The Positivist Dispute after 50 years – An unrepentant ‘positivist’ view

The ‘Positivist Dispute’ is the name given by sociologists and philosophers to the debate on the underlying methodology of the social sciences which took place in the 1960s and 1970s between advocates of Critical Rationalism on the one hand and Critical Theorists from the Frankfurt School on the other. Its most prominent participants were Karl Raimund Popper and Hans Albert as Critical Rationalists and Theodor W. Adorno and Jürgen Habermas as Critical Theorists. It is quite clear that the dispute on positivism began at the Conference of the German Society of Sociology which was held in Tübingen in October 1961; its most important publication is Adorno et al.’s (1969 [1976]) volume, translated as The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, which included Popper’s and Adorno’s lectures from the conference in Tübingen, the remarks made by its organizer, Ralf Dahrendorf, in the Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Habermas’ ‘postscript’ to that taken from the Festschrift for Adorno and criticism of the latter by Albert, further replies from Habermas and Albert as well as an article by Harald Pilot, all three first published in the Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, an earlier work by Adorno (taken from the Festschrift for Helmut Plessner), a (new) comprehensive (‘long’) introduction by Adorno and a ‘short surprised postscript’ by Albert. The German original has been reprinted numerous times and is still popular reading for discussions in sociology seminars and discussion groups in the German-speaking world.

Unlike the start of the Positivist Dispute, it is not easy to pinpoint its end; given the continuing methodological and philosophical differences of opinion in the fundamental viewpoints of the Critical Rationalists and the representatives of Critical Theory, it would certainly be possible to claim that this dispute has not yet been concluded and that maybe it never really will be. If the latter were the case, it would share the fate of its prominent precursors such as the older Battle of Methods between the Austrian School of Economics (represented by Carl Menger) and the younger (German) Historical School (led by Gustav Schmoller, among others) on an appropriate methodology for economics (and other social sciences) and the younger Battle of Methods between representatives of value freedom in the social sciences (Max Weber in particular) and, once again, Schmoller’s school on the question of the legitimacy and/or necessity of value judgements in research in the social sciences. In these (and many other) academic disputes, a certain pattern seems to emerge: After what is often a very intensive (and often none too friendly) exchange of arguments, there is a phase in which the two sides consolidate their controversial positions, which they then adhere to for many years, sometimes without even acknowledging the other side’s arguments, until the combatants become so exhausted that either the original issues are not even dealt with explicitly any more or schools of thought emerge which patently ignore the opposing school’s point of view.

It is also worth setting up a comparison with the two Battles of Methods because two of the main issues in the Positivist Dispute are concerned with the question of a suitable methodology for analysing problems in the social sciences (and, by extension, in science in general) and the question of the value reference of analyses in the social sciences. In this sense, the Positivist Dispute can be interpreted as a continuation of these older conflicts. Paradoxically, there is one thing that this dispute certainly is not and that is a quarrel with or about ‘positivism’ (unless this term was to be used with what would be a totally unconventional meaning in the history of philosophy, namely, as a synonym for ‘analytic philosophy’). Equally, it is not only a dispute ‘in (German) sociology’, as the title of Adorno et al.’s (1969 [1976]) tome would suggest, but a debate which is fundamentally epistemological, socio-philosophical and, last but not least, political in nature.

The fact that Critical Rationalism was wrongly identified with positivism (and especially with the Logical Positivism of the Vienna Circle) has been demonstrated in the literature on many an occasion, with Popper and his proponents explicitly and repeatedly opposing the stance of Logical Positivism. There follows a list of the most important differences between Logical Positivism and Critical Rationalism:

The Positivist Dispute and its origins have been analysed in the literature in manifold ways, particularly in the detailed study by Dahms (1994), which also explains the various ‘crossovers’ of the ‘scientific camps’ involved in the dispute. Above and beyond a mere historical interest in this episode in the history of philosophy in the German-speaking world, which has been paid very little attention in Anglo-American circles, there are a number of issues which were discussed during the dispute between Critical Rationalism and Critical Theory which deserve more than just passing, unsystematic attention. It is also a question of asking what insights relating to this issue could be gained from subsequent developments in the thoughts of the most important proponents. At a distance of more than 50 years, it is maybe easier to pass a sober verdict on what was discussed so heatedly at the time and maybe even to come to a consensus on some of the points.

Among the scientific issues which were considered to be controversial by Adorno and Habermas on the one hand and by Popper and Albert on the other, the following are most prominent (see, for example, Neck, 2008; Ritsert, 2010): Social science has to be based on ‘methodological individualism’, explaining collective phenomena as resulting from the actions and interactions of human individuals, according to Popper, while the ‘totality’ of society has to be taken into account in any social science analysis according to Adorno. Second, the notion of ‘critical’ for Critical Rationalists refers to methodology, while the object of critique for Critical Theorists is always (capitalist) society. Therefore, Critical Theory is less prone to embrace the dichotomy of values and facts than Critical Rationalism; instead, Critical Theorists plead for the integration of practical goals and especially the aim of changing society so as to overcome the alleged alienation of the individual in any social science. Finally, methodological differences relate to the use of hypothetic-deductive explanation versus hermeneutic ‘understanding’ (Verstehen) and to analytic versus dialectic reasoning.

In his contribution to this special issue, Herbert Keuth considers the question of whether the differences of opinion between the Frankfurt School and Critical Rationalism were primarily scientific or primarily political in nature. In a detailed analysis focusing in particular on the argumentation Habermas contributed to the Positivist Dispute, followed by his later musings on questions ranging from epistemology, the philosophy of science and ethics down to the philosopher’s (somewhat surprising, in the eyes of many) re-orientation towards religious matters, Keuth comes to the conclusion that Habermas’ positions are anything but tenable in a scientific sense. Based on the fact that Critical Theory and Habermas have nevertheless been more successful than the Critical Realists in academia in particular (at least in the German-speaking world), Keuth concludes that it was the political aspects of the theory which made it more attractive. One objection to this pessimism is that the student movement of 1968 is just as much history as the unhappy memories of ‘Real Socialism’ and that the idea of an Open Society was particularly significant in Eastern Europe as part of the battle against totalitarianism. Maybe the non-academic public sphere has a better feel for reality on certain issues than many a philosopher (also of a political bent)?

One point which is put forward relatively often in connection with the Positivist Dispute, and also in the literature written in English on the theory of science, and which argues against Critical Rationalism and the (analytical) philosophy of science claims that, instead of using a prescriptive methodology, questions relating to science have to be dealt with from a sociological perspective because science is a sub-system of society and the way in which science actually proceeds does not, in any case, conform to methodological standards of any kind whatsoever. Such a position is justified by the so-called strong programme of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge which grew in importance in the philosophy of science in relation to the social sciences under the impression of the intensive debate in the Anglo-American sphere on the theory of science associated with the work of Thomas Kuhn (1996), Imre Lakatos (1970) and Paul K. Feyerabend (2002). It is, however, possible to demonstrate that the aspirations of the sociology of knowledge are not really tenable (Koppelberg, 2008). On the other hand, it is not necessary to insist on a strict division between epistemological and sociological analyses; it is also possible to plead for cooperation between the two disciplines, as prompted in particular by the way in which Critical Rationalism approaches epistemological problems.

Jürgen Habermas is definitely the one representative of Critical Theory who took on Critical Rationalism most intensively. Since the Positivist Dispute, Habermas has, however, expressed his standpoints on sociological, philosophical and political questions in a wealth of publications and has often modified his views on various issues. In fact, Habermas has changed his fundamental position to such an extent on several occasions that not much is left of his original notions, and one would even be justified in asking whether he can still be counted as a Critical Theorist in the spirit of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse. Gröbl-Steinbach (2008) characterizes Habermas’ intellectual evolution as developing from dialectics to linguistic pragmatism and identifies a convergence with the positions of Critical Rationalism in many respects. For details, see also Gröbl-Steinbach Schuster (2012).

In this respect, the theory of discourse developed and advocated by Habermas in particular has to be submitted to a critical evaluation from the perspective of Critical Rationalism. His Discourse Theory of Law, for example, is to be seen as an inadequate justification of a constitutional democracy (Engländer, 2008): It is not in a position to substantiate comprehensive constitutional rights and civil liberties, and it cannot be used to provide a defence without contradiction for legislative procedures. Other authors have exposed the problems of using the general Theory of Discourse in particular as a basis for a theory of knowledge or ethics, rejecting the sustainability of this theory. This is not only true for the Theory of Discourse but, more generally, for the Theory of Communicative Action, which Habermas has been working on since the 1980s and uses to justify political processes. Wohlgemuth (2008), for example, points out that the capital-driven competitive society of all things, which has always been rejected by Habermas and all other representatives of Critical Theory, can be seen as a communication network which fulfils many of Habermas’ demands much better than the political process in which the citizens’ preferences are inadequately represented due to various forms of ‘government failure’. On the political stage, opinion is produced oligopolistically while the market place (at least in its ideal form) fulfils Habermas’ postulated characteristics of a ‘discourse free from domination’. This leads to the (somewhat ironic) conclusion that capitalism would have to be the economic order which Habermasian theories would justify the best.

As the main representative of Critical Rationalism in the original Positivist Dispute of the 1960s, Hans Albert once again takes up some of the arguments of the Positivist Dispute in his contribution to this special issue. In discussions in the German-speaking world, Martin Heidegger’s influence led to the predominance of anti-realism and relativism in philosophy; in the Anglo-American sphere, it was Ludwig Wittgenstein’s. Albert has criticized these positions in many of his books from a critical–rational perspective, amplifying Popper’s theory of knowledge and his political philosophy with a comprehensive description of a critical–rational philosophy of the social sciences including the fundamental principles of social order; in this connection, special attention should be drawn to Albert’s (1968 [1985]) Treatise on Critical Reason, which is not heeded sufficiently in the Anglo-American literature.

Another issue which is important in understanding the differences between the two camps in the Positivist Dispute but which seems to be neglected in the contributions of the main combatants is the basic motivation for a particular methodology and philosophy of science position. If we look at Popper’s motivations for his political philosophy and even his philosophy of science, it can be argued that they are primarily moral obligations. For instance, in his own postscript to the (English) volume on the Dispute, he explains that critical reasoning is the only alternative to violence so far available, critical discussion leading eventually to the elimination of wrong theories instead of killing authors or burning books. This, however, calls for formulating one’s ideas in ‘simple, modest language, rather than high-sounding jargon. This is an effort which those, fortunate ones who are able to devote themselves to study owe to society’ (Popper, 1976: 298). Critical Rationalists subscribe to this credo, and for them, it is an attitude not only towards social science and politics but towards life in general. From this perspective, it is somewhat easier to understand why they are not impressed by texts by authors from the Frankfurt School and refuse to deal with them in more detail.

Perhaps this special issue can spark off a new dialogue between representatives of both philosophical and sociological schools which – in the parlance of the Critical Rationalists – comes closer to the truth. In any case, these contributions should give impetus to and stimulate the discussion of fundamental issues in the social sciences and science in general, which have been neglected as a result of many spheres of science and universities being trivialized by what is often the very short-term orientation of their policy makers and the political system they are subordinate to so as to reflect on and maybe even re-open the debate on the ‘big’ questions of science. For not asking them will not make these questions disappear, and it is certainly worth asking them, even when this cannot be expressed in euros, dollars or pounds.