Abstract
In this article, we examine how language and linguistic membership might feature in luck egalitarianism, what a luck-egalitarian theory of linguistic justice would look like, and, finally, what the emphasis on language teaches us about the validity of standard luck-egalitarian assumptions. We show that belonging to one language group rather than another is a morally arbitrary feature and that where membership of a specific linguistic group affects individual chances, the effects of such bad brute luck ought to be neutralized on the luck-egalitarian view. We assess two ways of redressing those kinds of unjustified inequalities: the ‘universal language’ option and the ‘linguistic advantages for all’ option. But we also argue, in the second part, that exploring luck egalitarianism through the lens of language exposes some difficulties intrinsic in many existent luck-egalitarian theories. We argue that treating circumstances one identifies with as choices is problematic. In addition, we argue that the linguistic preconditions of both the capacity to be responsible as well the exercise of responsibility complicate the idea of individual responsibility on which most luck-egalitarian theories rely. We conclude by suggesting the need to develop a luck-egalitarian theory of justice which is less reliant on causal features of the distinction between choice and circumstance and which is more sensitive to the idea of collective cooperation as opposed to individual responsibility.
Keywords
1.
Consider Gulliver’s account of the Grand Academy of Lagado, and the efforts made in its School of Languages to improve communication in the country. The sages of that academy have agreed on a scheme to abolish words altogether and substitute them with things, which people ought to carry around and show or exchange with each other to express their views on any given matter. They have come to see that words are only names for things, Gulliver reports, and that knowledge might advance significantly if one managed to remove the efforts and obscurity involved in expressing oneself verbally, and simply substituted words with the objects to which they refer. Of course, Gulliver goes on to say, they face the inconvenience that if one’s activity is too complex and of various kinds, one has to carry a greater bundle of things. He himself has often seen the sages of that academy almost sink under the weight of their loads, whether when they lay the sacks down to hold a conversation or when they help each other resume so that they can subsequently take their leave. But there is also the great convenience that a similar way of proceeding might serve as a ‘Universal Language to be understood in all civilized Nations, whose Goods and Utensils are generally of the same kind, or nearly resembling, so that their Uses might easily be comprehended’ (Swift, 2002: 158).
In this article, we assess something like the proposal of the Academy of Lagado from a perspective that appears missing in Gulliver’s account: the perspective of justice and not just convenience. Clearly, the real world differs considerably from the one envisioned by Lagado’s sages. First, in the real world, some things are harder to carry around: words that stand for things such as ‘friends', ‘houses', ‘mountains', ‘the sun’, or ‘God’ are only a few examples which illustrate why it is better to use language. Second, humankind is crucially marked by linguistic diversity. Our use of language rather than things and the existence of multiple languages pose many challenges for those interested in just relationships between human beings. In what follows, we consider how language affects human cooperation, what kind of constraints the diversity of languages places on the distribution of human benefits and efforts, and what would be required to remedy the potentially negative impact of language on people’s access to advantage. How great is the bundle that each of us carries in being part of one linguistic group rather than another? In what ways does the weight of that bundle facilitate or hinder our mutual cooperation? Most importantly, what would a fair distribution of effort in carrying that bundle require?
These questions are explored from within an influential, if still controversial, set of views about justice: luck egalitarianism. Roughly speaking, luck egalitarianism combines the following set of claims: (1) that inequalities of access to advantage are justified if they can be traced to ‘choices' 1 that people have made and (2) that inequalities arising from unchosen circumstances are unjust and ought to be redressed. In this article, we examine how language and linguistic membership might feature in luck-egalitarian accounts, what a luck-egalitarian theory of linguistic justice would look like, and, conversely, what kind of intuitions of luck-egalitarian theory are to be supported and which of its assumptions ought to be revised when seen in the light of linguistic justice.
The article therefore aims to contribute both to our understanding of linguistic justice (by considering which luck dimensions of language are (un)just and how they could be remedied) and to our understanding of the normative importance of equality (by considering what reflection on linguistic justice may teach us about some of the main assumptions of luck egalitarianism). Exploring ways of taking luck egalitarianism seriously within the realm of linguistic justice and addressing some objections that core premises of the theory attract when applied to issues of linguistic disadvantage pave the way to a more nuanced and potentially original way of refining some core luck-egalitarian assumptions. More particularly, by focusing on some features of linguistic cooperation considered as an irremediably collective enterprise, we hope to suggest that in cases similar to that of linguistic justice, luck-egalitarian theory will need to operate with a more nuanced concept of desert and responsibility and to identify alternative ways of articulating the distinction between choice and circumstance.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we explore linguistic justice through the lens of luck egalitarianism, by analysing how language could be considered a matter of luck. We show that belonging to one language group rather than another is a morally arbitrary feature and that where membership in a specific linguistic group affects individual chances, the effects of bad brute luck ought to be neutralized. We assess two ways of redressing those kinds of unjustified inequalities: the ‘universal language’ option and the ‘linguistic advantages for all’ option. In the first part of the article, we show that there are luck-egalitarian arguments to be found for and against both positions, although luck-egalitarian intuitions appear to tilt the scale in favour of the second approach. But we also argue, in the second part, that exploring luck egalitarianism through the lens of language exposes some difficulties intrinsic to many existent luck-egalitarian theories. Two points in particular appear in need of greater attention: the question of whether circumstances with which people identify should have an impact on the distribution of access to advantage and the role of responsibility in luck-egalitarian theories of justice. 2 We argue that treating circumstances one identifies with as choices is problematic when it comes to their impact. In addition, we argue that the linguistic preconditions of both the capacity to be responsible as well as the exercise of responsibility complicate the idea of individual responsibility on which most luck-egalitarian theories rely. We conclude by suggesting the need to develop a luck-egalitarian theory of justice which is less reliant on causal features of the distinction between choice and circumstance and which is more sensitive to the idea of collective cooperation as opposed to individual responsibility.
2.
A few preliminary remarks are required at this stage. In this article, we only focus on the distribution of language efforts from the point of view of luck-egalitarian theories of justice. After a long neglect, the relevance of language is now appropriately recognized in contemporary theories of justice and democracy. A debate has emerged which analyses language policy, language rights, and linguistic disadvantages (see, in particular, Kymlicka and Patten, 2003), and various theories of linguistic justice have been developed. So far, few have taken up the relevance of luck-egalitarian intuitions for linguistic justice. This is regrettable since, as we go on to show, most starting premises of luck-egalitarian theory seem interestingly appropriate to illustrate the roots of specific kinds of injustices to which linguistic disadvantage gives rise. Here we try to fill that gap. Without dismissing alternative ways of approaching language-based normative controversies (for example, communitarian, libertarian, fairness-oriented, or interest-rights-based (see Kukathas, 2003; Patten, 2001, 2003; Stilz, 2009; Taylor, 1993)), for the purposes of this article, we set them to one side.
Second, analysing the relevance of luck egalitarianism for a fair distribution of linguistic efforts does not imply either that we endorse that whole family of views or that we wish to make conclusive assessments on its validity or invalidity. Our aim is to look at the core luck-egalitarian intuitions, for example, the idea that people should not suffer from disadvantages due to unchosen circumstances, and consider their implications for the issue of linguistic justice.
Third, this initial assessment of language as a morally arbitrary factor over which people exercise little control does not imply suggesting that language is the only or the most important kind of unchosen circumstance that affects access to advantage. This article is restricted to exploring the consequences of language-based unequal access to advantage, but its conclusions should be read in continuity with attempts at neutralizing other (non-linguistic) forms of bad luck rather than in opposition to them.
A final important clarification is that we focus here exclusively on language and not on other cultural circumstances. A number of authors have discussed how cultural membership is an arbitrary feature that affects people’s position in society and is also subject to justice-based assessments (Heath, 1998; Kymlicka, 1989, 1995; Quong, 2006). Our argument is both more extended and more specific. It is more extended because it is often the case that our dependence on language stretches beyond the boundaries of a specific culture (or nation) or that people share a language without necessarily sharing the same culture. So, for example, Australians and South Africans may well share a language (English), but not a culture. But it is also more specific because particular issues raised by our dependence on language do not arise in the context of discussions of cultural membership or, conversely, some controversies provoked by the question of access to cultural opportunities do not necessarily arise in the case of language. All this is to say that the issue of linguistic justice and the moral concerns we might have with an unequal distribution of linguistic efforts seem well worth raising in their own right.
3.
Luck egalitarians argue that inequalities resulting from unchosen circumstances are unjust and therefore ought to be neutralized. The question we ask here is whether inequalities resulting from language 3 ought to be neutralized, on a luck-egalitarian perspective. To ask this question implies raising three issues. First, is language a circumstance relevant for luck egalitarianism? Second, (how) can language give rise to inequalities? Third, how, if ever, can these inequalities be neutralized? 4 Let us consider them in turn.
3.1. Is language unchosen?
There can be no doubt that language is to a large degree not the result of one’s choice. This is most clearly the case for the language one is raised in. We do not have a say regarding which native language to speak. 5 The people who raised us did so in a particular language; we had no choice in the language in which we were raised, just like we did not choose our parents, and there is no doubt that we cannot be seen as agents capable of making genuine choices before having language. Clearly, then, all other things being equal, people’s native language, their ‘mother tongue’, is an unchosen circumstance. Therefore, on the luck-egalitarian view, it is a morally arbitrary feature of one’s life. If inequalities arise from this circumstance, then they are, on the luck-egalitarian view, unjust.
However, the fact that we did not choose the language in which we grew up and gained literacy does not imply that there are no choice dimensions whatsoever in language. On the contrary, assuming background conditions do not complot against us, we can make many linguistic choices. For instance, we can choose to put time and energy in acquiring a second language. We can also choose to conduct our lives in that second language, for instance, by marrying a partner with a different native tongue or by emigrating (if allowed) to a country or province where that other language is the official language. In addition, within one and the same language we can make choices: we can consciously cultivate a local dialect in our speech or assume a particular style of writing. On the luck-egalitarian view, inequalities which arise as the consequence of making or failing to make such choices in a situation of equal background conditions for all concerned ought not to be neutralized. 6
3.2. Language-related inequalities
Fleshing out the extent to which language can be a choice or a circumstance is relevant because it will allow us to judge whether inequalities resulting from language ought to be neutralized. There are many such inequalities, and their natures are diverse. Consider the following linguistic inequalities.
Socio-economic. People who speak a language different from the language required for a certain practice which brings socio-economic benefits or speak that language only poorly or speak a non-standard version of the language face disadvantages.
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These are disadvantages in being successful in the job market, in securing and interpreting contracts, in being admitted to universities, in being effective at carrying out tasks, at convincing people when engaged in deliberation, and so on. These disadvantages are a source of socio-economic inequality.
Expressive and interpretive capacity (communication). A lack of proficiency in the language(s) spoken in the place where one lives or in one’s general social environment leads to inequalities in interpreting others and in being understood, compared to those who do speak the language well. This expressive and interpretive capacity is a comparatively important basic interest: people need to be able to communicate with others around them by expressing themselves and understanding others on topics and in situations covering the full range of human pursuits and interests.
Relational benefits. A lack of proficiency in the language(s) spoken by the people who are part of one’s social context leads to inequalities in developing social relationships, such as in finding friends or a life partner, compared with those who are proficient speakers of the language(s).
Physical security. While expressive and interpretive capacity is a basic interest, it is also instrumentally useful in securing health and safety. Lack of knowledge of the societal language constitutes a hindrance to getting access to services such as hospitals, in securing help when one is sick, in being able to read and understand product labels, in understanding public messages, and in understanding traffic signs.
Exercise of political rights. People who do not know the language of their political community or do not know it well are not equally able to exercise their political rights. They are less well informed about what is going on in the public sphere and in the political process and they are less able to defend their interests publicly. They are also less effective at defending themselves in courts: even when, as is usually the case, these provide interpreters, people’s access to knowledge about legal means and practice is negatively affected when they do not speak the language.
Political stability. Belonging to a state which is marked by a significant amount of linguistic diversity can weaken the state: it makes the democratic process more complicated, it enhances confusion, and it often fosters sub-state nationalism among sufficiently large language groups who use language as a marker of sub-state affiliation (see, for example, Kraus, 2004; McRae, 1975). Here the inequality is not between citizens of the same political community, but between the citizens of states with linguistic diversity and the citizens of other states.
Cultural autonomy. As it has often been noted, a cultural context, which often includes a linguistic context, is a necessary precondition for autonomy (Gans, 2003; Kymlicka, 1995: 83; Raz, 1995; Taylor, 1993: 46–7). Autonomy, so the argument goes, requires the disposition of a set of options. Languages and cultures are option packages: they provide us with the options available to us. Even if one finds this a dubious claim, on a basic level it has a quite palpable thrust. We only know literary stories through knowing a language in which they are told. Unless we are physically present at events, we are only aware of those events through pieces of information available in a language we understand. To know that there is a thing called a computer, and to know how to operate it, we need access to the language in which one talks or writes about computers and their use. Without knowledge of the language spoken in the society in which one lives, one does not have equal access to a set of choices. This interest encapsulates the concerns behind points 1–6, but also goes deeper: it does not just involve specific implications of language for choice, but it portrays language as a context of choice, a context within which choices come to make sense.
Status and dignity. A language is a source of collective and personal status and dignity (in what follows we understand equal status as a precondition of a sense of dignity). People’s self-respect and dignity are often affected by the esteem their language gets from others or from the state. For example, if there are several language groups in a society, whereby the language of one group is officially endorsed as a state language, and made into the language of the education system, the parliament, and the judicial system, then this is typically felt as a direct assault on the dignity of the speakers of the unrecognized languages.
It is important to notice that the inequalities mentioned above are entangled and often reinforce one another.
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Someone who faces inequality in the exercise of political rights may be less successful in securing his or her interests politically, and therefore also face extra socio-economic hurdles. Furthermore, a lack of autonomy may lead to a general feeling of disorientation and therefore reinforce a sense of lower status in society. Of course, some language-related disadvantages may be offset by advantages in other domains. Hillel Steiner (2002) has argued, for instance, that living in a place where English is not an official or native language may result in that place being cheaper in terms of land or living costs than ‘English places'. Language disadvantages are thus sometimes compensated by ‘naturally’ co-occurring non-linguistic advantages. But disadvantages due to language-related inequalities may not always be fully neutralized in this way. For the cases in which they are not, it is still important to worry about their consequences.
Some of the language-related inequalities mentioned above will be chosen, others will not. To understand the difference, it is important to distinguish between one kind of inequality related to a speaker’s native language and another kind of inequality related to the differential effort and ability in learning a second language. For instance, the inequality of access to advantage faced by the native speakers of one language compared with the native speakers of another (more popular) language is typically unchosen. But inequalities related to the acquisition of a new language among native speakers of the same (version of the) language are often the result of choice.
To see these differences, consider the following case. Imagine two Romanians, equally endowed in every relevant dimension. Imagine that one of them deliberately sets out to acquire perfect proficiency in English, while the other person chooses to invest the time, money, and effort that the first one invested in learning English in developing personal hobbies conducted in Romanian (or even in learning another foreign language, such as German). If both apply for very well-paid jobs in English in the United Kingdom, and the English learner is much more successful in getting such a job and as a result reaps more financial benefits, then the resulting socio-economic inequality between the two Romanians is not unjust, on the luck-egalitarian view. The only injustice involved in this case (especially if there are no similar well-paid jobs in Romanian) is the fact that both Romanians face the unchosen circumstance of having a native language different from the one required for the job, English, which is available to the native English job applicants.
One might object here that the case above would be considered an injustice only if we take the scope of luck egalitarianism to be global. Of course, a statist egalitarian would maintain that territorial political boundaries determine the scope within which luck-egalitarian ideals are to be pursued. However, since membership of a particular state is often itself considered a matter of brute luck, luck egalitarians rarely endorse state-based rather than global assumptions concerning the scope of justice. 9 Without probing the global-scope assumption, here we shall proceed by taking it for granted.
So, the inequality between native Romanian speakers and native English speakers resulting from having Romanian and not English as a mother tongue arises from unchosen circumstances (all else being equal). But the inequality of advantage between two (similarly endowed) native Romanians in the Anglophone job market is the result of choices made by them. Rather than enjoying hobbies or learning German, the Romanian who now does not know English could have learned it. (An analogous situation might also arise with speakers of different language groups, for example, a Bulgarian and a Greek job applicant, when the first has made the effort to acquire English and the other has not.)
There are cases, however, in which inequalities between members of different linguistic groups who try to learn a new language can be ascribed to brute linguistic luck. For instance, due to linguistic proximity among certain languages, some speakers will have more difficulty than others in acquiring a second language. Learning English, for example, is simply easier for some non-natives due to the proximity of their grammar or vocabulary to the English language. A Dutch speaker will on average gain English proficiency more fluently than a Chinese speaker. Some languages may be notoriously hard to learn, as a result of which there is an asymmetry involved when two speakers of different languages, one more difficult and the other one easier, learn each other’s native tongue.
Unchosen learning inequalities may also be the result of factors other than the intrinsic qualities of languages themselves. They may also result from qualities intrinsic to speakers. Some speakers may be linguistically gifted, which will give rise to inequalities. Sometimes inequalities result from circumstances not related to languages themselves or speakers: growing up in a context in which a specific foreign language is omnipresent (which is certainly the case with English in several Western and Northern European countries, and increasingly in all the countries in the world where English is not an official language) or in which its learning is deliberately encouraged by state policy or with parents who are able to send their children to expensive language camps abroad substantially increases proficiency in that language and generates inequalities compared with those with less luck.
To sum up, almost all the language-related inequalities resulting from the position of one’s particular native language vis-a-vis a dominant other language are unchosen: the reason is that one cannot choose one’s native tongue. At the same time, most language-related inequalities resulting from one’s lack of proficiency in a second language (compared with others who do not have that language as their native language) are chosen. But both crude statements need to be qualified: there is also choice within a native language and some aspects of second-language learning are clearly a matter of brute linguistic luck.
3.3. Is it possible to neutralize the effects of unchosen language-related inequalities?
3.3.1. Universal language solutions
If the inequalities were all monetary in kind (and were subsumed under the first inequality category articulated above), then a relatively simple solution might be worked out: calculate how much money has been foregone as a result of having a different native language, tax all the speakers who have benefited from their language to the extent that the foregone money is collected, and hand it over to those with the different native language. The monetary redistribution would, however, need to happen continually (or repeatedly), because once the redistribution has taken place, new language-related inequalities would emerge. But, as we have seen, not all language-related and unchosen inequalities are socio-economic in nature, and compensating through financial redistribution will not reduce these other inequalities. Moreover, while money is a means required for the realization of one’s ends, language is not just a means to realize certain ends, but part of the context in which ends are shaped (Kymlicka, 1989: 192–3; Taylor, 1990). Therefore, linguistic compensation in the form of financial incentives is like exchanging self-respect for money (Kymlicka, 1989: 192–3) and, even though required on certain grounds, this move seems unable fully to resolve the problem. 10
A second suggested solution is the idea of making sure that humanity collectively switches to the same native language. The problem with all the language-related inequalities we have seen is that they emerge as a result of linguistic diversity. If there was only one universal language, then none of the inequalities could be related to language. It seems that, in this solution, all individuals on earth would have to learn this new universal language, and, from its inception, all children would be taught only that language. According to this proposal, everyone would face a burden, but the burden would be equally shared, provided the universal language is new to all. Everyone suffers, but everyone faces equal amounts of suffering. Equality is preserved by equalizing the amount of effort made by all those who have to learn a new language. 11
The most outstanding luck-egalitarian objection to this approach is that of intergenerational linguistic inequality among the first generations. It is not true that all will share the same burden. Imagine that the proposal is implemented in 2013. From that moment on, all individuals on earth set out to learn the universal language. Assume that it is agreed that all children born after that date will be raised uniquely in that language, and imagine the unlikely fact that humanity is successful at doing so. Clearly then, after some 20 years, many linguistic inequalities will have disappeared: all those born after 2013 will be perfectly proficient in the universal language, and between them there is no linguistic inequality. But a large source of linguistic inequality persists: the inequality between those born before and those after 2013. All living individuals on earth who reached adulthood before 2013 will do worse at participating in democratic contexts and at getting access to public hospitals compared with those born after that date. So it seems that one major stumbling block for the universal first language movement is the linguistic inequalities faced by the first generations that will have to switch from their native to a universal language. The inequalities they will face may include all the inequalities in the list mentioned above: they will be less successful in participating in political life, will face status and autonomy inequalities, and so on.
Notice that the problem does not entirely disappear if we focus our analysis on simultaneous time segments rather than on succeeding generations, since members of different generations might overlap in time. Linguistic injustice is not limited to differences between the (older) generations that do not yet speak the universal language as a native language and all the generations in the future who do so. Linguistic disadvantages might also occur between the generations who simultaneously reside on the surface of the earth in say 2040: the global population of 2040 in this imaginary scheme will consist of generations who speak the universal language as a native language and those who do not, and even in this case some will be necessarily burdened. Of course, once the older generation is no longer there, the problem we raise might disappear, on the simultaneous time-segments version. But this is not to say that we should not insist on its relevance, while it is still being faced. 12
In addition, there might also be linguistic disadvantages suffered by the second generation, such as the fact that these youngsters could have a less stable sense of belonging and of continuity with the past: not being able to speak the first language of one’s parents and grandparents (not being able to sing the same songs, to situate the accents that co-define a person’s personality, or to understand or enjoy jokes to the same extent) is clearly a loss. These disadvantages will in turn produce new intergenerational inequalities compared with still younger generations, who will less clearly suffer from them. Here again, as time passes, these inequalities will fade away too, which once again does not do away with the luck-egalitarian problem as long as these generations remain on earth, on the simultaneous time-slice view. Of course, one might reason that, even if first generations will suffer inequalities, the massive expected benefit of future equality is so huge that it might tilt the balance in favour of indeed eradicating all native tongues. But even if the intergenerational inequality in the near future is thought to be counterbalanced by future equality, the latter still does not do away with the former. There remains a luck-egalitarian problem with intergenerational inequality in the near future, as the present speakers of other languages face inequalities for which they cannot be held responsible. Even if, all things considered, something important is to be gained from such a policy shift, the points pressed above help us maintain awareness of the cost of these gains, and of what has been irremediably lost.
These and other reasons concerning feasibility, attachment to native tongues, the importance of preserving linguistic pluralism, and other benefits related to the existence of linguistic diversity have led some to argue that having a universal language is of crucial importance, but only as a lingua franca, not as a native language. Philippe Van Parijs claims, for instance, that the evolution whereby English is rapidly becoming the world’s lingua franca should be enthusiastically endorsed for normative reasons. Non-native speakers of English should speak English as a second language. All interlinguistic exchanges can then occur in English, and the aim is to create perfect and global proficiency in English as a second language, as a result of which interlinguistic inequalities would disappear (Van Parijs, 2011).
The most immediate objection raised to such a scheme from a luck-egalitarian viewpoint is that the speakers of English retain a major unchosen advantage. Making sure everyone is fluent in English will indeed reduce socio-economic inequalities, enhance communication, enhance democracy in multinational states and in supranational units of decision-making, and so on. But it will not do so perfectly. Acquiring a second language is a long and tiresome process and often never fully succeeds: even advanced speakers of a second language tend to retain a disadvantage when speaking the language compared with native speakers of that language. What is more serious, however, is that the more progress one makes on the first six inequalities in the list above, the worse one does with regard to the last two, and in particular with status inequality. For the more people around the world progress in learning English, the larger the status inequality between English and all the other remaining languages becomes. We are increasingly progressing towards a scheme whereby the non-Anglophones in this world have to bend their head linguistically and go through the difficult process of learning another language, whereas Anglophones, over and above the advantage of not having to learn another language, retain the advantage of always speaking their native language more fluently and do not face the status disadvantages which are only aggravated, instead of eased, by the universalization of English as a lingua franca.
Van Parijs (2004) answers this challenge with a two-pronged attempt at neutralizing these remaining inequalities. The first prong is to compensate non-Anglophones for investing time, money, and energy in learning English by taxing the Anglophones of this world and distributing the money raised to the non-Anglophones. 13 The second part of the solution tackles the worsened dignity problem, and argues that we should apply a firm linguistic territoriality principle: ‘cuius regio, eius lingua’ (Van Parijs, 2000: 219). This principle makes the language of a particular territory the only admissible one in that territory as regards (among other things) public administration, political life, judicial procedures, and publicly funded compulsory education. Only such a principle, says Van Parijs, is capable of ensuring ‘equality of dignity between those peoples whose identities are closely associated to a language’ (2008: 24). Immigrants may be welcome to join the political community, but they are asked to adapt linguistically by learning the language of the territory and not demanding public recognition for their own language.
We have already remarked that the first solution is not perfect on luck-egalitarian grounds, because, even after paying the non-Anglophones for their efforts, there remains a proficiency inequality. But the second solution also faces luck-egalitarian problems. It may be true that a world with a linguistic territoriality principle (LTP) results in more dignity than a world without one. But notice here that what the LTP does is to make sure that everyone in a particular territory is encouraged to learn the language of that territory. This is required by all language groups, as well as by the English-speaking nations. So the LTP inhibits linguistic freedom in a reciprocal way. When a US citizen moves to Quebec, she is asked to adapt linguistically. But when a Quebecois moves to the USA, then she is also asked to respect the USA’s LTP. But if the LTP is reciprocal in this way, then how can it ever compensate for the unchosen status inequality due to the fact that English is the sole lingua franca? This appears all the more important given that English enjoys a superior status compared to all other language groups on earth, especially when this status inequality is due precisely to the attempt to make knowledge of English even more universal than it is now. The LTP is supposed to compensate for the fact that English enjoys and should enjoy global dominance. But if it protects English as much as it does French, or Danish, or Quechua, then how can it compensate for this global dominance? The resulting levels of dignity remain untouched. 14
So the universal first language movement faces problems and so does the proposal to learn English as a global lingua franca. Note that the problems with English also exist, albeit to a lesser extent, when Esperanto is seen as a lingua franca (Archibugi, 2005). Esperanto is more neutral than English, but is closely tied to the European languages of this world, and is in no way neutral between Chinese and English. Note also that the objections mentioned against the universal first language movement also apply to the movement to install a neutral universal language which is neither English nor Esperanto, but a yet-to-be-designed really universal language that is equally fair to all language groups. For, going back to our previous example, here too existing generations will face linguistic inequalities compared with, say, post-2013 perfectly bilingual (or unilingual) generations, and post-2013 generations will face certain inequalities compared with pre-2013 and with subsequent generations.
3.3.2. Language advantages for all
There is also another route available to the luck egalitarian interested in neutralizing brute linguistic luck. We can try to work the inequality away by granting language benefits to the group of people who speak a language associated with some of the disadvantages mentioned above. Let us assume a stylized case of a society in which there is a territorially concentrated group of native speakers of language A who share institutions with another territorially concentrated language group speaking language B. Imagine that the public sphere and a number of societal practices are largely conducted in B and most of the business takes place in B or is directed by B as a result of contingent reasons (for example, the fact that B is the language of a former colonizer or the fact that B speakers have been socio-economically dominant or the fact that B is a world language whereas A is only spoken in that particular region). If this is the case, all other things being equal, then the A speakers will face all of the linguistic inequalities mentioned in the list above. They are likely to do worse on average in the job market; they will be less able to understand or match goods coming from B (including cultural goods); they will face status inequalities and they may not be able to sustain a full context of choice in B. These inequalities are unchosen as they result from the fact that A speakers were raised in A. (Even if the A speakers did not experience status inequalities, the fact that they can all learn B will still result in inequalities due to the fact that B is a second language for them and not for the native speakers of B.)
One solution is to make sure that the speakers of A massively assimilate to B. But another solution is to make sure that both groups get adequate support. We can increase the amount of language rights and benefits of the A speakers by providing them with rights and financial resources to organize public education in A, to strengthen their markets, to enable the A speakers to have access to a full context of choice in a sufficiently large range of areas so that the disadvantages they face in speaking that particular language are neutralized. In this case, not only are the A speakers guaranteed enhanced status and a context for autonomy, but they are also able to avoid the other inequalities by enjoying the goods associated with them in their own language. They are able to understand traffic directions, search for jobs, and participate in the democratic process in their own language. Let us call this the ‘language advantages for all’ solution. 15
In the example discussed, the ‘language advantages for all’ solution neutralizes specific unchosen circumstances not by creating one set of linguistic resources, but by creating two such sets. An important objection can be raised, however, against this approach. The objection states that the abstract example assumes away that language groups in the real world are crucially unequal in size. But inequality in size will have as a consequence that the different packages offered under the equal ‘language advantages for all’ solution will also be unequal in size. We can distinguish between two relevant types of inequality here. First, some language groups will be large enough to sustain a sufficiently large package of resources or opportunities in the language of the group, but will still face inequalities. Compare French and English in Canada: the size of the group of English speakers is a lot bigger than that of the French speakers. This means that there will be a larger job market in English, a larger market for books written in English, and dignity issues will emerge among the Francophones. This example considers groups who share the institutions of one state, but it is possible to think of an analogue even when considering the position of two different and non-contiguous territorial language groups. The second type of inequality exists where a language group is so small that it is not possible to sustain a large enough context of autonomy, of socio-economic opportunity, and of social relationships in that language. Often language groups contain only a few thousand speakers or less. For such groups, it is impossible to offer a sufficient set of linguistic opportunities in the language of the group. This size objection is a hard nut to crack for luck egalitarians. While many of the linguistic inequalities will have been rooted out through a ‘language advantages for all’ solution, there are some remaining inequalities. Especially in the case of the second sort of size inequality (where not even a threshold set of opportunities can be reached) this constitutes an important problem. Moreover, remember that, as with the universal language solution, if in this second case we choose to make sure the disadvantaged language group is fluent in the advantaged language, then some inequalities will be neutralized (or neutralized to a large extent), but others, in particular the dignity inequality, will be aggravated.
It seems that the only fair route open to the luck egalitarian is to say something like the following. We cannot fully compensate the disadvantaged speakers for their linguistic plight, and there appears to be no solution that takes away all unchosen linguistic inequalities. But we can in some cases approximate the ideal by granting more recognition to the weaker language. More recognition can entail more money, but also asymmetric rights, by giving the minority speakers extra benefits, such as extra resources to allow for more opportunities to be available to the members of that disadvantaged group, threshold or extra representation rights in parliament, perhaps the right to restrict immigration into the region where the groups lives, and so on. One way to understand this issue is by thinking about the standard luck-egalitarian examples in which those on a prelinguistic island or prelinguistic parties to the original position might be willing to insure themselves for the possibility that they will belong to a minority group. But it cannot entirely neutralize all the inequalities.
To summarize, there are good luck-egalitarian arguments to show that many instances of linguistic injustice need to be compensated for and both solutions discussed above attempt to remedy their inequalities. Intergenerational inequalities and the advantages for the native speakers of the universal language which is to be picked out are important problems for the universal language stance; the unequal size of groups is the main (if partly avoidable) objection to ‘language advantages for all’. The particular choice of the former or the latter theory will to a large extent depend on one’s assessment of dignity. The challenges to equality of dignity are the most important obstacles to the universal language paradigm. While fully compensating the other inequalities is often impossible, we can approximate full equality in those terrains. But the more we are successful in doing so (by making sure individuals reach near-perfect proficiency in a universal language, by subsidizing the costs they incur in attempting to reach proficiency, and so on), the greater the loss of dignity becomes. To us the ‘language advantages for all’ solution seems more compatible with luck egalitarianism because it is hard to imagine how this dignity problem can be solved otherwise. Not all interests are convertible in terms of other interests: while one might say that gains in financial means can more or less compensate the extra effort non-native speakers of the universal language have to invest in learning it, it is unclear what might compensate dignity. That is why, in our view, the argumentative balance puts forward the ‘language advantages for all’ solution as the better alternative. Since there are relatively comparable gradations of closeness to equality in both solutions, except for the extra dignity problem which the universal solution faces (and which ‘language advantages for all’ faces to a lesser extent, if at all), there are more arguments for the advantages-for-all solution. Note that disagreements with this particular view regarding dignity and the impossibility of all-encompassing convertibility can be luck-egalitarian disagreements. There is no need to depart from luck-egalitarian justice if one adheres to another metric of convertibility. That not all interests are inter-convertible is a view compatible with, but not intrinsic to luck egalitarianism itself.
4.
The arguments we have explored so far provide different ways of articulating possible solutions to the issue of linguistic disadvantage, when approached from a luck-egalitarian perspective. More particularly, the idea that people should not suffer from injustices due to circumstances beyond their control might seem to support the normative justification of the various options for neutralizing linguistic brute luck that we examined above. However, things may be more complex than that. To see the problem, we need to return to the proposal of ‘language advantages for all’. What supported this proposal was the difficulty with those kinds of neutralization that seem to overlook how certain forms of linguistic disadvantage are irreducible to socio-economic or political factors and may instead raise questions related to inequality of status. Dignity, we noted, is hard to compensate financially and it is for this reason that, notwithstanding some objections, it may be more plausible to increase the resources available to linguistically disadvantaged groups, without demanding that they assimilate in any linguistically dominant entity.
There may be objections to this proposal. Those objections go to the heart of the distinction between choice and circumstances that luck egalitarians identify as crucial to decide what kind of injustices ought to be redressed. Answering them requires, first of all, exploring some more fine-grained distinctions within luck-egalitarian theory, and (as we shall shortly see) leads to the endorsement of a particular version of it. Second, and perhaps more importantly, taking these objections seriously and attempting to answer them will bring us to emphasize the need to adapt some core assumptions of luck-egalitarian theory. In areas of human interaction with an irreducibly collective dimension, luck-egalitarian theory may need to operate with a weaker focus on notions of personal desert and individual responsibility and pay more attention to comparisons between collective entities.
Let us start with some familiar objections first. If, as we emphasized above, people’s sense of dignity and perception of status is implicated, does not that suggest that linguistic membership might not be purely a matter of circumstance? Even if it is a matter of circumstance, is it not the kind of circumstance with which people (choose to) identify? Perhaps it was bad luck for you to be born in Iceland and perhaps you are owed some compensation for the disadvantages you encounter as a result of being a member of such a small linguistic community, but if, when offered an alternative and a financial incentive, you are unwilling to switch to a different language group (with all its relevant benefits) does that initial circumstance not start to look very similar to a genuine choice you might have made? If that is so, should you not bear responsibility for the costs associated with that choice? Why does anyone owe you anything to neutralize the effects of circumstances with which you identify (Cohen, 1989; Dworkin, 2000: 260–3, 290; Rakowski, 1991: 63; Scanlon, 1986)?
There are two ways to respond to this objection, both of which accept that circumstances that are identified with can indeed be considered choices (below we will drop this assumption). The first runs as follows. Let us grant that members of a small linguistic group are not entitled to compensation for linguistic circumstances with which they choose to identify. This still does not explain how the members of an alternative majority group, which obtains significant advantages simply by virtue of the fact that its community of speakers is larger, could be entitled to the benefits derived. It may well be that the smaller, and therefore more demanding, linguistic group is not entitled to the additional resources required to access greater linguistic advantages by virtue of the fact that this is a circumstance with which the group chooses to identify. This is not enough to show that the dominant linguistic group is entitled to its additional benefits, given that belonging to that group is a matter of brute good luck, determined by factors beyond the control of its members. Belonging to that dominant linguistic group is in relevant ways a circumstance and therefore does not entitle the majority to benefits that it has done nothing to acquire. To give a simple example, even if we grant that Estonian speakers who identify with Estonian are not owed any neutralization for their brute bad luck, this does not imply that English speakers around the world are entitled to the benefits they may derive from the fact that they belong to a lucky linguistic group. 16
A second possible response to the objection raised above points to the size of the groups to which these individuals belong. Even if we accept that an agent exercises control over his own personal circumstances, including the circumstance of communicating in a specific language, he does not have control over the number of other agents who identify with them (see also Cohen, 2004: 12). If membership of a specific linguistic group is disadvantageous by virtue of the number of other speakers of the language, inequalities in need of being addressed are owing to the fact that this language is a minority language (Kymlicka, 1989: 182–205) rather than to the fact that specific agents have chosen to identify with it. The agent in this case might well have a claim to neutralization because brute luck is manifest not in his choosing to identify with a specific language, but in the fact that very few people actually communicate in that language and this affects the agent’s access to social advantages. The features of the linguistic group may well fall within the range of circumstances that agents control, but the size of the group itself does not. It is the size of the language group that makes the linguistic preference of members of that group more difficult to satisfy. 17
But there is also another, more ambitious, strategy available to discuss some of the objections raised above. This second strategy allows us to consider the issue of linguistic justice as a lens through which to explore the moral significance of the implication of the will in circumstances with which one identifies. For the distinction between circumstances one identifies with and circumstances beyond identification may well turn out to be a weakly grounded one. Indeed, it may be the case that once we start pressing on the issue of what the circumstances are for which any neutralization of bad luck is owed to anyone, depending on how stringent or loose our interpretation of ‘circumstances' is, many things that may have initially appeared arbitrary from a moral point of view will end up looking just fine. Moreover, there may be reasons to wonder whether this distinction in the end serves the luck-egalitarian case and whether it applies equally to different aspects of human cooperation (for example, issues of linguistic cooperation).
For one, it is hard to see why the case of groups identifying with particular (more or less demanding) languages is different from the case of individuals who choose to develop or fail to develop their talents. Most luck egalitarians would endorse the claim that talents and abilities are arbitrary from a moral point of view, and likewise they would endorse the claim that if their development led to unequal outcomes, the morally objectionable consequences of similar unfortunate circumstances ought to be neutralized. But it is hard to see how the case of a group who chooses to identify with a particular language is different from the case of an individual who chooses to identify with the brilliant talents he now has due to having been stimulated to develop them as a child. In both cases the starting position is an unchosen circumstance, and in both cases what determines the actual benefit or lack of benefits involved is the agent’s identification with that set of unchosen circumstances. So if the response to someone demanding neutralization for the bad luck involved in her choosing to identify with a particularly demanding language is ‘You could have chosen otherwise,’ then the talented person asked to share the benefits enjoyed from the development of her talents is also likely to respond ‘Why so? I could have chosen otherwise.’ The idea we are considering suggests that circumstances that one identifies with should be treated as choices. But this can apply both to circumstances that bring benefits and to those that bring disadvantage. When it applies to beneficial circumstances, then an argument is being provided that entitles advantaged people to treat their good luck effectively as resulting from ‘choices'. So if the argument can be endorsed by defenders of the theory to draw the line between justified and unjustified luck neutralization, it is just as likely (and for the same reasons) to be endorsed by critics to reject the contribution to society on the side of talented individuals. A luck-egalitarian theory of justice grounded in the distinction between circumstances we identify with or do not identify with thus bites its own tail: any (much-desired) success in argumentatively withholding compensation for those who identify with circumstances leading to disadvantages backfires into (undesired) argumentative success in bolstering the claims of the talented who ‘identify’ with their talents to hold their advantages for themselves.
All this is to say that, as has frequently been noted, the consequence of expanding the range of choices to include not only actions chosen freely, but also features of the self that determine the range of choices available is to doubt whether a sharp distinction between circumstances one identifies with and circumstances beyond identification really does support the positions that luck egalitarians favour (Scheffler, 2003: 20). Moreover, even if such distinction resulted unambiguously it does not necessarily help the cause of those who would want to remedy the injustice suffered by victims of bad luck. In the case of linguistic disadvantage, tracing that distinction does not render more acceptable the injustices suffered by members of groups with demanding languages, even if those members identify with their circumstances. Assessing the moral weight of inequalities arising from certain unfortunate circumstances through the lens of linguistic justice supports existing critiques of some flaws inherent in the attempt to specify circumstances in need of being rectified on the basis of subjective involvement in their acceptance.
These points contribute to linguistic justice and luck-egalitarian debates in several respects. First, they suggest the need to adopt a luck-egalitarian theory of justice which operates with a more nuanced distinction between choice and circumstance and in which both the background preconditions and the consequences of identification are appropriately taken into account. Second, they support the recent development in luck-egalitarian theory towards focusing not on choices as such, but on relevant choices, on choices ‘for which it is reasonable to hold agents responsible’ (Voigt, 2007: 389–90; see also Segall, 2007: 180), or on choice as ‘reasonable avoidability’ (Segall, 2009: 19–25). Finally, they help us open up a further avenue for development, as the next section goes on to show.
Of course, some of these flaws can be (and have been) explored from perspectives other than that of linguistic justice. However, it is important to recall them here, first, because if we want to bring the luck-egalitarian theory to bear in linguistic justice debates, it is important to show awareness of the strengths as well as weaknesses of that theory. Although luck egalitarians will be unsurprised by some of these responses, those engaged in issues of linguistic justice might display less familiarity with them and will need to think about their implications. But second, and more importantly, being sensitive to the questions and argumentative strategies raised above is relevant for further developing luck-egalitarian theory once we have seen its main premises operate in the context of linguistic justice. Indeed, as the next section illustrates, the analysis of linguistic justice provides specific insights for tackling one key objection that defenders of a sharp choice/circumstance distinction typically offer at this point: the idea that ignoring that distinction threatens to ignore seemingly important issues concerning personal responsibility and desert.
5.
One possible response to the arguments presented so far might be that even if being worse off due to circumstances one identifies with appears to have unjust consequences, relaxing the distinction between choice and circumstance in certain relevant dimensions is also problematic. Indeed, it would be even more unjust to try and neutralize the effect of circumstances one chooses to identify with by burdening those who have made responsible choices and deserve the fruits of their efforts.
In this section we would like to respond to such a line of argument by putting pressure on the relevance of individual responsibility in luck-egalitarian theories when applied to the issue of linguistic justice. Luck egalitarians are typically moral individualists: when talking about responsibility, reasonable avoidability, or choice, they assume that it is individuals who are to be responsible, are able reasonably to avoid, and choose. But language is a collectively produced good, and at least within the realm of linguistic justice considered from the perspective of luck egalitarianism, this weakens the scope for individual responsibility. Insisting on these more collective aspects of language might therefore support a development of the theory’s core assumptions in a potentially novel direction.
We can begin to articulate these points by paying attention to the following two features of language: first, that of being a vehicle of communication through which agents are rendered mutually dependent and, second, that of constituting a collective cooperative effort. Let us start with exploring the significance of the first, by realizing the extent to which the choices we make are linguistically dependent. The context in which choice is shaped is not entirely in the control of the agent taken as an individual, but is structured by the collective activity through which the objects of experience become meaningful for speakers of a certain language. Agents have access to external cognitive sources through the use of language and information of different kinds (be it scientific, literary, or political) is only available to them in a specific language. Hence, the way other speakers intervene to communicate with an agent through language strongly influences the way in which that agent ascribes meaning to the world and the actions of others are therefore intrinsically related to the way in which he exercises choice in it. Language thus shapes the way in which humans relate to each other, how they assess the options available to them, and how they exercise responsibility in selecting courses of action.
Consider, for example, the case of the Piraha in Brazil, whose language does not have words for numbers. Piraha is a very small language group and its speakers are all largely monolingual. They have little access to information about what happens outside the Amazonian spot where they live, except for that which comes through some Brazilian traders and the odd North-American linguist who lives among their midst. Speakers of Piraha only refer to something as being small or large in quantity and they seem to experience difficulty remembering the number of objects if their quantity is greater than three (Everett, 2008; Gordon, 2004). It is easy to imagine that a similar obstacle might lead the speakers of such language to encounter difficulties in making comparative assessments. So if we consider, for example, how a speaker of Piraha and a speaker of Portuguese make investments, and want to calculate the soundness of their choices, it would be hard to neglect the impact of their different linguistic experiences or of the information they had access to in each language in holding each of them responsible for their differential outcomes. It would also be hard to argue that the speaker of Portuguese, no matter how much effort he has put into his work, deserves the advantage he has over the speaker of Piraha. Linguistic luck is in this case at the root of the capacity to make choices and strongly affects an agent’s ability to exercise more or less responsibility. Hence our linguistic dependency shapes the selection of our courses of action in general. Once we pause to reflect on how the way in which we exercise responsibility is itself dependent on features we do not control, the role of personal effort in luck-egalitarian theories of justice ends up appearing much weaker than it might otherwise have done.
The second feature to consider is the fact that language constitutes a collective and cooperative effort. Whether we speak the same language or whether we are making an effort to translate our thoughts into a common language that others can understand, we are cooperating with others to mutual advantage. But this means that individuals can never alone be fully entitled to the rewards for their efforts. 18 Language provides each of us with a vehicle of communication without which there would be no translation of effort into material benefits and no rewards for the responsible exercise of one’s talents. Speakers of a given language continuously sustain a practice that enables individuals to transform efforts into benefits; they supply each other with words and a grammatical structure through which their activity can become mutually comprehensible and which influences the perception of their choices. This means that what agents are entitled to is never entirely a result of their responsible individual efforts; others have a claim to share some of the product of these efforts.
To see this case, consider the following example. Suppose that you need to cook a cake and you take the sugar for it from a collective sugar deposit to which all contribute. It seems that regardless of whether and how much the others have worked to produce the cake, they can always be entitled to something, simply by virtue of having contributed through the collective deposit to the successful outcome of your efforts. Now think about language in analogy with the sugar. Language constitutes a fundamental ingredient for anyone who obtains beneficial results from the exercise of most of his efforts. Others are always contributing to the maintenance of words and a grammatical structure necessary to an agent’s access to the world; they are collectively contributing to his individual enterprise by rendering the product of his efforts significant to others. The transformation of most efforts into benefits depends on those who are ‘co-lingual’ with an agent; without their contribution there could be no reward for the agent’s solitary activity.
This argument seems to hold irrespective of whether those who are co-lingual are native speakers. It may be argued that non-native speakers of a language contribute to the collective cooperative project which is that language, and help provide for the transformation of efforts into benefits. The argument is also not limited to the ‘co-lingual’: when I write a book which is translated into another language, then cooperation in that other language helps transform my efforts into benefits in just the same way that the language in which the book was originally written does.
Of course, there are a number of other things that contribute to the transformation of efforts into benefits, and the role of other agents can hardly be denied in those other cases too. To emphasize the role of language is not to downplay the relevance of those other activities, it is simply to remind defenders of the role of personal efforts and responsible choices that there is always a residual in an agent’s activity, the benefits of which cannot be ascribed to the individual efforts of that agent alone.
The two aspects of language we have emphasized narrow the scope for ascriptions of personal responsibility and affect the consequent distribution of benefits and burdens in the following two ways. First of all, if language structures the options available to me and as a result the way I exercise responsibility, then the scope for individual responsibility and the resulting distribution of benefits and burdens are significantly affected. Moreover, the consequent degree of responsibility ascription does not just depend on individual cognitive, psychological, or moral features, but will vary according to the language group one belongs to. Second, even if an agent was taken to be entirely personally responsible for his or her efforts, that agent would still be (unavoidably) dependent on others (those who are co-lingual and other human beings) for the transformation of efforts into advantages. Consequently, the link between individual responsibility and advantages becomes significantly looser. This implies that luck egalitarians will need to find ways of featuring this irreducibly collective dimension (and potentially differing cross-language groups) into their theories.
Emphasizing this point need not be considered a frontal attack on luck-egalitarian theories. In addition, of course, luck-egalitarians may not explicitly deny the collective importance of language. However, discussions on differential linguistic ability rarely feature in applications of that theory, and one way in which this article contributes to existing debates is by explicitly making the link and forcing readers to think about its implications. Another important consequence is that if we do not want to bracket an important aspect of human interaction as beyond the point of luck-egalitarian justice, we need to find ways of analysing potential ascriptions of responsibility and choice-making in a way that does not rely purely on interindividual comparisons, but also on intergroup ones. This is worth bearing in mind when attempting to limit calls for neutralizing brute linguistic luck by appealing to the importance of the exercise of individual responsibility. The difficulty of isolating individual responsibility in cases in which fundamental advantages of the person depend on collective and cooperative efforts, as the case of language shows, reminds us of the need to articulate a theory of luck-egalitarian justice with greater sensitivity to the collective (rather than individual) dimension of human responsibility. It does not necessarily result in the need to drop the notion of responsibility altogether, but it does both narrow its individual scope and open up new avenues in which to pursue its collectivist alternative.
This development does not imply gratuitously reducing the scope for individual responsibility. It implies reducing the force of the criticism that neutralizing the effects of circumstances one identifies with is unjust because it would have to burden those who have made ‘responsible’ choices. Moreover, it does so in a potentially novel way, one which shifts the focus from purely individual ascriptions of responsibility and brings out dilemmas arising from a sphere in which it is exercised in irreducibly collective ways.
Is it to be concluded, then, that a luck-egalitarian theory of linguistic justice is impossible or even that luck-egalitarianism itself is ill-founded? Are the nuances and developments we argued for on the basis of linguistically thinking through luck egalitarianism destructive to luck-egalitarian justice? There are no grounds for such a worry. That collective responsibility is involved to a large extent in linguistic justice does reduce, but does not obliterate the scope for individual responsibility. It does point towards a deeper notion of responsibility, one which opens up room for individual responsibility to be both possible and limited by virtue of the individual tapping into its collective preconditions. In addition, that within the individual responsibility framework linguistic circumstances identified with are not reducible to pure choices does not mean luck egalitarianism is flawed or inapplicable to linguistic justice. It simply calls for altering one assumption of luck egalitarianism as typically understood.
6.
In this article, we have assessed inequalities due to the distribution of linguistic advantage from the perspective of a range of familiar theories of justice often labelled as ‘luck egalitarianism’. An exercise such as this is beneficial to those interested in understanding linguistic injustice and its remedies: it shows, for instance, one possible justification for the need to grant linguistic advantages to language minorities. Of course, other justifications of language-related entitlements (such as interest theories or threshold theories of language rights) are possible. Yet, given the widespread influence of luck-egalitarian intuitions in much recent political theory, the case for language rights is strengthened if a luck-egalitarian theory for the distribution of language-related benefits and burdens can be worked out, an outline of which has been sketched above.
Such an attempt also sheds light on some theoretical issues within luck-egalitarian theory itself. We have argued that although luck egalitarianism offers some very plausible starting intuitions through which to consider the question of linguistic disadvantage, once we start exploring possible remedial alternatives, a number of difficulties intrinsic to luck-egalitarian theories of justice start to emerge. These difficulties suggest that the theory might need to be developed in ways different from those available at present. If we put pressure on some conventional assumptions of luck egalitarianism from the perspective of linguistic disadvantage, both the importance of identification with one’s circumstances and the role of individual responsibility in transforming efforts into benefits ought to be reconsidered. On the one hand, luck egalitarianism appears to be an ideal perspective from which to consider the issue of linguistic disadvantage; on the other hand, the specific difficulties encountered while illustrating the moral arbitrariness of brute bad linguistic luck invoke seemingly unorthodox revision strategies. Integrating those strategies within a fully plausible luck-egalitarian theory of linguistic justice, as opposed to alternative normative accounts, constitutes an important challenge. Rising to that challenge is a task that we must defer to future work.