elements of his complex argumentation by skilfully picking up different points to concede and to refute:

Excerpt 1 – Interview 2

 Ethically what he’s saying is true, but actually as when you consult, think about human psychology, I think that you need to push people, eeeh well, not need to but, certain mechanisms might be more effective in achieving the results, I would say…

The cardinal type of concession carried out here does not make explicit what is conceded to, except for merely endorsing an ethical point in generic terms and thereby treating the view offered by the activist as a conventional one (Mouro and Castro, 2012):

In such cases, in order to make explicit the difference of opinion and what is conceded to (X), the content of the but-clause (Y) becomes the primary source (Snoeck Henkemans, 1995). The interviewee’s position can be reconstructed as contrasting the ethical standing of carbon offsetting to the effectiveness of those ‘mechanisms’:

In order to understand how the concession works, it is important to identify what can be conceded to as ‘ethical’ in the activist’s argument. This can most plausibly be the argument that carbon offsetting has been created to exploit the rising levels of climate consciousness. However, and crucially, the interviewee does not make this concession explicit. What is regarded as ‘ethically true’ can also be the argument that carbon offsetting makes people think that they don’t have to worry about the choices they make. In other words, the concession is permitted to ‘float’, giving the vagueness necessary for the continuation of an argumentative discourse (Moscovici, 1994: 169; see Eisenberg, 2007) and for directing the talk towards the argumentative interests of the interviewee (Van Rees, 2006). This ambiguity makes the concession look like it is made to all ‘what he says’, appropriating the activist’s critical comments as commonplace and broadly acceptable.

In the but-clause, the interviewee then introduces the argument of effectiveness (1.1b, let us call it q). By dissociating between what is ethical and what the actual problematic circumstances require, the interviewee – having agreed that there are legitimate ethical concerns – argues that under the given circumstances we need to achieve results, the concerns of effectiveness take precedence. Hence, the first example of cardinal concessions can be summarised as:

Concession 1

A: p; if p then R; so R

B: Yes p but q (where q is more important than p), and since if q then not-R; so not-R

The conclusion of the interviewee’s argument (namely that carbon offsetting should be used as a mechanism against the threat of climate crisis) is conveyed indirectly by means of the counter-argument about effectiveness, which is presented as an argument to be privileged under the concrete circumstances. This type of concessive yes, but… construction, which was the most common in our corpus, works in the way that Anscombre and Ducrot considered the prototypical argumentative function of but (Snoeck Henkemans, 1995): a concession (yes, p) is overridden by a counter-argument (but q) that is presented as more important in the concrete situation. As a result, the arguer (our interviewee) indirectly contradicts the standpoint (R) of the opponent (the activist), by raising a sufficiency criticism. This criticism accepts p as a serious argument in general, but denies that it is sufficient to justify R under given specific circumstances. Hence, it does not expel the opponent’s argument from the debate or future instantiations of the debate (Castro and Batel, 2008).

Cardinal scheme 2: Relevance criticism

In the argumentative episode initiated by the ‘sceptic’ scientists who contested the scientific consensus on the human causes of CC, a key strategy employed by the interviewees was to first admit the uncertainties and then criticise the sceptics’ fixation on certainty. This was carried out through concessions that are similar to the example earlier in their sequential structure, but different in the type of criticism raised through this structure:

Excerpt 2 – Interview 15

 … [in order] to be sure, that the change in greenhouse effect, the gases caused this effect, you must cause this effect and measure. You could not make trials with land, with earth. So you have the probability, not… you have… you are not sure 100%. (…) So, I could not as a scientist say, as a scientist, this is caused by that. As a scientist I could not, but as a politic, I must change the point of view. (…) If it is plausible that this action of the man caused an effect that are irreversible, this action could not, not must not, could not take place. The same for that, this is plausible, not sure, but it’s plausible, that the gases… So, the politics must take action.

Let us first note that the cardinal concessive reconstructed below is recycled at the end of the excerpt as embedded in a proposition–concession–reprise structure:

In this yes, but… construction, the interviewee does not directly address the sceptics’ controversial position regarding the lack of consensus among the IPCC scientists, but an inference from and a crucial assumption supporting it. Against what he discerns as the sceptics’ claims, the interviewee argues in the following way:

In the yes-clause, positioning himself as a scientist, the interviewee concedes that there is only a probability – and not a certainty – regarding the human causes of CC. In the but-clause, taking the role of a political person, he raises criticism by drawing on the plausibility of the causal relation and its action implications. It is this move from probability to plausibility – and the accompanying shift from theoretical to practical reasoning – that makes this indirect disagreement compelling. This ‘identity shift’ (Castro and Batel, 2008) makes it possible to rhetorically re-signify what is conceded to.

Through this concession, the interviewee not only demonstrates that he is as fastidious as the ‘sceptic’ scientists, but also maintains that the particular case of CC does not lend itself to the approach of experimental verification. In the but-clause, we have a reformulation of the concession (1.1b) and an explicit linking premise (1.1′). The latter replaces the linking premise of the argument used by the ‘sceptic’ scientist (that scientific consensus is a necessary condition for taking action about CC) and renders irrelevant the need for scientific consensus. In a way, the interviewee argues that what we need is a consideration of practical consequences, rather than a sweeping experimental demonstration or theoretical certainty. His concession can be represented as follows:

Concession 2

A: p; (if p then R); so R

B: Yes p but not-(if p then R); so not-R

It is worth noting that this concession is carried out by significantly re-interpreting the arguments conveyed in the video-excerpt. This is a major complication encountered in analysing the concessive constructions, to which we will return later.

Cardinal scheme 3: Acceptability criticism

Not in all analysed cases did the conceding argument involve an undivided acceptance of the argument presented by the opponent. In the following excerpt, the interviewee accepts only partly the opponent’s argument:

Excerpt 3 – Interview 12

 (…) in his opinion, what should happen would be systemic change, so we have to change the way our society is organized. And he thinks that personal action, individual actions contribute not that much to- to… offset the problem. And I can agree with him that the fundamental changes have to be made on a very big scale, but I would not diminish the role or importance of individual responsibility and how individuals can themselves try to offset. (…) In the beginning of the video he says that the offsets are just, just an issue of peace of mind, that’s not true. Because an offset can actually be an offset, even if it’s just a percentage of the emission you are responsible for. If you put a tree in a place that didn’t have any tree you are contributing a little bit, for a little bit of carbon to be captured in the next years.

In the first part of this excerpt, the interviewee recapitulates the two major points made by the activist: ‘what should happen would be systemic change’ and ‘individual actions do not contribute much to offset the problem’. In doing that, he re-presents the activist’s argument as follows (the argumentation is marked by the letter O to indicate that this is a re-representation by the interviewee of his Opponent’s position):

He then concedes to the first of these (O1.1a, p₁) and challenges the second (O1.1b, p₂), by constructing a yes, but … sequence of the cardinal type:

Here, the interviewee concedes to the necessity of big-scale (systemic) changes, but disagrees with his opponent’s main position against the use of carbon offsetting as a mechanism to counter the threat of climate crisis:

Once again, a crucial complication in analysing this concessive construction is that the interviewee significantly re-interprets the activist’s argument: the activist claims that carbon offsetting should not be used as a mechanism against the threat of climate crisis since ‘what really needs to happen’ are ‘the bigger systemic changes’. The interviewee first re-presents what the activist said: ‘in his opinion, what should happen would be systemic change’. Then, he goes on to ‘agree with him that the fundamental changes have to be made on a very big scale’ (note that for the activist, this is an argument that supports his standpoint, R). Yet he finishes by contradicting the activist’s standpoint: ‘but I would not diminish the role or importance of. . . how individuals can themselves try to offset’.

The crucial discursive task lies here in negotiating the meaning of the phrase that a systemic change is ‘what really needs to happen’ or ‘what should happen’. The activist is clearly defending that ‘what really needs to happen’ – systemic changes – should be our primary and only concern, and we should exclude distracting measures such as individual carbon offsets. Our interviewee takes this to instead signify an important, but not only concern – individual actions are then complementary with it. This shift of meaning from exclusivity to complementarity of ‘what needs to happen’ makes possible both the concession (X′) and the opposition (Y). Taking the argumentative aspect of the concession into account, the concession can be represented as follows:

Concession 3

A: p₁; p₂; (if p₁ & p₂ then R); so R

B: Yes p₁ but not-p₂; so not-R

This concession is quite typical of the concessions carried out in the second argumentative episode. In it, the interviewee concedes to one part of the activist’s argumentation but rejects another part of it, making the argumentation as a whole unacceptable. While the yes-clause accepts some of the activist’s arguments, the but-clause expresses an acceptability criticism to other arguments and thus justifies the disagreement with the opponent’s standpoint on the basis of that criticism.

Such examination of argumentative relations gives us a good idea of the similarities and differences between the concessions analysed. The three are similar in their sequential organisation (they instantiate the cardinal concessive scheme) as well as in the fact that they all involve agreement with an argument (yes, p) but not with its conclusion (but not-R). They are different, however, in the basis on which the disagreement is justified. In the first concession, interviewee 2 introduced a counter-consideration that is an example of sufficiency criticisms: yes, his argument is acceptable but not sufficient to justify the standpoint. In the second concession, interviewee 15 instead rejected the relevance of the conceded argument to the standpoint (not-(if p then R)). This is an elaborate example of relevance criticisms: yes, they are right but it does not really matter here. In the third concession, by distinguishing between the acceptable and unacceptable parts of the opponent’s argument, interviewee 12 rejected the standpoint on the basis of the unacceptable argument (yes, p₁, but not-p₂). This is an example for acceptability criticisms, which can only be raised against a part of the encountered argument in the context of yes, but… constructions (the yes-clause indicates that argumentation is partly acceptable). The concessions are thus embedded in different types of criticism, and their analysis demonstrates the importance of taking the content of arguments into account for understanding their functions (Johnson and Blair, 1994; Snoeck Henkemans, 1992).

Proposition–concession–reprise structure: Different argumentative relations?

Interviewee 12 in Excerpt 3 resorts to a further concession in the latter part of the excerpt, regarding the argument of the activist that carbon offsets are sold merely as ‘a peace of mind’. He first directly rejects it: ‘That’s not true’ (not-R). His claim comes right after ‘An offset can actually be an offset’ (R). The concession carried out afterwards using an even if construction – similar to that of yes, but… in its sequencing – can be structurally analysed as follows:

The concession in this example involves a proposition–concession–reprise structure (Antaki and Wetherell, 1999). While it structurally differs from the foregoing examples, a more careful look at the argumentative relations would clearly show that this concession is embedded in a sufficiency criticism, just like concession 1.

The interviewee agrees that the contribution of an offset may be just a little bit of what you are responsible for, and in reprise he disagrees with the activist’s argument that you cannot neutralise your emissions once they’re out there. In relation to this disagreement, the interviewee can be seen to argue that

In the conceding argument 1.1a, the interviewee may be seen to render his opponent’s case as follows:

Through this rhetorical move, he transforms the activist’s argument against neutralisation of one’s emissions into something that he can concede to (1.1a) and criticise (1.1b). The latter involves a new consideration, namely, the additionality of possible contributions, which is presented as more important than what was conceded. Hence, the interviewee’s concession functions as follows:

Concession 4

A: p; if p then R; R

B: Yes p but q (where p is more important than q), and since if q then not-R; so not-R

From the argumentative perspective, such a concession is similar to the concession made by interviewee 2, analysed earlier in Excerpt 1. The interviewee accepts an argument (p) but not its conclusion (R) because he brings about a counter-argument (q) that is considered more important. The two are similar despite their different sequential structures.