Abstract
In the reply of Herr von Jagemann (in No. 143) [of the Frankfurter Zeitung] to the statement by the two Heidelberg academics in constitutional law, it must be particularly striking that Jagemann speaks of the theory of ‘mutuus dissensus’ as one created by him. This must be resolutely opposed. For as long as the Reich Constitution exists there have been both lay people and dilettanti who, because the introduction of the Constitution speaks of the forming of an ‘eternal federation’ (‘ewigen Bundes’), have argued that the Reich, according to the analogy of the Triple Alliance or certainly at least of the old German Federation, 2 can be further dissolved through treaty of the counterparties named therein. This is a viewpoint, casually asserted, which would have had the result, among others, that any individual federal state, like Bavaria, on the basis of unanimous agreement of all other governments at any time, and without the participation of the Reichstag, would have had to be expelled from the Reich association. In the winter of 1886/87 – as my late father laughingly explained at the time – a saying of Prince Bismarck was bandied around the corridors of the Reichstag along the lines of: if the Reichstag did not see reason on the military issue, then eventually it would be better to fall back on the individual states and to dissolve the federation. Whether Prince Bismarck who was known in intimate circles to say things that were not significant in his state-praxis – actually the monarchy is a real ‘burden’ on the form of the state, since ‘this man’ (the old Kaiser) ‘costs him two hours ever day’ – really has said those things, is indifferent. Were he to have done so in the form that now Herr von Jagemann has used, perhaps in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Bismarck would have called it a ‘less than a proper day’s work’. Already at the time the obsequious assiduity of those ‘office-holders’ bothered themselves so much over those thrown away scraps: I clearly remember during lunchtime drinks at the law court how seriously these were discussed, and the conversation on this (das Dictum) may have found its way in the evening to a comfortable bar close to [Unter der] Linden where the smaller and the smallest federal states would cry into their beer over their lack of political influence. That now this bar-room politics – since this is the only way to describe it – refreshed with the utter certainty of the dilettante, is presented to Heidelberg students as ‘constitutional law’ theory is surely less than an uplifting spectacle. But the source of that theory could nevertheless cause the serious political press to look beyond the humorous side, as it has done until now.
Of course there is a serious side to the process. If, with some justification, we take the occasional flirtation on the side of a part of the Social Democrats with the word ‘revolution’ light-heartedly, and for a great party unworthily, so the flirtation with revolution ‘from above’ on the side of people who in an emergency situation would be very far from the trouble, must be rejected in the sharpest way imaginable. In order to bring about a constitutional conflict in this way, and then with the support of the bayonets of a standing army to ‘muddle on’ for a bit, that would require no truly great statesman, not even a ‘strong man’ (in today’s sense). To achieve this requires an unscrupulous idiot or a political adventurer at the head of the Reich government. To rescue us from this conflict without leaving our position in the world, our unity and independence from abroad in tatters, but also leaving all our institutions without the security of law for many generations, – that would require, given the peculiarity of our state and our situation, a statesman of quite another standing than all those who in today’s Germany strut around as ‘coming men’. Even the reduction of our army would be a lesser danger than such an experiment undertaken by the generation of epigones that rule us. The musings of obsequious minds over the possibilities of an extra-parliamentary regime belong in that system of pinpricks, with which certain court and agrarian circles have subjected our parliamentary institutions for decades. Leaving aside the share of blame of the people’s representatives, it is undeniable that the reasoning on its incapacity, the talk of the ‘survival’ of parliamentarism and the like – things that could also be heard just the same 250 years ago in England – are so much part of our good manners that almost a certain courage is required to oppose this fashionable rubbish. And yet the critics of parliamentarism today would have every reason to be quite cautious in provoking debates about the relative value of each of the main factors of our state life; especially when the likelihood of conflict starting from below is so remote as at any time in our history, where for example the chances of parliament challenging the military compared to 10 or 20 years ago, or indeed 40 years, are simply enviable. The tables could also be turned around someday. For almost 15 years we have lived under a regime which is marked by so strong a personal-monarchical character, as seldom was ever the case. Were we now to ask what in particular this regime has accomplished, even in that area where supposedly the regime should be able to demonstrate its specific competence, that is, foreign policy – so a comparison with the democratically governed major states would surely not be flattering. The unprecedented decline in German prestige is not without cause, and there are many other instances than that of the German Parliaments which are to blame.
Enough of this. The broad strata of German bourgeoisie for good reasons are supporters of the monarchy as an institution, and so long as it matters to us it will remain so, even if, as we have to suffer the actual holder of the monarchy not living up to the expectations which we were entitled to place upon him. But we have to request in the strongest possible terms that kindly the same always applies to parliamentary institutions. Because in the continuation of such debates the monarchy would not fare better than parliamentarism.
Heidelberg, 31 May 1904.