Inclusive versus exclusive: A cross-national comparison of the effects of subnational,national,and supranational identity

Abstract

A superordinate identity reduces bias and facilitates intergroup cooperation. This suggests that getting European Union (EU) citizens to identify with Europe will decrease outgroup hostility. Is European identity thus a superordinate identity? Using Eurobarometer data, I determine which level of identification is the most inclusive for individuals' immigration attitudes. Those who feel European hold more favorable views toward immigrants—an effect that is amplified under conditions of cross-cutting cleavages and where country length of European Union membership is greatest. In contrast, strong national identity is associated with more negative immigration attitudes; regional identity has no effect. A subsequent test confirms that the benefits of identifying with Europe extend most strongly to immigrants of European Union origin, although positive effects are observed toward non-European Union migrants as well.

Keywords

Common Ingroup Identity Model European identity European Union immigration attitudes superordinate identification

Social psychologists have long focused on the relationship between identity and conflict, noting an innate human tendency to categorize oneself and others into distinctive groups that are then perceived to be in competition for power, resources, and status. Though ingroup favoritism does not inherently imply outgroup hostility (Brewer, 1999), scholars continually record a high correlation between affect for one's own group and prejudice against another (Duckitt and Mphuthing, 1998; Huddy, 2001; Oakes, 2002; Sumner, 1940)—even under the imposition of relatively simplistic and arbitrary identity labels (Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Brewer, 1996) and especially under conditions of unequal status or contact (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998). In many circumstances, these prejudicial attitudes then set the stage for intergroup conflict through the perpetuation of negative stereotypes, denigration of the ‘other,’ and a desire to exclude outgroup members from receiving the same rights and rewards as ingroup peers.

Yet certain identity arrangements may have the potential to mitigate—if not altogether negate—these harmful effects by adjusting the way individuals see themselves. Because individuals have multiple identity options to choose from (Huddy, 2001), the Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) contends that recategorizing members of separate subgroups under one overarching superordinate identity can simultaneously reduce bias and induce tolerance (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner et al., 1993). Put simply, turning ‘us versus them’ into a new, all-inclusive ‘we’ should help members of formerly disparate groups evaluate one another more positively. Experimental evidence abounds¹ and real-world tests of this hypothesis are rising,² yet it remains unclear how well these findings travel (1) outside the American context and (2) to political–territorial (as opposed to solely racial or ethnic) identities. Therefore, I ask: to what extent is attachment to a shared European identity associated with improved outgroup attitudes?

After more than 60 years of institutional cooperation and expansion, ‘European’ has become a viable identity alternative for European Union (EU) citizens. EU policymakers have long proclaimed their desire for a common European identity to boost public support for integration (Tugendhat, 1977). As the leading model for regional integration efforts worldwide, Europe provides an important test for determining whether a supranational identity is possible, and whether attachments of this scale actually spawn the consequences indicative of superordinate identities. European integration and international migration are constantly reshaping social landscapes, evoking new identity debates and, in some instances, generating hostile attitudes as group boundaries are in flux (McLaren, 2001; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007). Thus, it is vital to know whether European identity unites or divides: does it render individuals more inclusive by extending positive attitudes to a collective ingroup of multiple nationalities, or steer them toward an exclusionary ‘Fortress Europe’ view that exacerbates outgroup antipathy?

Applied to Europe, the CIIM suggests that a shared European identity should help citizens of contrasting nationalities become more accepting of one another. To assess this projection, I use Eurobarometer data to estimate multilevel models that compare the effects of European, national, and regional identity for individual attitudes toward immigration. As predicted, I find greater identification with Europe improves assessments of immigrants while the opposite effect is evident among those professing a strong national identity. Regional identity appears to have no effect. I also test whether a superordinate European identity interacts with a country's preexisting linguistic and religious context, and how the effect of European identity varies across a country's length of EU membership. Where cross-cutting cleavages are high, identification with Europe produces even stronger positive sentiments toward immigrants; residing in an older EU member state also amplifies European identity's positive effect. A final inquiry clarifies precisely for whom European identity improves outgroup attitudes: as expected, identification with Europe has the strongest boost on attitudes toward fellow EU (as opposed to non-EU) immigrants. Altogether, these results demonstrate that identification with Europe produces the beneficial effects purported by the CIIM.

Identity: An overview

People demarcate the world around them into ingroups and outgroups, where salient group memberships then carry emotional and affective significance for an individual's own conception of self (Reicher, 2004; Tajfel, 1982). The psychological desire for positive differentiation results in preference for one's own group, often—though not necessarily—at the expense of others. Moreover, ingroup identity need not be strongly entrenched or relevant; ‘mere categorization’ can activate discrimination and bias against the outgroup (Brewer, 1996). Conflict often erupts over perceptions of intergroup threat, regardless of how justified (Esses et al., 1998; Monroe et al., 2000; Sherif, 1998). Unaddressed, these tendencies forecast a bleak picture of social exchanges in multiethnic societies.

The CIIM

Studies in conflict reduction posit that one way of improving intergroup relations is to help individuals recategorize themselves into an umbrella identity encompassing multiple subgroups (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner et al., 1993). ‘Original ingroup–outgroup distinctions become less salient when both groups are included in a new ingroup that encompasses previously separate groups’ (Brewer, 1996: 294). In this case, subgroup identification is retained while the superordinate identity becomes more psychologically central and salient. As the CIIM proclaims, when contact among ingroup and outgroup members is structured to help them realize what they have in common, feelings of ingroup favoritism may be extended to outgroup members—positive evaluations which then generalize to other members of the outgroup at large.

A proliferation of support for CIIM has arisen in recent years. Its ability to reduce outgroup antagonism has been witnessed among university students of different nationalities (Eller and Abrams, 2004), employees of different ethnicities (Eller and Abrams, 2004), multiethnic high school students (Gaertner et al., 1996), corporate executives after a recent merger (Gaertner et al., 1996), ethnicity-based work unions within the public sector (Huo et al., 1996), white South Africans' views of blacks (Gibson and Gouws, 2003), white Americans deciding on tax increases for minorities (Transue, 2007), and roommates of opposite race (West et al., 2009).

Importantly, a superordinate identity need not eradicate subgroup identification altogether. In fact, it may be that conditions that promote dual identification with both the sub- and the superordinate group yield the most positive effects (González and Brown, 2003; Hornsey and Hogg, 2000). Emphasis on dual identity may be the best avenue, particularly when dealing with already extensive subgroups like nationality (Eller and Abrams, 2004). Maintaining a strong subgroup identity in the midst of superordinate recategorization should help subgroup members view those opposing subgroups in a positive light—regardless of whether they have experienced personal contact with the entire outgroup. This suggests a superordinate European identity can operate independently of—and in conjunction with—national attachment.

Operationalizing and explaining intergroup hostility

Immigration attitudes are a common indicator of outgroup evaluations (e.g. Coenders, 2001; Schneider, 2008). In keeping with this tradition, I evaluate individuals' views toward immigrants as a proxy for their degree of outgroup bias. Existing explanations fall along four main dimensions: economic anxiety, crime concern, demographics, and perceived cultural threat.

Firstly, many oppose immigration because of feared competition over scarce economic resources like jobs or social benefits (Esses et al., 1998; Gang et al., 2002, Olzak, 1992). The dual threats of labor market competition and fiscal burden reduce natives' tolerance for immigration. Some find lower-skilled and poor natives are more exclusive than higher-skilled and richer ones (Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006) while others uncover this exclusionary trend in natives of any skill or wealth status (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Sociotropic assessments of the national economy also affect openness to immigration. In hard economic times, individuals report more negative attitudes toward immigrants (Citrin et al., 1997; Kiewiet, 1983; Lahav, 2004).

Secondly, security concerns are a powerful predictor of immigration attitudes (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2008; Fitzgerald et al., 2012; McLaren and Johnson, 2007). Though objective statistics typically show no or even a negative connection between immigration and crime (Aebi, 2004; Hiatt, 2007; Wadsworth, 2010), many individuals cling to the subjective perception of immigrants as criminals and therefore oppose immigration altogether.

Thirdly, several demographic factors affect how accepting individuals are of immigrants. Hostility is common in older males with less education (Fetzer, 2000; Green, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007).

Finally, identity considerations have risen both in popularity and explanatory power over the years. Strong in-group attachment (typically operationalized at the national level) is associated with a corresponding antagonism toward immigrants (McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Mughan and Paxton, 2006; Pehrson and Green, 2010) and opposition to immigration (Sides and Citrin, 2007). Here, perceptions of cultural threat operate through mechanisms of prejudice to make natives less accepting of foreigners (Green, 2007, 2009; Quillian, 1995; Riek et al., 2006; Stephan and Stephan, 2000). This xenophobia can erupt into profound social clashes over clearly different ways of life (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007; Sniderman et al., 2004), making the study of remedies to identity conflict all the more important. The CIIM predicts a superordinate identity can improve intergroup relations, but extant tests of identity's impact on immigration attitudes have yet to include this additional identification option.

Superordinate European identity

Europe provides an ideal location for studying the relationship between identity and immigration for two reasons. First, national and regional ties are more strongly entrenched in Europe than elsewhere (Diéz Medrano, 2003; Fitjar, 2010), bringing identity issues to the fore.³ European integration has opened up the potential for greater identification with Europe. The EU's motto, ‘United in Diversity,’ proclaims its desire to encompass the various economic, cultural, and social heritages of member states within a larger political–institutional framework. European citizens thus confront multiple options for political–territorial self-identification—including, unlike almost anywhere else, a visible superordinate contender. Second, integration has intensified exposure to other cultural groups. Immigration has become extremely controversial and politicized among European parties and publics (Fitzgerald et al., 2012; Lahav, 2004; McLaren, 2001) at the same time that national policymakers' efforts to ramp up the fight against unwanted immigration have left huge swaths of immigrants feeling helpless and unwelcome (Fraser, 2010; Stinson, 2008).

Can a superordinate identity offer hope? In many ways, European identity exhibits the desired dual emphasis on both sub- and superordinate group: few expect citizens to completely abandon old allegiances (Fossum, 2001; Kohli, 2000). And in most cases, the very essence of ‘Europe’ is deeply intertwined with national interpretations (Pichler, 2008; Risse, 2010).

For now, it matters little what individuals may be thinking when asked about their level of identification with Europe. Though the specific contents of European identity fall into civic versus cultural components (Bruter, 2003, 2005, 2009; Pichler, 2008), all that matters is whether seeing oneself as European—whatever that means to him or her—activates the psychological processes of a common ingroup identity. If so, the more an individual sees herself as European, the more accepting she should be of immigrants:

H1: The greater one identifies with the superordinate group, the less hostility she will exhibit towards outgroups.

Contextual conditions

As with many phenomena, certain conditions may enhance or exacerbate a given effect. I explore two here: cross-cutting cleavages and length of exposure to a superordinate identity alternative.

Cross-cutting cleavages

Ingroup–outgroup animosity appears strongest in societies divided along a single cleavage.⁴ Where fractionalization is nested and hierarchical, intergroup interaction enhances ingroup perception of threat from the outgroup (Brewer, 1996). But where social interactions are instead structured by extensive and persistent cross-cutting associations, there is greater propensity for intergroup peace and cooperation (Goodin, 1975; Olzak, 1992, 2006; Rae and Taylor, 1970; Zuckerman, 1975)—which may hold the key to sociopolitical stability (Lipset, 1959).

The conflict-reducing benefits of cross-cutting cleavages stem from two complementary factors. At the individual level, they increase the number of identity alternatives available and lessen reliance on any single identity for self-definition.

Such cross-cutting ingroup-outgroup distinctions reduce the intensity of the individual's dependence on any particular ingroup for meeting psychological needs for inclusion, thereby reducing the potential for polarizing loyalties along any single cleavage or group distinction and perhaps increasing tolerance for outgroups in general (Brewer, 1999: 438).

Simultaneous membership in multiple groups thus increases the chances that an individual will have something in common with the other people she encounters and decreases the potential for extremist or exclusive attitudes.⁵ When these individual effects are aggregated, cross-cutting cleavages typically produce structural arrangements—e.g. consociational governance—that minimize political party fragmentation and incentivize compromise (Lijphart, 1977; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Altogether, this implies that where cross-cutting cleavages are high, the positive effects of a superordinate European identity should be even more pronounced. Conversely, where cross-cutting cleavages are low, a superordinate identity may be less able to take psychological root:

H2: The greater cross-cutting cleavages in a society, the greater positive impact attachment to a superordinate identity will have on one's attitude towards outgroups.

Length of exposure to the superordinate identity alternative

The length of time in which a superordinate identity has been a viable option may affect the extent to which its positive effects are realized. Varying degrees of exposure affect opinion change (Festinger, 1964) and may play a strong role in identification as well. Prior work confirms that the salience of the EU and, hence, European identity depends on its psychological existence—that is, entitativity—in citizens' minds (Castano, 2004: 41, 53), which could be affected by their country's year of EU entry.

Several Central and Eastern European countries only recently joined the EU. While the underlying determinants of European identity do not appear to differ in these member states (Gherghina and Chiru, 2011), the consequences of doing so may. Given institutions' socializing and habitualizing effects (Risse, 2005), European identity should have a weaker positive effect on immigration attitudes among citizens of newer member states who have had less time to adjust to EU membership and perhaps internalize a superordinate European identity.

H3: The longer a superordinate identity alternative has existed, the greater positive impact attachment to it will have on one's attitude towards outgroups.

Data, measurement, and method

To test the above predictions, I use Eurobarometer 71.3 (Papacosta, 2009), which surveys respondents from 27 EU member states. The dependent variable, Pro-Immigration Attitudes Index, combines respondents' answers to seven questions about whether immigrants enrich ‘our’ culture, are a cause of insecurity, increase unemployment, fill unwanted jobs, help solve the problem of Europe's aging population, play an important role in increasing tolerance and understanding, and contribute more in taxes than they benefit from government services.⁶ In each instance, respondents were asked whether they tended to agree or disagree, resulting in a mean index ranging from 0 to 1 with 19 overall categories.⁷ The mean is 0.472 (SD 0.319), suggesting that citizens have relatively low opinions of immigration in general—though there is substantial cross-national variation (Figure 1). Immigration attitudes appear most favorable in Sweden (mean 0.694; SD 0.273) and most hostile in Malta (mean 0.194; SD 0.224).

To capture superordinate identification, the key independent variable (Feel European) assesses whether one thinks of herself as European not at all, not really, somewhat, or to a great extent. Likewise, Feel National and Feel Regional gauge the extent to which individuals see themselves in these other terms. These three levels are positively correlated, confirming that most individuals do not view identity in zero-sum terms but instead hold multiple identities simultaneously (Citrin and Sides, 2004; Gherghina and Chiru, 2011). European identity correlates with national and regional identity at 0.132 and 0.134 respectively, while national and regional identity correlate at 0.339.⁸ The mean of each identity shows that the average EU citizen feels more national (mean 2.752; SD 0.593) than regional (mean 2.658; SD 0.636) than European (mean 1.951; SD 0.924). While the order of these attachments varies widely across individuals, the aggregate pattern makes clear that superordinate identification is not that common and that national identity prevails. This—in addition to the variation observed in Figure 1 and confirmed through an analysis of variance (Table 1, Model 1)—highlights the importance of understanding how each type of identity operates for immigration attitudes.

Table 1.

Multilevel determinants of pro-immigration attitudes

	1: ANOVA			2: Individual-Level			3: Cross-Cuttingness			4: EU Membership Length
	Coef.	SE	Sig.	Coef.	SE	Sig.	Coef.	SE	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.
Fixed effects
Individual level
Feel European				0.061	0.003	**	0.061	0.003	**	0.061	0.003	**
Feel National				−0.042	0.004	**	−0.042	0.004	**	−0.042	0.004	**
Feel Regional				−0.004	0.004		−0.004	0.004		−0.004	0.004
Crime is an Issue				−0.049	0.005	**	−0.049	0.005	**	−0.049	0.005	**
Economic Situation Index				0.074	0.004	**	0.074	0.004	**	0.074	0.004	**
L–R Ideology				−0.013	0.001	**	−0.013	0.001	**	−0.013	0.001	**
Age				0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Male				0.002	0.004		0.002	0.004		0.002	0.004
Education				0.044	0.003	**	0.044	0.003	**	0.044	0.003	**
Urban				0.012	0.003	**	0.012	0.003	**	0.012	0.003	**
Born here				−0.076	0.009	**	−0.076	0.009	**	−0.076	0.009	**
Homeowner				−0.008	0.005		−0.008	0.005		−0.008	0.005
Unemployed				0.010	0.008		0.010	0.008		0.010	0.008
Blue Collar Worker				−0.027	0.006	**	−0.027	0.006	**	−0.027	0.006	**
Country level
Ling–Relig Cross-Cuttingness							0.193	0.099	*
Length of EU Membership										0.001	0.001
Constant (γ00)	0.461	0.022	**	0.472	0.018	**	0.473	0.017	**	0.474	0.018	**
Variance components
Individual-level variance (σ²)	0.092	0.001	**	0.082	0.001	**	0.082	0.001	**	0.082	0.001	**
Country-level variance (τ₀₀)	0.013	0.004	**	0.009	0.002	**	0.008	0.002	**	0.008	0.002	**
Model fit
Number of individuals	26,048			19,929			19,929			19,929
Number of countries	27			27			27			27
Individual-level variance explained				11.55%			11.55%			11.55%
Country-level variance explained				33.24%			41.52%			37.51%
Deviance (−2 × log likelihood)	11,996.31			6748.73			6745.14			6746.94

Note: Table entries reflect estimates of a two-level random intercept model. For ease of interpretation, all variables are centered at their means.

*≤0.05;

**≤0.01.

In terms of covariates, the Economic Situation Index taps evaluations of both egocentric and sociotropic economic matters. Dummies for Unemployed and Blue Collar Worker test for perceived economic threat in terms of job competition. Anxiety over crime is operationalized by a dichotomous variable, Crime is an Issue, equal to one if a respondent mentioned crime as one of the ‘two most important issues facing (our country).’ Demographically, I control for L–R Ideology, Age, gender (Male), Education, residence (Urban), and home ownership (Homeowner). Finally, I include a dichotomous variable for whether a respondent was Born Here. At the country level, I first employ an index of Linguistic-Religious Cross-Cuttingness from Selway's (2011a) ‘Cross-country Indices of Multidimensional Measures of Social Structure,’ where higher values indicate greater overlapping social ties. This measure, defined as ‘how identically distributed groups on one cleavage are on a second (or more) cleavages’ (Selway, 2011b: 49), overcomes the unidimensional nature of most fractionalization (or polarization) measures, which focus exclusively on only one cleavage (e.g., ethnicity) and cannot capture the multidimensional nature of overlapping group memberships. It therefore affords the best test of the theory discussed earlier. Second, I include Length of EU Membership, calculated as the survey year minus each country's year of EU entry.

Multilevel regression controls for the underlying structure of these data (individuals nested within countries) and enhances the ability to explain—rather than simply control for—contextual variance in attitudes toward immigration (Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). Not only does statistically significant variance exist at the country level (Table 1, Model 1), but it comprises 12.38% of the total variance in the dependent variable. This variance is not only substantively intriguing, but failure to properly account for the clustering of individuals from the same country would deflate standard errors and increase the likelihood of erroneously finding significance (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). To avoid this, I first employ random-intercept hierarchical models (allowing baseline immigration attitudes to vary by country) before later running random-coefficient models (allowing the slope of European identity's effect on immigration attitudes to vary by country) that test the predicted cross-level interactions. Variables are centered at their means so the constant reflects the average immigration sentiment for the average individual across all groups.

Individual, contextual, and cross-level results

Linear effects

Table 1, Model 2 outlines the basic effect of each individual-level predictor for immigration attitudes—effects that remain robust throughout all analyses and specifications. Providing support for H1, superordinate identification with Europe is positively and significantly associated with more inclusive immigration attitudes. This effect is substantively stronger than the negative pull of national identity: a one-unit increase in Feeling European results in a 0.061 improvement in immigration attitudes, compared to a −0.042 decrease from a similar shift in Feeling National. Interestingly, as evidenced by its nonsignificance, regional attachment has no clear effect on evaluations of immigrants.

The other individual-level predictors perform as expected. Fear of crime is negative and significant, underscoring the importance of perceived safety threat. Perceived economic threat is also apparent. The better one's personal and the national economic situation, the more positively she will view immigration. Though being unemployed does not significantly alter immigration attitudes, skill level (Blue Collar Worker) does. Consistent with past studies, greater education and more cosmopolitan residence correspond with better attitudes toward immigrants while a right-leaning ideology is associated with more negative ones. Contrary to findings established elsewhere, age and gender do not appear to matter (perhaps because immigration attitudes can be equally polarized across males and females of all generations); neither does home ownership.

Turning to contextual effects, Models 3 and 4 add in country cross-cuttingness and length of EU membership. Residing in highly cross-cut linguistic and religious societies appears to improve individuals' assessments of immigrants, while coming from a newer EU member state is associated with no less significantly favorable views. Though each model helps explain a good portion of the variance in immigration attitudes at both the individual and country levels, there is still significant variance to be explained after weighing each group of predictors.

To more thoroughly compare the magnitude of these effects, Figure 2 illustrates the change in predicted value on the Pro-Immigration Attitudes Index when moving across the full range of each significant variable. Ordered from greatest to least, identification with the superordinate category is the second strongest substantive effect. Moving from identifying with Europe not at all to a great extent translates to a 0.18 overall increase in predicted value. Phrased differently, those who feel very European are almost 20% more likely to exhibit positive immigration attitudes than those who do not feel European at all (predicted values of 0.529 versus 0.346). This effect is only slightly trumped by economic evaluations and relatively matched by education. Comparing country-level effects, moving from the lowest to highest degree of linguistic–religious cross-cuttingness increases pro-immigration attitudes by 0.14 (predicted values of 0.378 versus 0.523, respectively).

These results support the CIIM hypothesis that a superordinate identity can improve intergroup attitudes and minimize outgroup animosity. What remains to be seen is whether and how this effect changes under conditions of cross-cuttingness and time in the EU.

Moderating effects

Cross-cutting cleavages may make it easier for individuals to conceive of themselves as members of multiple groups, thereby increasing the chance that an overarching superordinate identity will ameliorate intergroup antagonism. If this expectation holds, the coefficient on the interaction term should be positive and significant. Table 2, Model 5 tests this by including a cross-level interaction between individual strength of identification with Europe and country linguistic–religious cross-cuttingness.

Table 2.

Contextual moderators of European identity's effect on pro-immigration attitudes index

	5: Cross-Cuttingness			6: EU Membership Length
	Coef.	SE	Sig.	Coef.	SE	Sig.
Fixed effects
Individual level
Feel European	0.061	0.004	**	0.061	0.004	**
Feel National	−0.042	0.004	**	−0.043	0.004	**
Feel Regional	−0.005	0.004		−0.004	0.004
Crime is an Issue	−0.048	0.005	**	−0.048	0.005	**
Economic Situation Index	0.074	0.004	**	0.074	0.004	**
L–R Ideology	−0.013	0.001	**	−0.013	0.001	**
Age	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Male	0.002	0.004		0.002	0.004
Education	0.043	0.003	**	0.043	0.003	**
Urban	0.012	0.003	**	0.012	0.003	**
Born Here	−0.074	0.009	**	−0.075	0.009	**
Homeowner	−0.008	0.005		−0.008	0.005
Unemployed	0.010	0.008		0.010	0.008
Blue Collar Worker	−0.028	0.006	**	−0.027	0.006	**
Country level
Ling–Relig Cross-Cuttingness	0.200	0.099	*
Length of EU Membership				0.001	0.001
Constant (γ00)	0.474	0.017	**	0.475	0.018	**
Random effects
Cross-level interactions
Feel European × Ling–Relig Cross-Cuttingness	0.072	0.024	**
Feel European × Length of EU Membership				0.000	0.000	**
Variance components
Cross-level variance
Ling–Relig Cross-Cuttingness	0.0002	0.0001	**
Length of EU Membership				0.000	0.000	**
Other
Individual-level variance (σ²)	0.081	0.001	**	0.081	0.001	**
Country-level variance (τ₀₀)	0.008	0.002	**	0.008	0.002	**
Model fit
Number of individuals	19,929			19,929
Number of countries	27			27
Individual-level variance explained	11.84%			11.84%
Country-level variance explained	41.05%			36.48%
Deviance (− 2 × log likelihood)	6702.55			6707.75

Note: Table entries reflect estimates of a two-level random coefficient model with cross-level interactions. For ease of interpretation, all variables are centered at their means.

*≤0.05;

**≤0.01.

A positive interaction effect is indeed observed, supporting H2: the marginal effect of European identity on immigration attitudes increases as cross-cutting cleavages increase. To better elucidate the relationship between these two variables, Figure 3 displays the predicted value of the Pro-Immigration Attitudes Index by combination of European identity and cross-cuttingness; Figure 4 then graphs the marginal effect of European identity on the dependent variable across values of the moderating condition. Of the countries examined, Malta has the lowest degree of cross-cutting cleavages while Spain has the highest. Therefore, Figures 3 and 4 represent the overall difference between Maltese and Spanish citizens who identify equally strongly (or weakly) with Europe. The predicted value changes by 0.199 (from 0.392 to 0.591) while the corresponding marginal effect of European identity on immigration attitudes increases from 0.026 in Malta to 0.079 in Spain—a total shift in slope of 0.054. This shows that cross-cuttingness boosts superordinate identity's already positive effect on outgroup evaluations.

Next, I test for changes in European identity's effect across country length of EU membership. In addition to having been exposed to the European identity alternative for less time, citizens of newer EU member states may hold systematically different views of immigration, which could attenuate a superordinate identity's likelihood of reducing intergroup prejudice. In either case, the interaction between an individual's feelings of superordinate identification and length of EU membership would be positively signed, as residence in an older member state would amplify the already-positive tendencies associated with European identity.

Table 2, Model 6 shows that length of EU membership exerts a statistically significant (albeit substantively small) positive moderating effect on the relationship between European identity and immigration attitudes. This supports H3. As depicted in Figure 5, the effect of European identity is moderated by time in the EU: moving from minimum to maximum length of EU membership produces a 0.09 difference in predicted immigration attitudes (0.494–0.581). Similarly, as portrayed in Figure 6, the positive marginal effect of a superordinate European identity grows even stronger among the oldest EU member states (from 0.062 to 0.085 – a total shift in slope of 0.023). Thus, though superordinate identification is positive on its own, its ability to ease intergroup tensions appears strongest in country contexts where the European identity alternative has been made more salient by longer EU membership.

Extension: Who is considered the ‘outgroup’?

In general support of the CIIM, the above results show that identification with Europe produces the beneficial consequences one would expect a superordinate identity to have on outgroup attitudes. However, immigration attitudes may vary depending on who is migrating. How a native reacts can depend on immigrants' geographic and cultural backgrounds (Sniderman et al., 2004), as well on the reason for and circumstances surrounding their emigration (e.g. exchange student versus guest worker versus refugee; legal versus illegal; etc.) (Green, 2007, 2009; McLaren, 2001). Does superordinate identity operate the same way in each instance, prompting blanket acceptance of all types of immigrants? Or might European identity evoke stronger affect for fellow EU nationals while immigrants from other areas of the world instead provoke heightened perceptions of threat?

The CIIM predicts a superordinate identity will specifically improve members of the various subgroups' assessments of each other. The generic tests above did not allow for such differentiation. Thus, to more fully support the CIIM, identification with Europe should have the strongest effect on attitudes toward fellow EU citizens.

H4: The greater one identifies with Europe, the less hostility she will exhibit towards outgroups from other EU countries.

To investigate whether European identity's effect differs, I take account of individuals' contextual exposure to primarily EU or non-EU immigrants by incorporating objective migration statistics from Eurostat on the percentage of foreign-born population from EU versus non-EU countries residing in each EU member state (Rogers, 2010). Figure 7 aligns these figures by country.

As shown, there is substantial variation in the type of immigration each EU member state is experiencing. Some countries (like Cyprus) receive the bulk of their immigrants from other places in the EU. Others (like Latvia) have a much larger proportion of non-EU residents. These country-level trends should affect who citizens within their borders are thinking of when prompted to report on their attitudes toward immigrants. Hence, when asked about their immigration opinions, individuals in Cyprus are likely responding based on their feelings toward EU immigrants while people in Latvia are answering from the perspective of receiving non-EU ones.

Though respondents' exact mental reference points are unknown from these data, Table 3 replicates the earlier analysis using a restricted sample of Cypriot versus Latvian citizens. Importantly, the positive effect of identification with Europe remains robust in both locations. However, judging by its higher coefficient size in the Cyprus case (0.044 compared with 0.032 in the Latvian sample), Feel European indeed has a stronger substantive effect on attitudes toward individuals of another subgroup encompassed within the same overarching superordinate identity (here: Europe). This provides additional evidence to suggest that the benefits of superordinate identification, while positive overall, operate most strongly exactly as the CIIM would predict. But interestingly, while the magnitude of its impact is greatest in places receiving predominantly EU immigrants, identification with Europe appears to help individuals feel more friendly toward everyone as it is still positive and significant where immigration from non-EU countries abounds.

Table 3.

The effect of identification with Europe on pro-immigration attitudes index in countries with high EU versus non-EU immigration

	High EU: Cyprus			High Non-EU: Latvia			All 27 EU Members
	Coef.	SE	Sig.	Coef.	SE	Sig.	Coef.	SE	Sig.
Feel European	0.044	0.015	**	0.032	0.010	**	0.061	0.003	**
Feel National	0.023	0.040		−0.031	0.012	*	−0.042	0.004	**
Feel Regional	−0.008	0.029		0.012	0.018		−0.004	0.004
Crime is An Issue	0.005	0.025		0.011	0.025		−0.049	0.005	**
Economic Situation Index	0.062	0.025	*	0.017	0.021		0.074	0.004	**
L–R Ideology	−0.005	0.004		−0.014	0.004	**	−0.013	0.001	**
Age	0.001	0.001		−0.001	0.001		0.000	0.000
Male	0.049	0.024	*	−0.027	0.019		0.002	0.004
Education	0.058	0.019	**	0.015	0.014		0.044	0.003	**
Urban	0.018	0.027		−0.017	0.012		0.012	0.003	**
Born Here	−0.113	0.072		−0.072	0.044		−0.076	0.009	**
Homeowner	0.031	0.027		−0.003	0.019		−0.008	0.005
Unemployed	0.036	0.070		0.034	0.028		0.010	0.008
Blue Collar Worker	0.043	0.034		0.011	0.028		−0.027	0.006	**

Constant	0.311	0.019	**	0.401	0.015	**	0.472	0.018	**
Number of individuals	359			727			19,929
Number of countries	1			1			27
R-squared	0.132			0.065
Individual-level variance explained							11.55%

Note: Columns 1 and 2 report OLS regression models restricted to that country sample only. Column 3 replicates Model 2 from Table 1 using a two-level random intercept model. For ease of interpretation, all variables are centered at their means.

*≤0.05;

**≤0.01.

Conclusion

The above analyses sought to gauge whether expectations (drawn in many instances from lab experiments and predominantly from race relations in the American context) about the positive effects of a superordinate identity for intergroup relations generalize to political–territorial identification in the EU. It also sought to elucidate superordinate identity's effect in different contextual circumstances, namely under conditions of meager versus many cross-cutting cleavages and short versus long exposure to the superordinate identity alternative. Two noteworthy results stand out from this investigation into the relationship between European identity and attitudes toward immigrants.

First, the comparison of different types of identity aimed to satisfy the recommendation that scholars ‘…focus on understanding the psychology of multiple group identities and its implication for intergroup perceptions and attitudes’ (Brewer, 1999: 442). Doing so not only allowed for consideration of the strength of individuals' attachment to each identity, but also analysis of the distinct consequences of different identity categories. In every instance, greater European identity—which theoretically subsumes multiple subgroup nationalities under one superordinate umbrella—was matched by more inclusive views of and positive affect toward immigrants. National identification demonstrated the opposite relationship, once again confirming that exclusive preference for one's own subgroup elicits greater bias against members of an outgroup (Huddy, 2001). Regional identification had no effect, suggesting that subnational affiliations may be less salient for immigration attitudes than other identities.

Second, as with many things, context matters. Psychological features like identity rarely operate on a blank slate, and certain preexisting conditions may augment or undercut the positive effects of superordinate identification. Cross-cutting cleavages, long championed as desirable for political stability and conflict reduction (Lipset, 1959; Olzak, 2006), enhanced evaluations of immigrants on their own and operated in conjunction with superordinate identity to maximize positive attitudes toward immigration. Similarly, greater country length of EU membership amplified the strength of superordinate identity's positive effect.

These findings solidify the precepts of the CIIM as a method of recategorizing individuals' self-conceptions in order to minimize intergroup animosity and maximize intergroup cooperation (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner et al., 1993). At the same time, they raise some issues worthy of further consideration.

First, further analysis is necessary before concluding that a definitive causal relationship exists between the variables under scrutiny. Whether identity causes inclusiveness or favorable views toward immigrants increase one's propensity to view herself as part of the superordinate group in the first place is unresolved. For now, we simply see that these psychological traits—a superordinate sense of self and immigrant acceptance—are systematically bundled together. Though past experimental evidence for the CIIM supports the causal order specified here (that recategorization precedes improved outgroup evaluations), the cross-sectional nature of the present data, in addition to a reliance on strictly attitudinal measures, curbs any concrete conclusions about causality. Furthermore, given xenophobia's high correlation with nationalism (De Master and Le Roy, 2000; McLaren, 2001; Quillian, 1995), future work should turn to longitudinal analyses or experiments that can parse out the exact causal relationship between subgroup attachment, willingness to identify superordinately, and outgroup prejudice.

Next, though basic predictions were confirmed by an extension scrutinizing whether the positive effect of identifying with Europe differed based on the predominant origin of a country's foreign-born population, greater distinctions should be made to qualify the extent to which superordinate identity increases favorable views toward EU versus non-EU immigrants. To improve upon the preliminary test conducted here, further research should employ data where respondents are asked directly about their views toward various immigrant outgroups rather than immigrants in general.

Finally, the role of regional identity deserves much greater attention. Its apparent nonsignificance could reflect a canceling-out effect from variation in the salience of regional identity across Europe, or the tendency for some regional identities to be highly inclusive while others are completely exclusive. Regional identity is also not typically as politicized as national or European identity.⁹ Therefore, scholars should more fully explore regional identity's effect on immigration attitudes.

Limitations aside, these findings optimistically affirm the CIIM's prediction that superordinate identification helps everybody get along by empirically demonstrating that identification with Europe produces the intergroup consequences expected of a superordinate identity.¹⁰ Knowing, then, that identification with Europe yields this beneficial tendency, it is all the more important to appreciate why and how only some citizens come to see themselves in this superordinate light.

Footnotes

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am especially grateful to Jennifer Fitzgerald, Sara Hobolt, Joseph Jupille, Jennifer Wolak, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. All remaining errors are mine. Replication materials are available from the journal or at .

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