Disengaging elections? Political interest,number of elections,and turnout in elections to the European Parliament

Abstract

Since direct elections to the European Parliament began in 1979, variations in voting behavior in European Parliament elections from national elections have raised interesting questions about political behavior. I add to a growing literature that explores turnout in European Parliament elections by focusing on the count of national elections between European Parliament elections. Through a cross-national study of elections, I find that turnout decreases in the European Parliament contest following cycles with numerous national contests. Then, using data from the European Election Study, I argue that this is the result of frequent elections decreasing turnout particularly among already low interest voters who stay home. My findings have implications for how formal rules of multi-level elections shape political behavior more generally and voter fatigue in particular.

Keywords

Elections European Parliament elections European politics political disengagement turnout

Introduction

Since direct elections to the European Parliament (EP) began in 1979, turnout in these contests has dropped from around 60% in 1979 to around 42% in 2014. In the 2019 contests, turnout increased for the first time in the history of EP elections after eight contests which saw declines in turnout. Furthermore, the turnout levels vary across member states from consistently high turnout around 80% to 90% (Belgium and Luxembourg) to consistently low turnout around 20% to 30% (United Kingdom (UK), Slovakia). The wide variance across the member states coupled with a consistent decline in overall turnout raises important questions about the relationship between voters and EP elections. Given the increasing challenges facing Europe and role the EU plays in addressing those challenges, why do voters abstain in EP elections?

In this article, I contribute to a large and growing literature that attempts to answer this question by focusing on the effect of the scheduling of national elections on voter turnout in EP elections. Since the financial crisis, several countries have held frequent elections in short succession. For example, Spain has held four general elections since 2015 including two in 2019 after stalled coalition talks, a corruption scandal involving the Prime Minister, and attempts to increase the governing party’s majority. In the UK, following the Brexit referendum in 2016, there were general elections in 2017 and again in 2019 due to the controversy over Brexit. The goal of this article is to better understand the relationship between frequent elections in countries like Spain or the UK and political participation.

The timing of elections is frequently included in studies of turnout in EP elections as part of the second-order model of EP elections, which views EP elections as extensions of national politics (Reif and Schmidt, 1980). However, these studies have focused on the effect of the most proximate national election to the European election (Garmann, 2016, 2017; Schakel and Dandoy, 2014). In particular, Garmann (2017) demonstrates that the raw number of elections depresses turnout, but his analysis focuses solely on Germany and he restricts his analysis to two years prior to the EP contest. Building on this work in the European turnout literature, I argue that the entire electoral cycle matters, and that the entire number of national elections between European elections is associated with lower turnout, especially among those who have low levels of political interest.

To conduct this study, I combine cross-national panel data on the number of elections between EP elections by counting parliamentary elections, presidential elections, and referendum. I include a series of controls for institutional factors that influence voter behavior as well as the number of days a national election is held before and after an EP election. In a second step, I then explore the relationship between interest and the number of elections using survey data from the 2019 wave of the European Election Study (EES, Schmitt et al., 2019). I find a significant effect of political interest as a moderator of the negative effect of the number of elections on the likelihood of turning out and provide the first individual-level study of the effects of frequent elections on European turnout.

Ultimately, I argue that the number of elections across the whole European electoral cycle depresses turnout in EP elections, and that this relationship is particularly strong among voters that are already disengaged from EU politics. Drawing on cross-national data of EP elections from each member state, I demonstrate that numerous domestic elections between EP contests is associated with declining turnout in EP elections. Then, using hierarchical multi-level modeling of individual-level responses to the ESS and contextual data from the 2019 elections, I show that this relationship holds even when turnout increased in 2019 and is driven by low interest voters. Ultimately, these results demonstrate that frequent elections between second-order contests can decrease turnout, especially among voters who are already disengaged.

Explaining turnout in EP elections

Reif and Schmitt’s (1980) canonical work argues that EP elections are second-order elections, meaning voters treat these contests as extensions of national politics rather than about preferred European outcomes. This results in lower turnout over national-level elections, higher vote shares for anti-government and small parties (Mzes, 2005; Reif, 1984). This is especially the case for EP elections, where voters perceive these elections as the most distant and low-stakes, leading to decreased turnout and the election results reflecting tests of national politics (Lefevere and Van Aelst, 2014; Reif, 1984). Voters make decisions over whether to vote based on their attitudes regarding domestic politics, with consequences such as turnout reflecting trends in national politics (Reif, 1984; Reif and Schmitt, 1980).

Numerous studies have since found substantial support for the second-order model of elections when studying European elections. Hobolt and Wittrock (2011) find that EP elections fit into the second-order model of elections since voters are more responsive to national issues and national politics when making decisions. Additionally, voters vote in European elections because they are motivated to do so by national issues, considerations, and parties and usually interact with European elections in order to protest national governments or send signals (Flickinger and Studlar, 2007; Hix and Marsh, 2007; Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011; Marsh, 1998; Schmitt and Mannheimer, 1991; Stockemer, 2012). As a result, EP elections are considered signals of national political currents.

Despite strong evidence that national politics shape outcomes in EP elections in accordance with the second-order model, national politics are not deterministic of outcomes in EP elections. Participation in EP elections is multi-layered and does not fit the conventional second-order model (Hobolt and Spoon, 2012; Koepke and Ringe, 2006; Schmitt et al., 2020). Extant work on the way Europe matters in EP elections has demonstrated that despite the second-order status of these elections, attitudes towards the European project influence behavior in EP elections. More information about the EP, greater trust in the institution and leaders, and a higher perceived importance of the EP all lead to increased participation (Fauvelle-Aymar and Stagmaier, 2008; Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011; Hogh and Larsen, 2016; Stockemer, 2012). Even when EP election results match the expectations set out by the second-order model, it is important to take into account and study the ways in which national-level factors can influence, and interact with, attitudes towards EU politics to better understand how and why people turn out to vote.

Frequent elections and political interest

The extant literature tells us that European elections are a unique form of second-order election in which national politics still play a great role, but voters can be mobilized by attitudes towards the European project, such as interest in the EU or the salience of European issues. As a result, some scholars have sought to unpack the sources of political disengagement in order to understand how to effectively increase engagement. Some scholars point to increasing polarization and discord, leading some to opt out of political conversations and disengage (Settle and Carlson, 2019). Other studies suggest that government performance and scandals leave voters feeling like all politicians are corrupt and that the government is not worth their attention (Chong et al., 2015; De Vries, 2018). Work on participation in East Europe points to the historical legacy of communism resulting in lower levels of political trust and support for democracy, which can suppress interest in democratic politics (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2011, 2014).

However, a growing body of literature studies the effect of electoral schedules and campaigns on political disengagement. Some work has found that campaigns can increase a voter’s political knowledge and mobilize them (Arceneaux, 2006; Weber, 2007), while other studies suggest that longer campaigns harm turnout (Boyd, 1986). A large literature exists on the effects of electoral timing on outcomes in second-order contests. For example, EP elections scheduled right before national elections increase turnout due to campaign effects from the national contest (Weber, 2007) while EP elections scheduled close after national elections minimizes turnout due to the development of voter fatigue reducing a voter’s ability, or willingness, to pay attention and engage with voting again (Fauvelle-Aymar and Stagmaier, 2008; Garmann, 2016, 2017; Mattila, 2003; Rallings and Thrasher, 2005; Schakel and Dandoy, 2014; Weber, 2007). As a result, extant literature on EP elections frequently uses the timing of the EP election compared to the national election as a control, demonstrating a conventional acceptance that timing matters (Hix and Marsh, 2007; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012; Marsh, 1998).

However, these studies treat EP elections as midterms, which occur between national contests or only take into account the most proximate national elections before and after the EP election (e.g. Hobolt and Spoon, 2012). Missing from the literature on the effect of elections on voter fatigue in the EU are studies which focus on the entirety of the European electoral cycle and the scheduling of national elections between EP elections. This is best exemplified by Garmann (2017), who restricts his analysis into the number of elections to just two years prior to the EP contest, instead of the complete five-year cycle. This understudied aspect of EP elections provides further insight into the theoretical implications of the development and consequences of voter fatigue over extended periods of time in multi-level systems that contributions focusing on the most proximate national elections ignore.

It is important to study the entire electoral cycle, including all national, state-wide elections between two EP elections. In doing this, we can more fully understand the relationship between frequent elections and voting behavior in multi-level democracies in second-order elections. As Lijphart (1997) argues, the frequency of elections should depress turnout by contributing to antipathy among the electorate. He focuses on the American political system and argues American midterms experience lower turnout due to fatigue from voters who disengage from politics following the presidential elections Similarly, other work has found that extended political campaigns and election calendars which demand the constant attention of voters suppresses turnout in subsequent contests (Boyd, 1986; Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2010; Lijphart, 1997; Rallings et al., 2003; Schakel and Dandoy, 2014). As Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen (2010) argue, frequent elections affect the propensity of voters to turn out over the long-term, suggesting that there can be long-term consequences from frequent elections over a complete cycle.

This same logic of long-term disengagement resulting from frequent elections over entire cycles can be applied to the European context as well. Since some countries in the EU can schedule elections regardless of fixed electoral cycles while EP elections are on fixed five-year terms, multiple national elections can take place before voters cast their next vote in an EP election. Due to fixed terms shorter than five years, flexible electoral scheduling, hybrid systems that require separate executive and legislative elections, and frequent referendums, there is variation in the number of elections that can occur between EP contests. As a result, voters sometimes face multiple rounds of voting in national elections during the fixed European electoral cycle. I argue that this electoral flexibility results in lower turnout where the number of elections between the EP elections is higher. Overall, as the number of domestic elections increases between EP elections, turnout in the EP election will decrease (H1).

The conditional effect of political interest

According to the literature on the effect of electoral timing and frequency, constant elections increase the costs of voting by increasing the demands placed on voters to collect information and make political decisions, resulting in antipathy with the political process (Boyd, 1986; Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2010; Lijphart, 1997). However, I posit that the effect of numerous elections between two EP elections is not homogenous for the whole electorate but is conditional on the political interest of the voter.

According to the second-order model, turnout in European elections is low because these elections are low-stakes, and as a result, do not garner enough attention to mobilize voters (Reif, 1984; Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Recent work has found support for this model that EP elections are not sufficiently engaging, and that voters participate out of habit rather than out of a desire to influence EU politics, resulting in declining turnout as voters lose interest in participating in EP elections (Franklin and Hobolt, 2011; Schmitt and Mannheimer, 1991). However, we know from extant work that political interest does increase the propensity to vote in the EP election as interest increases (Schmitt et al., 2019; Stockemer, 2012). Given the importance of political interest to participation in second-order contests, engagement in European politics should play an important role in explaining turnout in European contests and should moderate the negative effect of numerous elections.

For voters who are politically interested, frequent elections should have no association with their likelihood of voting. Among these voters, the increasing costs that are expected to disengage voters associated with increasing the number of elections should be negligible. Prior work has demonstrated that voters who are interested in politics have higher levels of political sophistication (Denny and Doyle, 2008; Luskin, 1990), suggesting that the information and decision-making costs would be minimal and not lead to abstention. Therefore, numerous elections should not negatively impact these voters as the negative consequences linked to frequent elections should not depress their propensity to vote from their higher levels of interest and sophistication.

Therefore, I argue that the effect of the number of elections is driven by those voters who have low levels of political engagement. For voters with low political interest, the potential costs of numerous elections are meaningful detractors of their propensity to vote as they lack the interest in, and sophistication to, continuously collect new political information and make political decisions. When the number of elections increases, the demands placed on voters to make important decisions increases. For low interest voters, as politics becomes too demanding and overwhelming through numerous elections, their propensity to disengage should also increase. Overall, as political interest decreases, the magnitude of the coefficient of the number of domestic elections should increase (H2).

Data and methods

In order to understand the effect of the quantity of elections on turnout, I conduct a cross-national time-series study of EP elections. In a first step, as a test of the direct relationship between the number of elections and turnout, I compile data on the number of elections between EP contests from 1979 to 2014 at the aggregate level. Then, in a second step, I merge data on the number of elections between 2014 and 2019 with EES data to test the moderating role of individual-level political interest.

Each of the current 27 member states, and the UK, have participated in at least one EP election since the first direct elections in 1979. The main dependent variable is turnout in the EP election by country for each EP election retrieved from publicly available data from the EU. To test the relationship between aggregate turnout rates and the number of elections between two EP elections, I code the number of domestic elections that have been held in each member state between EP elections. For this study, only national, state-wide elections count towards the number of elections.¹ Each general legislative election, presidential election, and state-wide referendum (see Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2010) are counted as part of the analysis and given equal weight. The goal of this study is to understand how the number of elections as instances in which voters are asked to vote influences turnout in the EP elections. Regardless of the type of information needed or the perceived importance, the more times voters are asked to cast a ballot, the more politics requires their attention whether that is a vote for a member of the legislature or on an issue referendum.² Since there was no European election prior to 1979, or prior to off-cycle elections as members joined, there is no basis for which to start the European cycle. As a result, I have dropped the first election in each country from the analysis.³ For EP elections that follow off-cycle elections for new member states, the number of elections is counted despite electoral cycles that are less than five years since the focus is on the effect of national elections between EP elections. Each country-election observation for each value of the number of elections can be seen in the Online appendix.

I also include several control variables to account for other institutional explanations of voting behavior in European elections. First, I include both the number of days before and after that separate the most proximate legislative election from the EP contest in order to adjust for the conventional short-term effects of electoral scheduling (Fauvelle-Aymar and Stagmaier, 2008; Garmann, 2016, 2017; Mattila, 2003; Rallings and Thrasher, 2005; Schakel and Dandoy, 2014; Weber, 2007).⁴ Second, I count the number of European elections in which the member state has participated up to that point to capture the duration of membership, which should increase turnout as voters become more accustomed to participating in an EU election (Flickinger and Studlar, 2007). Third, I capture the district magnitude at the European level, which is a function of how many seats each country is allocated divided by the number of electoral districts. This accounts for the proportionality of the EP with a higher value representing a higher degree of proportionality. As proportionality increases, turnout should also increase (Eggers, 2015; Prosser, 2016).⁵ Fourth, I include a dichotomous variable for states that have compulsory voting (Belgium, Cyprus, Greece and Luxembourg). Compulsory voting should increase turnout (Franklin, 2001). Fifth, I use a dichotomous variable if a concurrent election was held alongside that year’s EP election, which should increase turnout (Garmann, 2016). Finally, I include a control variable to indicate whether the country was a member state of the European Union (EU) prior to the Southern and Eastern enlargement in 2004, which should mean higher turnout in the pre-Eastern enlargement member states (Koepke and Ringe, 2006).

All data come from government electoral databases. For older elections unavailable on official websites, I turn to Adam Carr’s electoral archive, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and the European Election Database. The summary statistics for all variables included in the analyses can be found in the Online appendix.

I use a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the model, which can be expressed as follows:

T_{i t} = α + β_{1} {N E}_{i t} + β_{2} {LDV}_{i t} + β_{3} X_{i t} + a_{i} + b_{t} + ϵ

Where the dependent variable of turnout (T) in country i in election t depends on the number of elections between the prior and current EP election, denoted as NE, plus prior turnout, LDV, and a battery of control variables, X. The variable of interest is the coefficient of NE, which provides the marginal effect of the number of elections on turnout and should be negative. I include a lagged dependent variable, denoted as LDV, to adjust for autocorrelation between elections and fixed effects for EP election (b_t) and country (a_i) to control for other unobserved heterogeneity not captured already by the control variables.⁶

Aggregate-level results

I find support for my first hypothesis (H1) that an increasing number of elections depresses turnout in EP elections. Table 1 presents the results of an OLS regression model testing H1, which considers both the national electoral schedules and European electoral schedules by estimating the effect of the number of domestic elections between two EP elections. According to Model 2 with the lagged dependent variable, an increase in the number of elections by one election between EP contests is associated with an average 1.5 percentage point decline in turnout in the subsequent EP election. This demonstrates that the number of elections over the entirety of the European cycle has a negative relationship with turnout in subsequent EP elections. As the number of elections between EP elections increases (see Model 2) turnout decreases in the elections at the end of the given electoral cycle.⁷

Table 1.

Estimating the effect of the number of elections.

	(1) No LDV	(2) LDV
Number of Elections	–1.485* (0.815)	–1.465* (0.870)
Days After National Election	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
Days Before National Election	–0.001 (0.003)	–0.001 (0.003)
Lagged Dependent Variable		0.018 (0.130)
Number of Prior EP Elections	–6.024*** (1.003)	–5.881*** (1.437)
EP District Magnitude	0.042 (0.029)	0.041 (0.029)
Compulsory Voting	59.475*** (2.991)	58.294*** (8.623)
Concurrent Election	2.184 (3.442)	2.173 (3.446)
Pre-Eastern Expansion Member	24.306*** (4.943)	23.728*** (5.99)
Constant	19.629** (7.815)	19.289** (8.788)
Observations	112	112
R²	0.926	0.926
RMSE	6.08	6.12
Fixed Effects (Election Year, Country)	Yes	Yes

Note: EP: European Parliament; LDV: lagged dependent variable; RMSE: root mean square error. Standard errors reported in parentheses, clustered by country year. p < .1* p < .05** p < .001***

Figure 1 depicts the observed relationship between the number of elections and predicted turnout and demonstrates that with only one domestic election between EP elections, as in Denmark or Germany between 2009 and 2014 for example, turnout is at 52%. At the other end of the spectrum, when there are seven elections, consisting of general elections, presidential elections, and referendums, between two EP elections, as in Ireland and Slovenia from 2009 and 2014, turnout decreases to 42%. This relationship is most significant between two and three elections between EP contests with predicted turnout decreasing from 49% at two elections to 47% at three elections. For example, the Netherlands held two elections between the 1979 and 1984 EP contests and turnout in the latter contest was 50.9% while Denmark held three elections between the 1984 and 1989 EP contests and turnout was 46%.

Figure 1.

Effect of the number of elections on turnout in EP elections.

Among the controls, the only statistically significant variables are compulsory voting, being a pre-Eastern enlargement member state, and the number of past EP elections in which a country has participated. As expected, compulsory voting increases turnout in EP elections by making participation mandatory (Franklin, 2001). Similarly, as expected, being a member of the 15 pre-Eastern enlargement countries increases turnout by 23.7 percentage points, confirming observed patterns that Eastern Europe and Western Europe behave in EP elections differently from one another (Koepke and Ringe, 2006). Interestingly, however, turnout in EP elections actually decreases as the member state participates in more EP elections, suggesting that the duration of membership has a negative relationship with turnout.⁸ While challenging expectations, this lends support to generational arguments that young people and first-time voters are discouraged from voting in future EP elections (Bhatti and Hansen, 2012; Franklin and Hobolt, 2011). Additionally, the negative effect of the duration of membership also suggests that part of the story behind the decline in turnout from 1979 is growing fatigue with EU politics and frustration with EU governance, both of which are individual-level accounts of the decision to abstain in EP elections. The lower turnout among Eastern European states despite them being newer to the EU further suggests that there may be attitudinal differences among voters in different regions of the EU that influences their decision to vote such as their interest in and satisfaction with democratic politics in the EU (see also Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2011, 2014).

Who’s disengaged by frequent elections?

In order to determine whether the relationship between the number of elections and turnout is moderated by one’s political interest, I combine contextual data used in the aggregate analysis for the 2019 elections with individual-level survey responses to the 2019 wave of the EES. The 2019 round of EP elections serve as a good case study in which to explore the effect of numerous elections and the likelihood of voting because, for the first time in a European election, overall turnout increased. This increase in turnout came after the EU became a highly politicized issue in the member states (Schmidt, 2019) and after several countries, including Spain and the UK, held several rounds of elections in short intervals. As a result, the 2019 round of elections represent a hard test of the expected effect of numerous elections since the outcome would suggest that voters were not disengaged following numerous elections. If the number of elections between 2014 and 2019 is associated with a declining propensity to vote, we can be more confident that frequent elections have a meaningful negative relationship with turnout even in a highly politicized and salient electoral environment, especially among those with low levels of political interest

The dependent variable for this analysis is the respondent’s self-reported turnout in the 2019 round of EP elections, coded as a dichotomous variable for either “Yes” (1) or “No” (0).

The main independent variable of interest is an interaction between the number of elections held in a given country between 2014 and 2019 and an individual’s response to the following question which taps into their political interest: “to what extent would you say you are interested in politics” (EES 2019, Q21)?

In the model, I include controls for age and gender of the respondent. To adjust for potential resource explanations for turnout, I control for years of education and socioeconomic status, both of which should increase the likelihood of voting as they increase (Brady et al., 1995). Fourthly, I control for whether or not an individual identifies as ideologically extreme, measured as a dichotomous variable with responses on the left-right scale less than three or greater than seven considered extreme, with the rest coded as ideological moderates. Extreme ideologues should be more likely to turn out (Whitford et al., 2006). I also adjust for whether a voter identifies with a political party, which should increase the likelihood of voting (Larcinese, 2009). Lastly, to control for attitudes towards the EU and EP elections, I adjust for electoral salience and satisfaction with democracy in the EU. As both of these variables increase, the likelihood of voting in the EP election should also increase (Hogh and Larsen, 2016; Rallings and Thrasher, 2005; Stockemer, 2012). I am unable to include a lagged dependent variable as the EES does not ask voters whether they participated in the 2014 EP elections. At the contextual level, I control for the same variables as in the aggregate analysis, including a dummy variable for whether or not a midterm national election has been held in the second half of the EP term (within 913 days) before the 2019 elections. The summary statistics for all variables included in the analyses can be found in the Online appendix.

Since individual responses are nested in the county-level contexts, estimating a standard regression model without accounting for the hierarchical data structure may result in deflated standard errors and inflated type 1 error rates so the significance of estimated effects may be overrated (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002: 219–220). As a result, I run a hierarchical multi-level model, which can be expressed as follows:

{P (V)}_{i} = α + β_{1} {N E}_{c} + β_{2} {P I}_{i} + β_{3} {N E}_{c} * {P I}_{i} + β_{4} X_{i c} + ϵ

Where the dependent variable of whether the voter i voted (V) depends on the interaction between the number of elections between the prior and current EP election, NE, in country c and voter i’s political interest, PI, and several country-level controls, X. The multi-level model effectively controls for heterogeneity between countries, making country fixed effects unnecessary.⁹

Individual-level results

Table 2 displays the results of my analysis for voting in the 2019 EP elections, and demonstrate support for both hypotheses. According to Model 3, which does not include the interaction term between political interest and the number of elections, the number of elections between 2014 and 2019 is negatively associated with the likelihood of an individual voting. This would support H1 that the number of elections has a negative relationship to turnout. Even in the highly politicized 2019 elections, the findings from the cross-national analysis from 1979 to 2014 that numerous elections between EP contests is related to lower turnout in the subsequent EP election does help explain the decision to participate in the 2019 elections.

Table 2.

Estimated effect on the likelihood of voting in EP election.

Individual Level
	(3)Direct Effect	(4) Interaction
Age	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Age²	–0.000 (0.000)	–0.000 (0.000)
Male	0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)
Education	0.018*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)
Socioeconomic Status	0.011** (0.003)	0.011** (0.003)
Ideologically Extreme	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022** (0.006)
Partisanship	–0.036 (0.026)	–0.035 (0.026)
Political Interest	0.038*** (0.005)	0.022** (0.008)
Salience	0.033*** (0.001)	0.033*** (0.001)
Satisfaction	0.025*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.004)
Contextual Level
Number of Elections	–0.013** (0.006)	–0.024** (0.008)
Midterm	0.011 (0.021)	0.011 (0.021)
Pre-Eastern Enlargement Member	–0.019 (0.047)	–0.018 (0.046)
Number of Prior EP Elections	0.012 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)
EP District Magnitude	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Compulsory	0.074** (0.031)	0.073** (0.03)
Cross-Level Interactions
Interest x Number of Elections		0.006** (0.003)
Constant	0.312*** (0.053)	0.341*** (0.055)
Observations	14,099	14,099
Number of Groups	28	28

Note: EP: European Parliament. Standard errors in parentheses. p < .1* p < .05** p < .001***.

Additionally, Model 4 incorporates the interaction term between political interest and the number of elections between 2014 and 2019.¹⁰ These results provide support for my second hypothesis that as political interest decreases, the magnitude of the effect of the number of elections increases (H2). When the number of elections is zero, there is a positive and statistically significant effect of a voter’s political interest on her likelihood of voting. This means that as political interest increases, the likelihood of voting also increases. Alternatively, when a voter reports no political interest (a self-reported value of zero), the number of elections decreases the likelihood that she voted in the 2019 EP elections. Importantly, the significant interaction term provides evidence that the relationship between the number of elections is moderated by a voter’s interest in politics.

Figure 2 provides a clear picture of the moderating role of political interest on the effect of the number of elections on the likelihood of voting. Among those with high political interest, the effect of the number of elections is small and insignificant. Those with high political interest, rather than becoming disengaged by frequent elections, instead pay attention and participate in every election regardless of how many are held in a given time frame. When political interest is high (reported score of 3), with no elections between 2014 and 2019, the estimated likelihood of voting is 86.5% and decreases to 82.6% when the number of elections increases to seven (i.e. Slovenia), although this difference is not statistically significant. However, for those with low political interest, there is a statistically significant decline as the number of elections between two EP elections increases. For voters with low political interest, the increasing frequency of elections depresses their likelihood of voting. With no elections, those with low interest have an estimated probability of voting at 79.9% while the probability decreases to 63% when there are seven elections. As a robustness check, I use how much the voter paid attention to the election as a measure of salience instead of political interest, and the substantive findings are the same (see the Online appendix). These results demonstrate the moderating role of political interest on the likelihood of voting as the number of elections between EP elections increases and supports the findings from the aggregate analysis in Table 1.

Figure 2.

Effect of number of elections moderated by political interest.

Regarding the controls, among the individual-level controls, political salience and satisfaction have significant positive effects on the likelihood of voting, matching expectations. Similarly, voters identified as ideologically extreme have a statistically significant higher propensity to vote. Age also has a positive effect, meaning that as a voter gets older, her likelihood of voting also increases. Education and socioeconomic status also have statistically significant positive effects on the likelihood of turning out to vote. The positive relationship between being in higher social classes and getting more education support the traditional resource model of participation where more resources like money and skills facilitate participation (Brady et al., 1995). There is no statistically significant effect for any contextual-level factor other than compulsory voting, which has a positive effect on the likelihood of turning out, in line with expectations that making voting mandatory will increase turnout (Franklin, 2001).

Discussion

Taken together, the aggregate-level and individual-level results suggest that numerous elections between two EP contests is associated with lower turnout in the subsequent EP election. In EP elections between 1979 to 2014, the aggregate analysis suggests that as the number of elections increases between two contests, turnout decreases in the latter of the two contests. The significant, negative effect of an increase in the number of elections demonstrates that numerous elections between two EP contests negatively impacts turnout in the subsequent election. Using survey data from the 2019 elections, which presents a hard test as overall turnout increased for the first time in an EP election and as turnout increased in several cases where the number of elections was high (i.e. Spain), I find that numerous elections between 2014 and 2019 still decreased the likelihood of voting.

I then argued that this effect is moderated by one’s interest in politics. Those who are politically interested are less susceptible to the negative effects of numerous elections, while those who are not politically interested are especially impacted by the costs of numerous elections. Even in the highly politicized electoral environment where overall and within-country turnout increased in the 2019 elections, among voters with lower levels of political interest, increasing the number of elections depresses the likelihood of voting. As political interest decreases, the negative effect of the number of elections strengthens. Overall, I argue that increasing electoral frequency between two contests contributes to a lower likelihood of voting, especially among those who are not interested in politics where frequent elections leads to further disengagement.

At first glance, these results challenge the habitual model that once an individual votes for the first time, she is more likely to vote because it becomes a habit which shapes her behavior in subsequent elections at the same level (Plutzer, 2002). Among other evidence that the habitual model does not apply to EP elections (see Franklin and Hobolt, 2011), I find that frequent elections, which should present opportunities for the voting habit to develop, does not translate to the European level. In fact, the opposite occurs, where frequent elections is associated with diminishing turnout in the second-order contest, suggesting that voting habits may not travel across levels of governance.

However, at the individual level, I find heterogenous effects for the number of elections on the likelihood of turning out. For voters with high political interest, or voters that could be considered habitual voters attuned to politics, the number of elections has no significant relationship on voting habits. It is only for the voters with low political interest that numerous elections is associated with a lower likelihood of voting. Unlike voters with pre-existing habits and high interest, voters that may already have disengaged from politics and become uninterested are more likely to succumb to the effects of frequent elections and are less likely to vote as the number of elections in which they are asked to vote increases.

These results could present a pessimistic account for direct democracy and political engagement, suggesting that frequent calls to vote diminishes democratic participation in the long term. The obvious takeaways would be to reduce the number of elections, although this has problematic implications for democracy. Another option may be to hold more concurrent elections, although research suggests a drop-off effect on turnout down the ballot as well (Bowler et al., 1992; Garmann, 2016).

Instead, this study suggests that a decline in turnout resulting from frequent elections may be an avoidable consequence of frequent and numerous elections that suppresses turnout among the politically disengaged. Voters paying attention to the election and interested in politics were unaffected by the negative consequences of frequent elections, suggesting that engaging with voters and increasing their interest in politics can combat the negative consequences from numerous elections. The overall results from 2019 further support this more optimistic outlook on political engagement in Europe, where voters still were less likely to vote following periods of numerous elections, but the heightened politicization of the EU and the election raised the salience of the election and likely contributed to the increase in overall turnout. As Hobolt and Rodon (2020) point out, the domestic contestation of European politics has made EU governance more challenging and has had far-reaching consequences for the European polity. Perhaps this domestic contestation could also be increasing interest in the EU as evidenced by the increased turnout in 2019, which as this study suggests, may supersede the negative consequences of frequent elections. This highlights a potential upside to the nationalization and polarization of EU issues which is that higher interest in the EU makes voters more immune to the desire to stay home generated by numerous elections in the domestic arena. More research is needed on the relationship between polarization around the EU and one’s political efficacy towards European politics.

Regarding the debate over the applicability of the second-order model to EP elections, this study suggests that the second-order model is still necessary. The negative effect of national level elections on turnout in EP contests would match the second-order model which states that national politics are the driving force behind political behavior in EP contests (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). In this case, frequent national-level elections are depressing turnout in the European contest, demonstrating how domestic-level political forces shape participation in EP contests. Europe may matter for the issues that influence voters when deciding whom to vote for (Hobolt et al., 2009; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012), but turnout is still negatively impacted by the formal rules of national-level electoral schedules.

While I focus on the EU, the implications of these results travel beyond the EU. The EU represents one model of multi-level governance which holds elections at the varying levels of administration (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, 2003). These results suggest that this model of multi-level democracy, in which there is low coordination in electoral scheduling or at the very least varying electoral calendars across administrative units, depresses turnout when elections are frequent between two contests. In the United States (US) for example, not only are there fixed federal elections every two years, but states also hold their own elections and primaries independent from one another. While the US is not exactly the same as the EU as there is some coordination around electoral scheduling, the results from this study suggest that too many elections between contests across the various levels of governance can depress turnout in second-order contests, especially among low interest voters.

Future work

This article presents an important first step into studying the long-term effect of electoral frequency and scheduling on participation in EU elections. However, this study is not without limitations that future studies should work to address. Importantly, the findings should not be read as causal, but as suggestive evidence that numerous elections is associated with meaningful negative consequences on turnout, especially among low interest voters who become more disengaged as the number of elections increases. Future work should aim to further develop the causal relationship behind the effect of numerous elections through instrumental variable approaches, regression discontinuity designs, or quasi-experimental methods to better identify the causal effect of the number of elections on participation. Furthermore, work should aim to better unpack the mechanism behind the negative effect of numerous elections. Prior work often cites voter fatigue as voters tire of politics from numerous elections, yet other potential mechanisms such as increasing information costs, declining satisfaction with democracy, or declining campaign mobilization may be responsible for the observed negative effect of numerous elections on low interest voters.

These results lay the groundwork for important studies into how the number of elections influences voter engagement. Importantly, I treat the number of elections that were held between EP contests as equal weight, despite differences in type, importance and the precipitating circumstances that led to the election. Future work should aim to unpack the effect of different types of elections and different electoral conditions on the propensity to turn out. Do institutionally mandated elections differ in their impact than politically motivated elections which were called by politicians? Do elections which result from crises have a different impact than those that are planned? Does the clustering of elections in short intervals have a greater effect than the frequent elections spread out over five years? Lastly, do different types of referendums have different effects on turnout or are some issues mobilizing? While these questions extend beyond the scope of this study, future studies into the effect of elections on turnout should work to answer these questions. Unpacking the effect of numerous elections on political engagement is an avenue of future research. As elections become more polarizing and common, it is important to understand the consequences of these frequent calls to action on behavior and political attitudes for the health and legitimacy of democracy.

Supplemental Material

sj-pdf-1-eup-10.1177_1465116521998455 - Supplemental material for Disengaging elections? Political interest, number of elections, and turnout in elections to the European Parliament

Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-eup-10.1177_1465116521998455 for Disengaging elections? Political interest, number of elections, and turnout in elections to the European Parliament by Jeffrey Nonnemacher in European Union Politics

Supplemental Material

sj-zip-2-eup-10.1177_1465116521998455 - Supplemental material for Disengaging elections? Political interest, number of elections, and turnout in elections to the European Parliament

Supplemental material, sj-zip-2-eup-10.1177_1465116521998455 for Disengaging elections? Political interest, number of elections, and turnout in elections to the European Parliament by Jeffrey Nonnemacher in European Union Politics

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Jae-Jae Spoon for her help and support throughout this project. I would also like to thank Joe Jupille, Sarah Wilson Sokhey, Douglas Snyder, Christopher Jorde, Jennifer Fitzgerald, Pablo Fernandez-Vazquez, the members of the Comparative Politics Reading Group at the University of Pittsburgh, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback. All mistakes remain my own.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Jeffrey Nonnemacher

Notes

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