Abstract
Two emancipatory political philosophies have for the past two decades had an uneasy relationship with one another: multiculturalism and feminism. The late Susan Moller Okin in her seminal paper, “Is multiculturalism is bad for women?” largely initiated this feminist pushback against multiculturalism. Okin argued that giving ethnic minorities special group-differentiated rights based on their cultural membership comes into conflict with the rights of the women within these minorities. Also in the realm of politics itself multiculturalism (and its concrete policies concerning minority rights and accommodations) continues to be pitted against the rights and interests of women. Indeed, these concerns are often thought to be a central part of the multiculturalism’s crisis or, even, demise. But I will argue that this verdict is too simplistic. While I will not take issue with the fact that multiculturalism and multicultural policy on occasions can and should be pitted against women’s rights, I will offer three arguments to challenge the overall tension between these political philosophies. First, I will show that a one-sided focus on the problems with multiculturalist policy for feminists distorts how alternative political frameworks to multiculturalism, such as cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism can also be bad for women. Second, I will show that much gender emancipation and equality sought by minority women, is both identified and advocated for in terms of their cultural membership and community. Third, and finally, I will argue for the epistemic value of cultural diversity for feminist imagination and problem-solving.
Introduction
Two emancipatory political philosophies have for the past two decades had an uneasy relationship with one another: multiculturalism and feminism. The late Susan Moller Okin in her seminal paper, “Is multiculturalism bad for women?” (1999) largely initiated the liberal feminist pushback against multiculturalism. Okin argued that giving ethnic and religious minorities special group-differentiated rights based on their membership comes into conflict with the rights of the women within these minorities. Also, in the realm of politics itself multiculturalism (and its concrete policies concerning minority rights and accommodations) continues to be pitted against the rights and interests of women. Indeed, some have argued that these concerns are a central part of the multiculturalism’s crisis (Kymlicka 2007a) or, even, demise (Phillips 2009). As a result the case seems to be closed in favour of (liberal) feminism, or, as Ayelet Shachar points out, “if one is looking for an unambiguous answer, then the liberal-feminist approach offers an attractive solution… (A)ccording to this approach, women’s rights must trump cultural diversity whenever the two stand in ostensible conflict” (2007: 146). 1
But I will argue that this verdict is too simplistic. While I will not take issue with the fact that there will still be trade-offs between certain policies and the promotion of minority women’s emancipation and equalities, I will offer three arguments to challenge the overall tension between multiculturalism and feminism. First, I will show that a one-sided focus on the problems with multiculturalism and multiculturalist policy for feminists distorts how other political frameworks, such as cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism, can also be bad for women. Second, I will show that much gender emancipation and equality sought by minority women, is both identified and advocated for in terms of their cultural membership and community. Third, and finally, I will argue for the epistemic value of cultural diversity for feminist imagination and problem-solving.
In reply to my argument, some will likely argue that their political philosophies or frameworks support better feminist strategies or are more compatible with (some other) aspects of feminism. This would not be an entirely disappointing result for me, as even then I will have achieved my first aim by shifting the debate to a more productive place of comparing the feminist merits of multiculturalism vis-á-vis certain alternatives.
Okin’s feminist critique of multiculturalism and some rejoinders
During the late summer of 2021 the Taliban swiftly and decisively took over the rule of Afghanistan. Now almost all of the worst suspicions about how this would affect women in the country have been confirmed with the previous rights of girls and women attached to access to education and participation in political let alone public life being removed. Women and girls have also been disproportionately affected by the severe decline of the rule of law in the country and the increase in poverty will further increase dependence on fathers, brothers, and husbands. What’s more the cultural norms that specifically apply to women have curtailed their voices to the extent that even singing in their own home is forbidden.
The Taliban is the sort of case that both is and is not the subject of Susan Okin’s original critique of multiculturalism. On the one hand, it illustrates quite nicely precisely those features within a culture that Okin worried about unleashing with multiculturalist policies. For one, she was concerned about limitations on girl’s education as she recognizes that it is a precondition for much further choice (1999: 9). She also took a central problem with many cultures to be how their views about women and their agency is confined to the private sphere and how the norms of the culture restrict the freedoms of girls and women even there. In a word, she was concerned with patriarchal cultures, and its ”elaborate patterns of socialization, rituals, matrimonial customs, and other cultural practices (including systems of property ownership and control of resources) aimed at bringing women’s sexuality and reproductive capabilities under men’s control” (1999: 14). Multiculturalism is thereby seen as a problem because it advocates special rights to or in other ways legitimizes many patriarchal cultures who in turn limit the freedom of girls and women within these groups. Why be in the business of sanctioning or even enhancing the power of these cultures at the expense of its girls and women?
On the other hand, the Taliban case is actually not the kind of scenario Okin had in mind in her critique of multiculturalism. Her argument is not supposed to apply to nations or societies whose whole ethos goes against liberalism. Instead, her criticism targets the predominantly liberal societies where there are democratic institutions, rule of law and so on. The focus is thus not on patriarchal cultures per se, but on nations or societies which have minority cultures within them that display patriarchal elements such as the ones mentioned above (Song, 2007: 3). 2 In what follows, we will also retain this focus of multiculturalism being chiefly a concern about minority rights and accommodations within largely liberal states rather than as a global issue, which would bring in further matters such as what to do with illiberal societies and the ethics of interventions.
Okin’s argument has of course not gone unchallenged in the past decades. An important rejoinder concerns the lens by which Okin locates cases of cultural oppression and patriarchy (Al-Hibri 1999; Razack 2004; Volpp 2001). Leti Volpp (2000) for example draws attention a double standard: immoral behaviour in Western culture is ascribed to bad or mad individuals, while much of the same bad behaviour in non-Western contexts is ascribed to patriarchal culture. Volpp therefore rightly wonders whether immoral behaviour in majority cultures cannot sometimes also be ascribed to culture and whether there are not also alternative explanations for bad behaviour in the case of minority cultures.
Still, this critique is unlikely to sway those feminists who, like Okin, at least in principle, would condemn the very same practices and damaging patriarchal norms in majority cultures (even if they may have blind spots about the cultural causes of this behaviour) (Song, 2007: 6). Many liberal feminists would likely suggest that this response is simply to change the topic: patriarchal culture, whether of the majority or minority is still the culprit.
Another response to Okin comes from one of the most influential liberal multiculturalists, Will Kymlicka, who observes that many cultural rights are designed to promote equality and justice between ethnocultural groups, and, as such, do not directly conflict with women’s rights (1995: 31). 3 Okin however resorts that the indirect impact of such cultural rights are sufficient for a direct conflict with feminism. Minority rights that are chiefly applicable in the public sphere will for example often have detrimental effects in the private sphere in terms of the confinement and control of women’s lives. 4
Kymlicka seems to accept Okin’s point that recognizing and legitimizing “societal cultures” might indeed end up undermining the more informal ways that minority cultures control women and their freedom (Kymlicka 1999: 31–35). All the same, he insists that there remains much more that unites than divides multiculturalism and feminism: “I see multiculturalism and feminism as allies engaged in related struggles for a more inclusive conception of justice. Indeed, my own thoughts on ethnocultural justice have been deeply influenced by Okin’s work on gender justice, since I think there are many comparable historical patterns and contemporary lessons.” (Kymlicka 1999: 34)
But even such a flattering reply is not going to persuade feminists of the appeal of multiculturalism specifically. Why shouldn’t they simply stick to stick to their own emancipatory feminist vision – especially in the face of conflicts and tensions with multiculturalism? To this Kymlicka offers little to persuade. In fact, recently Kymlicka even suggests a rejoinder that mirrors what we will see is claimed by liberal nationalists, which is that minority women can always fall back on their constitutional rights or rights as citizens if their minority culture fails to respect them (2007b: 150). I believe a much stronger reply to Okin is needed and can be given, which is what I turn to in the succeeding sections.
Multiculturalism and its alternatives
My aim in this paper is not to dissolve or resolve certain conflicts that arise between putative multiculturalist and feminist policies such as those mentioned in the last section. I think they are often very real and must continue to be reckoned with. What I am concerned to show is that accepting that there will be such trade-offs should not decisively count against a feminist multiculturalism.
The first reason for this is that many feminist policies also conflict with a range of other political frameworks and arrangements. Consider first Okin’s definition of feminism, which I will also largely adhere to here:
By feminism I mean the belief that women should not be disadvantaged by their sex, that they should be recognized as having a human dignity that is equal to that of men, and that they should have the opportunity to live as fully and freely chosen lives as men. (Okin 1999:13).
On this understanding of feminism, there will be a conflict whenever a certain political framework or arrangement falls short of giving women a freedom and dignity that is equal to that of men.
But what alternative frameworks should we compare multiculturalism with? Recall that the multiculturalism that Okin targets is applicable chiefly to largely liberal and democratic nations. Thus, to be a relevant alternative to multiculturalism it should concern communities with an egalitarian and emancipatory ethos, but differ in some other important respect. Along with the egalitarian and emancipatory ethos, multiculturalism places value on culture, community, and cultural diversity, indeed also for realizing freedom and equality (why and how will become clear in succeeding section). It is these values that motivate multiculturalists to support minority (cultural or group-differentiated) rights simply because equality and freedom demands that minority cultures should enjoy (much of) the same recognition and rights which are enjoyed, implicitly or explicitly, by (cultural) majorities.
This already suffices for identifying at least two alternative political frameworks which on the one hand share a liberal and egalitarian ethos with multiculturalism, but on the other do not rely on cultural identity or diversity to make their emancipatory and egalitarian arguments; namely, cosmopolitanism or liberal nationalism. 5 For liberal nationalists, the nation may not be entirely culturally neutral, but typically liberal nationalists maintain that the national culture is a comparatively “thin” public notion such that it is capable of unifying a community of different ethnic, cultural and religious affiliations. 6 For a classic liberal nationalist like David Miller, the cultural identity of a nation is primarily understood in functional terms. In his words, a national identity is a “inclusive identity, accessible to members of all cultural groups” (2007: 9). For cosmopolitans, a cultural identity is only one among many different identities that can be relevant for freedom and to one’s life taking form (e.g. Appiah 2007; Waldron 1992). Thus, neither cosmopolitanism nor liberal nationalism places much real value on cultural diversity in their theorizing. As opposed to other possible alternatives like republicanism and communitarianism who in many ways share the central values of community and non-domination with multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism do not evoke the instrumental or intrinsic value of culture or cultural membership as part of their framework.
So, given that cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism are untethered to cultural membership in their liberal arguments, would they not provide less conflict with a feminist agenda of Okin and others? To be sure, a feminist critique or charge does not in fact tend to be levelled to the same extent at liberal nationalism or cosmopolitanism as multiculturalism. Still, many intersectional and non-Western feminists have made strong arguments to this effect, since their criticisms concern the risks of national and universalist agendas at best masking the diversity of women’s situations and perspectives, and, at worst, assuming a Western white middle-class agenda as a universal one (see e.g. Crenshaw 1989; Khader 2018; Lâm 1994; Mohanty 2003; Spelman 1988).
Nor do we have to think long or come up with far-fetched examples to imagine conflicts with feminist ideals of women’s emancipation and equality. For liberal nationalism this will occur as soon as the nation or the majority has patriarchal or discriminatory elements. Just consider the stubborn occurrence of domestic violence in liberal nations. Here national liberal policies of protecting people’s privacy and not interfering in their own home, clearly conflicts with the rights of women not to be exposed to violence and abuse and protected by policies of for instance installing surveillance systems in their homes. Similarly, many cosmopolitan efforts will not in effect, to paraphrase Okin’s definition of feminism, recognize women as having a human dignity that is equal to that of men, or provide them with the opportunity to live as fully and freely chosen lives as men, because nothing in their framework stops the policies leading to the world’s most powerful human beings (i.e. in this world, typically male business owners, oligarchs, and political leaders) hording all the natural resources from the near-powerless (i.e. in this world: many women and children).
Both theorists who advance cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism, will of course respond that they are committed to liberal principles of equality and autonomy which, ideally, would be instituted in political guarantees applying to all persons. This would then ensure equality and emancipation also for women. 7 So, it could be claimed that both cosmopolitans and liberal nationalists therefore have the resources internal to their position to criticize the above arrangements as conflicting with respect for equal dignity and agency of women and men.
The trouble is that this would be to employ a double standard. On the one hand, multiculturalism can be faulted for always siding with culture, community and cultural diversity in its implementation and also in any given trade-off between a feminist emancipatory agenda and a multicultural one. On the other hand, liberal nationalism and cosmopolitanism is thought of as protected from these trade-offs and policy conflicts, because it is considered from the purview of ideal formulations that can side with individual women’s autonomy and equality. But then why not suppose that a more ideal formulation of a feminist multiculturalism, would not also have the internal resources to side with the minority women’s emancipation and equality (for example, given certain cultural change, as argued in the next section)? Thus, either multiculturalism is also considered from the horizon of ideal theory and free to side with individual (minority) women’s freedoms within (transformed) non-patriarchal cultures. Or else alternative political frameworks such as liberal nationalism and cosmopolitanism also cannot ignore certain real-world conflicts and trade-offs just as multiculturalist cannot ignore them. One simply cannot have it both ways. 8
None of what I have said so far implies that feminist multiculturalists shouldn’t be attentive to the very real trade-offs between the oft-conflicting political commitments we have to make in the real world. My argument in the above is simply that the aims of feminism as formulated by Susan Okin leads to many generalisable conflicts and thus trade-offs with any political framework that does not adequately cater to girl’s and women’s equality and emancipation.
Toward a feminist multiculturalism. Or why gender rights are (also) cultural rights
Multiculturalism, gender and the value of culture
My aim in the following sections is to show how multiculturalists can offer something to feminists specifically that has not been truly picked up so far. What unites most multiculturalist thinkers is their argument for the special value of culture and cultural belonging to choice and group rights such as self-determination. In making his argument for multiculturalism Kymlicka was inspired by Ronald Dworkin’s idea that culture provides “the lens by which we identify valuable experiences” (1985: 221) and describes the cultural context as providing one’s choice with a sense of self-understanding and respect (Kymlicka 1995: 8). To this Kymlicka adds the following largely uncontroversial egalitarian premise: given the importance of one’s own culture for choice, it is only right that minority group members should enjoy a freedom and recognition that is equal to that of members of cultural majorities. Another influential multiculturalist Charles Taylor (1994) describes the value of cultural membership in terms of its social and even existential meaning: in the continuation and survival of one’s culture and community. For our purposes, it is not so important to settle whether these accounts of the value of culture really differ or are compatible. 9 I will focus on the type of value Kymlicka identifies in culture, but I believe that much of what I say will also be compatible with the value of culture thought to be central to other forms of multiculturalism, such as Taylor’s.
The first thing that a feminist multiculturalist argument must establish is how culture determines choices concerning the nature of gender and gender relations. Consider three different senses in which a cultural context determines one’s gender identity. 10 First, a cultural context determines how many genders there are, that is, whether gender is binary or whether there are more options available. This cultural influence is often hidden from view given the global dominance of binary systems of gender. But many cultures are not or have not always modelled gender in a binary fashion. Instead, they have recognized non-binary or third genders such as the hijras and so-called “two-spirits” and even have cultures of ritualization in recognition of these non-binary gender identities. In North American tribes alone, one has documented at least 130 alternative forms of gender, some of which are also open to individuals sexed as both males and females (Roscoe 1992: 5). Sadly, European colonialism is in many cases responsible for not only subordinating, but even eradicating many of these cultures, and thus also the non-binary options available to any cultural descendants.
Second, culture determines the content of relevant gender roles, that is, what characteristics and norms are associated with a particular gender or gender identity. Anthropologists, ethnologists, and psychologists who have reviewed gender roles across non-industrial cultures find that in almost all cultures one finds some division of labour between genders. 11 At the same time what gets assigned to women, men and non-binary genders respectively varies between cultures. In some non-industrial societies, for example, women serve as combat troops and game hunters (Wood and Eagl 2002).
Third, culture assigns a relative valence attached to a gender role and identity. Here, we simply value our gender identity because of the nexus of cultural support and affirmation we thereby enjoy. But for many feminists this is also the most troubling way in which culture affect choice since the choices available to women (and non-binary genders) by many cultures ultimately implies a lower status or lesser value relative to the choices of men. 12
Thus, many feminists will retort that while culture may determine much of the meaning of gender identity, roles, and status hierarchies, this influence of culture is surely and largely something negative – something to be resisted especially when it comes to gender hierarchies. Indeed, liberal nationalism and especially cosmopolitanism might seem more appealing to feminists precisely on the grounds that they can downplay a culture’s influence on gender. Not only do these political frameworks not assume a distinct value attached to one’s culture compared to other determinations of identity, but they suggest a different context of choice that might be more attractive from the feminist point of view. 13 Liberal nationalists recommend an affiliation with a national culture where gender oppression and patriarchy might be addressed more decisively than within a more patriarchal minority culture. Cosmopolitans would instead likely recommend looser ties to a particular cultural community (or a more pronounced sense of cosmopolitan membership) in order to facilitate women freely picking their context of choice, rather than the value being determined by it by fiat. Indeed, the appeal of a cosmopolitanism or liberal nationalism is even more pronounced for many women that never subscribed much to the traditional meanings of a minority culture and therefore have not felt so rooted to begin with.
One way to respond to the recommendations of these alternative contexts is to claim that the strategies in essence neglect minority girls and women’s very real cultural ties and the rather indisputable cultural nature of gender. As such they would not represent real alternatives to most minority women and are too ideal to be realistic or effective for devising feminist strategies. One should also worry about whether the alternative, national or cosmopolitan, contexts are truly as open and inclusive to all as they claim to be and whether the possibility of a “cultural exit” is truly open to all.
While I think these rejoinders are essentially correct, I want to avoid getting embroiled in the debate about the standard or benchmark for non-ideal theorizing and what is realistic or not. So, I will choose a different tactic. I will try to show that multiculturalism, which respects the value of cultural membership, unlike other frameworks, is essential for identifying, appreciating, and enabling the diverse notions of gender emancipation and gender equality. Pace, Kymlicka’s argument, for minority members to enjoy the same chance of gender equality and emancipation as majority members, I’ll argue that feminists must also be multiculturalists.
But before we do this, we must first tackle a seeming obstacle to thinking about gender emancipation and equality from a multiculturalist perspective.
Multiculturalism and cultural change
If the value of culture and cultural affiliation for multiculturalists is equated with stable or traditional culture, then it probably cannot be seen as congenial to feminists. Fortunately, even without concerns that spring from feminism, multiculturalists like Modood (1998), Mason (2007), and Patten (2011:738) acknowledge they have an independent interest in not defining culture in such terms. One the one hand, many believe one should avoid a troublesome essentialism where a culture is fixed, bounded, or that takes cultures as unchangeable entities; on the other hand, it is recognized that one still needs a sufficiently robust notion of culture and cultural belonging to defend its distinct value. 14
Is there a way to make culture robust and real while at the same time allowing for change (and, similarly, cultural hybridization)? There is. For example, Alan Patten has argued for a social lineage view of culture and takes the intergenerational formative socialization attached to a lineage to unify a culture or cultural community (2011; see also Parekh 2002; Garner and Godman 2024 for related ideas). A closely related notion of culture in terms of lineages also exists in the literature on cultural evolution of human groups (Lewens 2015; Richerson and Boyd 2005). Such a view explicitly makes room for change within the formation of social lineages. Instead, the focus of such lineage views of culture is on the continuous processes of socialization between members of a cultural community (in the literature on cultural evolution these processes are included within the concept of social learning and contrasted to explicit or formal instruction) (Heyes 2012). 15 Like its biological cousins (genetic and epigenetic reproduction), social learning is often a vertical process between parents and offspring, but it can also occur horizontally between peers within one’s proximity. At the same time, the social learning and formative socialization that is constitutive of social lineages also occurs independently of genetic inheritance.
Social lineage accounts that focus on the process of socialization and transmission within a community are perfectly compatible with the beliefs, norms and practices of a culture changing since here culture is not identified with, or individuated by, any particular beliefs, practices and so on, but rather with the social learning process and lineage itself. In fact, changes in the beliefs and practices of a culture naturally occur as part of the transmission. 16
The social lineage view of culture is offered as an illustration of how one can embrace a notion of culture which allows for it to have value in identifying meaningful connections within a community without equating it to cultural traditionalism or stagnation. 17 The main point here is thus not to offer an explicit defence of a social lineage view as there might be other views on which culture is something real and robust while also being compatible with cultural change. 18 I do however need to stress that multiculturalists do need some such view of culture to be consistent with emancipatory agendas such as feminist ones that aspire for many cultural changes to gender identities, hierarchies and roles.
A feminist multiculturalism
In this section, I will argue that a woman’s, girl’s, or non-binary person’s culture and cultural affiliation especially with the right policies in place, can be something normatively positive from a feminist perspective. I therefore advocate a feminist multiculturalism where a women’s way of seeking emancipation and equality is nested within her cultural membership. As a corollary, to truly respect a woman’s agency is to address both her gender and her cultural membership. 19 My proposal shares some affinity with Monica Mookherjee’s argument (2009) that women’s rights can often be seen as (multi)cultural claims, though I will also show how my proposal differs from hers.
I will not deny that many cultures and cultural norms have in a tense relationship with typical liberal feminist concerns. As admitted in Section 3, we face trade-offs between the rights and recognition of minority cultures and broadly liberal feminist commitments. As I have also argued, this may not be a unique problem for a feminist multiculturalism, but these are conflicts and trade-offs that nevertheless must be managed. I believe there are many cases where a feminist multiculturalist should side with strong and well-motivated liberal concerns about the individual’s freedom; but there are also many others in which the cultural belonging and commitment have more sway. Indeed, I firmly want to get behind Mookherjee’s rejection of Martha Nussbaum’s claim that a woman’s affiliation with a certain group should not be taken as normative for her, unless, with all the capabilities at her disposal, she makes that norm her own (Nussbaum 1999). Many cultural options and choices can have a normative pull for us even if we don’t have all the capabilities at our disposal and not all liberal or feminist policies are in place in the community. The multicultural feminism that I espouse quite simply acknowledges that a women’s affiliation with her cultural group is often normative in its own right and morever will often settle her choice in a suboptimal way from some liberal feminist perspectives.
What I chiefly want to draw attention to now is that this focus on conflicts ignores that there are also many scenarios where it is necessary to pay attention to the culture to identify and address what gender emancipation and equality is in the first place. Consider first the Roma or traveller communities in Sweden. This minority has a long history in the region dating back at least to the 1500s. Their history facing discrimination from the state and majority culture is arguably equally long with a remarkably high incidence of children taken away from their parents and subsequently also denied access to their parents’ culture (Taikon 1963). In 2000, the Roma cultural community were recognized as a national minority as part of ratifying the European conventions of minority rights. 20 This has among other things meant some special funds for language and civil society projects and for Roma organizations to be able to strengthen their outreach to the rest of their community.
The Roma communities in Sweden are patriarchal in many of the ways discussed by Okin. In recognition of the marginalization of Roma women, it was decided that government agencies, including the one for youth and civil society, should prioritize girls and women in their national minority-related initiatives. As a result, women ran 160 of the 217 projects funded by the Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society, and women were also a clear majority among those working as volunteers and among those reached by the projects (Lundkvist 2019: 17). Through the funded projects and networks these Roma women had a chance to raise the issues pressing for them and identify the means for change. Among the issues identified were the establishment of new network and meeting places, a language for discussing women’s general health (reproductive health, in particular), and developing strategies for combatting domestic violence (Lundkvist 2019).
Notice that although many of these Roma women that were the beneficiaries of such projects might recognize and even regret the cultural influence or the patriarchal norms of their community, they sought a change within their culture rather than to leave that culture behind or to assimilate with the majority culture. 21 A feminist multiculturalism straightforwardly identifies how making Roma girls and women the explicit beneficiaries of multicultural policy affects an emancipatory change conceived of in terms of retaining this cultural affiliation (and perhaps also an all-things-considered valuable gender identity). For alternative political arrangements things are at the very least more complicated, since there any feminist strategies are primarily sought in terms of women being humans with equal moral status (cosmopolitans) or qua citizens or nationals (liberal nationalists). Change toward emancipation, and equality is not identified in terms of how it is culturally nested, whereas this is exactly what a feminist multiculturalism does. 22
Another example of such culturally-nested strategies for gender emancipation and equality is discussed by political theorist Monique Deveaux (2000) who describes the reactions from the native or First Nation women to the Charlottetown Accord. This accord was designed to enhance the rights to self-government of different indigenous groups in Canada. Many First Nation women were not unequivocally positive to the accord and indeed expressed concern that the indigenous governments might decide to overturn some sex equality legislation (of 1985). If one looks at the actual changes these women sought within the Accord, it was not so much equal citizenship however, but cultural membership and its value that is central to understanding their emancipatory and egalitarian agenda. For one, these women primarily sought greater representation in the leadership within their own cultural communities, specifically (and not primarily as citizens or Canadians). Second, they sought to have recognition of their cultural membership reinstated through the Accord. The background was that the Indian Act of 1869 had disenfranchised tens of thousands of women and their children by stipulating that they had to forfeit their Indian status if they married non-status Indian men or non-Indian men (no converse disenfranchisement occurred for Indian men that married non-Indian women – indeed these women gained full status upon marriage). It was this colonial patriarchal convention these women hoped to dispel, to attain full (recognition of) membership for themselves and their children (Deveaux 2000: 527). 23 Thus, the gender rights sought are more precisely stated in terms of their cultural belonging.
Both the Roma women in Sweden and the First Nation women in Canada identify and pursue an emancipatory and egalitarian agendas for their lives (and for others) in terms of and nested within their cultural community. I therefore agree with Mookherjee’s idea (2009) that a feminist multiculturalism actively appreciates that conforming to liberal values such as freedom and equality does not exhaust all that is good for and valuable to minority women.
Mookherjee also suggests that minority women should be granted “the right to mediation”, which recognises that:
“(a) non-liberal practices may often promote women’s interests, as liberal priorities do not account for all dimensions of the good; and (b) women experience culturally-specific vulnerabilities that are not always detected through a defence of abstract and universal liberal rights.” (Mookherjee 2009: 26)
I worry that this in effect however becomes a feminist multiculturalism on the defensive, which is resigned to make sure that, in cases of conflict, minority women’s interests and vulnerabilities are understood and adhered to in a mediation before a compromise is made. In contrast, I believe a feminist multiculturalist position can and should be a positive programme. To be sure many gender-specific vulnerabilities are culturally nested in the way that Mookherjee and others have argued. 24 But culture and cultural membership can also be utilised in actually advancing feminist aims of gender emancipation and equality. If we accept that a culture and cultural norms can change – and as I have argued in the last section, I think we should – then many gender-related freedoms and equalities start with recognizing cultural membership and belonging, and the priority it has for a girl’s or a woman’s agency. The cases discussed illustrate that it is primarily through their own culture that these women find it meaningful to challenge and change existing gender roles and hierarchies. Many other competing frameworks such as cosmopolitanism or liberal nationalism ultimately do not have the resources to appeal to the distinct and prioritized value of cultural belonging when they think of women’s emancipation and equality.
The epistemic value of cultural diversity
The focus so far has been on how recognizing the cultural membership (and multicultural policy) can help us identify and enable forms of emancipation of and equality for minority girls, women, and non-binary members. But perhaps, for some feminists, this is still deemed insufficient to establish the comparative benefits of multiculturalism. We might think that a truly feminist multiculturalism should be even bolder and more ambitious in its scope, explicitly speaking to members of cultural majorities that perhaps think their interests are equally or even more protected by liberal nationalism or cosmopolitanism. So, let’s then turn to another unique component that multiculturalism can offer feminists of all cultural memberships: the epistemic value of cultural diversity. Arguably this epistemic diversity argument also generalises to other emancipatory agendas of various hues, such as the LGBTQ+. 25
To be clear, I am not going to be concerned with arguments for the inherent value of cultural diversity from a feminist point-of-view (see Kymlicka, 2007b; Parekh 2002). It is possible that a diversity of different cultural systems matches some feminist ideal end-state. In such a scenario, cultural diversity is not simply a means toward an end, but an endpoint that is inherently desirable from the perspective of gender emancipation and equality. While I do not want to rule out the inherent value of such cultural diversity, I am not interested in arguing for it presently. I restrict my argument instead to the instrumental value of cultural diversity for developing (more) feminist strategies and feminist societies.
This is an instrumental, but also an epistemic argument for the role and value of cultural diversity for feminism: the existence of a plurality or diversity of cultures increases the prospects for advancing certain knowledge and problem-solving that are a key part of feminism. This argument assumes that achieving feminist aims of greater emancipation and equality for women and non-binary members is not merely about getting societies to subscribe to the correct values. Instead, my argument assumes that another obstacle to progress and change has to do with envisioning what feminist progress might be. To achieve such progress and problem-solve, I claim, one not only needs the right values and determination, but also instructive models to learn from.
Consider, for instance, the following issues that I take to be at least partly unresolved within feminism: What society-level models of gender identity should we aim for: single, binary, or multiple gender identities – or none? Relatedly, should we be striving toward a future where gender roles disappear entirely or are some gender roles acceptable as long as they are compatible with a high degree of emancipation and equality overall? Clearly structures of domination and subordination along gender lines (i.e., typically, patriarchy) should largely be resisted, but can such structures be tolerated if they appear in some voluntary relationships or at some times?
As I have indicated earlier these are issues in which cultures have chosen different paths for how to understand and model gender and gender relations. Now, the diversity argument simply says that there is a collective epistemic benefit that derives from cultures being able to pursue their own path and deliver different society-level answers to such questions, since then we can all eventually learn from this diversity of models provided.
The concept of epistemic obstacles that diversity might assist in resolving, are already front and centre in philosophy of science and social epistemology. Here a very influential diversity argument, which is also frequently formally modelled, is that the chance of hard-to-gain knowledge, and relatedly the chance of successful problem-solving, is increased if different paths can proceed and play out relatively independently. That is basically because as several philosophers of science have argued, exploring a single path is unlikely to hit on the right answer or best solution at the outset (see e.g. Pöyhönen 2017; Solomon 2001). Wylie (2013) also presents a related argument about the value of diversity for (scientific) creativity that might be fruitfully considered in this context. If these authors are correct, everyone benefits as the (epistemic) collective can learn from the diverse paths.
With these arguments in mind, we arrive at the thought that culturally diverse models also help us – the collective – achieve epistemic progress through different cultures being allowed to develop relatively independently of one another (i.e. we also have an epistemic argument for cultural self-determination). Here the collective consists of many different cultures standing to benefit from subsequently learning from one another. Translated to the case of feminist agenda, specifically, I propose that if different cultures are allowed to proceed relatively independently from another (rather than through forceable assimilation or a one-fits-all solutions, say), then we all benefit in developing better and even more accurate egalitarian and emancipatory models.
The fact that I appeal to the epistemic role of diversity (and not its direct political value, say) may make it seem less important. Still, such models have immense political potential in guiding the imagination and problem-solving of feminists of all cultures (and analogously for other emancipatory agendas). Consider, for example, giving the equal vote to women or the inventions of various forms of contraception that took a long time for any culture to arrive at, but once in place are clear signs of moral and epistemic progress partly because they are now sources of inspiration for many cultures. They represent society-level models that other societies and cultures can learn from and that can benefit strategic thinking cross-culturally. But, as intersectionality critics and non-Western feminists have long reminded us, we should not fall into the trap of thinking that it is Western or European cultures who are on the vanguard on all matters of gender equality and emancipation. I earlier mentioned the many indigenous cultures with non-binary systems of gender have been in place. This is something that many feminists these days would recognize as more progressive than cultural systems that only socially sanction binary gender models.
For another example, consider the Vanatinai on an island off mainland Papua New Guinea. Anthropologist Maria Lepowsky who studied them with a particular focus on their gender arrangements describes the culture as: “a sexually egalitarian society that challenges the concept of the universality of male dominance and contests the assumption that the subjugation of women is inevitable” (1993: vii). According to Lepowsky, one important element in making Vanatinai culture egalitarian is that it is matrilineal, where rights to land, forest and reef fishing is passed down from mothers to daughters (1993: 267). 26 Another is the bilocal residence pattern of this group, by which couples and their children alternate their residence between the hamlets of the wife’s and husband’s families with the associated equal distribution of social and kin support (Lepowsky 1993: 46).
These examples also illustrate that working out more emancipatory and egalitarian gender arrangements is partly an epistemic problem, usefully explored without imposition or dominance from surrounding cultures. I also think the fact that many women and girls of different cultures will feel inspired by what the Vanatinai example itself suggests about the value of cultural diversity for learning. That is, such relatively autonomous exploration may increase the overall prospect of (global) feminist change if unhampered by ethnocentric thinking.
Which brings us to a tricky assumption about the epistemic value of cultural diversity, which is of course that different cultures can learn from each other. I don’t deny that there are indeed real limitations attached to cross-cultural learning, but multiculturalists are of course the first to recognize them. For one the power asymmetries and dominance of majority and Western cultures can threaten to skew the learning process and problem-solving. In fact, Lepowsky concludes her book on the Vanatinai culture by asking “What can people in other parts of the world learn from the principles of sex equality in Vanatinai custom and philosophy” (1993: 305f)? She for instance believes the small scale society with a considerable amount of face-to-face negotiations in cases of interpersonal conflicts and the lack of delegation of power to “a small group of middle-aged male elites” leaves room for an ethic of respect and more non-hierarchal relations among men and women, which are conditions she readily admits might not be translatable to most other cultures (1993: 306). Still, granting that there are such limitations to cross-cultural learning is not the same thing as asserting them as absolute obstacles. So, they too do not undermine the overall epistemic argument for cultural diversity and certainly not a feminist multiculturalism.
Finally, it is worth noting that the epistemic value of diversity does not automatically trump all moral and political problems associated with cultural diversity, Consider, again, the Taliban and suppose – in contrast to the reason they were ruled out as relevant for discussion initially – that their cultural community (or social lineage) represented a minority culture within a roughly liberal democratic state. One thing we might want to say is that there are clearly some cultures that one cannot or should not learn from and that they therefore should be disqualified from the range of models under consideration from the point of view of achieving epistemic progress. On closer examination, I don’t think this is persuasive. Even the Taliban can teach us something about what not to do and not least about the risks of a backlash. In that sense, the epistemic value of diversity is absolute: the more diversity the better from a strictly epistemic perspective. A better reply to the above scenario is to admit that the epistemic value of cultural diversity itself has to be traded off with other moral and political values attached to cultural diversity (or uniformity) and that it is these competing (moral) values that would rule out the Taliban from consideration for cultural rights in the counterfactual scenario where they form a minority within a liberal state. 27
Conclusion
This paper has argued that multiculturalism offers important resources for greater gender emancipation and equality because it understands that such concepts are often identified and addressed within culturally nested identities. I take this to be the insight of a properly feminist multiculturalism. While I have not denied that there will be remaining trade-offs between liberal feminist concerns and cultural empowerment, which have to be managed and carefully considered, I have pointed out that similar trade-offs are needed also under alternative frameworks to multiculturalism, like liberal nationalism and cosmopolitanism. I finally provided an epistemic argument for cultural diversity suggesting that it is an important resource for overall feminist (and other emancipatory agendas) problem-solving, in generating different models that all can benefit and learn from. Along the way, I have suggested many cultures should pay attention to oft-neglected indigenous cultural models of gender equality and emancipation (including examples of non-binary gender systems and bilocal residence patterns). In more ways than one, women’s rights are cultural rights.
Perhaps there are other feminist concerns that only, say, liberal nationalists can identify and address. Thus, I would like to conclude by inviting feminists that remain critical of multiculturalism to argue for the relative virtues of their preferred alternative. Thinking of comparative virtues and feminist alternatives to multiculturalism would improve the debate about both feminism and culture in political philosophy and in politics writ large.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
This paper has been presented and benefited from discussions at the European Culture and Society & European Studies Winter Lecture at the Europa-Univertsität Flensburg and Multicultural citizenship, 25 years later, at the Université Paris 1, Panthéon Sorbonne. I have also learnt much from discussions with Ellen Lundkvist and from presentations at philosophy colloquiums at Central European University (Vienna) and Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED Madrid). Finally, I am very grateful to Kalle Grill, Jens Jørund Tyssedal, Andrea Sangiovanni and two reviewers for this journal for insightful and careful readings of different drafts.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Danmarks Grundforskningsfond; DNRF144, Danmarks Frie Forskningsfond; 9062-00049B.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Data availability statement
Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.