Discursive framing and the reproduction of integration in the public sphere: A comparative analysis of France,the United Kingdom,the Netherlands and Germany

Introduction

Commenting on research carried out for the EU Targeted Social and Economic Research programme (see Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003), Favell argues that the researchers did indeed find that immigrant as well as majority groups

talk about the issues in each country in ways that follow the distinct national ideologies. But little or no self-reflexive effort was made to ask how these nation-sustaining ideas about distinct national ‘models’ have themselves been created and sustained by politicians, the media and the policy academics themselves in each country.

(Favell, 2003: 22, emphasis in original).

As a concept that inspires the formation of policy, integration is intertwined with conceptions of the nation. Actors in the field of integration, such as politicians and academics, are often informed and influenced by these conceptions. Debates on integration therefore have a tendency to take place within and across national contexts, as is the case in Brubaker’s (1992) seminal work on the different citizenship regimes in France and Germany. Critics of Brubaker’s work have characterised his analysis as being too deterministic and static, leaving little room for internal contention or transnational convergence (Bertossi, 2011). It remains to be seen, however, if convergence of integration policies will find a public expression in the national integration debates. The case of Germany is interesting in this regard because it underwent a significant structural change in its citizenship regime in 2000. Regarding the impact in the contention over migration and ethnic relations in the public sphere, Koopmans et al. predicted that these changes will bring Germany discursively closer to countries such as Britain and France (Koopmans et al., 2005: 23). From the result of our analysis we can clearly see that this has yet to happen and we argue that, besides institutional changes in policy, it is likely that differences in the logic of integration continue to play a role in setting these debates discursively apart. Favell (2003), for example, argues that integration is about ‘imagining the national institutional forms and structures that can unify a diverse population; hence imagining what the state can actively do to “nationalize” newcomers and re-constitute the nation-state under conditions of growing cultural diversity’ (Favell, 2003: 18). As an imagined national and unifying activity, integration possesses a symbolic value that places it beyond the field of policy. A primary concern in the integration debate is therefore the symbolic governance of diversity within a bounded territorial space. Two opposite and archetypical ‘solutions’ to the governance of diversity seem possible. First, a solution can be sought in explicitly differentiating and distinguish groups on the basis of some perceived characteristics. Here diversity is ‘solved’ by the systematic maintenance of differences in society. On the opposite side we find a solution in the form of pure assimilation that defines the polity as an indivisible mass. In any integration debate these archetypical solutions form logical opposites that influence the way integration is perceived. Two central operators in this logic are the categorisation and distinction of societal groups. Together, these operators inform actors in the integration debate on who integrates into what. Categorisation in this regard determines who can be addressed in the integration debate, while the perceived distinction between groups tells us something about the normative acceptance of diversity in society. Taken together, this system of logic relations helps to shape the discursive repertoire of actors involved in the field of integration, e.g. politicians, academics and migrant groups.

Koopmans et al. (2005) postulate a similar theoretical model in which the making of political claims in the public sphere stands in a dialectic relationship with institutional and discursive opportunity structures. The institutional opportunity structures constitute structural issues such as the formal access to citizenship, while the discursive opportunity structures are formed by symbolic interpretations of citizenship and national identity. Cross-national differences in the institutional and discursive opportunity structures find expression in national variations in the political claim-making in the public sphere. In their model, Koopmans et al. (2005) draw a direct relationship between the institutional and discursive opportunities, arguing that there is a dialectic relationship between symbolic and structural dimensions of integration. We propose, however, that the institutional side of integration policy is not directly linked to the discursive framing in the integration debate. In between, we argue, stands an overarching repertoire of logic relations that are used to discuss, understand and govern diversity in society. We understand the direct relationship between the policy side and the discursive framing of claims to be severed because any logic of integration can be used with strategic ambiguity with a polysemic attribution of meaning to outwardly similar expressions. Contention, disputes and movements within the integration debate therefore operate quite well within the bounded discursive space of a singular logic system of relationships. In the following sub-sections we will proceed to illustrate this point by briefly introducing some dynamics found in the French, British, Dutch, and German integration debates. After that we will argue that it is these ‘logics of integration’ which explain national differences in discursive framing of the public debates on Muslims in France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany.

Republicanism in France

In relation to the debate on migration and integration, France’s republican tradition and history is often mentioned as an important factor. Bertossi (2011) points to the fact that there exists internal contention on the meaning of republicanism among scholars and politicians in the French integration debate. On one side there are propagators of a pure colour-blind republicanism in which the unity and equality of the polity is deemed absolute and unquestionable. The opposition argues that this specific colour-blind approach obfuscates some of the structural obstacles faced by ethnic minorities in France. Discrimination, both institutional and unofficial, hinders the integration of these groups regardless of the republican ideal of equality. The categorisation and distinction of societal groups play an important role in this regard. In modern societies, most forms of discrimination are both morally and legally prohibited. Blatant forms of xenophobic expressions based on race, ethnicity, culture or religion are not part of the norm, because, according to Van Dijk:

discrimination and racism are legally and morally prohibited, most Western countries share the official belief that therefore discrimination and racism no longer exist as a structural characteristic of society or the state. If discrimination or prejudice still exists, it is treated as an incident, as a deviation, as something that should be attributed to, and punished at the individual level. In other words, institutional or systemic racism is denied.

(Van Dijk, 1992: 95, emphasis in original)

Multiculturalism in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands

In relation to France and Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are typically seen as multicultural societies in their approach to integration. Diversity is governed through relatively inclusive policies that recognise the diversity in society. As in France, the symbolic strength of the multicultural model has in no small part been dependent on the involvement of political and academic elites in the integration debate. In the United Kingdom, before the 1960s, policies of assimilation rather than multiculturalism were the norm. Outbursts of violence against migrants were not uncommon and ethnic unrest and rioting remained an important social problem even after the Second World War. With the arrival of new migrants from the Commonwealth countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the British integration debate moved gradually towards the inclusive form of multiculturalism for which it is known today. Upon arrival, the migrants from the Commonwealth already possessed British citizenship. With respect to their integration, this sharpened the focus on colour and race in the categorisation and distinction of migrant groups (Lucassen, 2005). In the beginning the British approach to integration was primarily pragmatic:

British policy makers and collective minority actors have mostly opted for a pragmatic approach to integration rather than for a sophisticated normative model as in France. In this context, the work done today by the most influential British scholars on this issue may in fact be seen as an attempt to move away from this traditional pragmatic approach and to promote a public normative conception of multiculturalism.

(Bertossi, 2011: 1569)

Multiculturalism in the Netherlands has been based on a distinct ethno-cultural categorisation. The Dutch model of multiculturalism evolved in a less pragmatic fashion than in the United Kingdom and is based on a more normative categorisation and distinction between societal groups. In both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the integration debate has in recent years come under a multicultural crisis or backlash which has questioned the overall ‘success’ of the multicultural model (Bertossi, 2011; Grillo, 2010; Prins and Saharso, 2010). Bertossi argues that this backlash is mainly a ‘discursive strategy that has served until now as a proxy for a new wave of changes in the frameworks defining public debates and public interventions on integration’ (Bertossi, 2011: 1569). This ‘discursive strategy’ builds largely on the existing logic of multiculturalism and does not deny the existence of the multicultural society. The multicultural backlash opposes multiculturalism only in the sense that it is said to have failed as the primary system in the governance of diversity. This failure leaves room for new political solutions and thus new political leadership. The multicultural backlash, however, explicitly underlines the existence of multiculturalism and affirms its traditional significance as a model. It is therefore not uncommon that the backlash against multiculturalism builds and frames ‘new’ solutions within the same logic. In multiculturalism, the categorisation and distinction of groups centres on the official recognition of difference and the support of diversity. In the multicultural backlash initiated by the anti-Islamic Freedom party (PVV), this logic remains largely unaltered. In the rhetoric of the PVV, Dutch society is still inherently multicultural. The PVV supports and explicitly underlines the importance of Christian, Protestant and Jewish religious identities. However, the PVV aims to exclude Islam and Muslims from this multicultural order by arguing Islam is an anti-democratic political ideology. In the 2010 party programme on islambestrijding (combating Islam), under the heading ‘solutions’, the first point reads: ‘Islam is primarily a political ideology and can therefore in no way claim rights ordinarily reserved for religious movements’ (PVV, 2010: 15, our translation). This particular discursive framing is a crucial part of the PVV’s strategy in denying accusations of cultural, ethnical or religious discrimination. By discursively framing their programme as a struggle for democracy and freedom, the PVV performs a balancing act to legitimise its anti-Islamic rhetoric within the inclusive Dutch logic of ethno-cultural multiculturalism.

Differentialism in Germany

Although the logic of integration in France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands evolved differently, they are all more or less inclusive in orientation (Banton, 2001; Bertossi, 2011; Favell, 2003). Germany, on the other hand, is often typified as being rather exclusive in the area of integration. The de-ethnicising of German citizenship has perhaps shown that such a legacy does not rule out change, but, regarding the extension of citizenship law, Brubaker argues that it

was distinctive […] and indicative of deep-rooted German differentialism, [that] the solution was long seen on the left not in terms of incorporating immigrants and their descendants as full citizens, but rather in terms of extending even political rights – along with social, civil, and economic rights – to resident foreigners.

(Brubaker, 2007: 538)

In the German Ausländerpolitik, categorisations and distinctions are most commonly based on ethnicity. The very clear distinction between Germans and minorities can sometimes lead to somewhat oxymoronic expressions such as unsere ausländische Mitbürger (our foreign fellow citizens). The prevalence of strict categorisation and distinction in the German integration debate should be seen in relation to its history. The legacy of the Second World War has left many members of the German academic and political elite in the field of integration rather uneasy with strong normative conceptions of assimilation. This unease is felt both by the political left and the conservative right. While some actors in the integration debate simply felt that immigrants posed a threat to German society, others held a more benign position, believing it unethical to take away the identity of immigrants by forcing them to become German (Lucassen, 2005). Aside from a general unease with the idea of normative assimilation, the legacy of war created some integration policies that actively sought to rebuild and strengthen the shattered Jewish community in Germany. The instalment of the Wiedergutmachungspolitik, for example, discriminates on the basis of Jewish decent and grants Jewish migrants citizenship rights and financial support (Berger, 2010). Such measures harden the categorisation and distinction of different groups by coupling group identity with political and economic privileges. After the beginning of the 1980s, the German Ausländerpolitik became almost exclusively associated with the integration of Turks. Because of their large numbers and adherence to the Islamic faith, Turks were identified as being a troublesome foreign element (Fremdkörper) within German society. Turks were mainly categorised along national or ethno-cultural lines because racial classifications had become heavily discredited after the Second World War. Many observers believed that the Islamic background of Turkish immigrants would impose an insurmountable cultural barrier to their assimilation. The fear of a growing over-foreignisation (Überfremdung) became gradually more exclusively associated with a ‘Turkish problem’ (Türkenproblem). The belief in a fundamental ethno-cultural distance that precluded the assimilation of Turks into German society was especially strong among the Christian democratic parties, but also found some resonance among the social democrats. The SPD, for example, argued that Turks were a minority unable to assimilate. Besides politicians, some scholarly observers equally held the position that the integration of migrants would be problematic. In 1982 a group of scholars published the Heidelberg Manifesto in which they stated that the presence of migrants, and especially of Turks, constituted a biological and cultural threat to German society (Lucassen, 2005).

Conclusion: Logics of integration and discursive framing

Using recently collected empirical data, we have shown that there is some variation in the discursive framing of political claims in the debate on Muslims and Islam across our four countries. After the introduction of some simple distributions, we considered two non-discursive factors that are likely to influence the discursive framing in the media. These factors of selection could explain a large portion of the observed cross-national variation in discursive framing. However, after introducing these two factors as control variables in two logistic regression models, we found that the cross-national differences in discursive framing remain significant between all countries, with the exception of France and the Netherlands. Especially the case of Germany stands out. The discursive framing in the German debate is significantly more negative and specific. The persistent isolated position of the German debate on Muslims and Islam is particularly interesting in relation to the convergence of individual rights policies and the similarity between France and Germany regarding the cultural and religious requirements and accommodations for Muslims.

We argue that a cross-national variation in discursive framing in the integration debate that is not fully explained by non-discursive factors of selection should be understood as the reproduction of a different logic of integration in the public sphere. The variations in discursive framing therefore do not have to reflect any structural differences in integration policy. Constructed and perpetuated by academics and politicians, the logic of integration shapes public expression by providing a certain way of categorical and distinctive thinking that will legitimise certain forms of expressions over others. This can explain the differences in discursive framing in the integration debates on Muslims and Islam found in France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany. Very specific and negative political claims appear to find less resonance in the first three countries. This does not mean that these countries have somehow performed ‘better’ in structurally integrating their Muslims populations. It means rather that specific and negative claims are to a greater degree found to be legitimate expressions in the public debate. That a continuation of such negative expression in the public sphere can coexist with unrestrictive changes in integration policies is also stressed by Lucassen, who argues that in Germany the ‘focus on the public debates, xenophobia, and racism severely clouds the on-going integration process’ (Lucassen, 2005: 155). From the 1970s onwards, a particular discursive strategy was pursued in the German integration debate that reproduced the political ‘mantra’ that Germany was not an immigration country. Even with an increasingly structurally inclusive integration policy and a growing political acceptance of Germany as an immigration country, a popular unease with diversity appears to remain. Schönwälder argues that:

while the factors of post immigration and the resultant plurality of backgrounds and experiences in the German population are now accepted this is not accompanied by a generally positive approach to cultural diversity and public representation of minorities as groups. Germany’s life as a self-conscious country of immigration begins in a climate unfavourable to an active promotion of minority rights and identities.

(Schönwälder, 2010: 153)