Bringing green food to the Chinese table: How civil society actors are changing consumer culture in China

Shades of green: Safe and sustainable food in China

The concept of ‘green consumption’ was initially introduced by the International Organisation of Consumer Unions in 1963. While original conceptualisation referred to low-pollution products, definitions now cover sustainable production, purchase, consumption and disposal/reuse (Thøgersen, 2010; Zhu et al., 2013). I refer to ‘green’ foods to describe products that are consistent with environmental consumption but may or may not have official ‘organic’ certification.

Green food promotion has fallen within the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) (at least rhetorical) drive for a more environmentally friendly economy, which boosts domestic consumption. Chinese government policies have gradually evolved since the 1980s to place greater emphasis on sustainability. Food security and safety manifest in three policy areas: farmland preservation (since 1980s), food reserve system (since 1990s) and agricultural support (Scott et al., 2014: 160). Central government instruments include subsidies, eco-agricultural zones or demonstration bases, facilitation of farmers’ cooperatives, State Owned Enterprise (SOE) support for supplier conversion to organic, procurement of organic food for government employees etc. (Scott et al., 2014: 162). The latter has, however, become less frequent since the 2015 launch of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. Subnational governments in over 20 provinces have also formulated Measures for Green Food Management (Lin et al., 2009: 71). The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) manages three formal certifications with progressively strict criteria: hazard free (无公害食品), green (绿色食品) and organic (有机食品). From 1995, green products were further classified as A and AA. However, due to consumer confusion, the double tier system is being abandoned. Support has been complimented by regulatory changes. For example, since 2003, China’s Provisions on the Environmental Administration of New Chemical Substances require enterprises to release chemical use information, following similar initiatives, for example REACH of EU. Most recently, state efforts have focused on food risk, with US$800 million invested in facility upgrades and safety staff between 2010 and 2015 (Yasuda, 2015).

Through inclusion in the government’s agricultural modernisation platform, sustainable farming awareness has increased. On the supply side, China’s green food industry experienced a ‘fast-growth stage’ over the past decade (Lin et al., 2009: 70). Since 1990 many organic product categories have grown rapidly, increasing from 892 in 1997 to 15,238 in 2007 (Lin et al., 2009: 73). As of April 2010, more than 2400 enterprises had been awarded the label (Liao and Li, 2010: 19). The sector’s share of China’s total food production has also greatly increased. In 2007, 83 million tons of green food produced represented less than 7% of the total (Lin et al., 2009: 72). Currently, foods meeting at least one standard (hazard free, green or organic) represent over 25% of all agricultural products and 90% of agricultural exports (Scott et al., 2014: 159). While most organic products were initially exported, domestic demand has overtaken, due to growing food safety concern and expanding middle classes (Scott et al., 2014: 159). Nonetheless, domestic green food demand potential has remained largely unfulfilled.

Despite state policy and funding for food safety and organic farming, environmental and health risks persist. Yasuda (2015) highlights four-scale management failures of state regulation: coordination bodies, campaigns, model production zones and regulatory segmentation. Furthermore, effectiveness of local implementation of national policies has varied significantly (Scott et al., 2014: 161). Facing differing economic, social and environmental conditions, subnational agencies are not necessarily motivated towards compliance. Although the central state has tried to rectify implementation problems through coordination bodies at different political levels, this has been ineffective in most areas because local officials neither understand the role of food safety coordination bodies, nor see sufficient gain in their success (Yasuda, 2015: 753–754). Hence, regulatory bodies often operate as silos without cooperation of other important agencies.

Even if central plans were implemented, policies have emphasised large-scale organic production, marginalising smallholder farmers and domestic consumers. Farmers pay an MoA certification fee that increases with stringency level (hazard free, green, organic). Hence, organic certification is unaffordable for many small-scale farmers, even if they use internationally recognised organic methods. In their study of farmers in 10 provinces between 2010 and 2012, Scott et al. (2014: 164) identified 2 main reasons for not certifying. Firstly, costs are too high, especially after revisions to standards in 2012. Secondly, consumers are sceptical of formal certification. On the consumption side, China lacks comprehensive environmental and consumer protection laws, and corresponding enforcement mechanisms, relative to more mature markets for green food, for example, Japan, USA and Germany (Zhang, 2012: 62). Even where legal frameworks do exist, environmental performance of companies within transitional economies differs widely, despite their shared formal regulatory field (Dasgupta et al., 2000). Enforcement of China’s eco-labelling plan lacks transparency and consistency (Gao and Zuo, 2008) and inauthentic labelling has been common (Liao and Li, 2010). Therefore, Chinese consumers are sceptical of formal organic certification and distribution channels. State regulation alone is neither the most effective deterrent for irresponsible corporate behaviour, nor support for producers to engage in more sustainable agriculture. Responding to state voids – associated with food risk, certification trust and small-scale farming – NGOs have fostered dialogue and action around green food.

Civil society greening without democracy? Locating a Chinese third sector

Controversy surrounds the existence of civil society and NGOs in Communist China. While some (e.g. Chan, 1997; Guo, 2007) rightly emphasise tight state control over market and society under authoritarian Communism, most dismissals of Chinese civil society are based on normative application of Habermasian (1962) criteria, inappropriate for a non-democratic context. In conceptualising public sphere as a place of openly critical debate, often positioned against state authorities, Habermas (1962) outlined three criteria: disregarding status, explicit verbalisation of a common concern and inclusivity. Chinese civil society cannot endorse these criteria because direct challenge to state is unsustainable or impossible. For inclusivity, civil society participants (activists, NGOs, journalists, intellectuals etc.) are largely urban, prosperous, tertiary educated, ethnic majority Han, and organisational leaders are predominantly men. Yet, inclusivity of civil societies in Western democracies since the 1960s is also questionable. Moreover, I problematise Chinese exceptionalism and superficial East/West binaries, constructing homogenous ‘Asian’ civil society characterised by top-down moral intellectualism and cooperation in contrast to bottom-up antagonism and independence in European and Anglophone countries (e.g. Gao, 2011; Zhu, 2010). Instead, I draw on De Certeau’s (1980) ‘tactics’ to conceptualise Chinese civil society actors, who work within a unique institutional context to exert agency and influence structural change. When overt activism criticising government and business is imprudent or impossible, actors may subvert institutions with ‘tactics’, or ‘calculated action determined by the absence of a proper place… play[ing] with the terrain imposed on it’ (De Certeau, 1980: 6). More appropriate for China are definitions of civil society, which recognise a distinct and separate role, but also allow for connections to state and business (e.g. Cooper, 2006: 115; Schwartz, 2004: 34).

China is particularly challenging terrain for NGOs. For registration with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, NGOs have had to secure sponsorship from an official agency, not operate in the same administrative area as an organisation with a similar purpose, have a minimum of 50 members and hold a minimum of 100,000 RMB (Ho, 2001: 903–904; Maohong, 2009: 8). Registered organisations may be further characterised under three types, including social associations (拥有各类社团), civil non-enterprise units (民间非政府单位) and foundations (基金会). As social associations generally have closer ties to government, I do not classify them as NGOs. In contrast, civil non-enterprise units may operate relatively autonomously, but face greater resource and regulatory hurdles, for example the inability to have memberships. As of 2008, there were 210,000 social associations, 174,000 civil non-enterprise units, and 1341 foundations (Wang, 2013: 85). In addition, many non-profit CSOs navigate registration by operating as ‘businesses’.

Since the 1990s, environmental protection has become a relatively active area of civic participation (Jia, 2011; Tan-Mullins and Hofman, 2014). In 1994, Friends of Nature registered as the first national ENGO. Over the following decade, the number and activities of Chinese ENGOs increased intensively. As of 2008, there were 3199 registered ENGOs in mainland China: 1309 government supported mass organisations, 508 private non-enterprise units and 1382 student environmental protection associations (Wang, 2013: 86). State institutional changes since the 1990s have enabled ENGO development, albeit in relatively apolitical arenas that may also serve CCP interests (Gao, 2011; Zhu, 2010). For this increasingly traversable ‘terrain’, I identify four main domestic ENGO activities: service provision and education, sanctioned policy input through top-down public participation processes, advocacy for institutional implementation or establishment and (in rare cases) protest.

Problematising consumer behaviour approaches: Actor Network Theory as a meaningful alternative

While much research on green food consumer behaviour has adopted business and economics approaches (e.g. Liao and Li, 2010; Liu et al., 2010; Tsakiridou et al., 2008), these studies largely ignore collective elements, instead either quantitatively mapping demographics or positioning consumers as rational individuals. Demographic studies have identified significant influence factors for green food purchase in various national markets, for example, gender, age, education and income (e.g. Tsakiridou et al., 2008). However, while income has been identified as important for green food purchase in China, gender, age and education level have not emerged as significant in quantitative surveys (Chen et al., 2014; Yin et al., 2010). For qualitative analysis, Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour has often been applied to explain consumer behaviour in terms of attitudes, subjective norms and perceived control. Frequently identified attitudinal themes include green food awareness (Botonaki et al., 2006; Magistris and Gracia, 2008), personal and family safety risk (Chen et al., 2014; Tsakiridou et al., 2008; Yin et al., 2010), health (Chen et al., 2014; Yin et al., 2010), taste and quality (Dahm et al., 2009; Magistris and Gracia, 2008) and geographic origin (Botonaki et al., 2006; Ozretic-Dosen et al., 2007). In comparison, exploration of ‘subjective norms’ has been limited. A few studies have, however, provided insight into values and norms, such as environmental morality and emotional benefits (Chang, 2011; Hartmann and Ibanez, 2006), social desirability (Chang, 2011; Chen et al., 2014), social status and differentiation (Sun and Collins, 2006) and culinary culture (Chen et al., 2014: 346). Finally, frequently explored issues for consumers’ perceived control to access green foods include willingness and ability to pay a premium (Dahm et al., 2009), distribution and convenience (Chen et al., 2014: 346), labelling clarity and transparency (Rocchi and Stefani, 2005; Zhou et al., 2013: 342). Consumers may also perceive their individual behaviour as ineffective for influencing business or state actors, for example food producers’ (ir)responsibility to environment and health (Chang, 2011; Verhoef, 2005), significant for examining collective civil society.

While previous studies provide a useful basis, consumer behaviour approaches have been criticised for focusing on rational choice and individuals (Jackson, 2005; Peattie, 2010: 216; Thøgersen, 2010: 171). Instead, others have proposed analysis of macro-institutional conditions (e.g. Crivits and Paredis, 2013; Etzioni, 2009; Kilbourne et al., 1997). Busch (2016) extends this discourse to emphasise influence of shared social values, or informal institutions, on individual consumption decisions. I draw on Bajde’s (2013) extension of Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) with Actor Network Theory (ANT), which explores microelements and macroelements, their interactions, and processes of change. Although CCT represents itself as an alternative to ‘objective’ frameworks of business studies for consumption, Bajde (2013) argues that microelements remain in focus. Rather than proposing a shift towards macroelement, Bajde (2013) suggests a ‘flattening’, incorporating micro and macroelements and their relations: ANT ‘treat[s] everything in the social and natural worlds as a continuously generated effect of the webs of relations within which they are located’ (Law, 2009: 141). Relations include movements, displacements, transformations or creations (Latour, 2005: 64). Focus on change processes is useful for the relatively new phenomenon of green food in China. Consumption involves assembling and extending heterogeneous relations between material, social and discursive elements. Change action, therefore, requires actor networks, which enact assemblages, exemplified by relations between ENGOs, consumers, social enterprises and farmers. Within ANT CCT, ‘conceptions of exclusively human agency are replaced with a ‘flat’ ontology that puts all entities on a similar footing’ (Bajde, 2013: 229). Furthermore, ANT CCT embraces subject/object co-production. Through this lens, Chinese consumption networks are involved in green food consumption processes, both material object and its discursive representation, as well as production of its social meaning.

Methodology

Two-stage empirical research began with qualitative content analysis in 2013, followed by fieldwork interviews and participation during 2016. Sina Weibo blogs of four ENGOs between January and September 2013 provided data for qualitative content analysis. Sina Weibo is a Chinese microblogging platform, with over 500 million users. Since microblogging first commenced in China in October 2006, engagement has rapidly increased, and the number of microbloggers had reached 56% of the online population by June 2013 (Mou, 2014). Chinese microblogs are increasingly significant communication channels, where subjective norms are reflected and shaped. My study included blogs of FON (自然之友), Global Village Beijing (北京地球村环境教育中心), Global Environmental Institute (全球环境研究所) and Green Beagle (达尔问研究所). These Chinese ENGOs were selected based on two criteria: (1) members of Green Choice Alliance, a Chinese NGO network aiming to influence consumers, businesses and policy, and (2) self-identified green food promotion as organisational goal during 2013. The sample of 413 posts was generated using a keyword search: 有机食品 (organic food), 绿色食品 (green food) and 生态食品 (eco-food).

Significant themes from content analysis were cross-checked and further explored through 3-month fieldwork in Beijing during 2016. I conducted interviews with representatives from Chinese NGOs and international NGOs (INGOs), as well as green food producers and consumers. In addition, I undertook participant observation with one organic food non-profit social enterprise (社会企业). Participation included visiting the co-operative store, attending weekly organic markets to observe and talk to farmers and their consumers, spending time in the office to observe and talk to employees and volunteers, interviewing organisational members, attending and presenting at ‘sharing meetings’ about sustainable food issues. Coding was informed by the Bajde’s (2013) ANT CCT categories (material, social and discursive) and inductively elaborated as prevalent sub-themes emerged.

Chinese consumption networks experiencing and shaping materiality of green food

Material health risk of environmental degradation is pertinent in China, where excessive levels of PM2.5 and PM10 air pollution often inhibit ability to venture outdoors (Wang et al., 2016). Weibo content analysis, interviews and observation provided insight into how actors in consumption networks experience and shape the relationship between food risk and green alternatives. Material risk operated primarily at personal and nuclear family levels, with public environmental welfare an important secondary consideration. In 2013 Weibo communications detailed how chemicals and genetic modification compromise food safety. Furthermore, specific cases of dangerous contamination were used to warn against non-green foods, for example ‘even rice has excessive lead content’ and ‘Shandong vegetable vendors spray cabbages with formaldehyde solution, long-term inhalation of which can cause leukaemia’. After establishing fear of conventional foods, green products were represented as guaranteed safety, for example ‘organic food is undoubtedly a secure channel’ and ‘eat green food and rest assured’. Fear of conventional food may be the most influential driver of green food consumption in China (Chen et al., 2014) – yet, as proposed by Latour’s (2005) ‘black boxing’, explanatory foundations may also become effects, that is green food consumption networks (GFCNs) have also proliferated fear.

High exposure to food safety messages from government, media and NGO channels, had contributed to even greater awareness of problems among 2016 participants, but over-saturation also emerged. Both farmers and consumers at Beijing organic markets reported personal safety as the most significant attitudinal influencer, corroborating findings by Renmin University Non-Profit Organisation Research Institute (2016). Comparing various green food–related campaigns, one Chinese representative of an INGO reported highest consumer response for food testing because ‘people want to know what they eat, whether it contains pesticide residue, the heavy metal things, they want to know how can they avoid the risks of food safety concerns’. However, after experiencing high exposure to safety information over the past 5 years, some consumers seem disillusioned. One INGO interviewee engaged in organic agriculture and consumption projects described this phenomenon as ‘food fatigue’. Although the organiser of a Beijing organic market confirmed that consumer concern for food safety boomed from 2010 and that individual welfare remains the major driver, she noted some consumers are now so overwhelmed with air, water and soil pollution that they are starting to disengage: ‘People don’t care’ because they think ‘well, I’m going to die anyway’. Attendees of a weekly community ‘sharing meeting’ at an organic food store in Beijing also expressed feeling bombarded and disempowered by constant safety problems, desiring solutions.

Network actors contrasted risky conventional foods with healthy green foods, for example, ‘choose green, reduce intake of fatty and high-sugar foods’ (Weibo in 2013). Later, in 2016, a Beijing organic co-operative founder said that many customers considered green foods ‘better for the body’. In addition to individual health, socially desirable physical appearance emerged. According to an ENGO representative, ‘they might not care that much about the risk… it’s looking healthier, getting slimmer, being more beautiful’. Participants who mentioned beauty constructs referred to Beijing and Shanghai. Significance of physical desirability, and the very beauty norms mobilised, may be particular to large, wealthy, first-tier Chinese cities.

Secondary privileging of public environmental welfare, after individual concerns, corroborates with studies in other markets (Dahm et al., 2009). However, as previous Chinese studies have also identified (e.g. Wang et al., 2016), evidence from Weibo communications and fieldwork suggests that urban Chinese are highly motivated by environmental issues. Nonetheless, in 2013 Weibo communications, I identify a nuanced disconnection problem between food choices and environmental impact in the minds of Chinese consumers. Responding to this disconnection, ENGO Weibo communications aimed to increase awareness about environmental benefits of sustainable food production and consumption. Specifically, references were made to carbon emissions reduction, climate change prevention and maintaining biological diversity. Conversely, ENGOs represented non-green food production as a contributor to air, water and land pollution. Furthermore, ENGOs linked green food to holistic sustainability to shape consumers’ everyday material choices, for example, riding bicycles when grocery shopping or using baskets rather than plastic bags. Again, this shows ENGOs responding to insufficient state-led formal institutional change by trying to shift normative behaviour. Feedback by Weibo users demonstrated some effectiveness, for example, ‘I’m proud of myself. I do not smoke; do not drink; do not drive; do not throw away too much garbage; eat green’.

Despite ENGOs’ 2013 communications and some associated increase in awareness about environmental benefits of green food, 2016 participants reported disconnection persistence among many consumers outside the ENGO sector and environmental movement. For those consumers who did already position green food within broader sustainability, a major development in 2016 was increased discussion of reducing meat consumption, and interest in vegetarianism. Similarly, in 2016, vegetarianism was often discussed at civil society meetings associated with organic food. To some extent, this reflects international circulation of ‘Westernised’ vegetarianism, as participants often referenced movements elsewhere. Nonetheless, indigenous influence factors also include traditional Buddhist reincarnation beliefs, as well as changing relationships between meat consumption and social status in urban China (Klein, 2008, 2016; Liu et al., 2015).

Overall, however, participants in a Beijing focus group following a presentation of my research on green food consumer behaviour in China reported low awareness of links with sustainable lifestyles among their social networks. This was especially obvious to participants who had lived internationally. During interviews, ENGO representatives reported that government actors are more likely to react to environmental aspects of their campaigns, whereas consumers remain more concerned with personal wellbeing. The organic agriculture projects director of an INGO in Beijing reflected that increased environmental awareness has not led to significant behavioural change. Rather, the ‘food fatigue’ phenomenon previously discussed has led some consumers to accept the environmental crisis: ‘so what if the farmers use some pesticides on my food? The soil is already bad, the water is already bad and the environment is completely bad, so we just live with it’. While environmental awareness continues to increase, along with knowledge of sustainable lifestyle choices, it seems that personal safety remains the core material driver among most Chinese green food consumers.

Accessibility of distribution and price also influenced materiality. Many 2013 Weibo users attributed non-consumption of green food to distribution limitations. In response, ENGOs and other users suggested purchase channels. Distribution increased, with even conventional Chinese supermarkets offering organic products by 2014 (Chen et al., 2014: 346). While distribution seemed less problematic in 2016, at least in first-tier cities, a few participants still emphasised unavailability. Beijing organic markets attendance increased dramatically since 2010 establishment, when approximately 100 customers came once per week. In 2016, markets were held three times per week in various Beijing districts with 300 to 500 customers each time. One organic farmer reflected: ‘More people are buying organic now in Beijing because it has become easier to find distribution channels – in the past people didn’t know where to go’. In fact, although Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) farms were established around Beijing 15 years ago, consumer awareness has only recently increased, supported by CSO initiatives, for example, eco-shopping guides and a platform listing CSA and Participant Guarantee System (PGS) farms for Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. Beyond Beijing, the organic market trend is widespread throughout first-tier cities, with a 10-city network. The Beijing organisation provides support and advice to younger markets: ‘we are all very good friends. We visit one another very often’. According to ENGO representatives, e-commerce also increases availability. During my visits to Beijing organic markets, I noticed that most stores displayed QR codes for Taobao (online shopping) and Weixin (social media). Although retail availability is less problematic for urban consumers, hospitality industry material barriers persist. Eating out culture is important in urban China. However, green food restaurants are still limited and expensive. Furthermore, awareness of these businesses is low due to certification distrust, that is, if restaurateurs advertise as organic, consumers doubt authenticity and are unwilling to pay price premiums.

Even if consumers trust certification, affordability affects material acquisition (Chen et al., 2014: 346). Surprisingly, price was not emphasised in 2013 communications. Some Weibo posts did emphasise value –green/safe authenticity, quality, health and taste – prompting consumers to reassess priorities when shopping. For example, one user posted: ‘money is irrelevant for foods – it is your life’. However, price has been identified as a hindrance for green food consumption in China (e.g. Chen et al., 2014: 346) and I acknowledge that the Weibo sample may be biased towards marginalising the cost problem. Therefore, I further explored price during 2016 fieldwork. Interviewees did consider price a barrier, with green foods costing 5 to 10 times more. Even among ENGO actors, willingness and ability to pay premiums hindered behavioural change. Nonetheless, certain consumer segments are willing to pay for green. Although some organic vendors did report customers across income levels, for example, pensioners, interviewees described typical customers as ‘middle class’ families. When prompted to provide a ‘middle class’ household annual income, most interviewees approximated 200,000 RMB (almost 30,000 USD), which correlates with statistics for urban China (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2016). However, it must be acknowledged that 2015 average urban income was 2.73 times that of rural households. While consumption networks have successfully harnessed food risk to promote safer green foods and increased availability, price remains a material barrier for wider behavioural change.

Labelling confusion and scepticism: Turning to producer/consumer social relationships

Redressing overemphasis of many consumer behaviour studies on individual psychology associated with material factors, ANT CCT privileges social context. Yan (2012) applies Beck’s (1992) ‘theory of risk society’ to explore interconnectedness of food risk and broader distrust in Chinese society. He relates trust issues to perceptions of state and market institutions and relationships in alternative green food channels. Certification confusion emerged as a green food consumption inhibitor in 2013 Weibo communications. Weibo users expressed confusion around the complicated three-tier system (i.e. Hazard Free, Green A and AA, various organic), corroborating with past studies (Liu et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2012). ENGOs and other users responded with explanations of different schemes. ENGOs also provided links to more detailed sources. Encouraging consumers to select green or organic labels was often represented as a form of protest, pressuring enterprises through purchasing behaviour. In 2013, Weibo users identified with consumer empowerment, for example, ‘when we buy an item, we can see if it has environmentally friendly labelling. Money in our hands becomes a green vote’.

Nonetheless, in 2016, I frequently encountered persistent confusion and scepticism around labelling. Participants with greater understanding had generally gained this through overseas experience – whether real or vicariously through social network members. For example, an organic store community sharing meeting participant explained that she became familiar with eco-labelling while living in Taiwan. Many Chinese consumers without real/vicarious international experience remain confused. Furthermore, greater knowledge about different schemes, together with continual food scandals in media, has diluted certification value even further. Many consumers perceive formal institutions as unable to provide control over real green purchasing choices. One Beijing organic market customer identified distrust as the major barrier for friends who buy conventional food: ‘If I spend more, am I cheated?’ Previous research has also highlighted transparency problems and prevalence of counterfeit organic products (Wang et al., 2008).

In 2013, the most frequent Weibo user response to trust problems was dismay, reflecting low perceived individual efficacy and expectations that government should (and would eventually) assume responsibility. For example, one user wrote, ‘unfortunately, most people are still numb, waiting for someone else to act first; they cannot act themselves’. After criticising agricultural relocation policy, a Weibo user, suggested that the government give farmers ‘property rights over their own homes’ and allow decision making on ‘major architectural and construction projects in rural areas’, concluding with: ‘[l]eave some agricultural land and encourage farmers to engage in green food production’. Another consumer nostalgically recounted his childhood hometown and sustainable lifestyle, including consumption of green food, before comparing this with contemporary Beijing and holding government accountable: ‘[t]hese are our governance objectives?… 50 years smog in Beijing… Yu Zhou of the Ministry for Environmental Protection (MEP) – this guy is talking mindlessly!’ ENGOs criticised problematic state institutions, but also posted stories on positive central and subnational government initiatives, for example a report on MEP agreement to ‘jointly promote Chongqing’s urban and rural environmental protection strategy Cooperation Agreement’, and green food bases in Wengfengzhen Hongchiba (Wuxi county), Lanying township, Londing township and Tianmun Lake (Liyang city). Weibo users also praised central policy implementation by local governments, for example, ‘[t]hrough the “three wastes” and agricultural source point pollution control more environmentally friendly agricultural has been improved’. Furthermore, ENGOs and users also called for increased responsibility of food companies.

In contrast to 2013 focus on state and market changes, 2016 participants expressed complete disillusionment with institutional certification and mainstream distribution. Instead, green consumption networks aimed to regain control through collective initiatives built on relationships with producers. An international ENGO employee responsible for organic projects in north-eastern China aimed to help ‘real organic farmers engage with the consumers, get them to rebuild the trust‘. An organiser of Beijing organic markets reported that producers ‘don’t depend on certification, it doesn’t mean anything to them… here consumers and producers meet directly, why do you need a third person telling you whether they are trustworthy?’ When I visited these markets I never saw stalls displaying obvious certification, despite the fact that some were formally certified. Stallholders explained that their customers did not value labelling and it was even a deterrent for some. Participants in a focus group following a presentation I held about my research unanimously emphasised ‘face to face’ relations with farmers. The founder of a Beijing organic co-operative summarised appeal of smaller retailers: ‘To know where your food comes from is comforting. Here you meet the producer.’

Informal certification systems built on network trust are institutionalised to varying degrees. For example, some interviewees reported collectively ordering vegetables and chickens from their own or friends’ relatives, who run farms in neighbouring provinces. Collection work is shared among the buying group and often combined with social visits to farmers. In addition, there are numerous CSA projects in and around Beijing; agricultural visibility increases consumers’ perceived control over authenticity. PGS represents institutionalised network trust. For example, one co-operative organic food store in Beijing has stringent requirements for farmers, including endorsement of organic concept and farming methods (with or without formal certification), independent small or medium farm, openness and transparency, willingness to communicate with customers about production methods, consumer rights protection, spirit of cooperation with other farmers (e.g. sharing technology and knowledge). Recognising formal labelling ineffectiveness, the organic co-operative requires farmers provide information to signal ‘greenness’, for example, production processes and contact details for customer visits. Furthermore, there are regular PGS visits to different farms each week. Co-operative employees, consumers and other farmers check agricultural practices and increase the strength of the network. Other consumer segments may not, however, have time to build trust relationships with farmers; for example, singles without family caring responsibilities may perceive less benefit. Opinion leader endorsement and group buying, with rostered visits to farms, emerged as trends for increasing perceived authenticity control. Opinion leaders were either celebrities or from friendship, family or work circles. For example, an organiser of Beijing organic markets reported that trust increased after a musician associated herself with the organisation in 2010.

‘Good’ mothers and farming heroes: Discourse mobilisation to promote green food

Motherhood, hometown nostalgia, agricultural romanticism, patriotism and spirituality emerged as the most prevalent discourses around green food. Constructs of ‘good’ mothering, within discourses of femininity, were mobilised to promote green food purchase for children. Parental responsibility was mentioned as motivation by and for male and female consumers. However, in the majority of instances, mothers were emphasised. For example, when explaining consumer cooperatives, one interviewee said, ‘mothers buy together’. An ENGO representative involved in organic food campaigns noted a shift during pregnancy:

as an office worker [women] usually treat themselves badly. They do not have time to care about their own health … But when they fall pregnant … suddenly they care so much about what their babies eat and it’s a huge market.

Similarly, agricultural romanticism is shaped by Chinese culture but linked to global phenomena. While my research was limited to Beijing, studies throughout China have explored agricultural romanticism and food consumption (e.g. Schumilas, 2014: 196; Wu, 2014). Griffiths et al. (2010) argue that in the urban/rural, self/other binary in contemporary China, the rural has been reconstructed as positive through a ‘Romantic reappraisal of values’ (p. 335). Beyond China, the authors parallel romanticism following the European industrial revolution. Similarly, Schumilas (2014) draws a link between rural idols in China’s Alternative Food Networks (AFNs) and the 1970s ‘American pastoralism’ ‘back to land’ movement (p. 196).

Chinese agricultural romanticism manifests in contemporary valorisations of eco-farming heroes. In 2013 one Weibo user referred to ‘traditional rural beliefs’ as motivation for purchasing green food: ‘land is the mother, the bearer of all things’. Farming values seemed even more significant in 2016. Customers expressed desire to support small-scale farmers. During a Q&A session following a public presentation in Beijing by a German academic about a Bavarian CSA project, audience members were interested in farmers’ wages and conditions. An organiser of Beijing farmers markets emphasised just treatment of farmers as a driver of green food consumption. Beyond Beijing, Klein (2009) identified farmers’ welfare as a major theme for NGOs’ organic food campaigns in China. Some organic farmers have even attained heroic status. Referring to the founder of one of the earliest organic CSA farms near Beijing, an ENGO representative said, ‘her spirit inspired many people’. During encounters with Chinese consumers, I noticed a deep respect for knowledge of sustainable agriculture and the farmers who practice it. Many farmers are well educated and passionate, often with degrees in sustainable agriculture, particularly China Agricultural University for Beijing area. The founder of one farm near Beijing explained: ‘I wish to choose a healthy road, allow myself to do simple work, follow a simple career… I want to grow organic vegetables for people and environmental benefit. This is the greatest physical and mental protection’ (as cited in Renmin University Non-Profit Organisation Research Institute and Public Joint Management Consulting Co. Ltd., 2016). According to a Chinese representative of an international ENGO:

From 2013 I have seen more and more people aware of what they eat. Some of them go back to rural areas to become farmers themselves. People call them new farmers. And traditional farmers have decided to shift to new ways. And also consumers, there are many organisations that connect new ways of farming with consumers.

Spirituality is intertwined with patriotism in GFCN discourses. Tea, for example, has become an official symbol of Chinese culture and heritage, with state endorsement and use in soft power campaigns. A Beijing-based INGO representative reflected on a successful education campaign: ‘we released a report telling people that this iconic drink, tea, is so contaminated with pesticides’. Another successful initiative was crowdfunding for organic rice involving the traditional Chinese practice of keeping ducks for weeding, removing pests and fertilisation. Nationalism also emerges frequently. One interviewee explained that ‘anti-GMO consumers have a strong nationalism background… preserving the traditional way of living’. Patriotism, and sometimes regionalism, was also important for farmers’ self-identities. When asked about their sustainable agriculture motivations, Beijing organic market stallholders almost unanimously mentioned local Chinese production, retail and consumption.

Influence of place extended beyond nationalism to local identities within 老家/家乡 (hometown) discourses. In 2013, ENGOs mobilised hometown discourses to position green foods as pure and sacred. Weibo users responded by reflecting nostalgically on childhood food experiences, for example:

During my childhood my family was too poor to have much to cook, so we dug for vegetables in the mountains … Now that living conditions are good, wild vegetables are called green food, and loved by people, especially in the cities.

Conclusion

Although Chinese state actors have attempted to address environmental and health problems in the food industry through promoting green alternatives, they have left voids related to domestic consumption and small-scale farmers. Nonetheless, green food consumption is increasing in China. Responding to this puzzle, I have asked how GFCNs, driven by CSOs, work to influence consumer culture around green food in China. The two-phase research involved qualitative content analysis of four Beijing ENGO Weibo blogs in 2013, followed by interviews and participant observation with ENGO representatives, green food retailers, producers, and consumers during 2016. Analysis indicates that CSOs have helped to fill state voids related to consumer trust and small-scale farming through establishing online connections via social media platforms like Weibo, as well as offline networks for interpersonal relationships between consumers and producers via farmers’ markets, CSA, family connections and collective buying.

As an alternative to conventional consumer behaviour theory, which tends to privilege individual rational choice at the expense of contextual and collective aspects, Bajde’s (2013) ANT CCT has provided a meaningful lens for examining influences of civil society on organic agriculture and consumption. The framework covers microelements and macroelements, their interrelations, and processes of change. Demonstrating the co-production of subject and object inherent to ANT CCT, analysis identified engagement with, and re/creation of materials, discourse and social meanings by GFCNs, including NGOs, farmers, retailers and consumers. For green food in China, safety remains the greatest material concern. Distributive unattainability seems to be diminishing for urban consumers, partly due to creation of alternative channels by civil society actors. Nonetheless, financial attainability remains a barrier and future studies should explore food justice issues in greater depth. The significance of consumer scepticism around green labelling and effectiveness of social networks as a mechanism for building trust among and between producers and consumers corroborates with previous findings throughout China and in other countries. The major contribution of this study, however, is exploration of change and diverse consumer and producer/retailer responses. While confusion about labelling schemes emerged in 2013, by 2016 most participants expressed complete disillusionment with institutional certification. Although consumption networks have built trust through social ties (real and virtual) between consumers and farmers, a counter trend of non-green food health risk acceptance was also identified. Mobilisation of discourses around parenting, especially motherhood, and agricultural romanticism, including spirituality, patriotism and local identity, among consumption networks in this study parallels trends in the wider Chinese and international contexts. The case of green food in China demonstrates not only how consumption networks enact and shape material, social and discursive elements of consumer behaviour, but also how civil society may operate to address state voids even in an authoritarian setting.