Abstract
Following the success of Daniel Billy v. Australia at the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), and its potential implications on rights-based climate litigation, this paper examines the possibility of similar litigation by African applicants at the HRC. The decision of the HRC in Daniel Billy v. Australia highlights the significance of human rights-based climate litigation and is a pointer to the potential prospects and challenges African litigants may face before the HRC. The case is significant as it represents the first instance in which victims of climate change were successful in invoking the provisions of the international human rights instruments before the HRC. The author observes that despite the increasing impacts of climate change on human rights in Africa, there has been a paucity of cases before domestic and regional courts, and none before international human rights bodies. In anticipation of climate litigation before the HRC, the article identifies the challenges and prospects African applicants may face before it. The article argues that African Applicants now have an additional avenue in the HRC to seek climate change-redress against African States Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its First Optional Protocol.
Keywords
Introduction
Climate change litigation before international human rights bodies is not a new phenomenon. 1 The choice of international human rights bodies has been attributed to their strategic position and international character. 2 Since 2005, treaty bodies have been approached by individuals and groups with climate change-related complaints, but they were only successful for the first time before the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC). 3 Since then, several rights-based climate-related complaints and requests for Advisory Opinions have been filed and decided by international courts and tribunals, including the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), International Court of Justice (ICJ), 4 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). For instance, in KlimaSeniorinnan v. Switzerland, 5 the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) found that Switzerland had violated the rights of a group of older Swiss women, especially their right to life and health as a result of its inadequate climate policies. 6 The ECtHR ruled that States Parties have a positive obligation to protect individuals from the adverse impacts of climate change.
However, the majority of the petitions before international human rights courts and tribunals have been brought by applicants in the Global North, who are increasingly turning to international judicial forums to seek redress and protection from the impacts of climate change. 7 In addition to other approaches and causes of action being employed by victims and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in courts, rights-based climate litigation is becoming an increasingly powerful pathway to climate justice for vulnerable groups experiencing the impacts of climate change. 8 As climate litigation is expanding, victims and NGOs are also exploring other international treaty bodies, including the HRC, to ramp up pressure on States. This is especially because severe impacts of climate change constitute threats to the enjoyment of human rights protected under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The HRC is established and empowered to monitor States Parties’ compliance with the ICCPR. Moreover, the individual complaint procedure recognised by the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR allows individuals to directly bring claims against States Parties before the HRC.
The decision of the HRC in Daniel Billy v. Australia 9 (commonly known as the Torres Strait Islanders case) has brought to the fore the emerging contribution of the HRC in addressing the climate crisis and potentially inspired more people to hold states accountable for the impacts of climate change. The case is unprecedented for two reasons: firstly, it is the first time an international human rights quasi-judicial body has found a connection between the violation of international human rights treaty (ICCPR) and climate change. Secondly, this is the first time the HRC has found a State (Australia) liable for violation of international human rights by failing to take timely and adequate climate adaptation measures. 10 The ruling of HRC even though not binding, has created both moral and political pressure of international character on the violating state party. 11
Despite the increasing impacts of climate change in Africa, 12 especially on the vulnerable groups, there is a paucity of climate-related cases at the national, regional and international judicial forums. It is only recently that a nongovernmental organisation, PALU, has, for the first time on the African continent, submitted a petition, requesting the African Court on Human and People's Rights to issue an Advisory Opinion on the obligations of African States in relation to climate change. 13 Climate litigation before domestic courts in Africa is emerging. However, the challenges of access to justice in many of African countries are discouraging victims of climate change and potential litigants from approaching domestic courts for redress, which then prevents them from fulfilling the admissibility requirements of regional and international courts and tribunals.
While a thorough consideration of the reasons behind the paucity of climate litigation at the African human rights system, despite its immediate benefits, is undoubtedly a worthwhile project, it is not one we seek to pursue here. In any case, many scholars 14 have done this. What we instead aim to do is to consider additional and complementary litigation pathway available to victims of climate change in Africa through the individual complaint procedure of the HRC, and how it can be employed to expand access to justice.
It is important to note that African states have a legal obligation under international law to address both mitigation and adaptation aspects of climate change.
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However, while petitions premised on insufficient mitigation action may not be successful, given the insignificant greenhouse gas emissions of most African states,
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adaptation-related claims offer a stronger litigation pathway for victims of climate change given its human rights dimension. Establishing causation – an integral part of proof – in adaptation-related cases is less stringent because of its human rights dimension.
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Also, HRC has well-established jurisprudence stating that States Parties have obligations under the ICCPR to implement measures preventing acts that threaten enjoyment of human rights, including climate change.
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Extreme weather conditions such as drought, flooding and sea level rise are impacts of climate change that directly threaten enjoyment of human rights of victims, including right to life, right to privacy, home and family life and right to enjoyment of culture. Also, adaptation obligation of states is not dependent on the amount of state's greenhouse gas (GHG) contributions.
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The individual pathway to the HRC offers a promising avenue for African litigants to pursue climate adaptation-related claims
Therefore, in anticipation of climate litigation before the HRC in the near future, this article identifies the potential prospects and challenges African applicants may face before the HRC. It also serves as a practice note that provides relevant information to parties on the procedural and substantive challenges that may arise when litigating climate-related matters before the HRC. In identifying the climate cases, the article relies on the methodology adopted by the global climate change databases, maintained by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law of the Columbia Law School and the Climate Change Laws of the World of the Graham Institute. 20 Despite their limitations, 21 the databases provide significant resources for this article. The databases currently record twenty-nine (29) climate-related cases filed in some domestic courts across six (7) African countries. 22 We find that the lack or paucity of climate cases at the regional and international judicial bodies can be attributed to the difficulties in meeting the admissibility requirements of exhaustion of domestic remedies, given that only a few cases have been brought at the national level. We note that following in the footstep of Daniel Billy v. Australia, the challenge of admissibility requirement can be overcome by African applicants before the HRC.
While the ‘Introduction’ section serves as a general introduction, the ‘Climate change governance in Africa’ section analyses climate change governance and priorities in Africa, noting that despite the increasing impacts of climate change on the continent, litigation in domestic and international courts and tribunals remains limited. The ‘HRC as an additional pathway for African litigants’ section examines the role of the HRC in climate litigation, with particular reference to its decision in Daniel Billy v. Australia. It also highlights the complementarity between the HRC and the African human rights system regarding climate change claims. ‘Prospects and challenges of climate litigation before HRC’ and ‘Potential prospects of climate litigation by African litigants at the HRC’ sections analyse the potential prospects and challenges African applicants may face at the HRC, and suggest strategies to overcome them. The ‘Conclusion’ section concludes by highlighting the benefits of climate litigation by African litigants before the HRC.
Climate change governance in Africa
Scientific findings show that Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents that is adversely impacted by climate change, despite its negligible greenhouse gas emissions. 23 Given its pre-existing developmental challenges, Africa has been described as ‘the continent most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change’. 24 Historical inequalities created by colonial exploitation and unbridled extractive activities have placed the continent and its people in a fragile and vulnerable position, exposing the continent to the threats of climate change.
In many African countries, the realities of climate change can no longer be denied. 25 From the rising temperatures, ravaging droughts, heavy floods, intense heat waves to sea-level rise, the impacts of climate change are leading to the loss of life, destruction of property and biodiversity. 26 Existing socioeconomic vulnerabilities of Africa such as high rate of poverty, inadequate and weak legal and institutional frameworks, decayed infrastructure and leadership failure, are exacerbating the susceptibility of the continent to the climate crisis. 27 The severity of climate change is threatening the enjoyment of crucial human rights, such as the right to life, right to private and family life, education, health, housing and culture. 28 Even so, vulnerable groups such as children, women, indigenous people, elderly and people living with disabilities are more exposed and at risk of the impacts of climate change. 29 From Western, Eastern, Central, Northern to Southern Africa, the devastating impacts of climate change are worsening the living conditions of the people, especially the vulnerable groups. 30
As part of the global stakeholders to address the causes and impacts of climate change, many African nations are signatories and parties to both regional and international instruments to combat climate change. This indicates that African states have obligations to not only protect their people from the adverse impacts of climate change, but also ensure that they take necessary measures to prevent violations of human rights in connection with climate change (UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, ICCPR, and African Charter). Also, at the domestic level, some African countries have either enacted dedicated climate laws, policies (Nigeria's Climate Change Act, 2021; Kenya Climate Change Act, 2016; and South Africa Climate Change Act, 2024, among others) or mainstream climate concerns into existing environmental legislations. 31
Despite these developments, evidence shows that many African states are not adequately prepared to tackle the existential threats posed by climate change. 32 This insufficient action in the face of mounting climate crisis in Africa implicates crucial civil and political human rights protected under the African Charter and other international treaties. 33 Also, this calls into question the climate change priority of African states despite their commitments to implementing both mitigation and adaptation pledges.
While both mitigation and adaptation are crucial to addressing the climate crisis in Africa, 34 debates are ongoing regarding the climate change priority of African states in relation to mitigation and adaptation. 35 Indeed, the international climate change regime directs developing countries, which have historically benefitted from fossil fuel extraction, to take the lead in cutting their greenhouse gas emissions. 36 However, developing countries, including African states, do not have immediate obligations to achieve absolute emissions cuts. 37 African states have and continue to argue that it will be unfair to expect them to cut their carbon emissions when historically they only contribute little or negligible amount of greenhouse gas to the atmosphere. 38 Many factors including the vulnerability of the continent, limited contribution to GHG emission, developmental priorities, among others, have been put forward as justifications why climate adaptation should be a central focus for Africa and the Global South's unique climate challenges. 39
However, states’ inability to adequately protect victims of climate change has led to the emergence of climate change litigation across the world, including in some African states. 40 The role of courts as a critical legal tool in climate change governance has been recognised in many jurisdictions, especially in many countries of the Global North, where courts are interpreting national laws and states’ obligations under international agreements to hold them accountable. However, in sharp contrast to this exponential growth of climate litigations in the Global North, there has been a paucity of climate cases from Africa at the regional and international levels. 41 Even at the domestic level, the small number of climate-related cases is not a reflection of the problematic climate change situation of many states.
Available data, as of May 2026, indicates that only twenty-eight (29) climate-related cases have been filed in seven (7) African states including Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, Malawi, Zambia and Namibia. 42 From the figure above, out of the 29 climate-related cases, twelve (12) were filed in South Africa alone. 43 Scholars have attributed this low climate litigation profile at the national and regional levels to some factors. For instance, Suedi and Fall attribute this to obstacles at the domestic level such as weak legislative frameworks, slow judicial processes and limited financial resources. 44 They further note that this will typically impede prospective applicants from exhausting domestic remedies, which is a precondition to bringing claims before the African Human Rights Systems and other international human rights bodies.
However, Boshoff observes that another strategic reason is because most African states are not the major cause of climate change, given their low GHG emissions, and therefore may not be significantly held liable for the current climate crisis. 45 This will create problems of proof and causation for litigants in establishing liability against African states at national, regional and international judicial bodies. While many developing countries, including African states, may raise issues of justice and fairness for not prioritising or take adequate measures to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions given their low carbon footprints, their obligations to provide adaptation measures notwithstanding the amount of their GHG emissions is sacrosanct. 46 Furthermore, Luporini argues that the adaptation obligations on developing countries are not dependent on their amount of GHG emissions because climate change constitutes a threat to the enjoyment of human rights protected under regional and international treaties, including the African Charter and ICCPR. 47
In this sense, developing countries, including African states, have legal obligations to consider adaptation as a priority because the continent is already suffering from the adverse effects of climate change, threatening the enjoyment of human rights. 48 It, therefore, means that a rights-based climate adaptation approach is a far stronger pathway to holding African states accountable for the impacts of climate change that threaten the enjoyment of regional and international human rights instruments. This is already happening at the domestic levels. 49 For instance, in Tsama William and Others v. Uganda's Attorney General, 50 the applicants who are victims of landslide filed a climate adaptation related claims, alleging that the relevant Ugandan government agencies have failed to put in place an effective machinery against landslides in Bududa district, 51 and as such, their action or inaction have led to the violation of the applicants’ fundamental rights, 52 including right to life, right to clean and healthy environment, right to property and right to physical and mental health. The applicants further contended that their district is likely to be affected by more landslides in the future as a result of changing rainfall patterns and increasing extreme weather conditions caused by climate change and environmental degradation. 53 They argued that the government is failing in its positive obligation under national and international climate change law. 54 They are therefore seeking monetary compensation for the violation of their rights and cost of resettlement to safer areas. 55
It is important to acknowledge that climate litigation before the African human rights system, especially the African Commission and African Court, offers more immediate and stronger benefits for African litigants. While a thorough consideration of the benefits of climate litigation before the African human rights system is undoubtedly a worthwhile project, it is not one we seek to pursue here. In any event, many scholars have already done this. 56 In the next section, we will examine climate litigation before the HRC and its complementarity with the African human rights system.
HRC as an additional pathway for African litigants
The UN HRC is a treaty body established under Article 28 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 57 Its major function is to monitor the implementation of the provisions of ICCPR by state parties. 58 To that extent, all States parties to the ICCPR undertake to submit reports to the HRC on the measures they have adopted to give effect to the rights enshrined in the ICCPR and the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights. The HRC discharges its responsibility through four procedures: state reporting under Article 40, individual complaints based on the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, inter-state complaints under Article 41 and preparation of general comments under its procedural rules. 59
As a human right quasi-judicial body, the jurisdiction of the HRC is now being invoked by victims of climate change-related human rights violations. The individual complaint procedure under the First Optional Protocol allows private individuals to submit climate change related petitions against States Parties who have ratified the Protocol. This is evident in the two notable cases decided by the HRC: Daniel Billy v. Australia and Teitiota v. New Zealand. In addition to the HRC's well-developed jurisprudence on human rights, and recently its connection to climate change, the connection between climate change and human rights has been a subject of intense debates. However, the consensus is that climate change threatens the enjoyment of human rights. 60 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has recently issued an Advisory Opinion declaring that ‘States have obligations under international human rights law to respect and ensure the effective enjoyment of human rights by taking necessary measures to protect the climate system and other parts of the environment’. 61 Also, the Paris Agreement in its Preamble clearly recognises the connection between climate change and human rights and the principle of intergenerational justice, urging States Parties to consider these elements in addressing the climate crisis. 62 Furthermore, the HRC in its general comment has reaffirmed that climate change constitutes a threat to the present and future generations’ right to life with dignity, urging states to ensure that measures taken to preserve the right to life with dignity include protection against the impacts of climate change. 63 It is therefore not surprising that victims of climate change and especially the vulnerable groups are turning to the international human rights bodies, including the HRC in their quest for climate justice. For more context on this, we will analyse below the HRC's decision in Daniel Billy v. Australia.
Daniel Billy v. Australia
Eight Australian citizens of the indigenous people living in the Torres Strait Islands filed a petition before the HRC against the Australian government, claiming violations of their international human rights under the ICCPR as a result of the impacts of climate change. Specifically, the applicants claimed that the Australian government has violated their right to life, private, family and home life, and culture, as provided under Articles 6, 17 and 27 of the ICCPR, respectively. The applicants also alleged that the Australian government violated the rights of their children under Article 24 of the ICCPR. 64 The applicants claimed that they were among the victims of climate change and one of the most vulnerable to the impacts of extreme weather conditions. 65
The applicants alleged that changes in weather patterns have a severe adverse effect on their livelihood, culture and traditional way of life. 66 They further claimed that in recent times, heavy flooding as a result of tidal surge has damaged the family grave with human remains scattered across their islands. They also argued that changes in rainfall patterns have damaged the land and trees with a severe impact on food availability including fishing tradition and farming. The applicants alleged that their rights had been violated on the grounds that Australia failed to take necessary adaptation measure to address the impacts of climate change such as by upgrading seawalls on the islands and cutting greenhouse gas emissions.
Australia argued that the petition is inadmissible on the grounds that no provisions of the ICCPR have been violated. 67 Further, it claimed that the applicants failed to provide evidence to substantiate their claim of imminent threats to their rights. 68 On admissibility, the HRC dismissed the objection of Australia, holding that the risks of human rights violations of the Torres Strait Islanders as a result of the ongoing adverse impacts of climate change is real and ‘more than a theoretical possibility’. 69 On the merits, the HRC found that failure of Australia to take appropriate and sufficient adaptation measures for the protection of the applicants against severe impacts of climate change resulted in the violation of their human rights to enjoy their culture and to be free from arbitrary interferences with their private life, family and home. 70 Therefore, the HRC directed Australia to compensate the applicant for the adverse effect they have suffered. 71 Also, it further directed Australia to hold meaningful consultations with the applicants to assess their needs and undertake necessary adaptation measures for the protection of the applicants’ communities. 72
This case is significant because it is the first case in which an international human rights body has found that the rights of indigenous vulnerable people have been violated owing to the severe impacts of climate change. The influence of this case on subsequent international climate litigation is already manifesting. For instance, in KlimaSeniorinnan v. Switzerland, 73 the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) found that Switzerland had violated the rights of a group of older Swiss women, especially their right to life and health as a result of its inadequate climate policies. The ECtHR ruled that States Parties have a positive obligation to protect individuals from the adverse impacts of climate change. Victims of the impacts of climate change, especially in Africa, can take advantage of this momentum by bringing climate-related complaints before the HRC.
While the decisions of the HRC are not binding on state parties, its international character and strategic position as a United Nations treaty body are potentially capable of ramping up pressure against state parties. 74 However, Knox identifies two crucial reasons why litigation before the UN treaty bodies, including HRC, is important: first, he observes that even though their decisions are not legally binding under the terms of their treaties, they may well have some ‘persuasive’ authority. 75 Secondly, in some States, their decisions may be enforceable under domestic laws. 76 Along this line, Shelton added that even though international human rights bodies may not have the power to award remedies, their practice is influencing national courts and defining the extent of states’ obligation. 77
It is therefore not surprising that victims of climate change and especially the vulnerable groups are turning to the international human rights bodies in their quest for justice. Rights-based climate litigation before the HRC is growing as victims, especially vulnerable groups are turning to the HRC for redress. Therefore, in addition to litigation before the African Commission and the African Court, the HRC can provide a promising and complementary avenue for victims of climate change and affected communities in Africa to seek redress against their country.
Relationship between the HRC and African human rights system
Examining the relationship between the HRC and the African human rights system can help us understand the complementarity between the two systems and the extent of their utility to African litigants. In this section, we highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the HRC procedure in relation to the African human rights system.
It is important to acknowledge that climate litigation before the African human rights system offers substantial benefits to African litigants for several reasons. Firstly, unlike the HRC, where direct individual access is limited to States Parties that have ratified both the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights offers a more open and liberal standing requirement to individuals and NGOs. 78 Secondly, applicants before HRC are required to establish their victim status as part of the admissibility requirements. This is not a major feature of the African Commission or the African Court, as petitions may be submitted by a person or group that is not itself the victim of such violation, but acting in public interest. 79 Also, the African human rights system recognises ‘collective’ or community human rights protection, as communities have been found to be collective victims of human rights violations. 80 This rule allows more individuals to sue governments without having to prove their victim status. 81 Again, under the African human rights system, there is no division between civil and political rights on one hand and social, economic and cultural rights on the other. 82 This contrast with the jurisdiction of HRC whose function is to monitor the implementation of civil and political rights under the ICCPR by its State Parties. Finally, while the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights is empowered to issue binding decisions, the decisions of the HRC are not binding on States Parties. 83 For the following reasons, the African human rights system may be preferred to the HRC.
Despite these limitations, we posit that the HRC offers promising avenue for victims of climate change and indigenous groups in Africa, complementary to the African human rights system in the following circumstances: firstly, where an African state has not ratified the African Charter, but has ratified the ICCPR and its First Optional Protocol, litigants from such a country may prefer the HRC as a viable international quasi-judicial avenue. Even though this is very rare, a good example of this is Morocco. While Morocco has yet to ratify the African Charter, it has ratified both the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol, thereby allowing its people direct access to the HRC. In this situation, HRC may be considered as a promising avenue.
Also, even though majority of the African states have ratified the African Charter, only eight (8) of these countries have submitted declarations to allow direct individual access to the African Court 84 in accordance with the Articles 5 (3) and 34 (6) Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ouagadougou Protocol). 85 In these circumstances, victims of climate change from these countries may prefer the HRC to the African human rights system. Additionally, litigation before the HRC can provide a global platform to put the spotlight on African countries for their inadequate actions and omissions on climate change. Given the global visibility of the HRC as a United Nations treaty body, its decisions often attract global attention and scrutiny. 86 This can raise the level of awareness and increase public engagement at the national and international levels, thereby ramping up the needed pressure on the African state parties to implement timely and necessary adaptation measures. In sum, given this complementary relationship, the HRC procedure offers a promising additional pathway for African litigants. In the next section, we will highlight the prospects and challenges potential African litigants may face when bringing climate change-related human rights petitions at the HRC.
Prospects and challenges of climate litigation before HRC
While there is evidence that climate change is adversely affecting many African communities, climate litigation profile of the continent is still very low at the domestic level and non-existence at the international level (Suedi and Fall 2023). The success of Daniel Billy v. Australia has prompted an inquiry into the potential prospects and challenges of climate litigation before the HRC by victims and vulnerable groups in Africa. In this section, we highlight the potential challenges prospective applicants from Africa may face in their petitions before the HRC. This will serve as a practice note, providing relevant information to parties on the procedural and substantive challenges that may arise when litigating climate-related matters before the HRC. First, we consider the procedural issues that may create significant obstacles to African litigants.
Procedural issues before HRC
Just like other international or regional human rights bodies, there are some procedural conditions that litigants are required to fulfil before their petitions can be heard on merit at the HRC. Potential African petitioners may face additional difficulty in scaling this hurdle to have the chance of being heard on merit. Given the peculiar climate change experience of Africans and following the precedent in Daniel Billy v. Australia, we argue that African litigants have potentially difficult but a real chance of overcoming the procedural issues at the HRC. We highlight below some of the procedural issues they are likely to face.
Ratification of ICCPR and its first optional protocol
As we have stated above, Article 41 allows state parties to the ICCPR to bring claims before the HRC. However, only individuals whose state parties have ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR are allowed to bring individual petitions against the state parties before the HRC. 87 Within the context of climate litigation, petitions are only allowed from individuals against states that have ratified the optional protocol, and this explains why the Torres Strait Islanders were able to bring claims against Australia for human rights violations under the ICCPR in the context of climate change.
While nearly all the African countries have ratified the ICCPR, a significant number of them, including South Africa, Algeria, Ghana, Senegal and Cameroon, have also ratified its First Optional Protocol, allowing HRC to receive individual petitions from African States Parties. 88 Therefore, prospective applicants from Africa must first make an inquiry whether their countries have ratified the Optional Protocol before filing complaints at the HRC, as their case may be dismissed on this score alone. However, where the countries of prospective applicants have not ratified the optional protocol, non-governmental organisations and concerned groups should begin to ramp up pressure on their countries to ratify it.
Exhaustion of domestic/local remedies
Exhausting local remedies is a common feature of most international human rights bodies. It is an integral part of the admissibility requirements that prospective applicants must fulfil before these treaty bodies. 89 The underlying reason for this rule is to ensure that before proceedings are brought before this international body, the State concerned must have had the opportunity to remedy it through its own local system. With respect to individual claims before the HRC, applicants who allege human rights violations must ensure that they have first exhausted all available domestic remedies to vindicate their claims. The same rule applies to individual complaints of human rights violations in connection with climate change. For instance, in Sacci et al. v. Argentina et al., 90 the United Nations Committee on the Rights of a Child (UNCRC) dismissed the petition brought by a group of children against some countries, claiming that five countries have violated their rights to life, health, culture and the best interest of the child owing to their failure to take actions to mitigate climate change. The UNCRC ruled that the applicants failed to initiate domestic proceedings before the respondents’ countries.
Also, in Daniel Billy v. Australia, 91 the applicants did not exhaust domestic remedy. However, they were able to scale this hurdle on the strength of the provision of Article 5(2) of the Optional Protocol, which provides that the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies shall not apply where its duration is ‘unreasonably prolonged’. Thus, the applicants were able to show there were no domestic remedies available applicable to their case because the legal system in Australia does not envisage violations of human rights in connection with climate change. Again, applicants argued that the legal precedent by Australian courts showed that there is an absence of duty of care by state authorities in respect of climate change. 92 The implication of this is that applicants can directly approach the HRC where there are no available local remedies in the state party or where they are able to establish that there is an unjustifiable delay in the proceedings before the domestic courts.
However, prospective applicants from Africa may face a significant challenge in establishing exhaustion of domestic remedy at the HRC. This is because to date only a few cases have been filed before national courts in Africa based on the adverse effect of climate change on enjoyment of human rights. While some have been decided, others are still pending. Suedi and Fall identify three reasons for this state affairs: weak legislative frameworks, slow judicial processes and limited financial resources. 93 They further note that these factors ‘would typically impede prospective litigants from exhausting domestic remedies to then seize the African human rights system’. Prospective African applicants will typically face the same challenge at the HRC. The fact that many litigants face the challenge of access to justice at the national level means that only a few cases have been filed in those courts, which ultimately impedes their ability to fulfil the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies before seizing the jurisdiction of the HRC.
However, African litigants may be able to surmount this challenge by relying on the exception to the general rule of exhaustion of local remedy under Article 5 (2) (b) of the First Optional Protocol by arguing that even though domestic remedies are available in their states, they are ‘unreasonably prolonged’ as a result of delay and slow judicial processes in many courts in Africa. It is an undeniable fact that delay is a major problem to access to justice in many courts in Africa owing to insufficient infrastructures to administer justice in a timely and effective manner. 94 For instance, the Mbabazi case in Uganda is a typical example of how delay and slow judicial process can affect access to justice in domestic courts. 95 While this case has been filed at the High Court in Uganda since 2012, the court has not taken any further steps on the case to date. Applicants in the Mbabazi case will have a valid justification to approach the HRC on the ground that their case at the domestic court has suffered an unreasonable delay. Also, as a result of the weak and sometimes absence of a legislative framework on climate change in many African countries, 96 prospective applicants may argue that the available local remedies in their states are not capable of providing a reasonable chance to redress the alleged violations. 97
Jurisdiction and victimhood
Article 1 of the Optional Protocol may constitute another constraint to individuals bringing claims before the HRC. Article 1 provides that ‘A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognises the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant’. The twin requirements of jurisdiction and victimhood can pose varying challenges to prospective applicants. 98 However, in both Daniel v. Australia and Teitiota v. New Zealand, jurisdiction was not a major obstacle for the applicants as they were able to establish that they were subject to the jurisdiction of the state parties, and the alleged human rights violations are within the scope of the ICCPR.
On victimhood, this may pose a significant challenge to the applicants. Victims have been described as ‘persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations of international human rights law’. 99
In the context of climate change, applicants must show that they are actually affected by the State party's violation of human rights or the risk of being affected is ‘more than a theoretical possibility’. 100 In establishing their victim status, the applicants in Daniel Billy v. Australia had to prove that at the time of bringing their claims before the HRC, they had suffered from current and imminent injury that is attributed to the state party (Australia), in line with the provision of Article 1 of the Optional Protocol. In accepting their victim status, the HRC acknowledged the unique identity of the applicants as indigenous people who are highly exposed to adverse impacts of climate change, which threatened their private lives and culture. 101 The undisputed vulnerability of the applicants to the severe impact of climate change and the adverse effects they are already experiencing were the two major factors that proved their victim status. As a result, the HRC found that the violations of their rights were ‘more than a theoretical possibility’. 102
As far as African litigants are concerned, meeting the requirement of jurisdiction may not present a difficult challenge, as more than half of the African countries have ratified the Optional Protocol, which recognises the competence of HRC to receive petitions from individuals subject to their jurisdiction. However, applicants from Africa must establish their victim status by referencing their long-standing vulnerability to climate change and the adverse impact they are currently experiencing. Similar to Daniel Billy v. Australia, several indigenous communities in Africa are currently being affected by the adverse impacts of climate change, which threaten their private and family life, health, culture and their spiritual way of life. 103 Also, given their special connection to their land and natural resources, climate change is aggravating indigenous peoples’ vulnerabilities and sustenance. 104
For instance, in West and East Africa, indigenous peoples such as Bororo, Tuareg, Ogiek, Endorois, Yaaku and Maasai are at the frontline of the climate crisis, which is impacting their grazing lands, access to safe water, traditional economic and cultural activities and displacement. 105 Also, in March 2023, Malawi witnessed the devastating impact of Tropical Cyclone Freddie, which led to the death of more than 679 people, and 659,278 people were displaced. 106 The African Commission has recognised the increasing impacts of climate change, leading to deaths and displacements in Mozambique, Comoros, Tanzania, and the insufficient actions of state parties to address the problem. 107 Therefore, in climate litigation before the HRC, African applicants, especially indigenous people, may establish their victim status by referencing their long-standing and current vulnerabilities to climate change and argue that the insufficient actions of states to provide adequate and timely adaptation measures violate their right to private and family life, culture and spiritual way of life.
For instance, minority communities in many African countries who are historically and currently experiencing severe environmental pollution and climate change from the activities of both government-owned and multinational oil firms have a better chance of establishing their victim status. Also, African Applicants may also rely on peer-reviewed research studies, such as the IPCC reports on the impacts of climate change on African countries, to support their petitions.
No simultaneous inquiry
Finally, another important admissibility requirement can be found under Article 5 (2) (a) of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. It provides that the HRC shall not consider any individual petition where the same complaint is being examined before another international investigative or settlement body. This is a serious jurisdictional issue, and it places an obligation on the HRC to first make a finding whether the complaint before it is not being examined by another international body. Therefore, to file a communication before the HRC, prospective applicants from Africa must ensure that their claims are not at the same time being examined by other regional or international bodies like the African Court, African Commission or other UN bodies.
Lack of awareness, limited financial and technical supports
Litigation before national and international bodies requires enormous financial and technical supports in terms of retaining the services of expertise, legal representation and cost of filings in courts. 108 This presents a significant barrier to potential litigants from bringing climate claims, thereby widening ‘access to justice gap’. A report suggests that only 8.47% of the total communications filed at the HRC were brought by Africans through individual complaint procedure. 109 However, this small figure is not a reflection of the problematic human rights situation on the continent. It has been pointed out that lack of awareness of the possibility of filing cases and the nature of rights protected by the international human rights treaties are the major obstacles for accessing international human rights tribunals. 110
Financial and technical supports are needed in bringing cases before international tribunals. As a result of the existing socioeconomic issues in Africa, victims of climate change may find it challenging to finance litigation at the HRC through personal financing. Erinosho observes that in the absence of funding and support from non-governmental organisations, aggrieved parties will have to rely on private financing, which may be unaffordable. 111 However, it must be acknowledged that nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) have been playing a critical role in filling the access gap in Africa, particularly in climate change issues. For instance, majority of the climate-related cases filed in national courts in Africa were either solely brought by, or with the support of NGOs 112 (Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Peel and Lin 2018). However, in countries without strong legal frameworks on climate change, the ability of NGOs to effect changes may be limited. It has been observed that in many low and middle-income countries in Africa, the activities of NGO are impacted by the absence and/or weak environmental legislations and issues of access to justice. 113
The activities of NGO can potentially assist to improve level of public awareness amongst victims of the impacts of climate change and also provide legal aid services to the marginalised groups in Africa. If the current trend continues, we hope to see many NGOs partnering with local communities at the frontline of the climate crisis in holding African states accountable in both domestic and international tribunals. To this extent, the challenge of limited financial and technical supports can be overcome by potential litigants from Africa. Also, in cases where limited finance may hinder local NGOs from being able to file a complaint at the HRC, a partnership between local NGOs and foreign NGOs may be explored for financial and non-financial supports. We have seen this happen in the past. For instance, in 2021, some Nigerian farmers in partnership with an international organisation, Friends of the Earth Netherlands, won an historic oil pollution case against Shell at the Court of Appeal in Hague. 114
Substantive issues at the HRC
As stated above, virtually all African states are parties to the ICCPR. Therefore, as duty-bearers under the ICCPR, they have obligation to ensure that the substantive human rights are not compromised by the impacts of climate change. Articles 6, 17 and 27 of the ICCPR enjoin state parties to take necessary measures to prevent violations of right to life, right to privacy, family and home, and right to enjoyment of culture, respectively. The HRC has established that climate change poses a threat to right to life and dignity. 115 Additionally, the HRC has repeatedly affirmed this jurisprudence in its previous decisions. 116 For instance, in Daniel Billy v. Australia, 117 the applicants argued that Australia's failure to implement adequate mitigation and adaptation measures to prevent negative climate change impacts constituted a violation of their right to life, right to privacy, family and home and culture. 118
However, establishing causation will be a major substantive obstacle to African litigants at the HRC. Generally, because of the global character of climate change, linking a particular impact of climate change to the actions of a state or private entity poses a significant challenge to litigants, and many cases have been unsuccessful on this score alone. 119 Within African context, state party may put forward two likely defences: first, that climate change is a global problem caused by many countries, and its impacts are being felt all over the world; therefore, it is not reasonable to hold a state responsible. Second, African state party may also argue that its greenhouse gas emissions is insignificant and negligible compared to major emitting countries; therefore, it cannot be held liable for the cause and impact of climate change. These defences may constitute major obstacles to individual African applicants.
Despite these limitations, litigants can overcome these substantive challenges based on the following two counter-arguments. Firstly, we submit that bringing rights-based climate adaptation-related cases have a better chance of success against African states than mitigation given their insignificant GHG emissions. The reason is that establishing causation in adaptation case is less challenging because of its human rights dimension. 120 States have obligations under international human rights norms to put in place measures to prevent acts that threaten enjoyment of human rights, including climate change. 121 Extreme weather conditions such as drought, flooding and sea level rise are impacts of climate change which directly threaten enjoyment of human rights of victims, including right to life, right to privacy, home and family life and right to enjoyment of culture. Secondly, adaptation obligation of states is not dependent on the amount of their GHG contributions. 122
Therefore, in addition to climate litigation before national and regional courts, two classes of complaints may also be brought at the HRC. Firstly, victims of climate change may bring ‘targeted adaptation claims’ against signatory African states at the HRC. Targeted adaptation claims can be brought by vulnerable and indigenous groups who are already suffering the adverse effects of climate change against concerned African states for failure to provide timely and sufficient adaptation measures to prevent threats to human rights enjoyment in connection with climate change. For instance, the basis of liability in Daniel Billy v. Australia was because the state party failed to take timely and sufficient adaptation measures to prevent the negative effect of climate change on the applicants and their Islands, which led to the violations of their rights under the ICCPR.
Secondly, vulnerable communities/individuals and Africa states may also bring ‘transnational climate suits’ against developed states that are the largest emitters of GHG for their contribution to the climate crisis and failure to provide adequate adaptation funding to African states, in accordance with international climate change laws. 123 However, African litigants may face potential challenges in this type of claims. One of the major challenges litigants may face is satisfying the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedy typically in the jurisdictions of the defendants’ states before petitioning the HRC. The difficulty in overcoming this requirement, especially in extraterritorial climate cases, explains why Sacchi et al. v. Argentina et al., 124 and Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Other States 125 were dismissed by the Committee on the Rights of a Child (CRC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), respectively.
Also, other substantive rights under Articles 17 and 27 of the ICCPR relating to right to privacy, family, home or correspondence, and right to enjoyment of culture can be invoked by African applicants. The evidence required to prove violations of human rights under Articles 17 and 27 is not as stringent as the violation of right to life. For instance, in Daniel Billy v. Australia, the applicants argued that climate change is already affecting their privacy, family and home life, and they faced the prospect of abandoning their homes due to the devastating effect of flooding, which caused erosion of their islands and distress to the people. Referring to its General Comment on Article 17, the HRC noted that states parties have obligation to prevent interference with a person's privacy, family and home from conduct not attributable to states, where the interference is foreseeable and serious.
Therefore, HRC found that Australia had violated Article 17 of the ICCPR by its failure to discharge its positive obligations to implement adequate adaptation measures to protect the applicants’ privacy and family home. However, on the applicants’ claim of violation of right to life, the HRC ruled that the applicants failed to establish that they ‘faced or presently face adverse impacts to their own health or a real and reasonably foreseeable risk of being exposed to a situation of physical endangerment or extreme precarity that could threaten their right to life, including their right to a life with dignity’. 126 Similar to its ruling in Teitiota, the HRC concluded that ‘the information before it does not disclose a violation by the State party of the applicants’ right to life under Article 6 of the ICCPR.
Potential prospects of climate litigation by African litigants at the HRC
African litigants stand to benefit significantly from litigating climate change issues at the HRC. As we have noted above, the current small number of cases brought by African before the HRC is not a true reflection of the problematic human rights situation on the continent. By adopting the individual complaint procedure of the HRC, litigants will benefit from its decisions, which may have both direct and indirect impacts on the victims.
First, litigation at the HRC can be beneficial to African litigants by putting the spotlight on the climate change situation on Africa states, especially its disproportionate impacts on indigenous and vulnerable groups on the continent. This can potentially raise the level of awareness and increase public engagement at the national and international levels, and ramp up the needed pressure on the African state parties to implement timely and necessary adaptation measures. For instance, in Daniel Billy v. Australia, the level of public engagement generated by the case ultimately pressured the state party (Australia) to announce its decision to commit more financial resources for adaptation measure in the applicants’ Islands, even before the adoption of the HRC decisions. 127
Secondly, litigation at the HRC can contribute to the clarification of the obligations of African states in relation to impacts of climate change on international human rights. In both Teitiota and Daniel Billy cases, the HRC emphasised that State Parties have human rights obligations to prevent the foreseeable impacts of climate change that threaten enjoyment of human rights on the people within their jurisdictions.
Furthermore, through its authority to direct state party to provide reparation to victims of human rights violations, the HRC can direct a state party to provide full reparation to the victims of climate change, and direct states to ensure participation of the affected communities in the decision-making process. While the decisions of the HRC are not formally binding, States Parties are required to give effect to its recommendations. 128 Even though this obligation is not legally binding, States Parties are required to report on measures taken to implement HRC's decisions in good faith. 129 Also, the HRC has monitoring mechanisms to follow up on States Parties’ implementation of its Views, including requesting state parties to provide information on steps taken to implement its decisions, and appointment of rapporteur to engage with states. 130 In this regard, African litigants have a lot to benefit from pursuing climate-related claims before the HRC.
Conclusion
Despite the increasing impacts of climate change on the African continent, especially on indigenous and other vulnerable groups, only a few cases have been brought before domestic courts and none at the international level. This is a reflection of the challenges of access to justice in many African countries. This article has examined the contributions of the HRC to climate litigation with particular emphasis on its decision in Daniel Billy et al. v. Australia. The case is profoundly significant being the first individual-sponsored petition in which the human rights body has found a State liable for international human rights violations for failure to take sufficient, timely and necessary adaptation measures to address the impacts of climate change on vulnerable group. We argue that even though the African human rights system offers stronger protection for victim of climate change in Africa, litigants now have an additional international adjudicatory avenue in the HRC to seek justice against African State Parties to the ICCPR and its First Optional Protocol for violations of human rights in connection with climate change. However, African litigants face some potential substantive and procedural hurdles before the HRC. We have highlighted these obstacles and how they can be overcome.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
My sincere thanks to the journal editors and the anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions, which helped to improve this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Notes
Author Biography
Taofeeq Alatise is a fulltime lecturer at the Department of Private and Property Law, Faculty of Law, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. He is currently an Erasmus+ PhD Scholar at Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius, Lithuania. He is also a Rapporteur, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Columbia Law School, New York, USA. His research interests are International Environmental Law, Human Rights Law and Constitutional Law.
